12. Judicial Conduct
12.0 The Framework: Four Canons, One Idea
Rule: The Model Code of Judicial Conduct rests on one idea — that a judge must be, and must be seen to be, independent, honest and impartial — and works it out through four Canons: uphold the judiciary's integrity and avoid impropriety (Canon 1); perform the job impartially, competently and diligently (Canon 2); keep outside activities from conflicting with the job (Canon 3); and keep political activity within limits that preserve independence (Canon 4).
How the Code is built, and how the exam uses it:
- Canons state overarching principles. Rules under each Canon are the binding, enforceable provisions. Comments explain. Terminology defines the words that do the work — "impartiality," "economic interest," "third degree of relationship," "knowingly," "de minimis," "law." A question that turns on one of the defined terms is usually testing whether you know the definition. (Scope [1]–[3])
- Who is bound: every full-time judge, and — in modified form under the Application section — part-time, retired and pro tempore judges. A judicial candidate, including a lawyer running for judicial office, is bound by Canon 4. (Application; MR 8.2(b))
- What the exam asks: whether a judge is "subject to discipline" — under the Code — and occasionally whether a lawyer who dealt with the judge is subject to discipline under the Model Rules (MR 3.5, 8.2, 8.4(f)).
The word that recurs: Impartiality — freedom from bias or prejudice toward or against any litigant or group of litigants, plus an open mind about the issues the judge may have to decide. Many Rules ask whether a reasonable person could doubt the judge's impartiality — an objective standard, applied from the viewpoint of an observer who knows the facts, not from the judge's own confidence in herself. (Terminology)
⚠ Exam trap: "The judge was in fact impartial" is not the test where the Rule asks whether a reasonable observer could doubt her impartiality. Appearance, judged objectively, is enough.
Cite: CJC Preamble; Scope; Terminology; Application; Canons 1–4
12.1 Integrity, Independence, and the Prestige of Office (Canon 1)
12.1.1 Avoiding impropriety and its appearance
Rule: A judge must obey the law, the Code included, and must conduct herself at all times so that the public has good reason to trust that its courts are independent, honest and even-handed. She must avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety — in her official conduct and her personal life alike.
- The appearance test: would a reasonable person, knowing the facts, conclude that the judge broke the Code, or did something that casts doubt on her honesty, impartiality, temperament or fitness to serve? (Rule 1.2; cmt. [5])
- Judges are held to a standard higher than lawyers because the office depends on public confidence; a judge accepts restrictions on her conduct that would be burdensome for an ordinary citizen. (cmt. [2])
12.1.2 No trading on the office
Rule: A judge may not use, or permit others to use, the prestige of judicial office to advance her own personal or economic interests or those of others. That is the Abuse of the prestige of judicial office.
Explanation, by the situations the exam presents:
- Letters and references. A judge may write a reference or recommendation from her own knowledge of the person. She may put it on official letterhead only if she marks it as a personal reference and no one could reasonably read the letterhead as leaning on the recipient with the weight of her office. (Rule 1.3; cmt. [2])
- Identifying herself as a judge to get out of a traffic ticket, get a better table, or influence a private dispute is the paradigm violation. (cmt. [1])
- Testifying as a character witness. Whether the forum is a court, an agency hearing or any other tribunal that decides disputes, a judge may not volunteer to speak to someone's good character — from the witness stand or in any other form — unless duly summoned. A judge on the stand lends the office's prestige to a party; a subpoena removes the element of choice. (Rule 3.3)
- Others using the judge's name. The judge must not permit others — a spouse's business, a charity — to trade on her office. (Rule 1.3)
Example: Stopped for speeding, a judge says to the officer, "You know I'm a judge in this county, don't you?" That is an abuse of the prestige of office whether or not the officer lets her go.
Cite: CJC Rules 1.1–1.3 and cmts.; Rule 3.3
12.2 Doing the Job: Impartiality, Diligence, Decorum (Canon 2)
12.2.1 Impartiality and fairness; no bias, no outside pressure
Rule: A judge must apply the law as it stands and handle every matter fairly and even-handedly. Nothing she says or does in her judicial role may display bias or prejudice against anyone on a protected basis, she may not harass anyone on such a basis, and she must stop the lawyers in her courtroom from doing either. Her rulings must come from the law and the record — not from popular pressure, worry about criticism, or the pull of her relatives, friends, politics, finances or other personal ties.
- Bias includes epithets, slurs, demeaning nicknames, stereotyping, and irrelevant references to personal characteristics — by the judge or, unchecked, by lawyers in the courtroom. Legitimate advocacy on issues where a protected characteristic is relevant (a discrimination claim) is not bias. (Rule 2.3; cmts. [2]–[4])
- External influence. Personal ties — to family, friends, a political camp or a source of money — may not shape her rulings, and she may not suggest, or let anyone else suggest, that some person or group has special access to her. (Rule 2.4)
- Competence and diligence. A judge must perform judicial and administrative duties competently, diligently and promptly, and must cooperate with other judges and court officials. (Rule 2.5)
- The duty to decide. A judge must hear and decide matters assigned to her — she may not duck a case by recusing without a ground — except where disqualification is required. (Rule 2.7)
- The right to be heard, and settlement. Everyone with a legal stake in a case, or that person's lawyer, is entitled to be heard as the law provides. A judge may encourage settlement but may not coerce it — for example by threatening a party with consequences for refusing to settle. (Rule 2.6)
- Decorum. A judge must treat litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, staff and everyone else who comes before her with patience, dignity and courtesy, and must require the same of lawyers and staff. She may not praise or fault jurors for the verdict they reached, except in an order or opinion in the case. (Rule 2.8)
12.2.2 Ex parte communications
Rule: A judge may not initiate, permit or consider an Ex parte communication — a communication about a pending or impending matter made to or by the judge outside the presence of all parties or their lawyers — unless it falls within five exceptions.
Explanation — sort the five permitted contacts by the question a practitioner asks first: when do the other parties have to hear about it?
| When the parties must be told | Who is on the other end, and about what | What the judge must do |
|---|---|---|
| Consent comes first | The parties themselves, one side at a time, in an effort to settle or mediate | Get every party's agreement to separate meetings before holding them (2.9(A)(4)) |
| Before the judge consults | An outside authority on the governing law who has no stake in the case — and the advice must come in writing | Tell the parties beforehand who will be asked and on what subject, then give them a fair chance to object to the plan and to answer the advice (2.9(A)(2)) |
| Promptly afterward | Anyone, about calendars, logistics or an emergency — never the merits | Proceed only where she reasonably thinks no side gains any edge from the contact, then tell the others what was said and let them reply (2.9(A)(1)) |
| Not at all | Insiders — other judges, and court staff and officials whose job is to help her decide | Keep the decision her own, and take in no facts from them that are not in the record (2.9(A)(3); cmt. [5]) |
| As the authorizing law says | Any contact a statute or court rule expressly allows — one-sided applications the rules permit, for instance | Follow whatever that law requires (2.9(A)(5)) |
Three related duties:
- Inadvertent receipt. A judge who inadvertently receives an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing on the substance of a matter must promptly notify the parties of its substance and give them an opportunity to respond. (2.9(B))
- No independent investigation. A judge may not dig up facts about a case on her own — internet searching included — and may rely only on the record evidence and on facts properly subject to judicial notice. (2.9(C); cmt. [6])
- Staff. The judge must make reasonable efforts to ensure court staff and others under her direction do not violate the rule on her behalf. (2.9(D))
Example: A lawyer telephones the judge's chambers to ask whether a hearing can be moved from Tuesday to Thursday. The judge's clerk handles it and the judge sends a notice to all parties. That is a permitted scheduling communication. If the lawyer had added, "and by the way, Judge, the other side has no evidence on damages," the communication is substantive and the judge must not consider it — and must disclose it.
⚠ Exam trap: the outside-legal-expert exception requires advice in writing, advance notice to the parties, and a chance to respond. A judge who quietly telephones a law professor, then decides, has violated 2.9 even if the professor has no stake in the case — and a phone call fails the writing requirement even with notice.
12.2.3 Public statements about pending cases
Rule: A judge must not say anything in public that she can reasonably foresee could sway the result, or compromise the fairness, of a case now pending or about to be filed in any court. And on matters likely to reach her own court, she may not bind herself by pledge, promise or commitment to a position that is at odds with deciding them impartially.
- Permitted: explaining court procedures; statements in the course of official duties; scholarly presentations for legal education; responding — directly or through a third party — to allegations in the media about her conduct in a matter. (Rule 2.10(C)–(E))
- The judge must require the same restraint of court staff. (2.10(C))
12.2.4 Disqualification (Rule 2.11)
Rule: Disqualification is required whenever a reasonable observer who knows the facts would have good reason to doubt the judge's impartiality. The Code names particular situations that always meet that test; the general standard catches everything else.
The listed grounds, sorted by the three questions a practitioner asks about the judge:
| Question | Situations that always require disqualification | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Who is the judge connected to? | Her feelings about the people: she holds a personal bias for or against a litigant or against counsel. Her relatives: someone within the Third degree of relationship to her or to her spouse or domestic partner — or that relative's own spouse or partner — is a litigant (or an officer, director, general partner or trustee of one), is appearing as counsel, or is likely to be a material witness; and the same applies to the judge herself and her spouse or partner. Her donors: within the period the jurisdiction designates, a litigant, a litigant's counsel or counsel's firm gave her campaign more, in total, than the jurisdiction's threshold. Her former colleagues: a lawyer she was associated with took a substantial part in the matter while they were together. | 2.11(A)(1), (2), (4), (6)(a) |
| 2. What does the judge stand to gain or lose? | Her household's money: she knows that she, her spouse or domestic partner, her parent or child (wherever living), or any other relative living with her holds an Economic interest in a litigant or in what the case is about. A relative's stake: one of the relatives in question 1 has an interest the outcome could substantially affect, if that interest is more than de minimis. | 2.11(A)(2), (3) |
| 3. What has the judge already done or said? | Seen the facts: she personally knows facts that are in dispute. Taken a side in public: as a judge or a candidate, outside any court proceeding or ruling, she has said something publicly that commits her, or appears to, to a particular result or ruling. Worked on the matter before: she was a lawyer in it; as a government lawyer or official she took a personal and substantial part in it, or publicly gave a view on its merits; she was a material witness in it; or she already presided over it as a judge in another court. | 2.11(A)(1), (5), (6) |
The defined terms that decide these:
- "Third degree of relationship" — great-grandparent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, great-grandchild, nephew, niece. Cousins are not within it. (Terminology)
- "Economic interest" — any legal or equitable ownership stake that is not de minimis. It does not include: an interest in a mutual or common investment fund the judge does not manage; securities held by an organization in which the judge is an officer or member (a bar association, a church) unless the proceeding could substantially affect the value; a deposit in a bank or similar financial institution; or the interest of a government-securities holder in the issuer. (Terminology)
- "De minimis" — an interest so small that no reasonable person would doubt the judge's impartiality because of it. (Terminology)
Two duties that go with the Rule:
- Keep informed. She must track her own financial holdings, including those she holds as a fiduciary, and must make reasonable efforts to stay aware of the holdings of her spouse or domestic partner and of any minor children who live with her. (2.11(B))
- Disclose on the record anything she thinks the parties might reasonably see as bearing on disqualification — even where she herself sees no ground for it. (cmt. [5])
12.2.5 Waiving disqualification: remittal, and the rule of necessity
Rule: Except where the ground is the judge's personal bias or prejudice, the parties may waive disqualification by Remittal of disqualification: the judge discloses the basis on the record, and — outside the judge's presence — the parties and lawyers all agree the judge should not be disqualified, and the agreement is put on the record.
Explanation:
- The procedure has four steps: disclosure on the record; the judge asks the parties and lawyers to consider outside her presence; they all agree, without participation by the judge; the agreement is incorporated in the record. A judge who "asks whether anyone objects" from the bench and takes silence as consent has not complied. (2.11(C); cmt. [7])
- The exception that cannot be remitted: disqualification because the judge is personally biased about a litigant or a lawyer in the case. Everything else — family, money, prior involvement — can be. (2.11(C))
- Rule of necessity. Where every judge who could hear a matter would be disqualified — a challenge to judicial salaries, for instance — the rule of necessity permits a judge to sit, because the alternative is that no one can. The Code's comment acknowledges it. (cmt. [3])
Example: A judge's niece is an associate at the firm representing the defendant, though she has no role in the case. The niece is within the third degree; the "lawyer in the proceeding" ground is not met because she is not acting in it — but the judge should disclose the relationship, and if a party has a reasonable basis to doubt her impartiality, the parties may remit after proper disclosure.
⚠ Exam trap: remittal is unavailable for personal bias. An answer that has the parties "waiving" a judge's admitted bias against a lawyer is wrong.
12.2.6 Administrative duties and responding to misconduct
Rule: A judge must require court staff and officials to act consistently with the judge's obligations; must make administrative appointments on merit, without nepotism or favoritism, and may not appoint a lawyer to a compensated position if the judge knows the lawyer or the lawyer's spouse or domestic partner contributed above the jurisdiction's threshold to the judge's campaign within the designated period, unless the post is essentially unpaid, the lawyer's name came up in rotation from a list, or the judge finds that no other competent lawyer is willing and able to take it.
Responding to impairment and misconduct:
- Impairment. A judge who has a reasonable belief that another judge's or a lawyer's performance is impaired by drugs, alcohol or a mental, emotional or physical condition must take appropriate action — which may include a confidential referral to an assistance program. (Rule 2.14)
- Misconduct — two thresholds. A judge who has knowledge that another judge has committed a Code violation raising a substantial question as to that judge's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness — or that a lawyer has committed a Model Rules violation raising the same question — must inform the appropriate authority. A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood of such a violation must take appropriate action, which may be less than reporting. (Rule 2.15(A)–(D))
- Cooperation. A judge must cooperate with judicial and lawyer disciplinary agencies and may not take reprisals against anyone she knows or suspects helped an investigation. (Rule 2.16)
Cite: CJC Rules 2.1–2.16 and cmts.; Terminology ("impartiality," "third degree of relationship," "economic interest," "de minimis," "knowingly," "domestic partner")
12.3 Life Outside the Courtroom (Canon 3)
12.3.1 The general test for extrajudicial activities
Rule: A judge may take part in outside activities of every kind — civic, charitable, educational, religious, business, personal — unless the law or the Code forbids them. Five warning signs put an activity off limits: it gets in the way of her judicial work; it would force her off cases often; a reasonable person would see it as compromising her impartiality, integrity or independence; it looks coercive; or it draws on court premises, staff or resources for more than incidental use.
(Rule 3.1) The rest of Canon 3 applies that test to particular activities.
12.3.2 Government, testimony, and public positions
A recurring carve-out: the Code treats activity that is law-related — about the law itself, the courts and legal institutions, or how justice is delivered — more generously than other activity. This packet uses "law-related" for that category throughout.
- Appearing before government bodies. A judge may not volunteer to testify at a public hearing of, or otherwise confer with, the executive or legislative branch or any official in it. Three openings exist: she may speak on her own behalf about her own legal or financial affairs, or in a fiduciary role; she may address a law-related subject; and she may share knowledge or expertise she gained through her judicial work. (Rule 3.2)
- Character testimony — only when duly summoned (12.1.2). (Rule 3.3)
- Government appointments. A judge may sit on a government commission, board or committee only if its work is law-related. Ceremonial duty is different: she may stand in for her nation, state or town at ceremonies and at cultural, educational or historical occasions. (Rule 3.4)
- Nonpublic information that reaches her because she is a judge may be used only for her judicial work, never for anything else. (Rule 3.5)
- Discriminatory organizations. A judge may not belong to a group that engages in invidious discrimination on a protected basis, and may not make use of such a group's facilities or benefits when she knows or ought to know of its practices — though attending an isolated event is not a violation if it could not reasonably be perceived as endorsement. Religious organizations, and organizations dedicated to preserving the values of a legitimate common interest, are not "invidiously" discriminatory for this purpose. (Rule 3.6; cmts. [2]–[4])
12.3.3 Charities, clubs and fundraising
Rule: A judge may be active in nonprofit groups — schools, religious bodies, charities, fraternal orders and civic associations, as well as law-related organizations — and may sit on their boards as an officer, director or trustee or advise them on non-legal matters. The general test in 3.1 still applies, and the Code adds specific limits on fundraising and on groups likely to be litigating before her.
What she may do:
- Help plan fundraising, and take part in managing and investing the group's money. (Rule 3.7(A)(1))
- Ask for money only from her own relatives, or from other judges who are neither under her supervision nor subject to her appellate review. (3.7(A)(2))
- Recruit members (not money) for the group, but only if the group is law-related. Membership dues may support the group's work without turning the request into fundraising. (3.7(A)(3)) Separately, the Code's general limit on coercion still applies: she may not do anything a reasonable person would see as coercive, and its commentary warns that even a permitted request to join can leave the person asked feeling bound to say yes, or joining to win her favor. Asking lawyers who practice before her is where that risk is sharpest. (Rule 3.1(D); cmt. [4])
- Take a visible role at the group's events — give remarks, accept an award or other honor, appear on the program. If the event raises money, though, that visible role is allowed only when the event itself is law-related; at any other fundraiser she may attend, but may not be a speaker, a featured guest or the honoree. (3.7(A)(4))
- Be listed as an officer, director or trustee on the group's fundraising letterhead, so long as others are listed the same way. (3.7(A)(5))
What she may not do:
- Personally solicit funds from anyone other than family and non-supervised judges — no phone calls to donors, no signing appeal letters, no working the room. (3.7(A)(2); cmt. [3])
- Hold a board or advisory post in a group that is likely either to be a litigant in matters that would normally come to her, or to be a frequent adversary litigant in her own court or in courts her court reviews on appeal. (3.7(A)(6))
- Participate in any way where doing so would violate 3.1.
Example: A judge chairs the board of a children's hospital foundation. She may help plan the gala and be listed on the invitation as chair, and she may attend — but because the gala raises money and is not law-related, she may not be its featured honoree or speaker. Nor may she sign the letter asking donors for money, or call the town's lawyers to ask for table sponsorships. If the foundation is frequently litigating in her court, she may not chair it at all.
⚠ Exam trap: the exam's favorite distinction is planning a fundraiser (permitted) versus personally soliciting at it (prohibited). A judge who "asks guests at the gala to give generously" has crossed the line.
12.3.4 Fiduciary, arbitration, mediation and law practice
- Fiduciary roles (executor, trustee, guardian) — only for a member of the judge's family, and even then not if the role is likely to draw her into matters that would normally come before her, or if the estate or trust is likely to be litigating adversely in her court or in a court her court reviews on appeal. (Rule 3.8)
- Arbitrator or mediator — a judge may not serve as either, or carry out any other judicial function outside her official role, unless a law expressly allows it. (Rule 3.9)
- Practice of law — a judge may not practice law. She may represent herself, and she may help a family member for free — advising on the law, or drafting or reviewing papers — but may not act as that relative's lawyer before any tribunal or in any other forum. (Rule 3.10)
12.3.5 Money: business, compensation, gifts
Business and investments. A judge may hold and manage investments, real estate included, and may take part in a business that she or her relatives closely hold. In any other business she may hold no post at all — not director, officer, general partner, manager, employee or adviser. And her financial dealings must not get in the way of her judicial work, force her off cases often, tie her into repeated deals or ongoing business ties with lawyers or others likely to appear in her court, or reasonably look like cashing in on her office. (Rule 3.11)
Compensation for permitted outside activities is allowed if the amount is reasonable and taking it would not make a reasonable person doubt her impartiality, integrity or independence. (Rule 3.12)
Gifts. A judge may not accept any gift, loan, bequest, benefit or other thing of value if the law forbids it or if a reasonable person would see the acceptance as compromising her impartiality, integrity or independence. Subject to that, the Code sorts gifts into three groups:
| Group | Examples | May accept? |
|---|---|---|
| No report needed | Items of little intrinsic value (plaques, trophies, greeting cards); gifts or hospitality from friends, relatives or others, lawyers included, who could never appear before the judge without forcing her disqualification anyway; ordinary social hospitality; commercial or financial opportunities, discounts and ordinary bank loans available on the same terms to non-judges; rewards and prizes in drawings or contests open to non-judges; scholarships and fellowships available to non-judges on the same terms; books, magazines and resource materials supplied free by publishers for official use; benefits that flow from a household family member's own business or profession and only incidentally reach the judge | Yes |
| Report required | Gifts that come as part of a public testimonial in the judge's honor; free invitations for the judge and a spouse, domestic partner or guest to a bar-related or other law-related event; free invitations for the judge and a spouse, domestic partner or guest to an event tied to her own permitted educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic activities, when non-judges taking part in the same way get the same invitation; gifts, loans, bequests or benefits from a party or other person, lawyers included, who has appeared in the judge's court or probably will, or who holds a stake in a matter that has reached her or that may well reach her | Yes, if not otherwise prohibited, and reported to the extent Rule 3.15 requires |
| Prohibited | Anything a reasonable person would see as compromising her impartiality, integrity or independence, or that the law forbids | No |
(Rule 3.13(A)–(C); cmts. [1]–[4]; Rule 3.15)
Exam trap. Invitations to bar-related events feel routine, but they sit in the report group, not the no-report group.
Reimbursement and fee waivers for permitted extrajudicial activities — travel, lodging, meals for the judge and a spouse or guest — may be accepted if reasonable and if accepting would not make a reasonable person doubt her impartiality; public reporting is required except for certain categories. (Rule 3.14; Rule 3.15)
Example: A lawyer who regularly appears before the judge sends a case of expensive wine at the holidays. A reasonable person would see accepting it as compromising the judge's impartiality; it must be declined. A holiday card from the same lawyer may be accepted. A dinner invitation from the judge's brother — a lawyer whose appearance before her would require disqualification anyway — may be accepted without reporting.
Cite: CJC Rules 3.1–3.15 and cmts.
12.4 Politics and Campaigns (Canon 4)
12.4.1 What every judge and judicial candidate may not do
Rule: Canon 4 keeps judges and judicial candidates out of party machinery and limits how they run their own races. The limits sort by one question — whose political cause would the conduct advance?
- A party or other political organization. She may not lead it or hold any post in it, give speeches for it, raise money for it, give it money or pay its assessments, go to or buy tickets for dinners and events it sponsors, publicly run under its label, or seek or use its backing. (Rule 4.1(A))
- Someone else's candidacy. She may not publicly support or oppose anyone running for any public office, raise money for or give money to another candidate, or go to or buy tickets for events a candidate sponsors. (Rule 4.1(A))
- Her own campaign — its money and resources. She may not Personally solicit or personally accept campaign money; only a campaign committee may ask for and receive it. Court staff, facilities and other court resources stay out of the campaign. (Rule 4.1(A)(8); Rule 4.4)
- Her own campaign — what she says. No campaign statement that is false or misleading when she knows it is, or makes it without caring whether it is true (the Code's knowing-or-reckless standard). And no Pledges, promises or commitments that bind her, or seem to, to outcomes in the kinds of matters her court is likely to hear, where that would be at odds with deciding them impartially. (Rule 4.1(A)(11), (13))
Explanation — the ones the exam tests:
- No personal solicitation of contributions. The judge may not ask for money herself, in person or by signing an appeal. A campaign committee may solicit and accept contributions, manage the funds, and comply with reporting requirements. The judge is responsible for making sure the committee follows the Code. (Rule 4.1(A)(8); Rule 4.4)
- No pledges, promises or commitments. A candidate may state her views on legal and political issues, and may say she will follow the law and be tough on crime in the general sense, but may not commit — expressly or by appearance — to a particular result in a case or class of cases likely to come before her. "I will never grant bail in a domestic-violence case" is a prohibited commitment; "I take domestic violence seriously" is not. (Rule 4.1(A)(13); cmts. [13]–[15])
- No endorsements of any candidate for public office — including a fellow judge running for re-election. (Endorsing a candidate for the same judicial office the candidate is running for, in a public election, is permitted under 4.2.) (Rule 4.1(A)(3); Rule 4.2(B)(3))
- Family members are free to engage in political activity; the judge may not use them as a conduit for her own. (cmt. [5])
12.4.2 What a candidate in a public election may do
Rule: A judicial candidate in a public election — partisan, nonpartisan or retention — may, within the period the jurisdiction designates before the election: establish a campaign committee; speak on her own behalf; publicly endorse or oppose candidates for the same judicial office; attend or buy tickets to political gatherings; collect and publicize endorsements from anyone except a partisan political organization; and, in a partisan election, identify herself as a candidate of a political organization and seek its endorsement.
- The permission is time-limited — it opens a set period before the election and closes after it. Outside the window the Rule 4.1 prohibitions apply in full. (Rule 4.2(A)–(C))
- A candidate must run her whole campaign in a way that keeps faith with an independent, honest and impartial judiciary, must comply with election law, must review and approve campaign material before dissemination, and must take reasonable measures to ensure that others do not do on her behalf what she may not do herself. (Rule 4.2(A))
- False statements. A candidate must not knowingly or recklessly misrepresent her identity, qualifications, present position, or any other fact, or her opponent's. (Rule 4.1(A)(11))
12.4.3 Appointive office, and running for something else
- Candidates for appointive judicial office may communicate with the appointing authority and screening committees and may gather endorsements from anyone except a partisan political organization. (Rule 4.3)
- A judge who becomes a candidate for a non-judicial elective office must resign from judicial office — the Code does not permit a sitting judge to run for governor or the legislature. A judge who becomes a candidate for a non-judicial appointive office need not resign, provided she complies with the Code. (Rule 4.5)
Example: A sitting trial judge running for re-election signs a fundraising letter to the county's lawyers asking each for $500. That is personal solicitation, prohibited by Rule 4.1(A)(8) — the letter had to come from her campaign committee. If the same judge announced she was running for state senate, she would have to resign the bench.
⚠ Exam trap: the campaign-committee rule. The judge may know who contributed (the Code does not require the committee to hide it, though many states do), but she may not ask. And a lawyer who contributes above the jurisdiction's threshold triggers the judge's disqualification under 2.11(A)(4) in that lawyer's cases.
Cite: CJC Rules 4.1–4.5 and cmts.
12.5 Must-Know Checklist (Section 12)
- Impartiality is judged objectively — whether a reasonable observer could doubt it, not whether the judge feels impartial.
- No trading on the office: no using the title to get advantages; reference letters allowed with care; no character testimony unless duly summoned.
- Ex parte communications: none, except — sorted by when the parties must be told — settlement or mediation contacts (consent first); an outside legal expert's written advice (notice before, chance to respond); scheduling, logistics or emergencies with no edge to anyone (notice promptly after); colleagues inside the court (no notice, no outside facts); and whatever a law expressly authorizes. Inadvertent receipt → disclose. No independent factual investigation.
- Disqualification wherever a reasonable observer could doubt impartiality, and always when the answer to one of three questions is troubling — who is she connected to? (personal bias; family within the third degree, not cousins, as litigant, officer, counsel or material witness; donors over the threshold; a former associate who worked on the matter); what does she stand to gain? (an economic interest — beyond de minimis, with mutual funds, bank deposits and organizational holdings excluded — of the judge, spouse/domestic partner, parent, child or household member; a relative's substantially affected stake); what has she already done or said? (personal knowledge of disputed facts; public commitments; prior work on the matter as lawyer, government official, witness or judge).
- Remittal: disclose on the record; parties confer outside the judge's presence; all agree; agreement on the record. Never for personal bias. Rule of necessity lets a judge sit when every judge would be disqualified.
- Report a judge or lawyer when the judge knows of a violation raising a substantial question of fitness; take appropriate action on information indicating a substantial likelihood.
- Charities: may serve, plan fundraisers, be listed on letterhead, and speak at law-related events; may solicit money only from family and non-supervised judges; may not serve an organization likely to be litigating in her court.
- May not: practice law (except pro se and uncompensated family advice); act as arbitrator or mediator unless authorized by law; serve as fiduciary except for family; hold office in any business but a family one; belong to an invidiously discriminatory organization.
- Gifts: nothing a reasonable person would see as compromising her impartiality; ordinary social hospitality, trivial items, and gifts from friends or relatives whose appearance would require disqualification anyway are fine without reporting; gifts from likely litigants or their lawyers must be reported if accepted at all.
- Campaigns: no personal solicitation of funds (committee does it); no pledges, promises or commitments on cases; no endorsements except of candidates for the same office in a public election; no knowing or reckless false statements; resign to run for non-judicial elective office.
- Lawyer-side counterparts: MR 3.5 (no ex parte contact, no improper influence), 8.2 (no reckless falsehoods about judges; lawyer-candidates follow the Code), 8.4(f) (no assisting a judge's violation).
12.6 Common Traps
- "The judge was actually impartial." Objective test.
- The judge calls a professor for advice on the law without telling the parties.
- The judge looks up the accident location on a map website. Independent investigation.
- Treating a cousin as within the third degree.
- Treating a mutual-fund holding as an economic interest.
- "The parties waived the judge's bias." Personal bias cannot be remitted.
- Remittal by silence from the bench. The parties must confer outside the judge's presence.
- The judge "asks the guests to give generously." Personal solicitation.
- The judge testifies to a friend's good character without a subpoena.
- The judge signs her own campaign fundraising letter.
- "I will always rule for landlords in eviction cases." A commitment.
- A judge running for the legislature without resigning.
Part B: Items
Flashcards
Format: Front · Definition · Explanation · Example · Exam trap · Cite · Outline · Related. Term cards first (10), then concept cards (6).
FC-0001 (term card · OUT-12.0)
- Front: Impartiality
- Definition: Freedom from bias or prejudice toward or against any litigant or group of litigants, plus an open mind about the issues the judge may have to decide.
- Explanation: The Code's defined term. Where a Rule asks whether a reasonable person could doubt the judge's impartiality, the test is objective — a reasonable observer who knows the facts — not the judge's own confidence.
- Example: A judge whose brother is a party is disqualified however fair she believes she would be.
- Exam trap: "The judge was in fact impartial."
- Cite: CJC Terminology; Rule 2.11(A) · Outline: OUT-12.0 · Related: FC-0004
FC-0002 (term card · OUT-12.1.2)
- Front: Abuse of the prestige of judicial office
- Definition: Using, or letting others use, the judge's office to advance the judge's own personal or economic interests or those of others.
- Explanation: Rule 1.3. The paradigm is invoking the title to obtain an advantage. Reference letters based on personal knowledge are permitted, on letterhead only if marked personal and not reasonably seen as pressure. Character testimony is barred unless duly summoned (Rule 3.3).
- Example: "You know I'm a judge, officer."
- Exam trap: Vouching for a friend's character without a subpoena.
- Cite: CJC Rule 1.3; cmts. [1]–[2]; Rule 3.3 · Outline: OUT-12.1.2 · Related: FC-0011
FC-0003 (term card · OUT-12.2.2)
- Front: Ex parte communication
- Definition: A communication about a pending or impending matter made to or by the judge outside the presence of all parties or their lawyers.
- Explanation: Rule 2.9 bars initiating, permitting or considering one. Five exceptions, sorted by when the parties must hear of it: settlement contacts (consent first); an outside legal expert's written advice (notice before, chance to respond); scheduling, logistics or emergencies giving no one an edge (notice promptly after); colleagues inside the court (no notice, no outside facts); and anything a law expressly authorizes. Inadvertent receipt must be disclosed; no independent factual investigation.
- Example: A lawyer's call to chambers about the merits.
- Exam trap: Consulting the professor without telling the parties.
- Cite: CJC Rule 2.9(A)–(D); cmts. [5]–[6] · Outline: OUT-12.2.2 · Related: FC-0012
FC-0004 (term card · OUT-12.2.4)
- Front: Disqualification
- Definition: A judge's mandatory withdrawal from a case in which a reasonable, informed observer could doubt her impartiality, including the specific situations Rule 2.11(A) lists.
- Explanation: The listed grounds answer three questions. Who is she connected to (personal bias; relatives within the third degree; donors over the threshold)? What does she stand to gain (an economic interest of the judge or close family)? What has she already done or said (personal knowledge of disputed facts; public commitments; prior work on the matter as lawyer, government official, witness or judge)? The judge must keep informed of her own and her household's economic interests and disclose relevant information on the record.
- Example: The judge's former law firm, with which she was associated while it handled the matter, appears.
- Exam trap: Recusing without a ground violates the duty to decide (Rule 2.7).
- Cite: CJC Rule 2.11(A)–(B); cmt. [5]; Rule 2.7 · Outline: OUT-12.2.4 · Related: FC-0005, FC-0006, FC-0007
FC-0005 (term card · OUT-12.2.4)
- Front: Third degree of relationship
- Definition: Great-grandparent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, great-grandchild, nephew and niece — measured from the judge or from the judge's spouse or domestic partner.
- Explanation: Rule 2.11(A)(2) requires disqualification when such a relative, or that relative's spouse or domestic partner, is a litigant or an officer or similar of one, is appearing as counsel, is likely to be a material witness, or holds a stake the outcome could substantially affect (if the stake is beyond de minimis).
- Example: The judge's nephew is trial counsel for the plaintiff.
- Exam trap: Cousins are outside the third degree.
- Cite: CJC Terminology; Rule 2.11(A)(2) · Outline: OUT-12.2.4 · Related: FC-0004
FC-0006 (term card · OUT-12.2.4)
- Front: Economic interest
- Definition: Any legal or equitable ownership stake that is not de minimis — excluding a mutual or common investment fund the judge does not manage; securities held by an organization in which the judge is an officer or member (unless the proceeding could substantially affect their value); a bank deposit; and a government-securities holder's interest in the issuer.
- Explanation: Rule 2.11(A)(3) requires disqualification when the judge knows she, her spouse or domestic partner, a parent or child wherever residing, or another household family member has one in the subject matter or a party.
- Example: The judge's daughter owns 500 shares of the defendant corporation.
- Exam trap: Treating an index-fund holding as an economic interest.
- Cite: CJC Terminology; Rule 2.11(A)(3) · Outline: OUT-12.2.4 · Related: FC-0004
FC-0007 (term card · OUT-12.2.5)
- Front: Remittal of disqualification
- Definition: The parties' waiver of a judge's disqualification: the judge discloses the basis on the record; the parties and lawyers confer outside the judge's presence; all agree, without the judge's participation; the agreement is incorporated in the record.
- Explanation: Rule 2.11(C). Available for every ground except the judge's personal bias about a litigant or a lawyer in the case.
- Example: Parties agree the judge may sit despite her spouse's minor shareholding in a party.
- Exam trap: "Any objection?" from the bench, answered by silence, is not remittal.
- Cite: CJC Rule 2.11(C); cmt. [7] · Outline: OUT-12.2.5 · Related: FC-0004, FC-0008
FC-0008 (term card · OUT-12.2.5)
- Front: Rule of necessity
- Definition: The doctrine that lets a judge sit in a matter in which she would otherwise be disqualified when every judge who could hear it would be equally disqualified, so that the alternative is no adjudication at all.
- Explanation: Acknowledged in the comment to Rule 2.11. The classic case is a challenge to judicial compensation.
- Example: A suit over the constitutionality of a judicial pay freeze.
- Exam trap: It applies only when all available judges are disqualified.
- Cite: CJC Rule 2.11 cmt. [3] · Outline: OUT-12.2.5 · Related: FC-0007
FC-0009 (term card · OUT-12.4.1)
- Front: Personally solicit
- Definition: A judge's or judicial candidate's own request for campaign contributions — in person, by telephone, or by signing an appeal — as opposed to solicitation by a campaign committee.
- Explanation: Prohibited by Rule 4.1(A)(8). A campaign committee may solicit and accept contributions and manage the funds (Rule 4.4); the candidate is responsible for its compliance. Rule 3.7 applies the same idea to charitable fundraising.
- Example: The judge signs a letter asking lawyers for $500 each.
- Exam trap: The committee, not the judge, asks.
- Cite: CJC Rules 4.1(A)(8), 4.4 · Outline: OUT-12.4.1 · Related: FC-0010, FC-0015
FC-0010 (term card · OUT-12.4.1)
- Front: Pledges, promises or commitments
- Definition: Statements by a judge or candidate that bind her, or seem to, to a particular result or ruling in the kinds of matters her court is likely to hear, in a way that is at odds with deciding them impartially.
- Explanation: Prohibited by Rule 4.1(A)(13) and 2.10(B). A candidate may state views on issues and general dispositions ("I take domestic violence seriously"); she may not promise outcomes ("I will never grant bail in such cases"). A prior public commitment is also a disqualification ground (2.11(A)(5)).
- Example: "Elect me and no drunk driver will ever get probation in my court."
- Exam trap: Views on issues are permitted; commitments to results are not.
- Cite: CJC Rules 4.1(A)(13), 2.10(B), 2.11(A)(5); cmts. [13]–[15] to Rule 4.1 · Outline: OUT-12.4.1 · Related: FC-0009
FC-0011 (concept card · OUT-12.1.2)
- Front: May a judge testify as a character witness for a friend?
- Definition: Not voluntarily. A judge may testify as a character witness, or otherwise vouch for a person's character, in an adjudicatory proceeding only when duly summoned.
- Explanation: Rule 3.3. A judge on the stand lends the prestige of office to a party; a subpoena removes the element of choice.
- Example: A judge subpoenaed to testify at a former clerk's sentencing may testify.
- Exam trap: A written character letter to a sentencing court, unrequested, is vouching.
- Cite: CJC Rule 3.3; Rule 1.3 · Outline: OUT-12.1.2 · Related: FC-0002
FC-0012 (concept card · OUT-12.2.2)
- Front: May a judge look up facts about a case on her own?
- Definition: No. A judge may not investigate facts in a matter independently and must consider only the evidence presented and facts properly subject to judicial notice.
- Explanation: Rule 2.9(C); cmt. [6] makes clear this includes internet research. The prohibition protects the parties' right to know and test what the judge relies on.
- Example: Checking a mapping website to see whether the intersection has a stop sign.
- Exam trap: "It was public information."
- Cite: CJC Rule 2.9(C); cmt. [6] · Outline: OUT-12.2.2 · Related: FC-0003
FC-0013 (concept card · OUT-12.2.6)
- Front: When must a judge report another judge's or a lawyer's misconduct?
- Definition: When the judge has knowledge of a violation of the Code (by a judge) or the Model Rules (by a lawyer) that raises a substantial question about honesty, trustworthiness or fitness, she must inform the appropriate authority. When she merely receives information indicating a substantial likelihood of such a violation, she must take appropriate action, which may be less than reporting.
- Explanation: Rule 2.15(A)–(D). Two thresholds, two duties. Impairment by substance use or a condition triggers a separate duty to take appropriate action (Rule 2.14).
- Example: A judge who learns that a lawyer forged a client's signature must report; a judge who hears a rumor must look into it.
- Exam trap: Confusing the "knowledge → report" and "information → act" tiers.
- Cite: CJC Rules 2.14, 2.15 · Outline: OUT-12.2.6 · Related: FC-0004
FC-0014 (concept card · OUT-12.3.3)
- Front: What may a judge do for a charity's fundraiser?
- Definition: Help plan it; help manage and invest the group's money; be listed as an officer, director or trustee on its fundraising letterhead alongside others; attend it; speak, be featured or be honored at it only if the event is law-related; and ask for money only from her relatives and from judges she neither supervises nor reviews on appeal.
- Explanation: Rule 3.7(A). She may not personally solicit funds from anyone else, and may not serve an organization likely to be litigating in her court.
- Example: Chairing the hospital foundation's gala committee — but not signing the appeal letter.
- Exam trap: "Asking the guests to give generously."
- Cite: CJC Rule 3.7(A)(1)–(6); cmt. [3] · Outline: OUT-12.3.3 · Related: FC-0009
FC-0015 (concept card · OUT-12.3.5)
- Front: Which gifts may a judge accept?
- Definition: Any gift the law does not forbid and that a reasonable person would not see as compromising her impartiality, integrity or independence. Without reporting: items of little value, ordinary social hospitality, gifts from friends or relatives whose appearance before her would require disqualification anyway, opportunities and prizes open to non-judges, materials for official use. With reporting: gifts incident to a public testimonial, free invitations to bar-related events (provided the invitation extends to her spouse, domestic partner or guest if she attends, and only if similarly situated non-judges would receive the same invitation) and to events tied to her own permitted activities, and gifts from persons who have appeared or are likely to appear in her court.
- Explanation: Rule 3.13(A)–(C). A gift from a lawyer who regularly appears before the judge ordinarily fails the appearance test outright.
- Example: A holiday card from a lawyer — fine; a case of wine from the same lawyer — decline.
- Exam trap: Reporting does not cure a gift that fails the appearance test.
- Cite: CJC Rule 3.13; cmts. [1]–[4] · Outline: OUT-12.3.5 · Related: FC-0014
FC-0016 (concept card · OUT-12.4.3)
- Front: Must a judge resign to run for another office?
- Definition: To run for a non-judicial elective office, yes — on becoming a candidate. To seek a non-judicial appointive office, no, provided she otherwise complies with the Code. To run for another judicial office, no.
- Explanation: Rule 4.5(A)–(B). The concern is a sitting judge campaigning in partisan politics while deciding cases.
- Example: A judge who announces for state senate must resign; one who seeks appointment to a state commission need not.
- Exam trap: Conflating elective and appointive non-judicial office.
- Cite: CJC Rule 4.5 · Outline: OUT-12.4.3 · Related: FC-0009
Multiple choice
MC-0001 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 12.1 · OUT-12.1.2)
Judge Ames is stopped for running a red light. Before the officer says anything, Ames hands over her driver's license together with her judicial identification card and says, "I'm sure we can sort this out." The officer issues a warning instead of a citation.
Is Ames subject to discipline?
- A. Yes, because a judge may not commit any traffic offense, and Ames ran a red light while holding judicial office in the county.
- B. No, because Ames made no explicit request for favorable treatment, and the officer chose entirely on his own to issue only a warning.
- C. No, because a judge is required to identify herself accurately to law enforcement, and Ames produced her judicial identification.
- D. Yes, because a judge may not use the prestige of judicial office to advance her personal interests, and presenting the card did that.
- A is wrong: a traffic offense is not itself a Code violation; the misuse of office is.
- B is wrong: the violation is the use of the office's prestige; an implicit invocation suffices.
- C is wrong: the officer asked for a driver's license, not a judicial credential; nothing required its production.
- Answer: D. Rule 1.3 bars using the prestige of office to advance personal interests. Producing the judicial card in a traffic stop, unasked, is the paradigm; no explicit request is needed. (CJC Rule 1.3; cmt. [1])
- Tags: 12.1 · prestige of office · cites CJC Rule 1.3
MC-0002 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 12.2 · OUT-12.2.2)
Presiding over a complex patent case, Judge Bhatt telephones a law professor known for expertise in patent law, describes the legal issue, and receives the professor's views. Bhatt does not tell the parties and later rules consistently with the professor's advice.
Is Bhatt subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a judge may seek the views of a neutral outside authority on the law that governs the case, and a patent law professor is plainly one.
- B. No, because the professor is not a party and so the communication was not ex parte, and Bhatt discussed only the legal issue with him.
- C. Yes, because a judge may get a legal expert's advice only in writing, after advance notice and a chance to respond, and Bhatt did none of that.
- D. Yes, because a judge may never consult anyone outside the court about a pending case, and the professor is outside the court.
- A is wrong: states the exception without its conditions.
- B is wrong: an ex parte communication is one about the matter made outside the presence of the parties; the professor's status is irrelevant.
- Answer: C. Rule 2.9(A)(2) lets a judge get a neutral legal authority's advice only if the advice is in writing, the parties are told beforehand who will be consulted and on what, and they have a fair chance to object and to answer the advice. Bhatt's telephone call fails the writing element on its own — so the consultation falls outside the exception even with notice — and Bhatt gave no notice either. (CJC Rule 2.9(A)(2))
- D is wrong: overstates the rule; consultation with court staff and other judges is permitted, and so is an outside legal expert's written advice after notice. (Rule 2.9(A)(2)–(3))
- Tags: 12.2 · expert consultation · cites CJC Rule 2.9(A)(2)
MC-0003 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 12.2 · OUT-12.2.2)
While deciding a motion in a premises-liability case, Judge Cruz uses an online mapping service to view the accident location and concludes from the images that the lighting was adequate. She relies on that conclusion in her ruling. The images were not in evidence.
Is Cruz subject to discipline?
- A. No, because publicly available information is not an ex parte communication, and the mapping service is open to anyone who cares to look.
- B. Yes, because a judge may not investigate facts independently and must consider only the evidence presented and facts subject to judicial notice.
- C. No, because a judge may take judicial notice of any fact that is generally known, and the lighting at a public intersection is generally known locally.
- D. Yes, because a judge may not use the internet for any purpose connected with a pending case, and Cruz used it to view the accident site.
- A is wrong: the rule against independent investigation is separate from, and broader than, the rule on communications; public availability is no defense.
- Answer: B. Rule 2.9(C) forbids independent factual investigation, and the comment extends it expressly to electronic research. The adequacy of lighting on a particular night is a disputed evidentiary fact, not a matter for judicial notice. (CJC Rule 2.9(C); cmt. [6])
- C is wrong: judicial notice covers facts not subject to reasonable dispute; the lighting on the night in question is contested.
- D is wrong: legal research online is permitted; factual investigation is not.
- Tags: 12.2 · independent investigation · cites CJC Rule 2.9(C)
MC-0004 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 12.2 · OUT-12.2.4)
Judge Dorn is assigned a contract dispute in which the plaintiff is represented by a lawyer who is the judge's first cousin. The cousin is lead trial counsel. Dorn has no other connection to the parties.
Must Dorn disqualify herself under the specific relationship ground of Rule 2.11(A)(2)?
- A. No, because a first cousin is not within the third degree of relationship, though Dorn should still ask if a reasonable observer could doubt her impartiality.
- B. Yes, because a judge must disqualify herself when a relative is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding, and Dorn's cousin is lead trial counsel for the plaintiff.
- C. Yes, because any family relationship with a lawyer in the case requires disqualification, and a first cousin is a family relationship by blood.
- D. No, because the relationship ground applies only to relatives who are parties, not lawyers, and Dorn's cousin is a lawyer rather than a party.
- Answer: A. The Code's Terminology defines the third degree as great-grandparents through great-grandchildren, siblings, aunts, uncles, nieces and nephews. Cousins are outside it, so the specific ground is not triggered; the general reasonable-observer standard still applies. (CJC Terminology; Rule 2.11(A), (A)(2))
- B is wrong: the ground is limited to the third degree; not every relative qualifies.
- C is wrong: overstates the rule for the same reason.
- D is wrong: the ground expressly includes a relative acting as a lawyer in the proceeding. (Rule 2.11(A)(2)(b))
- Tags: 12.2 · third degree · cites CJC Terminology
MC-0005 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 12.2 · OUT-12.2.4)
Judge Ellis holds shares in a broad-market index mutual fund that she does not manage. One of the fund's hundreds of holdings is the defendant in a securities case assigned to her. The case could not materially affect the fund's value.
Must Ellis disqualify herself on the ground of an economic interest?
- A. Yes, because a judge with any financial stake in a party must disqualify herself, and Ellis's fund holds shares of the defendant.
- B. No, because an interest in a mutual or common investment fund the judge does not manage is not an economic interest under the Code.
- C. Yes, because the judge must disclose all investments and let the parties decide whether to remit, and Ellis has not disclosed her fund.
- D. No, because securities holdings never create a disqualifying interest, and the fund's stake in the defendant is a securities holding.
- A is wrong: the Code excludes indirect fund holdings precisely so that ordinary investing does not disqualify.
- Answer: B. The Terminology definition of "economic interest" excludes ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that the judge does not manage. The specific ground is not met. (CJC Terminology; Rule 2.11(A)(3))
- C is wrong: disclosure and remittal apply to actual grounds; there is none here.
- D is wrong: direct ownership of a party's securities above a de minimis level is a disqualifying economic interest. (Terminology)
- Tags: 12.2 · economic interest exclusion · cites CJC Terminology
MC-0006 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 12.2 · OUT-12.2.5)
Judge Farr discloses on the record that her spouse owns a small but more-than-de-minimis shareholding in the defendant corporation. She then asks the lawyers, from the bench, whether anyone objects to her continuing. No one objects, and she proceeds.
Which statement is most accurate?
- A. Farr acted properly, because the parties waived the disqualification by failing to object after full disclosure of the spouse's shareholding on the record.
- B. Farr did not comply with remittal, because the parties and lawyers must consider the waiver outside the judge's presence and record their agreement.
- C. Farr acted properly, because a spouse's shareholding in a party is not a ground for disqualification, and only the judge's own interests count.
- D. Farr did not comply, because disqualification for an economic interest can never be waived by the parties, however small the holding.
- A is wrong: silence under the judge's eye is exactly what the outside-the-presence requirement prevents.
- Answer: B. Rule 2.11(C): once the basis is disclosed, the parties and their lawyers must decide about waiver away from the judge and court staff, must all agree without the judge taking part, and must have that agreement made part of the record. Silence in response to a question from the bench is none of that. (CJC Rule 2.11(C); cmt. [7])
- C is wrong: a spouse's economic interest in a party is a listed ground. (Rule 2.11(A)(3))
- D is wrong: only personal bias is non-waivable; economic-interest disqualification may be remitted. (Rule 2.11(C))
- Tags: 12.2 · remittal procedure · cites CJC Rule 2.11(C)
MC-0007 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 12.2 · OUT-12.2.5)
Judge Gao has stated in chambers, in front of her clerk, that she "cannot stand" the plaintiff's lawyer and "wouldn't believe a word he says." The lawyer moves to disqualify her. The parties, wishing to avoid delay, propose to waive any disqualification on the record.
May the parties remit the disqualification?
- A. Yes, because any ground of disqualification may be waived by the parties after full disclosure on the record, and Gao's remarks can be disclosed.
- B. No, because remittal is available only in civil cases, and the parties here cannot waive the disqualification of a judge in this proceeding.
- C. Yes, because remarks made in chambers are not grounds for disqualification, and Gao spoke only in front of her clerk, not in open court.
- D. No, because when disqualification rests on the judge's personal bias toward a party or toward a party's counsel, it cannot be remitted.
- A is wrong: all grounds except personal bias may be remitted.
- B is wrong: no such limitation exists.
- C is wrong: the location of the remarks does not matter; they evidence bias.
- Answer: D. Rule 2.11(C) takes one ground out of remittal: the 2.11(A)(1) ground of the judge's personal bias about a litigant or about counsel. Gao's statement shows exactly that. (CJC Rule 2.11(A)(1), (C))
- Tags: 12.2 · bias not remittable · cites CJC Rule 2.11(C)
MC-0008 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 12.2 · OUT-12.2.6)
Judge Hale learns from documents filed in a case that a lawyer appearing before her forged a client's signature on a settlement agreement. The evidence is clear. Hale says nothing to anyone, reasoning that the client can pursue the matter if he wishes.
Is Hale subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a judge's duty to report lawyer misconduct arises only when the misconduct occurs in the judge's presence, and the forgery did not.
- B. No, because a judge who receives information about misconduct is required only to take appropriate action, which may be nothing at all.
- C. Yes, because a judge who knows a lawyer violated the Rules in a way raising a substantial question about honesty must inform the authority.
- D. Yes, because a judge must report every violation of the Rules by any lawyer who appears before her, and forgery is a violation.
- A is wrong: no such limitation; knowledge from any source triggers the duty.
- B is wrong: the "appropriate action" tier applies to information indicating a substantial likelihood; with clear knowledge the reporting duty applies. (Rule 2.15(D))
- Answer: C. Rule 2.15(B): knowledge of a lawyer's violation raising a substantial question as to honesty, trustworthiness or fitness requires informing the appropriate authority. Forgery of a client's signature is squarely that, and Hale has knowledge. (CJC Rule 2.15(B))
- D is wrong: the reporting duty is limited to violations raising a substantial question about honesty, trustworthiness or fitness.
- Tags: 12.2 · reporting lawyer misconduct · cites CJC Rule 2.15(B)
MC-0009 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 12.3 · OUT-12.3.3)
Judge Ito serves on the board of a nonprofit children's museum. At the museum's annual fundraising dinner, Ito gives a short welcome speech in which she urges the guests to "dig deep tonight — the museum needs your generosity." The museum has never been involved in litigation.
Is Ito subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a judge may serve on the board of a charitable organization and attend its fundraising events, and Ito did both and nothing more.
- B. Yes, because a judge may not personally solicit charitable contributions from anyone other than family and judges she does not supervise.
- C. No, because the museum is not likely to come before the court, so Ito's involvement in its fundraising raises no appearance problem.
- D. Yes, because a judge may not participate in any way in a charitable fundraising event, and Ito attended and spoke at the dinner.
- A is wrong: both are permitted, but neither licenses personal solicitation.
- Answer: B. Rule 3.7(A)(2): a judge may solicit contributions only from family members and non-supervised judges. Urging a room of donors to give is personal solicitation. Board service and attendance were permitted; the speech crossed the line. (CJC Rule 3.7(A)(2); cmt. [3])
- C is wrong: the organization's litigation profile affects whether the judge may serve at all; it does not permit solicitation.
- D is wrong: a judge may help plan and may attend such events (speaking, being featured or being honored at a fundraiser is allowed only if the event is law-related, which this one is not); the violation the question targets is the solicitation. (Rule 3.7(A)(1), (4))
- Tags: 12.3 · personal solicitation for charity · cites CJC Rule 3.7(A)(2)
MC-0010 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 12.3 · OUT-12.3.4)
Judge Jain's elderly mother asks her to review the mother's will and suggest changes. Jain does so without charge. The mother then asks Jain to represent her in a probate dispute with Jain's brother.
Which statement is most accurate?
- A. Both acts are proper, because a judge may practice law on behalf of family members.
- B. Both acts are improper, because a judge may not practice law in any form.
- C. Reviewing the will was improper, but representing the mother is permitted because the dispute is within the family.
- D. Reviewing the will without compensation was proper, but a judge may not serve as a family member's lawyer in any forum.
- A is wrong: the family exception covers advice and document review, not representation.
- B is wrong: overstates the rule; the uncompensated family-advice exception exists.
- C is wrong: reverses the rule.
- Answer: D. Rule 3.10: a judge may not practice law. She may represent herself, and she may help a relative for free by advising on the law or by drafting or reviewing papers — but she may not act as that relative's lawyer before any tribunal or in any other forum. (CJC Rule 3.10)
- Tags: 12.3 · practice of law · cites CJC Rule 3.10
MC-0011 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 12.3 · OUT-12.3.5)
A lawyer who appears before Judge Kim several times a year sends Kim a gift basket of wine and gourmet food worth about $300 for the holidays, with a note thanking her "for running such a fair courtroom." Kim accepts it and reports it on her annual disclosure.
Is Kim subject to discipline?
- A. Yes, because a judge may not accept a gift that would make a reasonable person doubt her impartiality, and reporting it is no cure.
- B. Yes, because a judge may never accept anything of value from a lawyer, and the basket of wine and food was worth about $300.
- C. No, because holiday gifts are ordinary social hospitality, and the lawyer sent the basket at the holidays with a friendly note.
- D. No, because a judge may accept a gift from a lawyer if she publicly reports it, and Kim reported the basket on her annual financial disclosure.
- Answer: A. Rule 3.13(A) forbids accepting a gift when a reasonable person would see the acceptance as compromising the judge's impartiality, integrity or independence. A $300 gift from a lawyer who regularly appears before her fails that test; the reporting tier in 3.13(C) applies only to gifts not otherwise prohibited. (CJC Rule 3.13(A), (C))
- B is wrong: overstates the rule; a holiday card, or ordinary social hospitality, may be accepted. (Rule 3.13(B))
- C is wrong: ordinary social hospitality is a shared meal or similar; a $300 basket from a regularly appearing lawyer is not.
- D is wrong: reporting is required for some permitted gifts; it does not make a prohibited gift permitted.
- Tags: 12.3 · gifts from lawyers · cites CJC Rule 3.13
MC-0012 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 12.3 · OUT-12.3.5)
Judge Lowe's brother, a lawyer, hosts a lavish 60th-birthday weekend for Lowe at a resort, paying all expenses. The brother's firm occasionally appears in Lowe's court; whenever it does, Lowe disqualifies herself because of the relationship.
May Lowe accept the gift without reporting it?
- A. Yes, because a relative whose appearance before the judge would force her disqualification anyway may give her a gift she need not report.
- B. No, because a judge must report any gift from a lawyer whose firm appears before her, and the brother's firm occasionally appears in Lowe's court.
- C. No, because a judge may not accept a gift of substantial value from anyone, and an all-expenses resort weekend is substantial.
- D. Yes, because gifts between family members are outside the Code entirely, and Lowe's brother is a member of her family.
- Answer: A. Rule 3.13(B)(2) lists, among gifts that may be accepted without reporting, those from friends, relatives or others — lawyers included — who could not take part in a case before the judge without forcing her disqualification anyway. Lowe's brother is such a person. (CJC Rule 3.13(B)(2))
- B is wrong: a giver whose appearance would force disqualification anyway falls in the no-report group under 3.13(B)(2), so the reporting category for people likely to come before the judge does not reach Lowe's brother.
- C is wrong: no such value cap exists; the test is appearance, and the disqualification relationship answers it.
- D is wrong: family gifts are within the Code; they fall into a permitted, non-reportable category because of the disqualification relationship.
- Tags: 12.3 · gifts from disqualifying relatives · cites CJC Rule 3.13(B)(2)
MC-0013 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 12.4 · OUT-12.4.1)
Judge Mora, running for re-election, personally telephones twenty lawyers who practice in her court and asks each to contribute $1,000 to her campaign. All contributions are properly reported.
Is Mora subject to discipline?
- A. No, because lawyers are permitted to contribute to judicial campaigns, and each lawyer Mora called was free to decline.
- B. No, because a judicial candidate may raise campaign funds if the contributions are reported, and Mora's were properly reported.
- C. Yes, because a judge or judicial candidate may not ask for campaign money herself; only her campaign committee may do the asking.
- D. Yes, because a judicial candidate may not accept contributions from lawyers who appear before her, and these lawyers practice in her court.
- A is wrong: lawyers may contribute; the judge may not personally ask.
- B is wrong: reporting concerns the committee's compliance; it does not permit personal solicitation.
- Answer: C. Rule 4.1(A)(8): campaign money must be requested and received through a campaign committee formed under Rule 4.4; the judge or candidate may not ask for it or take it herself. Telephoning donors herself is the paradigm violation. (CJC Rules 4.1(A)(8), 4.4)
- D is wrong: contributions from lawyers are permitted (with disqualification consequences above a threshold); the violation is the personal solicitation. (Rule 2.11(A)(4))
- Tags: 12.4 · personal solicitation · cites CJC Rule 4.1(A)(8)
MC-0014 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 12.4 · OUT-12.4.1)
Attorney Nash, a candidate for trial judge, tells a campaign audience: "I believe our sentencing laws are too lenient, and if elected I will impose the maximum sentence on every defendant convicted of selling drugs near a school."
Which statement is most accurate?
- A. The statement of belief about sentencing laws is proper, but the promise to impose the maximum sentence in a class of cases is a prohibited commitment.
- B. Both statements are improper, because a judicial candidate may not discuss sentencing at all, since sentencing questions will come before her.
- C. Both statements are proper, because a judicial candidate may state her views on legal and political issues, and sentencing policy is plainly such an issue.
- D. Neither statement is governed by the Code, because Nash is a lawyer rather than a judge, and the Code binds only judges who hold office.
- Answer: A. Rule 4.1(A)(13) forbids a candidate to bind herself, by pledge, promise or commitment, to outcomes in matters likely to reach her court when doing so is at odds with impartial judging. A view about the law is permitted; a promise of a particular result in a class of cases is not. As a candidate, Nash is bound by Canon 4 and by MR 8.2(b). (CJC Rule 4.1(A)(13); cmts. [13]–[15]; MR 8.2(b))
- B is wrong: candidates may discuss issues, including sentencing, in general terms.
- C is wrong: the second statement goes beyond views to a commitment.
- D is wrong: judicial candidates are bound by Canon 4, and MR 8.2(b) requires lawyer-candidates to comply with the Code. (CJC Application; MR 8.2(b))
- Tags: 12.4 · pledges and commitments · cites CJC Rule 4.1(A)(13)
MC-0015 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 12.4 · OUT-12.4.3)
Judge Oyelaran, a sitting trial judge with three years left in her term, announces her candidacy for the state legislature and continues to hear cases while campaigning.
Is Oyelaran subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a judge may run for any public office so long as she does not use court resources in the campaign, and Oyelaran has used none.
- B. Yes, because a judge who becomes a candidate for a non-judicial elective office must resign from judicial office, as here.
- C. No, because the prohibition on political activity applies only to partisan activity on behalf of others.
- D. Yes, because a sitting judge may not seek any office other than the one she holds.
- A is wrong: the resignation requirement is categorical for non-judicial elective office.
- Answer: B. Rule 4.5(A): upon becoming a candidate for a non-judicial elective office a judge must resign from judicial office. (CJC Rule 4.5(A))
- C is wrong: running for the legislature is the judge's own political activity, and the Code addresses it directly.
- D is wrong: a judge may seek another judicial office, and may seek a non-judicial appointive office without resigning. (Rule 4.5(B))
- Tags: 12.4 · resign to run · cites CJC Rule 4.5
MC-0016 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 12.2 · OUT-12.2.2)
The morning of a hearing, the defendant's lawyer emails Judge Pace's chambers asking to move the hearing to the afternoon because of a family emergency, and adds that "the plaintiff's damages theory won't survive the motion anyway." Pace's clerk forwards the email to the judge. Pace grants the postponement, tells the plaintiff's lawyer about the scheduling request, but says nothing about the comment on damages and does not consider it.
Which statement is most accurate?
- A. Pace acted properly, because scheduling communications are permitted and she neither considered nor relied on the substantive comment about damages.
- B. Pace acted improperly in granting the postponement, because a scheduling request from one side is an ex parte communication she may not act on.
- C. Pace should have promptly told the plaintiff's lawyer the substance of the damages comment and allowed a response, as the rule requires.
- D. Pace should have recused herself, because receipt of any ex parte communication about the merits requires disqualification from the case.
- A is wrong: correct as to the scheduling part; the disclosure duty for the substantive part was breached.
- B is wrong: scheduling communications are an express exception, subject to notice, which Pace gave.
- Answer: C. The scheduling portion was permitted under Rule 2.9(A)(1), and Pace properly notified the other side of it. But the damages comment was a substantive ex parte communication; under Rule 2.9(B), a judge who inadvertently receives one must promptly notify the parties of its substance and give them an opportunity to respond. Not considering it is necessary but not sufficient. (CJC Rule 2.9(A)(1), (B))
- D is wrong: receipt of an ex parte communication triggers disclosure, not automatic disqualification.
- Tags: 12.2 · inadvertent receipt · cites CJC Rule 2.9(B)
MC-0017 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 12.3 · OUT-12.3.5)
Judge Quon owns a one-third interest in a family-owned restaurant and serves as its managing partner. She is also asked to join the board of directors of a publicly traded bank, an unpaid position.
Which statement is most accurate?
- A. Managing the family restaurant is permitted, but the bank directorship is not, because a judge may not be a director of a business not closely held by her family.
- B. Both roles are permitted, because a judge may engage in financial and business activities that do not interfere with her judicial duties, and neither of these does.
- C. Neither role is permitted, because a judge may not participate in the management of any business, and Quon would manage the restaurant and direct the bank.
- D. Serving on the bank board is permitted because it is unpaid, but managing the restaurant is not because the judge is compensated for it.
- Answer: A. Rule 3.11(B): a judge may take part in a business that she or her relatives closely hold, but in any other business she may hold no post — not director, officer, general partner, manager, employee or adviser. Compensation is irrelevant to the director prohibition. (CJC Rule 3.11(B))
- B is wrong: the general permission is subject to the specific bar on directorships of non-family businesses.
- C is wrong: family-business participation is expressly permitted.
- D is wrong: the distinction is family versus non-family business, not paid versus unpaid.
- Tags: 12.3 · business activities · cites CJC Rule 3.11(B)
MC-0018 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 12.1 · OUT-12.1.2)
A former law clerk of Judge Rey is being sentenced for a fraud offense. Without being asked by anyone, Rey writes to the sentencing court on judicial letterhead attesting to the clerk's good character and urging leniency.
Is Rey subject to discipline?
- A. No, because a judge may write a reference based on personal knowledge, and Rey knew the clerk's character well from their years of working together.
- B. Yes, because a judge may never communicate with another court about a pending case, and the clerk's sentencing was pending in that court.
- C. No, because the letter was sent to another judge rather than to a jury, and a judge may communicate with a colleague about a former clerk.
- D. Yes, because a judge may not vouch for a person's character in an adjudicatory proceeding unless duly summoned, and Rey volunteered the letter.
- A is wrong: the reference-letter permission in Rule 1.3 cmt. [2] does not extend to vouching in an adjudicatory proceeding; Rule 3.3 governs that.
- B is wrong: overstates the rule; the violation is the unsummoned character vouching, not communication as such.
- C is wrong: the recipient does not matter; the proceeding is adjudicatory.
- Answer: D. Rule 3.3 bars a judge from testifying as a character witness or otherwise vouching for character in an adjudicatory proceeding except when duly summoned. An unsolicited character letter to a sentencing court, on letterhead, is vouching and lends the prestige of office to a party (Rule 1.3). (CJC Rules 3.3, 1.3)
- Tags: 12.1 · character witness · cites CJC Rule 3.3
True / False
TF-0001 (OUT-12.2.2)
- Statement: A judge may consult with court staff and other judges about a pending matter without notifying the parties, provided she does not receive factual information outside the record and decides the matter herself.
- Answer: True
- Why: Rule 2.9(A)(3) permits such consultation on those conditions.
- Cite: CJC Rule 2.9(A)(3); cmt. [5]
TF-0002 (OUT-12.3.3)
- Statement: A judge may be listed as an officer or director on the letterhead a charitable organization uses for fundraising, if comparable designations are used for other persons.
- Answer: True
- Why: Rule 3.7(A)(5) permits it.
- Cite: CJC Rule 3.7(A)(5)
TF-0003 (OUT-12.3.4)
- Statement: A judge may serve as a private mediator in her spare time, provided the parties are not before her court.
- Answer: False
- Why: Rule 3.9 keeps a judge from serving as an arbitrator or mediator, or carrying out any other judicial function outside her official role, unless a law expressly allows it.
- Corrected statement: A judge may not serve as an arbitrator or mediator outside her official role unless a law expressly allows it.
- Cite: CJC Rule 3.9
TF-0004 (OUT-12.4.1)
- Statement: A judicial candidate may state her views on disputed legal and political issues during her campaign, provided she does not pledge, promise or commit herself to outcomes in a way that is at odds with impartial judging.
- Answer: True
- Why: The Code prohibits commitments to results, not the expression of views; the comments to Rule 4.1 draw that line.
- Cite: CJC Rule 4.1(A)(13); cmts. [13]–[15]
TF-0005 (OUT-12.2.5)
- Statement: The parties may waive a judge's disqualification for personal bias against one of the lawyers if the judge discloses the bias on the record.
- Answer: False
- Why: Rule 2.11(C) takes one ground out of remittal — the judge's personal bias or prejudice about a litigant or about counsel. The other part of Rule 2.11(A)(1), personal knowledge of disputed facts, is not excluded and can be remitted.
- Corrected statement: After disclosure on the record and agreement reached outside the judge's presence, the parties may remit any disqualification ground except the judge's personal bias toward a litigant or toward a lawyer in the case.
- Cite: CJC Rule 2.11(C)
TF-0006 (OUT-12.0)
- Statement: A judge need not disqualify herself so long as she is in fact able to decide the case impartially.
- Answer: False
- Why: The standard is whether a reasonable, informed observer could doubt the judge's impartiality — an objective test — in addition to the specific listed grounds.
- Corrected statement: A judge must disqualify herself whenever a reasonable, informed observer could doubt her impartiality, whether or not she believes she could decide the case impartially.
- Cite: CJC Rule 2.11(A); Terminology
Scenario Walkthroughs
SW-0001 · The Judge's Week
Facts. In one week Judge Salazar does the following. (1) Monday: her nephew, an associate at a large firm, is listed as one of six lawyers on the defendant's brief in a case before her; he has done no work on it. (2) Tuesday: she telephones a retired judge, a friend, to talk through a difficult evidentiary question in a pending trial; she does not tell the parties. (3) Wednesday: she receives a $250 gift certificate from a court reporter's agency that bids on the court's contracts, and accepts it. (4) Thursday: at her synagogue's annual dinner she is introduced as "our own Judge Salazar" and the rabbi asks her to say a few words about the building fund; she speaks warmly and asks the congregation to be generous. (5) Friday: she signs a letter to the county bar, as chair of the local Legal Aid Society, inviting members to join the society and attend its annual meeting.
Issues. Which of the five acts is a Code violation?
Analysis.
- The nephew. A nephew is within the third degree of relationship. Rule 2.11(A)(2)(b) requires disqualification if such a relative is "acting as a lawyer in the proceeding." Being listed on a brief is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; that he did no work does not change what the filing represents. Salazar must disclose and, absent remittal, disqualify herself. Had the nephew merely been employed by the firm without appearing, the specific ground would not apply and the general standard would govern. Violation if she sits without remittal.
- The retired judge. Rule 2.9(A)(3) permits consultation with "other judges." A retired judge is no longer a judge; the friend is, for this purpose, a private lawyer. The call is an ex parte communication about the substance of a pending matter, and the outside-legal-expert exception requires written advice, advance notice to the parties and a chance to respond — a telephone conversation with no notice meets none of those. Violation.
- The gift certificate. Rule 3.13(A) forbids accepting a gift when a reasonable person would see the acceptance as compromising the judge's impartiality. A vendor competing for the court's business is precisely the kind of donor the rule targets, and the gift is not within any 3.13(B) category. Violation, and reporting would not have cured it.
- The synagogue. Rule 3.7(A) permits a judge to take part in religious organizations. If the dinner is a fundraiser she may speak at it only if it is law-related (it is not), and in any event she may not personally solicit funds from anyone other than family and non-supervised judges. Asking the congregation to be generous is personal solicitation. Violation — she may attend and be introduced; she may not make the ask.
- The Legal Aid letter. Rule 3.7(A)(3) lets a judge recruit members for a law-related group, and 3.7(A)(5) lets her be identified as an officer on its letterhead. Inviting lawyers to join the society and attend its meeting is membership solicitation, not fundraising, and the Legal Aid Society is law-related, so 3.7(A)(3) is satisfied. The remaining question is coercion under Rule 3.1(D): a letter from the judge to every member of the county bar reaches lawyers who practice in her court, and the commentary to Rule 3.1 warns that such lawyers may feel bound to join, or join to win her favor. Three cautions: the letter must not ask for money; the safer course is to send it only to lawyers unlikely to appear before her; and under 3.7(A)(6) she may not hold a board post in a group likely to be a litigant in matters that would normally come to her — a legal-aid society whose lawyers regularly appear in her court would disqualify her from the chair. Permitted under 3.7(A)(3); as a blanket mailing to the whole county bar it is at risk under 3.1(D).
Conclusion. Four of five are clear violations: sitting on the nephew's case without remittal; the ex parte call to a retired judge; the vendor's gift; and the synagogue solicitation. The Legal Aid membership letter is permitted by Rule 3.7(A)(3); the risk is coercion under Rule 3.1(D), which is lowest if the letter goes only to lawyers unlikely to appear before her, and subject to the caveat about an organization that litigates in her court.
Rules. CJC Rule 2.11(A)(2), (C); Terminology ("third degree of relationship") · Rule 2.9(A)(2)–(3) · Rule 3.13(A)–(B) · Rule 3.7(A)(2)–(6); cmt. [3] · Rule 3.1(D); cmt. [4]
SW-0002 · The Campaign
Facts. Attorney Tomas is running in a nonpartisan election for a seat on the county trial court against the incumbent, Judge Usman. During the campaign: (1) Tomas's campaign committee mails a fundraising appeal to every lawyer in the county; Tomas reviewed and approved the letter but did not sign it. (2) At a candidates' forum Tomas says, "Unlike my opponent, I will make sure landlords who ignore housing codes pay — tenants will win in my courtroom." (3) Tomas's website states that Usman "has been reversed more than any judge in the state," which Tomas has not checked and which is false. (4) Usman, meanwhile, personally asks three lawyers who regularly appear before her to host a fundraiser and to "make sure the room is full." (5) After Tomas wins, a lawyer whose firm contributed $5,000 to Tomas's campaign — above the jurisdiction's threshold — appears before Judge Tomas within the designated period.
Issues. Which acts violate Canon 4, and what follows from (5)?
Analysis.
- The committee mailing. Rule 4.4 permits a campaign committee to solicit and accept contributions; Rule 4.2(A)(3) requires the candidate to review and approve campaign material. Tomas did what the Code contemplates. No violation. (Sending it to every lawyer in the county is permitted; a state rule might limit solicitation of lawyers likely to appear, but the Model Code does not.)
- "Tenants will win in my courtroom." A candidate may state views on legal issues, including a view that housing-code enforcement matters. But "tenants will win" is a pledge of a result in a class of cases likely to come before the court — Rule 4.1(A)(13). Violation, and under Rule 2.11(A)(5) a public commitment of this kind will require Tomas's disqualification in cases to which it applies.
- The reversal claim. Rule 4.1(A)(11) forbids a candidate to make a false or misleading statement about her opponent that she either knows is untrue or makes without caring whether it is true. Publishing an unchecked statistic that turns out false is that second, reckless state of mind. Violation — and, as a lawyer, Tomas also violates MR 8.2(a) (S11), which reaches statements about judicial candidates and judges.
- Usman's request. Rule 4.1(A)(8): only a campaign committee may ask for campaign money; the judge may not personally solicit it. Asking lawyers to host a fundraiser and fill the room is personal solicitation of contributions, whatever the form. Violation. The lawyers' status as regular appearers makes the appearance problem worse but is not the element; the personal ask is.
- The contributor's appearance. Rule 2.11(A)(4): a judge is disqualified where a party's lawyer, or the lawyer's firm, has within the designated period made aggregate campaign contributions above the threshold the jurisdiction sets. The firm's $5,000 exceeds it. Judge Tomas must disqualify herself, subject to remittal under 2.11(C) — this ground is not personal bias and may be waived by the parties after proper disclosure.
Conclusion. The committee mailing is proper. Tomas's pledge and her reckless false statement are Canon 4 violations (and MR 8.2 violations while she is a lawyer-candidate); Usman's personal solicitation is a violation; and the over-threshold contributor's appearance requires Judge Tomas to disqualify herself unless the parties remit.
Rules. CJC Rules 4.1(A)(8), (11), (13); 4.2(A)(3); 4.4; 2.11(A)(4)–(5), (C) · MR 8.2(a)–(b)
Key terms
Each term is marked once in Part A at its definition and has a term card above.
| ID | Term | Outline | Card |
|---|---|---|---|
| KT-0001 | Impartiality | OUT-12.0 | FC-0001 |
| KT-0002 | Abuse of the prestige of judicial office | OUT-12.1.2 | FC-0002 |
| KT-0003 | Ex parte communication | OUT-12.2.2 | FC-0003 |
| KT-0004 | Disqualification | OUT-12.2.4 | FC-0004 |
| KT-0005 | Third degree of relationship | OUT-12.2.4 | FC-0005 |
| KT-0006 | Economic interest | OUT-12.2.4 | FC-0006 |
| KT-0007 | Remittal of disqualification | OUT-12.2.5 | FC-0007 |
| KT-0008 | Rule of necessity | OUT-12.2.5 | FC-0008 |
| KT-0009 | Personally solicit | OUT-12.4.1 | FC-0009 |
| KT-0010 | Pledges, promises or commitments | OUT-12.4.1 | FC-0010 |