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Legal Ethics Prep & Practice / The Client-Lawyer Relationship FREE

Subject 2: The Client-Lawyer Relationship

Free MPRE Study Material · NCBE weight: 10–16% · © 2026 PryvixLabs LLC. All rights reserved.

In this packet: The Client-Lawyer Relationship Outline, 48 multiple-choice questions, 30 true/false statements, 41 flashcards, 1 scenario walkthrough and 24 key terms.

Outlines1 outline
Multiple Choice48 questions
True/False30 statements
Flashcards41 cards
Walkthroughs1 walkthrough
Key Terms24 terms

2. The Client-Lawyer Relationship

2.0 The Framework: The Life Cycle of a Representation

This section follows a representation from start to finish. For any question, ask where you are in the life cycle:

  1. Beginning: Is there a client-lawyer relationship? Must or may the lawyer take the matter?
  2. Scope: What has the lawyer agreed to do, and who decides what?
  3. Middle: Is the lawyer communicating, staying within the law, and handling a client whose capacity is impaired?
  4. Money: Is the fee reasonable, properly communicated, and properly divided?
  5. End: Must or may the lawyer withdraw, and what must the lawyer do on the way out?

2.1 Forming the Relationship

2.1.1 When a client-lawyer relationship exists

Rule: A client-lawyer relationship generally forms when a person asks a lawyer for legal services and the lawyer expressly or impliedly agrees to provide them, or fails to clearly decline when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the person is reasonably relying on the lawyer to provide them.

Client-lawyer relationship: the relationship that triggers the lawyer's full duties of competence, diligence, communication, loyalty and confidentiality. It rests on agency and contract principles and can arise without a written agreement or a fee. (Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 14)

Ways it forms:

  1. Agreement: the lawyer expressly or impliedly agrees to help (for example, by giving specific legal advice about the person's own problem).
  2. Reasonable reliance: the lawyer fails to clearly decline when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the person is reasonably relying on the lawyer.
  3. Appointment: a tribunal with authority to do so appoints the lawyer to represent the person.

Explanation:

  • A fee is not required. Free advice creates the same duties as paid work.
  • A lawyer generally has no duty to accept a representation, except court appointments (Section 11). But once the lawyer takes on a matter, the full set of duties applies.
  • A person who consults a lawyer about a possible representation, even if no relationship results, is a prospective client owed confidentiality (Section 4).

Example: At a party, Attorney Vance listens to a guest describe a car accident and says, "You have a strong case. File within two years and you'll be fine." The guest relies on the advice. A client-lawyer relationship may have formed, and Vance could be liable if the advice was wrong.

⚠ Exam trap: "No fee, no retainer letter, so no client." Wrong. Specific advice that the person reasonably relies on can create the relationship.

Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 14; MR 1.18 (prospective clients)

2.1.2 The duty to decline, and the duty to inquire

Rule: At intake, the lawyer must turn a matter down when taking it would break the Rules or other law, when the lawyer's physical or mental condition would materially impair the representation, when the client has fired the lawyer, or when the client wants to use the lawyer's services for a crime or fraud and won't stop after the lawyer explains the limits. The lawyer must also look into the facts of each matter, at intake and as it goes on, to decide whether she may take it or keep it (the 2023 duty to inquire).

Grounds for mandatory declining (the same as for mandatory withdrawal): (MR 1.16(a))

  1. The representation will result in a violation of the Rules or other law (for example, a nonconsentable conflict, or assisting a fraud).
  2. The lawyer's own health, physical or mental, materially impairs her handling of the matter.
  3. The lawyer is discharged (for a representation already under way).
  4. The client or prospective client seeks to use, or keeps using, the lawyer's services for a crime or fraud, even after the lawyer has explained what the lawyer can't help with (under MR 1.2(d) and 1.4(a)(5)). (MR 1.16(a)(4), added in 2023)

Duty to inquire: before taking a matter, and again as it goes on, a lawyer must find out enough about the client and the job to judge whether it is proper to take it or keep it. The inquiry is risk-based: more is needed when the facts suggest the lawyer's services may be used for a crime or fraud, such as money laundering. (MR 1.16(a) and cmts., as amended Aug. 2023; ABA Formal Op. 513 (advisory))

Explanation: Screening at intake is how a lawyer avoids being used to launder money or commit fraud, and how conflicts are caught early (Section 4).

⚠ Exam trap: A lawyer may decline for many reasons, such as a full calendar or distaste for the case. The mandatory grounds are narrower: violation, impairment, discharge, or a client who insists on using the lawyer for a crime or fraud.

Cite: MR 1.16(a) and cmts.; MR 1.2(d)


2.2 Scope, Objectives, Means and Contract Terms

2.2.1 Who decides what

Rule: The client decides the objectives of the representation, and the lawyer must consult with the client about the means used to pursue them; the client alone decides whether to settle a matter, and in a criminal case, after consulting the lawyer, decides the plea to enter, whether to waive a jury trial, and whether to testify.

Objectives of representation: the goals the client wants to reach, such as winning, settling, or closing the deal. They belong to the client. (MR 1.2(a))

Means of representation: the tactics and strategy used to reach the client's objectives, such as which motions to file and which witnesses to call. Clients normally defer to the lawyer on technical, legal and tactical questions, and lawyers usually defer to the client on the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. The lawyer must consult about means as MR 1.4 requires. (MR 1.2(a); cmt. [2])

There are four decisions reserved to the client:

  1. Whether to settle a civil matter (and whether to accept or reject a settlement offer).
  2. In a criminal case, what plea to enter.
  3. In a criminal case, whether to waive a jury trial.
  4. In a criminal case, whether to testify.

Explanation:

  • A lawyer may take action impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. (MR 1.2(a))
  • Where the lawyer and client disagree about means, the Rule doesn't say who wins. The lawyer should consult and try to reach a mutually acceptable resolution. If that fails, the lawyer may withdraw if the disagreement is fundamental, and the client may discharge the lawyer. (cmt. [2])
  • A client may give the lawyer advance authority, for example to accept any settlement over a set amount. The lawyer may rely on it absent a material change in circumstances, and subject to the duty to communicate under MR 1.4. The client may revoke it at any time. (cmt. [3])

Example: Defense counsel receives a plea offer on the morning of trial and rejects it because she believes the client will win. She is subject to discipline: the plea decision belongs to the client, and she must promptly communicate the offer (MR 1.4).

⚠ Exam trap: "The lawyer may refuse a settlement offer the lawyer thinks is too low." No. The lawyer must communicate the offer and let the client decide, unless the client gave prior instructions about offers of that kind.

Cite: MR 1.2(a); cmts. [1]–[3]; MR 1.4(a)(1)

2.2.2 Representation is not endorsement

Rule: Taking on a client's matter is not an endorsement of that client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.

Explanation: Unpopular clients deserve lawyers. The rule reassures lawyers that taking a case doesn't mean agreeing with the client's views. (MR 1.2(b); cmt. [5])

Cite: MR 1.2(b)

2.2.3 Limited-scope representation

Rule: Lawyer and client can agree that the lawyer will handle only part of a matter. Two things make that agreement valid: the limit must be reasonable under the circumstances, and the client must give informed consent after the lawyer explains the risks and alternatives.

Limited-scope representation: an agreement that the lawyer will handle only part of a matter, such as drafting one document, coaching a self-represented party, or handling only the appeal. It is sometimes called "unbundled" services. There are two requirements:

  1. The limitation is reasonable under the circumstances.
  2. The client gives informed consent (agreement after the lawyer explains the material risks and reasonable alternatives; MR 1.0(e), see S01 OUT-1.1.2). The Model Rule does not require a writing, though one is wise.

Exceptions and limits:

  1. A limitation can't be so narrow that the lawyer can't provide competent representation. (cmt. [7])
  2. A limitation may not be used to waive duties the Rules impose, such as competence or the duty not to assist fraud. (cmt. [8])

Example: For a flat fee, Attorney Chen agrees to review a lease and point out risky terms, but not to negotiate it. That's reasonable, if the client understands and agrees. Agreeing to "defend the felony trial but not investigate the facts" would not be reasonable.

⚠ Exam trap: Scope limits are allowed, but competence within the limited scope is not negotiable.

Cross-reference (August 2026): a lawyer who deals with a person the lawyer knows or suspects has a limited-scope lawyer should first ask whether the person is represented on that subject before communicating directly. The ABA added this to MR 4.2 cmt. [9] (Res. 101F). It is taught in Section 7.

Cite: MR 1.2(c); cmts. [6]–[8]; MR 4.2 cmt. [9] (Aug. 2026)

2.2.4 Other terms in the client-lawyer contract

Rule: Beyond scope and fees, a client-lawyer agreement may not prospectively limit the lawyer's malpractice liability unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement; an agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims is different and is allowed if it is enforceable under applicable law and the client is fully informed of its scope and effect.

Explanation:

  • Prospective malpractice limits: banned unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement. (MR 1.8(h)(1))
  • Arbitration of malpractice claims: allowed, because it chooses the forum rather than limiting the lawyer's substantive liability. The agreement must be enforceable under applicable law, and the client must be fully informed of its scope and effect. (MR 1.8 cmt. [17])
  • Limiting scope under MR 1.2(c) is not a liability limit, as long as the limitation is reasonable and the client gives informed consent.
  • Settling an actual or potential malpractice claim with an unrepresented client or former client has its own rule (MR 1.8(h)(2)). See Section 4, OUT-4.2.6.

⚠ Exam trap: "The engagement letter's arbitration clause is an improper limit on malpractice liability." Not if the clause is enforceable and the client was fully informed. A clause capping damages is the one that needs independent counsel.

Cite: MR 1.8(h)(1); cmt. [17]; MR 1.2(c)


2.3 Counseling Within the Bounds of the Law

2.3.1 Never counsel or assist crime or fraud

Rule: Two sides of one line. A lawyer may not advise a client to commit, or help a client commit, conduct the lawyer knows is a crime or fraud. But a lawyer may give an honest analysis of the legal consequences of any plan the client is considering, and may help a client test in good faith what the law means, how far it reaches, or whether it is valid.

Assisting client crime or fraud: knowingly helping a client carry out criminal or fraudulent conduct, for example by drafting the documents for a scheme the lawyer knows is fraudulent. It is prohibited by MR 1.2(d).

What the lawyer may do: there are two permitted activities.

  1. Explain the legal consequences of any proposed course of action, even a criminal one. An honest analysis of the law is not assisting. But there is a critical line: recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed or concealed is prohibited assistance, even when framed as legal advice. (cmt. [9])
  2. Help test the law in good faith: advise on the validity, scope or meaning of a law, including helping a client challenge a law they believe is invalid.

When the client is already acting: (cmts. [10]–[11])

  1. If the lawyer learns the client is using the lawyer's services for a crime or fraud, the lawyer must stop assisting and must withdraw from the representation in that matter (MR 1.16(a)(1), (4)), unless a tribunal orders the lawyer to continue (MR 1.16(c)). (cmt. [10])
  2. Withdrawal alone may not be enough. The lawyer may need to give notice of the withdrawal and disaffirm (tell those relying on it that it is withdrawn) any opinion, document or affirmation the lawyer prepared (a so-called "noisy withdrawal"). See also MR 4.1 (Section 7).
  3. Disclosure of confidential information to prevent, mitigate or rectify the fraud is permitted by MR 1.6(b)(2)–(3), but only when the client used the lawyer's services, the crime or fraud causes or is reasonably certain to cause substantial injury to another's financial interests or property, and only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary (Section 3, OUT-3.4.2).
  4. Separately, MR 4.1(b) can make disclosure mandatory: a lawyer must disclose a material fact to a third person when that is necessary to avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud, unless MR 1.6 prohibits it. Because MR 1.6(b)(2)–(3) often permits disclosure in fraud cases, that permission can become a duty. (MR 4.1(b); cmt. [3]; Section 7)

Example: A client asks, "What happens if I don't report my cash income?" Attorney Ortiz may explain the civil penalties and criminal exposure. If the client then asks Ortiz to prepare books that hide the cash, Ortiz must refuse.

⚠ Exam trap: Discussing the consequences of illegal conduct is permitted. Students often pick "subject to discipline" when a lawyer merely explains the law. The answer changes if the lawyer tells the client how to do it without getting caught.

⚠ Exam trap: The standard is "knows". A lawyer who merely suspects fraud is not violating MR 1.2(d) by giving advice, though the duty to inquire and MR 1.16 may require more.

Cite: MR 1.2(d); cmts. [9]–[13]; MR 1.4(a)(5); MR 1.16(a); MR 4.1(b)


2.4 Decision-Making Authority: Actual and Apparent

2.4.1 The lawyer as the client's agent

Rule: Under agency law, a lawyer can bind a client by acts within the lawyer's actual authority, express or implied, and to third parties by acts within the lawyer's apparent authority; but a lawyer who exceeds actual authority is subject to discipline and may be liable to the client.

Actual authority: the authority the client actually gives the lawyer, either expressly (by words) or impliedly (because it's reasonably necessary to carry out the representation). (Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 21, 26)

Apparent authority: authority a third party reasonably believes the lawyer has because of the client's words or conduct toward that third party. It can bind the client even when actual authority is missing. (Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 27)

Explanation:

  • Settlement is the key example. Retaining a lawyer does not by itself give the lawyer authority to settle. Settlement needs the client's actual authority, so an unauthorized settlement generally does not bind the client unless the client's own conduct created apparent authority.
  • Procedural and tactical steps within the lawyer's role, such as scheduling and stipulations about evidence, generally bind the client.
  • Separately from agency law, exceeding authority on a reserved decision violates MR 1.2(a).

Example: Attorney Park, without asking her client, accepts a $40,000 settlement offer she thinks is excellent. The client never authorized any settlement. The settlement generally doesn't bind the client, and Park is subject to discipline for taking a decision reserved to the client.

⚠ Exam trap: "Hiring a lawyer to sue gives the lawyer authority to settle." No. Settlement authority must come from the client.

Cite: MR 1.2(a); Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 21–27


2.5 Clients with Decision-Making Limitations

Amended rule. In February 2026 the ABA replaced MR 1.14. It is now titled "Client With Decision-Making Limitations" instead of "Client With Diminished Capacity." This section teaches the new rule. NCBE tests a Model Rule amendment no earlier than about one year after the ABA adopts it, and may test the prior rule until then, so the new text can appear no earlier than about February 2027. NCBE doesn't promise the exact date. Many states' rules and older study materials still say "diminished capacity." (Checked against the official text of ABA Res. 100, Midyear 2026, on 2026-09-24.)

2.5.1 An ordinary relationship, with support

Rule: When a client has decision-making limitations, the lawyer must still keep up an ordinary client-lawyer relationship as far as reasonably possible, even when the limitations affect the client's ability to direct the lawyer or make reasoned, informed choices. A client has decision-making limitations when the client has substantial difficulty receiving and understanding information, evaluating information, or making or communicating decisions, even with appropriate supports or accommodations.

Decision-making limitations: substantial difficulty, even with appropriate supports or accommodations, in receiving and understanding information, evaluating information, or making or communicating decisions. Teaching breakdown (the rule has three clauses; the third is split here only to help spot issues): (1) receiving and understanding information, (2) evaluating it, (3) making decisions or (4) communicating them. The test is functional: it asks what the client can do, not what diagnosis the client has. Limitations can depend on the situation and vary in degree and over time. A client may be able to decide some matters and not others. (MR 1.14(a); cmt. [2])

What an ordinary relationship means. The lawyer follows the client's decisions about the goals of the representation, keeps the client informed, explains enough for the client to decide, and gives candid advice. It rests on the assumption that a properly advised and assisted client can make and communicate reasoned, informed decisions. With some clients that won't be possible in every respect. (cmt. [4])

Supports first. Supports and accommodations can reduce or remove a limitation. There are four kinds of example: (cmts. [3], [11])

  • communication devices or services;
  • help from appropriate third parties, including Supported decision-making, in which the client chooses trusted people to help her understand information and make and communicate her own decisions, and the client still decides;
  • changes of setting, such as meeting somewhere familiar, at a time when the client does best;
  • plain language and adjusted counseling, including developmentally appropriate interviewing for a minor.

Family and others in the room. The lawyer should get the client's informed consent before others take part. If their presence helps, the lawyer should document their role when that could help avoid a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Documentation helps; it doesn't guarantee the privilege survives. Decisions still come from the client, not the family, except in protective action. Whenever possible, the lawyer gives the client a chance to talk privately. (cmt. [5]) For when a third person's presence waives the attorney-client privilege, see S03 OUT-3.1.1: a support person needed for the client to communicate is treated like an interpreter, but someone there only for moral support is not.

Agents and guardians are treated differently. (cmt. [7])

  • Agent under a power of attorney: the lawyer still takes direction from the client and keeps communicating, unless the client has directed otherwise or can't give direction.
  • Court-appointed guardian or conservator: the lawyer ordinarily looks to the appointee for decisions within the appointee's authority. But the lawyer may represent the person to challenge or modify the guardianship, or in any matter where the person still has authority. Then the lawyer takes direction from the client.

Minors. A lawyer for a minor who can give direction ordinarily advocates for the minor's own objectives. (cmt. [9])

⚠ Exam trap: A diagnosis, old age or an unwise choice doesn't by itself establish a decision-making limitation. The lawyer looks at the client's functional abilities and whether supports would help. The lawyer's own observations can be enough; no doctor or court finding is required. (cmts. [13]–[14])

Cite: MR 1.14(a) (as amended Feb. 2026); cmts. [2]–[5], [7], [9], [11], [13]–[14]

2.5.2 Protective action

Rule: The lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action only when she reasonably believes three things: the client has decision-making limitations; the client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless someone acts; and the client can't adequately act in her own interest to address that risk.

Protective action: steps a lawyer may take under MR 1.14(b) to protect a client with decision-making limitations. The Comments give these examples: (cmt. [12])

  • consulting family members;
  • allowing a reconsideration period so things can become clearer or improve;
  • using voluntary surrogate tools such as a durable power of attorney;
  • consulting support groups, health-care professionals, adult-protective agencies or others able to protect the client.

Before consulting anyone, the lawyer should consider whether that person is likely to act against the client's interests. The lawyer is guided by the client's known wishes and values, the client's best interests, keeping intrusion on the client's autonomy to a minimum, making the most of the client's abilities, and respecting the client's family and social ties. (cmts. [12], [18])

Guardianship.

  • If the (b) conditions are met, the lawyer may consider whether a guardian, conservator or guardian ad litem is needed. (A guardian or conservator makes decisions for the person generally; a guardian ad litem is appointed by a court only to represent the person's interests in a particular proceeding.) Appointment is often more intrusive, costly or traumatic than the situation requires, so the lawyer should generally advocate the least restrictive action. (cmt. [15])
  • If someone else petitions for a guardianship, conservatorship or other restriction on the client's capacity, the lawyer may not advocate for it if the client opposes it. (cmt. [16])
  • A lawyer representing the respondent in a guardianship proceeding must advocate for the client's objectives if they are known or can be found out. (cmts. [12], [16])

After acting. Taking protective action doesn't by itself end the representation. But the lawyer must tell the client about the protective action, and should consider whether MR 1.16(a) now requires withdrawal, for example because of a conflict under MR 1.7. (cmt. [17])

Confidentiality.

  • Information about a client with decision-making limitations is protected by MR 1.6.
  • When taking protective action, the lawyer may reveal information even without the client's informed consent, but only what she reasonably judges the protective step requires, keeping the disclosure narrow.
  • The new rule says this directly. The old rule called the disclosure "impliedly authorized." (MR 1.14(c); cmt. [18])

Emergencies. (cmts. [19]–[20])

  • When: a substantial health, safety or financial interest of a person with decision-making limitations faces imminent and irreparable harm, and the person can't form a client-lawyer relationship.
  • Who consulted: the person consulted the lawyer, or someone acting in good faith on the person's behalf did.
  • Limits: the lawyer acts only if she reasonably believes no other lawyer, agent or representative is available, and only as far as reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. She has the same duties as to a client.
  • After: she keeps the person's confidences as if the person were a client, disclosing only what the protective action requires; tells any tribunal and other counsel what the relationship is; and takes steps to regularize the relationship or put other protective arrangements in place as soon as possible. Ordinarily she doesn't seek a fee for the emergency work.

Example: Attorney Moss's elderly client, who has advancing dementia, is about to sign her house over to a "friend" she met last month. Moss first tries supports: a quiet meeting at the client's home, with her trusted niece present at the client's request, and a pause before signing. If the risk remains and the client can't protect herself, Moss may consult the client's daughter, revealing only what is needed, and must tell the client what she did. She would consider a court appointment only if nothing less restrictive would work.

ABA Formal Opinion 525 (Sept. 2, 2026) (advisory). Ethics-opinion guidance interpreting the new rule, not rule text. The opinion says the lawyer should maintain an ordinary client-lawyer relationship as far as possible and respect the client's decisions about objectives; must assess the client's decision-making independently rather than simply adopt a diagnosis or someone else's evaluation; should use supports such as plain language, adjusted communication, third-party help and supported decision-making; may take protective action only where the rule's conditions are met, preferring less drastic steps, since a guardianship is a serious deprivation of the client's rights and is a last resort; may, if a guardianship is truly needed, file the petition on the client's behalf (though having someone else, such as a family member, petition is preferable); may not represent a third party petitioning for a guardianship over the lawyer's own client (a conflict); and, although withdrawal is permitted under MR 1.16, should generally avoid withdrawing when it would leave the client without needed help.

⚠ Exam trap: MR 1.14(b) permits protective action ("may"); it doesn't itself require it. But other duties can: in a criminal case, the duty of competence may require the lawyer to seek a competency or mental-health evaluation (cmt. [8]). The least restrictive option comes first. And a lawyer may not support a guardianship petition someone else filed if her client opposes it.

Cite: MR 1.14(b)–(c) (as amended Feb. 2026); cmts. [8], [12], [15]–[20]; ABA Formal Op. 525 (2026) (advisory)


2.6 Communication with the Client

2.6.1 What the lawyer must communicate

Rule: Communication has six parts. The lawyer must: (1) promptly tell the client about any decision or situation that needs the client's informed consent; (2) reasonably consult with the client about how to pursue the client's goals; (3) keep the client reasonably up to date on the matter; (4) promptly answer reasonable requests for information; (5) explain any limit on what the lawyer can do when the client expects help the Rules forbid; and (6) explain things well enough for the client to make informed decisions.

Reasonable communication: the duty to keep the client informed and consulted, so the client can take part in decisions. MR 1.4 lists six duties:

  1. Promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance that needs the client's informed consent, such as a settlement offer or a plea offer. (MR 1.4(a)(1); cmt. [2])
  2. Reasonably consult about the means used to reach the client's objectives. (MR 1.4(a)(2))
  3. Keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter. (MR 1.4(a)(3))
  4. Promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. When a prompt answer isn't possible, the lawyer or staff should acknowledge the request and say when to expect a response. (MR 1.4(a)(4); cmt. [4])
  5. Consult about limitations when the client expects help the Rules or other law forbid. (MR 1.4(a)(5))
  6. Explain matters enough for the client to make informed decisions. (MR 1.4(b))

Explanation: Every settlement offer in a civil case, and every plea offer in a criminal case, must be communicated promptly, unless the client has already said it would be acceptable or unacceptable, or has authorized the lawyer to accept or reject it. (cmt. [2])

⚠ Exam trap: "The offer was obviously too low to bother the client with." Unless the client pre-authorized the lawyer to reject offers like it, the lawyer must communicate it.

Update note (August 2026): the ABA added MR 1.4 cmt. [8] (Res. 101A, drawn from Formal Op. 481 (advisory)). A lawyer must promptly tell a current client about a material error the lawyer made in the representation.

  • Material is objective: a disinterested lawyer would conclude the error is reasonably likely to harm or prejudice the client, or is the kind of error that would reasonably cause a client to consider ending the representation even without harm.
  • The duty runs to current clients. Op. 481 found no Model Rule duty to tell a former client about an error the lawyer first discovers after the representation has ended. A duty that arose while the person was still a client isn't erased by ending the relationship.
  • The error can create a personal-interest conflict (MR 1.7(a)(2)) that the lawyer must assess.
  • Not every harmless slip must be reported. What is never allowed is hiding a material error to protect the lawyer.

The same meeting revised MR 1.4 cmt. [6] (with MR 1.2 cmt. [4] and MR 1.16 cmt. [6]) to match the amended MR 1.14, stressing supports and keeping a client with decision-making limitations involved. These are Comment changes, not black-letter changes. NCBE may test them no earlier than about August 2027. Some of the principles, such as Op. 481, already existed as ABA guidance.

Cite: MR 1.4(a), (b); cmts. [1]–[6], [8] (Aug. 2026); ABA Formal Op. 481 (2018) (advisory)

2.6.2 Withholding information from a client

Rule: In rare cases a lawyer may hold back news for a short time when telling the client right away would likely lead the client to act rashly against her own interests. The delay must serve the client. A lawyer may never keep information from a client to benefit the lawyer, to save the lawyer trouble, or to benefit someone else.

Withholding information: delaying the delivery of information in rare cases, for the client's own sake. For example, a lawyer may delay telling a client a psychiatric diagnosis if the examining psychiatrist says disclosure would harm the client. (MR 1.4 cmt. [7])

Limits:

  1. The delay must be for the client's benefit, never the lawyer's.
  2. A lawyer may not withhold information to cover up the lawyer's own mistake. A material error must be disclosed promptly to a current client (see the update note in 2.6.1).
  3. Rules or court orders limiting disclosure (for example, a protective order on confidential documents) must be followed, and the lawyer should explain that limit to the client.

⚠ Exam trap: A lawyer who hides a material error of her own (such as a missed deadline) violates MR 1.4. That's never "delaying for the client's benefit."

Cite: MR 1.4 cmt. [7]; MR 3.4(c)


2.7 Fees

2.7.1 Reasonable fees

Rule: A fee, and any charge for expenses, must be reasonable. The ban covers agreeing to, charging and collecting an unreasonable amount.

Reasonable fee: a fee that is reasonable in light of the factors in MR 1.5(a). There are eight factors:

  1. Effort and difficulty: how much work the matter takes, how new or hard its issues are, and how much skill it demands.
  2. Lost opportunities: whether taking the matter will keep the lawyer from other work, counted only if the client could see that.
  3. Local market: what lawyers nearby usually charge for comparable work.
  4. Stakes and outcome: how much is at stake and what the lawyer achieved.
  5. Deadlines: time pressure set by the client or by the situation.
  6. Relationship: how long the lawyer and client have worked together and what kind of relationship it is.
  7. The lawyer: the lawyer's experience, standing and ability.
  8. Fee structure: whether payment depends on the outcome (fixed or contingent).

Expenses: for in-house services (such as copying) a lawyer may charge either a reasonable amount the client agreed to in advance or an amount that reasonably reflects the lawyer's actual cost. (cmt. [1])

Explanation:

  • Reasonableness is measured at the time the fee is agreed, and also at the time it is charged and collected. A fee that looks reasonable at the start can become unreasonable if it turns out to be grossly out of proportion to the work.
  • Billing for time not spent or deceptive double-billing is dishonest (MR 8.4(c)) as well as unreasonable. Separately, charging for wasteful or unnecessary work can make a fee unreasonable under MR 1.5(a), even when the hours were actually worked; actual hours are judged by the reasonableness standard.

Example: Attorney Rowe agreed to an hourly fee. A routine motion took two hours, but Rowe billed ten, reasoning that "the result was worth it." That's an unreasonable fee and a misrepresentation.

⚠ Exam trap: A client's agreement to a fee doesn't make it reasonable. An unreasonable fee violates MR 1.5(a) even if the client signed.

Update note (August 2026): the ABA amended MR 1.5 cmt. [1] (Res. 101B): a fee change in the middle of a representation must still be reasonable, and it must be communicated to and accepted by the client. New Comment text, not a black-letter change. NCBE may test it no earlier than about August 2027.

Cite: MR 1.5(a); cmts. [1]–[5]; MR 8.4(c); ABA Formal Op. 93-379 (advisory)

2.7.2 Communicating the fee

Rule: The lawyer must tell the client, preferably in writing, what the representation covers and how the fee and expenses will be figured. This must happen before the work starts or soon after. It isn't needed when a regular client will be billed the same way as before. Any later change to the basis or rate of the fee or expenses must also be communicated.

Requirements:

  1. What: the scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses.
  2. When: before or within a reasonable time after starting.
  3. Form: preferably in writing. Under MR 1.5, a writing is required only for contingent fees and fee divisions between firms. Other rules can add writing requirements; for example, a fee paid with an interest in the client's business or other property may be a business transaction that must meet MR 1.8(a). (MR 1.5 cmt. [4])
  4. Exception: no new communication is needed for a regularly represented client billed on the same basis or rate as before.

⚠ Exam trap: "The fee agreement had to be in writing." Under MR 1.5, only contingent fees (MR 1.5(c)) and fee divisions between firms (MR 1.5(e)) need a writing. Ordinary hourly or flat fees paid in money need only be communicated, preferably in writing.

Cite: MR 1.5(b); cmt. [2]; MR 1.5 cmt. [4]; MR 1.8(a)

2.7.3 Contingent fees

Rule: Contingent fees are allowed except in the matters where they are banned. The agreement must be in writing and signed by the client, and it must explain: how the fee is calculated; the percentage for settlement, trial and appeal; which expenses will be deducted and whether they come out before or after the fee is figured; and any expenses the client owes even if the case is lost. When the matter ends, the lawyer must give the client a written statement showing the outcome and how the payout was calculated.

Contingent fee: a fee that depends on the outcome, usually a percentage of the recovery.

The writing must be signed by the client and must state: (MR 1.5(c))

  1. The method of calculating the fee, including the percentages if the matter is settled, tried or appealed.
  2. The expenses to be deducted from the recovery.
  3. Whether expenses are deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.
  4. Any expenses the client must pay whether or not the client wins.

Closing statement: at the end of a contingent-fee matter, the lawyer must give the client a written statement showing the outcome and, if there is a recovery, the remittance to the client and how it was calculated. (MR 1.5(c))

Prohibited contingent fees: there are two categories. (MR 1.5(d))

  1. Domestic relations: a fee whose payment or amount depends on securing a divorce, or on the amount of alimony, support, or a property settlement in place of them.
  2. Criminal defense: a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.

Explanation: The domestic-relations ban does not reach a contingent fee for collecting past-due alimony or child support after the divorce. (cmt. [6]) A contingent fee must also be reasonable under MR 1.5(a), judged on the circumstances, including the risk and the work involved. A contingent fee isn't improper just because some recovery is likely, but a percentage that produces an excessive fee for little risk or work can be unreasonable. (ABA Formal Op. 94-389 (advisory))

Example: Attorney Blake agrees to represent a client in a divorce for "20% of whatever alimony you're awarded." That is prohibited. Blake may, however, take a contingent fee to collect $30,000 in past-due child support after the divorce.

⚠ Exam trap: "The contingent-fee agreement was confirmed in writing by the lawyer's email." Not enough. It must be a writing signed by the client.

Cite: MR 1.5(a), (c), (d); cmts. [3], [6]; ABA Formal Op. 94-389 (advisory)

2.7.4 Dividing a fee between lawyers in different firms

Rule: Lawyers in different firms may split one fee only if three things are true: the split matches the work each does, or each lawyer takes joint responsibility for the whole matter; the client agrees to the arrangement, including each lawyer's share, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and the total fee is reasonable.

Fee division between lawyers: a single fee split between lawyers in different firms, such as a referring lawyer and a trial lawyer. There are three requirements: (MR 1.5(e))

  1. Basis: either in proportion to the work each lawyer does, or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility (financial and ethical responsibility, as if partners) for the whole representation.
  2. Client agreement, including the share each lawyer will receive, confirmed in writing.
  3. Total fee reasonable.

Explanation: The rule permits pure referral fees only when the referring lawyer takes on joint responsibility. A lawyer can't accept a share of a fee for doing nothing and taking no responsibility. The rule doesn't apply to lawyers in the same firm. It also doesn't regulate dividing fees received later for work done while the lawyers were associated in the same firm, for example after a partner leaves. (cmts. [7]–[8])

Example: Attorney Lin refers a malpractice case to Attorney Stone and does no work. They split the fee 30/70. This is proper only if Lin assumes joint responsibility for the case, the client agrees to the 30/70 split in a writing confirmed to the client, and the total fee is reasonable.

⚠ Exam trap: Joint responsibility doesn't mean the referring lawyer must do the work. It means the referring lawyer answers for the whole matter as if a partner.

Update note (August 2026): the ABA amended MR 1.5 cmt. [7] (Res. 101B) to add guidance on dividing a fee between lawyers in different firms, drawn from Formal Op. 474 (advisory). The key point: a lawyer may not take a share of a fee, including by assuming joint responsibility, in a matter the lawyer couldn't handle because of a conflict of interest. The three black-letter conditions above are unchanged. New Comment text, not a black-letter change. NCBE may test it no earlier than about August 2027.

Cite: MR 1.5(e); cmts. [7]–[8]; ABA Formal Op. 474 (2016) (advisory)

2.7.5 Advance fees, retainers and nonrefundable fees

Rule: Fees paid in advance must be held in trust and withdrawn only as they are earned, and on termination the lawyer must refund any advance payment of a fee that has not been earned; a so-called nonrefundable fee is subject to the reasonableness requirement and to that refund duty.

Advance fee: money paid before the work is done, to be earned as the lawyer works. It belongs to the client until earned, so it goes in the client trust account (Section 9). (MR 1.15(c))

General retainer: a fee paid to secure the lawyer's availability over a period, not for specific work. It can be earned when paid, but it still must be reasonable.

Nonrefundable fee: a label on a fee agreement saying the client can't get money back. The label doesn't override MR 1.5(a) or the duty to refund unearned fees when the representation ends. (MR 1.16(d); MR 1.5 cmt. [4])

Fees in property: a lawyer may accept property, such as stock, in payment, but taking an ownership interest in the client's business or in the subject of the case may be a business transaction subject to MR 1.8(a) or a prohibited interest under MR 1.8(i) (Section 4). (MR 1.5 cmt. [4])

Fee disputes: a lawyer should consider arbitration or mediation procedures a jurisdiction offers, and must follow any mandatory program. (MR 1.5 cmt. [9])

⚠ Exam trap: A $10,000 "nonrefundable" flat fee for a matter that ends after one hour of work because the client fires the lawyer must be refunded in large part. The label doesn't change the result.

Cite: MR 1.5(a) and cmts. [4], [9]; MR 1.15(c); MR 1.16(d)


2.8 Ending the Relationship

2.8.1 Mandatory withdrawal

Rule: A lawyer must withdraw in four situations: continuing would break the Rules or other law; the lawyer's own health, physical or mental, materially impairs her handling of the matter; the client fires the lawyer; or the client keeps trying to use the lawyer's services for a crime or fraud after the lawyer has explained the limits.

Mandatory withdrawal: withdrawal the lawyer must make (subject to a tribunal's order to continue). There are four grounds: (MR 1.16(a))

  1. Violation: continuing will violate the Rules or other law.
  2. Impairment: the lawyer's own health, physical or mental, materially impairs her handling of the matter.
  3. Discharge: the client fires the lawyer. A client may ordinarily discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to paying for services already provided. (cmt. [4]) Two qualifications: whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law (cmt. [5]); and a client whose decision-making limitations can't be adequately addressed with supports may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, in which case the lawyer should help the client consider the consequences and may take protective action under MR 1.14 (cmt. [6], as amended Aug. 2026).
  4. Crime or fraud: the client seeks to use, or persists in using, the lawyer's services to commit or further a crime or fraud, despite the lawyer's explanation of what the lawyer can't do. (MR 1.16(a)(4), 2023)

Explanation: Firing a lawyer doesn't end the client's obligation to pay a reasonable fee for work done, often measured by quantum meruit (the reasonable value of the services actually performed) under a contingent-fee contract.

⚠ Exam trap: Compare MR 1.16(b)(2)–(3). Past misuse of the lawyer's services, or a course of action the lawyer only reasonably believes is criminal, makes withdrawal permitted. A client who insists on using the lawyer for a crime or fraud after being warned makes it required.

⚠ Exam trap: A client doesn't need a good reason to fire the lawyer. Even without cause, the lawyer must withdraw (unless a court orders otherwise). The exceptions are narrow: appointed counsel, and a client who lacks capacity to discharge.

Cite: MR 1.16(a); cmts. [2]–[6]

2.8.2 Permissive withdrawal

Rule: A lawyer may withdraw when leaving won't materially hurt the client. She may also withdraw, even if it does, for listed reasons: the client keeps using the lawyer's services for what the lawyer reasonably believes is a crime or fraud; the client already used them to commit one; the client insists on something the lawyer finds repugnant or fundamentally disagrees with; the client, after a fair warning, substantially fails to meet an obligation to the lawyer (such as paying); the work has become an unreasonable financial burden or the client has made it unreasonably difficult; or other good cause.

Permissive withdrawal: withdrawal the lawyer may choose. There are seven grounds: (MR 1.16(b))

  1. No material adverse effect on the client. This ground allows withdrawal for any reason at all.
  2. Ongoing misuse: the client keeps drawing on the lawyer's work for conduct the lawyer reasonably believes is a crime or fraud.
  3. Past misuse: the client has already used the lawyer's work to commit a crime or fraud.
  4. Moral or strategic conflict: the client demands action the lawyer finds repugnant, or on which the two have a fundamental disagreement.
  5. Broken obligation: after a reasonable warning that withdrawal will follow, the client still commits a substantial failure to do what it owes the lawyer (paying fees, for example).
  6. Burden or obstruction: staying on would leave the lawyer carrying a financial burden that is unreasonable, or the client has made the work unreasonably difficult.
  7. Catch-all: some other good cause exists.

⚠ Exam trap: Nonpayment is a ground only after reasonable warning. A lawyer who drops a client mid-case for an unpaid bill, without warning, has not met MR 1.16(b)(5).

Cite: MR 1.16(b); cmts. [7]–[8]

2.8.3 Permission of the tribunal

Rule: When a court's rules require notice or permission to withdraw, the lawyer must follow them. If the court orders the lawyer to stay on, she must stay, even if she has good reason to leave.

Leave of court: permission a court's rules may require before counsel of record withdraws. If the court denies permission, the lawyer must continue, even if a mandatory ground exists. (MR 1.16(c))

Explanation: When the reason for withdrawing is confidential (for example, the client's plan to commit perjury), the lawyer should say only that professional considerations require withdrawal. The court should generally accept that statement. (cmt. [3])

⚠ Exam trap: A lawyer who walks away from a pending case without the court's required permission is subject to discipline, even with a valid reason to withdraw.

Cite: MR 1.16(c); cmt. [3]

2.8.4 Duties on termination

Rule: When the representation ends, for whatever reason, the lawyer must take reasonable steps to protect the client: for example, give reasonable notice, allow time to find a new lawyer, hand over the papers and property the client is entitled to, and return any advance fee or expense money not yet earned or spent. The lawyer may keep client papers only as far as other law allows.

Duties on termination: the steps a lawyer must take, to the extent reasonably practicable, to protect the client when the relationship ends, whatever the reason. The Rule gives four examples; the duty is broader than the list: (MR 1.16(d))

  1. Reasonable notice to the client.
  2. Time for the client to hire other counsel.
  3. Surrender of papers and property the client is entitled to.
  4. Refund of unearned fees and unincurred expenses.

Explanation: Even when the client fires the lawyer or refuses to pay, the lawyer must protect the client's interests on the way out. A lawyer may assert a retaining lien on files only where other law allows it, and even then may not use it in a way that prejudices the client unfairly. (cmt. [9])

Example: A client fires Attorney Diaz a week before a filing deadline. Diaz must promptly return the client's file and remind the client (or new counsel) of the deadline. Diaz can't hold the file hostage until the bill is paid in a way that causes the client to miss the deadline.

⚠ Exam trap: The duty to protect the client applies even when the lawyer did nothing wrong and even when the client caused the break.

Cite: MR 1.16(d); cmt. [9]


Section 2: Must-Know Checklist

  1. A relationship can form without a fee or a contract when a lawyer gives specific advice that a person reasonably relies on. (Rest. § 14)
  2. The client decides objectives. Four decisions always belong to the client: settlement, and in criminal cases the plea, jury waiver and whether to testify. (MR 1.2(a))
  3. Scope may be limited if reasonable and the client gives informed consent, but competence within that scope can't be waived. An engagement letter may require arbitration of malpractice claims if the clause is enforceable and the client is fully informed, but may not cap malpractice liability unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement. (MR 1.2(c); MR 1.8(h)(1), cmt. [17])
  4. Never counsel or assist a client's crime or fraud, but an honest analysis of the legal consequences is allowed. Recommending how to commit or hide it is not. (MR 1.2(d))
  5. Settlement authority comes from the client. Retaining a lawyer to sue doesn't authorize settling. (MR 1.2(a))
  6. Decision-making limitations: keep an ordinary relationship as far as possible, with supports. Protective action is permitted, least restrictive first, with disclosure only as reasonably necessary, and the client must be told. Never support someone else's guardianship petition the client opposes. (MR 1.14, as amended 2026)
  7. Communicate every settlement and plea offer promptly, unless the client gave prior instructions about it. (MR 1.4)
  8. Fees must be reasonable. Communicate the basis, preferably in writing. Contingent fees need a writing signed by the client and a closing statement. (MR 1.5(a)–(c))
  9. No contingent fees in criminal defense or for obtaining a divorce, alimony, support or a property settlement. Fee splits between firms need proportion or joint responsibility, client agreement confirmed in writing, and a reasonable total. (MR 1.5(d), (e))
  10. Withdraw when you must (violation, impairment, discharge, or a client who keeps using you for crime or fraud). May withdraw on the listed grounds. Follow court rules, and protect the client on the way out, including refunding unearned fees. (MR 1.16)

Section 2: Common Traps

  • "No fee, no client." Free advice that's relied on can create a relationship.
  • "The lawyer can reject an offer the lawyer thinks is too low." Only the client decides.
  • "Explaining the consequences of a crime is assisting it." It isn't.
  • "Every fee agreement must be in writing." Under MR 1.5, only contingent fees and fee divisions need writings (a fee paid in property may also trigger MR 1.8(a)).
  • "A nonrefundable fee is never refunded." Unearned advance fees must be refunded when the representation ends, whatever the label. A true general retainer, paid only for availability and earned on receipt, is different, though it still must be reasonable.
  • "A client can fire a lawyer only for cause." A client may ordinarily discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause.

Part B: Items

Flashcards

FC-0001 (term card · OUT-2.1.1)

  • Front: Client-lawyer relationship
  • Definition: The relationship that triggers a lawyer's full duties. It forms when the lawyer agrees to help, or fails to clearly decline when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know a person is reasonably relying on the lawyer. An authorized tribunal's appointment also creates it.
  • Explanation: No written agreement and no fee are needed. Giving specific legal advice about a person's own problem is the usual way it forms informally.
  • Example: A lawyer at a barbecue who tells a guest exactly when to file her injury claim, knowing she'll rely on it, may have formed a client-lawyer relationship.
  • Exam trap: "No fee, no client" is wrong. Free advice that is reasonably relied on counts.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 14
  • Related terms: Duty to inquire · Limited-scope representation

FC-0002 (term card · OUT-2.1.2)

  • Front: Duty to inquire
  • Definition: Before taking a matter, and again as it goes on, a lawyer must find out enough about the client and the job to judge whether it is proper to take it or keep it.
  • Explanation: The inquiry is risk-based. Warning signs of crime or fraud, such as unexplained cash or unusual fund transfers, call for more questions before the lawyer proceeds.
  • Example: A new client wants to route $2 million through the lawyer's trust account for a "quick" property purchase with no clear source of funds. The lawyer must look into it before proceeding.
  • Exam trap: The duty applies at intake and throughout the representation, not just at the first meeting.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(a), first sentence (2023 amendment); ABA Formal Op. 513 (2024) (advisory)
  • Related terms: Assisting client crime or fraud · Mandatory withdrawal

FC-0003 (term card · OUT-2.2.1)

  • Front: Objectives of representation
  • Definition: The goals the client wants to reach, such as winning, settling or closing a deal. The client decides them.
  • Explanation: The lawyer must abide by the client's decisions about objectives. Four decisions are always the client's: settlement, and in a criminal case the plea, jury waiver and whether to testify.
  • Example: A client who wants to settle quickly for less than full value may do so, even if the lawyer thinks trial would bring more.
  • Exam trap: A lawyer who overrides the client's goal, however well-meaning, violates MR 1.2(a).
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a)
  • Related terms: Means of representation · Actual authority

FC-0004 (term card · OUT-2.2.1)

  • Front: Means of representation
  • Definition: The tactics and strategy used to reach the client's objectives. Clients normally defer to the lawyer on technical and tactical questions; lawyers usually defer to the client on expense and concern for third persons.
  • Explanation: MR 1.2(a) requires consultation about means as MR 1.4 provides. The Rule doesn't say how a means disagreement is resolved. If it is fundamental, the lawyer may withdraw or the client may discharge the lawyer.
  • Example: Which expert to call and which motions to file are generally means decisions for the lawyer, after consultation.
  • Exam trap: Means decisions still require consultation. The lawyer can't simply ignore the client.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); cmt. [2]; MR 1.4(a)(2)
  • Related terms: Objectives of representation

FC-0005 (term card · OUT-2.2.3)

  • Front: Limited-scope representation
  • Definition: An agreement that the lawyer will handle only part of a matter. It is allowed if the limit is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.
  • Explanation: The limit can't be so narrow that competent representation becomes impossible, and it can't waive duties the Rules impose. The Model Rule doesn't require a writing, though one is wise.
  • Example: Reviewing a lease for a flat fee without negotiating it is a reasonable limit if the client understands and agrees.
  • Exam trap: Limiting scope doesn't limit competence. Within the scope, the lawyer must do competent work.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(c); cmts. [6]–[8]
  • Related terms: Client-lawyer relationship · Reasonable communication

FC-0006 (term card · OUT-2.3.1)

  • Front: Assisting client crime or fraud
  • Definition: Knowingly counseling a client to engage in, or assisting a client in, conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. It is prohibited.
  • Explanation: A lawyer may explain the legal consequences of any proposed conduct and may help a client test the validity or meaning of a law in good faith. If the lawyer learns the client is using the lawyer's services for a crime or fraud, the lawyer must stop and must withdraw from the matter (unless a tribunal orders otherwise).
  • Example: Explaining the penalties for not reporting cash income is proper. Keeping books designed to hide it, or advising how to avoid detection, is not.
  • Exam trap: The standard is "knows." Honest analysis of the law isn't assisting; recommending how to commit or conceal the wrongdoing is.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(d); cmts. [9]–[13]
  • Related terms: Duty to inquire · Permissive withdrawal

FC-0007 (term card · OUT-2.4.1)

  • Front: Actual authority
  • Definition: Authority the client actually gives the lawyer, expressly by words or impliedly because it's reasonably needed to carry out the representation.
  • Explanation: Acts within actual authority bind the client. Settlement requires actual authority from the client; being hired to sue doesn't include authority to settle.
  • Example: A client who tells the lawyer "accept anything over $50,000" gives express authority to settle at that level.
  • Exam trap: Retaining a lawyer for litigation doesn't imply authority to settle.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 21, 26
  • Related terms: Apparent authority · Objectives of representation

FC-0008 (term card · OUT-2.4.1)

  • Front: Apparent authority
  • Definition: Authority a third party reasonably believes the lawyer has because of the client's own words or conduct toward that third party.
  • Explanation: Apparent authority can bind the client to an act the client didn't actually authorize, but it must come from the client's manifestations, not the lawyer's own claims.
  • Example: A client who tells opposing counsel "my lawyer speaks for me on settlement" may be bound when the lawyer accepts an offer.
  • Exam trap: The lawyer's own statement that she has authority does not create apparent authority.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 27
  • Related terms: Actual authority

FC-0009 (term card · OUT-2.5.1)

  • Front: Decision-making limitations (formerly "diminished capacity")
  • Definition: Substantial difficulty, even with appropriate supports or accommodations, in receiving and understanding information, evaluating it, or making or communicating decisions.
  • Explanation: The test is functional, not a diagnosis. Limitations can vary by issue, by degree and over time. As far as reasonably possible, the lawyer keeps an ordinary client-lawyer relationship, with supports: she talks directly with the client and gives the client's views weight.
  • Example: A client with early dementia can still decide many things about her will; the lawyer should involve her directly.
  • Exam trap: A decision-making limitation doesn't make the family the client. The lawyer still represents the person.
  • Cite: MR 1.14(a) (as amended Feb. 2026); cmts. [2], [13]
  • Related terms: Protective action · Supported decision-making

FC-0010 (term card · OUT-2.5.2)

  • Front: Protective action
  • Definition: Reasonably necessary steps a lawyer may take when the lawyer reasonably believes a client has a decision-making limitation, is at risk of substantial harm unless action is taken, and can't adequately act in their own interest.
  • Explanation: Examples include consulting family or professionals, a reconsideration period, a durable power of attorney, or an adult-protective agency. A court appointment is considered only if less restrictive steps won't work. The lawyer may reveal information, but only as far as she reasonably believes necessary to protect the client, and must tell the client about the action taken.
  • Example: A client is about to deed her house to a new acquaintance. Even after a plain-language explanation in a quiet meeting, she can't say what the deed does, and she won't agree to wait. Her lawyer may call the client's adult son to help, revealing only what is needed, and must tell the client.
  • Exam trap: MR 1.14(b) permits protective action rather than requiring it, though other duties can require action (e.g., seeking a competency evaluation in a criminal case, cmt. [8]). The least restrictive option comes first.
  • Cite: MR 1.14(b), (c); cmts. [8], [12], [15], [17]; ABA Formal Op. 525 (2026) (advisory) (ethics-opinion guidance on protective action and guardianship as last resort)
  • Related terms: Decision-making limitations

FC-0011 (term card · OUT-2.6.1)

  • Front: Reasonable communication
  • Definition: The duty to keep the client informed and consulted: promptly inform of decisions needing consent, consult about means, report status, answer reasonable requests, explain limits on what the lawyer can do, and explain enough for informed decisions.
  • Explanation: Settlement offers in civil cases and plea offers in criminal cases must be communicated promptly, unless the client has already said how to handle offers of that kind.
  • Example: A lawyer who receives a settlement offer on Friday should tell the client promptly, not wait until the next scheduled meeting a month later.
  • Exam trap: "The offer was too low to mention" is no excuse without the client's prior instruction.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(a), (b); cmt. [2]
  • Related terms: Withholding information · Objectives of representation

FC-0012 (term card · OUT-2.6.2)

  • Front: Withholding information
  • Definition: Briefly holding back news from a client for the client's own protection: allowed in rare cases where hearing it at once would likely lead the client to act rashly. This is separate from limits imposed by a rule or court order, and from the brief consultation or quick correction allowed before disclosing a lawyer's own material error (S05 OUT-5.2.2). Concealing an error to protect the lawyer is never allowed.
  • Explanation: A lawyer may never keep information from a client to benefit the lawyer, to save the lawyer trouble, or to benefit someone else. Court orders limiting disclosure must be followed and explained.
  • Example: A lawyer may briefly delay sharing a psychiatric report that the examining psychiatrist says would harm the client to hear immediately.
  • Exam trap: Hiding the lawyer's own mistake is never permitted withholding. A material error must be disclosed promptly to a current client (MR 1.4 cmt. [8], Aug. 2026).
  • Cite: MR 1.4 cmts. [7]–[8]
  • Related terms: Reasonable communication

FC-0013 (term card · OUT-2.7.1)

  • Front: Reasonable fee
  • Definition: A fee that is reasonable in light of MR 1.5(a)'s eight factors, including time and skill, customary fees, the amount involved and results, and whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
  • Explanation: Reasonableness is tested when the fee is agreed and again when it's charged and collected. Expenses must also be reasonable, and general overhead can't be billed as an expense without agreement.
  • Example: Billing ten hours for a two-hour task because "the result was worth it" is unreasonable.
  • Exam trap: The client's agreement doesn't make an unreasonable fee reasonable.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(a); cmt. [1]
  • Related terms: Contingent fee · Nonrefundable fee

FC-0014 (term card · OUT-2.7.3)

  • Front: Contingent fee
  • Definition: A fee that depends on the outcome, usually a percentage of any recovery. It must be in a writing signed by the client that states how it's calculated.
  • Explanation: The writing must state the percentages on settlement, trial or appeal; the expenses deducted; whether expenses come out before or after the fee; and expenses the client owes regardless of outcome. Contingent fees are barred in criminal defense and for obtaining a divorce, alimony, support or a property settlement.
  • Example: A one-third personal-injury fee in a signed agreement stating all required terms is proper.
  • Exam trap: A lawyer's confirming email isn't enough. The client must sign.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(c), (d)
  • Related terms: Closing statement · Reasonable fee

FC-0015 (term card · OUT-2.7.3)

  • Front: Closing statement
  • Definition: The written statement a lawyer must give at the end of a contingent-fee matter, showing the outcome and, if there's a recovery, the amount paid to the client and how it was calculated.
  • Explanation: The closing statement lets the client check the fee and expense math against the signed agreement.
  • Example: After a $90,000 settlement, the lawyer gives the client a statement showing the one-third fee, the $4,000 in expenses, and the client's net share.
  • Exam trap: It's required for contingent-fee matters regardless of whether the client asks for it.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(c)
  • Related terms: Contingent fee

FC-0016 (term card · OUT-2.7.4)

  • Front: Fee division between lawyers
  • Definition: Splitting one fee between lawyers in different firms. It is allowed only if the split is proportional to the work or each assumes joint responsibility, the client agrees to each lawyer's share in writing-confirmed form, and the total is reasonable.
  • Explanation: A referring lawyer who does no work may share the fee only by assuming joint responsibility for the whole representation. The rule doesn't apply within one firm.
  • Example: A 30/70 split between a referring lawyer and a trial lawyer is proper if the referrer takes joint responsibility, the client agrees to the shares (confirmed in writing), and the total fee is reasonable.
  • Exam trap: The client must agree to the share each lawyer gets, not just to the fact of a split. And a lawyer who has a disqualifying conflict in the matter can't take a share (cmt. [7], Aug. 2026).
  • Cite: MR 1.5(e); cmt. [7]; ABA Formal Op. 474 (advisory)
  • Related terms: Reasonable fee

FC-0017 (term card · OUT-2.7.5)

  • Front: Advance fee
  • Definition: A fee paid before the work is done. It remains the client's property until earned, so it must be deposited in the client trust account and withdrawn only as earned.
  • Explanation: When the representation ends, any unearned part must be refunded.
  • Example: A $5,000 advance against hourly billing goes into trust; the lawyer withdraws $1,200 after billing six hours.
  • Exam trap: Depositing an advance fee into the firm's operating account is commingling.
  • Cite: MR 1.15(c); MR 1.16(d)
  • Related terms: General retainer · Nonrefundable fee

FC-0018 (term card · OUT-2.7.5)

  • Front: General retainer
  • Definition: A fee paid to secure a lawyer's availability for a period, rather than for specific work. It may be earned when paid, but it must be reasonable.
  • Explanation: Because it pays for availability, not services, a true general retainer isn't an advance fee held against future work. Labeling a fee a "retainer" doesn't make it one if it really pays for specific services.
  • Example: A company pays a lawyer $3,000 a month to be available for its questions, with work billed separately.
  • Exam trap: Many "retainers" are really advance fees that must go into trust.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(a); MR 1.15(c)
  • Related terms: Advance fee

FC-0019 (term card · OUT-2.7.5)

  • Front: Nonrefundable fee
  • Definition: A fee labeled as not refundable. The label doesn't override the reasonableness requirement or the duty to refund any unearned fee when the representation ends.
  • Explanation: If the client fires the lawyer early, the lawyer must refund what hasn't been earned, whatever the agreement says.
  • Example: A "$10,000 nonrefundable" flat fee for a trial must be largely refunded if the client fires the lawyer after one meeting.
  • Exam trap: "Nonrefundable" isn't a magic word.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(a) and cmt. [4]; MR 1.16(d)
  • Related terms: Advance fee · Duties on termination

FC-0020 (term card · OUT-2.8.1)

  • Front: Mandatory withdrawal
  • Definition: Withdrawal the lawyer must make when continuing will violate the Rules or other law, the lawyer's condition materially impairs the representation, the lawyer is discharged, or the client persists in using the lawyer's services for a crime or fraud after being told the limits.
  • Explanation: A client may ordinarily discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, but still owes for work done. Appointed counsel (cmt. [5]) and a client who lacks capacity to discharge (cmt. [6]) are the exceptions. A tribunal may order the lawyer to continue despite a ground to withdraw.
  • Example: A lawyer whose client insists on using the lawyer to complete an ongoing fraud must withdraw.
  • Exam trap: The client needs no reason to fire the lawyer.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(a)(1)–(4); cmt. [4]
  • Related terms: Permissive withdrawal · Leave of court

FC-0021 (term card · OUT-2.8.2)

  • Front: Permissive withdrawal
  • Definition: Withdrawal a lawyer may choose, including when it causes no material adverse effect on the client, or on six other listed grounds.
  • Explanation: The other six: the client keeps drawing on the lawyer's work for what the lawyer reasonably believes is a crime or fraud; the client already used that work for one; the client demands something the lawyer finds repugnant or there is a fundamental disagreement; after a reasonable warning, the client's substantial failure to meet its obligations to the lawyer continues; staying on would be an unreasonable financial burden, or the client has made the work unreasonably difficult; or some other good cause.
  • Example: A client who hasn't paid for six months, after a written warning, may be dropped, subject to the court's permission in a pending case.
  • Exam trap: Nonpayment requires a reasonable warning first.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(b)
  • Related terms: Mandatory withdrawal · Duties on termination

FC-0022 (term card · OUT-2.8.3)

  • Front: Leave of court
  • Definition: A tribunal's permission to withdraw, where its rules require it. If the tribunal orders the lawyer to continue, the lawyer must continue.
  • Explanation: When the real reason for withdrawal is confidential, the lawyer should say only that professional considerations require withdrawal.
  • Example: Defense counsel who wants out a week before trial must move for leave. If the judge denies it, counsel must try the case.
  • Exam trap: A valid reason to withdraw doesn't excuse leaving a pending case without the required permission.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(c); cmt. [3]
  • Related terms: Mandatory withdrawal

FC-0023 (term card · OUT-2.8.4)

  • Front: Duties on termination
  • Definition: Reasonably practicable steps to protect the client when a representation ends, such as reasonable notice, time to hire new counsel, return of papers and property the client is entitled to, and refund of unearned fees and unincurred expenses.
  • Explanation: These apply however the relationship ends, even when the client fires the lawyer or hasn't paid. A lawyer may keep papers only to the extent other law allows.
  • Example: A fired lawyer must promptly give the client her file and warn of an upcoming deadline.
  • Exam trap: Holding the file hostage in a way that harms the client violates MR 1.16(d).
  • Cite: MR 1.16(d); cmt. [9]
  • Related terms: Nonrefundable fee · Permissive withdrawal

FC-0024 (concept card · OUT-2.2.1)

  • Front: Four decisions always reserved to the client
  • Definition: Whether to settle; and in a criminal case, what plea to enter, whether to waive a jury trial, and whether to testify.
  • Explanation: These go to the heart of the client's objectives and rights. The lawyer must consult and advise, but the client decides.
  • Example: Even if counsel is certain the client will lose, the client decides whether to take the plea.
  • Exam trap: Don't list "which witnesses to call." That's a means question, on which clients normally defer to the lawyer after consultation.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a)
  • Related terms: Objectives of representation

FC-0025 (concept card · OUT-2.2.1)

  • Front: Can a client give advance settlement authority?
  • Definition: Yes. A client may authorize the lawyer in advance to accept or reject offers within set limits, and may revoke that authority at any time.
  • Explanation: With advance authority, the lawyer need not relay offers that fall clearly within the client's instructions. But the lawyer may rely on it only absent a material change in circumstances, and must still keep the client reasonably informed (MR 1.4).
  • Example: "Reject anything under $75,000 without calling me" lets the lawyer reject a $40,000 offer without consulting.
  • Exam trap: Without advance instructions, every offer must be communicated.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a) cmt. [3]; MR 1.4 cmt. [2]
  • Related terms: Actual authority

FC-0026 (concept card · OUT-2.2.2)

  • Front: Does representing a client endorse the client's views?
  • Definition: No. Representing a client doesn't endorse the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities.
  • Explanation: The rule supports access to counsel for unpopular clients and causes.
  • Example: A lawyer defending a controversial speaker isn't taken to share the speaker's views.
  • Exam trap: This is a statement of principle, not a duty to accept any client.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(b)
  • Related terms: Objectives of representation

FC-0027 (concept card · OUT-2.3.1)

  • Front: What may a lawyer do when a client asks about illegal conduct?
  • Definition: Explain the legal consequences of the proposed conduct, and help the client test the validity, scope or meaning of the law in good faith.
  • Explanation: The line is between honest analysis and assisting. Recommending how to commit or conceal the conduct crosses it. If the client proceeds, the lawyer may not help and must tell the client what the lawyer can't do; if the client seeks to use or keeps using the lawyer's services for it, the lawyer must decline or withdraw (MR 1.16(a)(4)).
  • Example: A client asks what would happen if she backdated an invoice to claim a deduction in an earlier tax year. The lawyer may explain the civil and criminal exposure. She may not suggest how to backdate the documents so an auditor won't notice.
  • Exam trap: "Discussing" a crime is not "assisting" one.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(d); MR 1.4(a)(5)
  • Related terms: Assisting client crime or fraud

FC-0028 (concept card · OUT-2.3.1)

  • Front: What is a "noisy withdrawal"?
  • Definition: Withdrawing from a fraud-tainted representation and giving notice of the withdrawal, while disaffirming (telling those relying on it that it is withdrawn) any opinion, document or affirmation the lawyer prepared that is being used in the fraud.
  • Explanation: Withdrawing quietly may leave the lawyer's work product in use as part of the fraud. The comments to MR 1.2 and MR 4.1 contemplate disaffirmance.
  • Example: A lawyer who discovers her client is using her opinion letter to mislead investors withdraws and notifies the recipients that the opinion is withdrawn.
  • Exam trap: Disclosing confidential facts goes beyond disaffirming and must fit an MR 1.6 exception. Where MR 1.6 permits it, MR 4.1(b) may require disclosure to a third person to avoid assisting the fraud.
  • Cite: MR 1.2 cmt. [10]; MR 4.1 cmt. [3]
  • Related terms: Assisting client crime or fraud

FC-0029 (concept card · OUT-2.4.1)

  • Front: Does hiring a lawyer to sue give authority to settle?
  • Definition: No. Settlement requires the client's actual authority. An unauthorized settlement generally doesn't bind the client unless the client created apparent authority.
  • Explanation: Agency law and MR 1.2(a) both point the same way: settlement is the client's decision.
  • Example: A lawyer who accepts an offer without asking the client has usually made a settlement the client can reject, and is subject to discipline.
  • Exam trap: Opposing counsel's reliance on the lawyer's own word doesn't create apparent authority.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 27
  • Related terms: Actual authority · Apparent authority

FC-0030 (concept card · OUT-2.5.2)

  • Front: Three conditions for protective action
  • Definition: The lawyer reasonably believes the client has a decision-making limitation, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and can't adequately act in their own interest.
  • Explanation: When all three are met, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action and reveal information only as reasonably necessary.
  • Example: A client with severe memory loss can't follow what a transfer means even after a plain-language explanation and help from his trusted niece. A new acquaintance is pressing him to sign away his savings this week, and he has no agent or guardian who could step in. That meets all three.
  • Exam trap: Mere disagreement with the client's choices isn't a decision-making limitation.
  • Cite: MR 1.14(b), (c) (as amended Feb. 2026)
  • Related terms: Protective action · Decision-making limitations

FC-0031 (concept card · OUT-2.6.1)

  • Front: Must every settlement offer be communicated?
  • Definition: Yes, promptly, unless the client has already said the offer would be acceptable or unacceptable, or has authorized the lawyer to accept or reject it.
  • Explanation: The same rule applies to plea offers in criminal cases. Communicating the offer lets the client make the decision that belongs to the client.
  • Example: A defense lawyer must promptly tell the client about a plea offer, even one the lawyer would advise rejecting.
  • Exam trap: The lawyer's view of the offer's merit doesn't excuse silence.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(a)(1); cmt. [2]
  • Related terms: Reasonable communication

FC-0032 (concept card · OUT-2.7.1)

  • Front: The eight factors for a reasonable fee
  • Definition: Effort, difficulty and skill demanded; other work the lawyer must turn away (if the client could see that); what local lawyers usually charge; what's at stake and what was achieved; time pressure; the kind and length of the relationship; the lawyer's experience, standing and ability; whether payment depends on the outcome (fixed or contingent).
  • Explanation: No single factor controls. The fee must be reasonable when agreed and when charged.
  • Example: A higher rate may be reasonable for an urgent matter that forces the lawyer to turn down other work.
  • Exam trap: Client agreement alone doesn't make a fee reasonable. And the eight listed factors aren't exhaustive; other relevant considerations may count.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(a)(1)–(8)
  • Related terms: Reasonable fee

FC-0033 (concept card · OUT-2.7.2)

  • Front: Which fee agreements must be in writing?
  • Definition: Under MR 1.5, two kinds. Contingent-fee agreements must be in a writing signed by the client, and fee divisions between firms must be agreed to by the client and confirmed in writing. (A fee paid in property may also be a business transaction requiring MR 1.8(a)'s writings.)
  • Explanation: For other fees, the basis or rate must be communicated, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after the work starts.
  • Example: An ordinary hourly engagement explained orally and never put in writing doesn't violate MR 1.5(b), though a letter is better practice.
  • Exam trap: "Preferably in writing" is not "must be in writing."
  • Cite: MR 1.5(b), (c), (e); MR 1.5 cmt. [4]; MR 1.8(a)
  • Related terms: Contingent fee · Fee division between lawyers

FC-0034 (concept card · OUT-2.7.3)

  • Front: Prohibited contingent fees
  • Definition: Two categories. Domestic-relations fees contingent on securing a divorce or on the amount of alimony, support or a property settlement; and contingent fees for defending a criminal case.
  • Explanation: A contingent fee to collect past-due alimony or support after the divorce is allowed.
  • Example: "20% of your alimony award" is prohibited. "20% of the back child support I collect" is allowed.
  • Exam trap: The ban is on fees for obtaining the divorce or award, not on post-judgment collection.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(d); cmt. [6]
  • Related terms: Contingent fee

FC-0035 (concept card · OUT-2.7.3)

  • Front: What must a contingent-fee agreement state?
  • Definition: The method of calculation and percentages on settlement, trial or appeal; the litigation and other expenses deducted; whether expenses are deducted before or after the fee; and expenses the client pays regardless of outcome.
  • Explanation: The agreement must be in a writing signed by the client. At the end, the lawyer must give a written closing statement.
  • Example: "33% if settled before trial, 40% if tried, 45% if appealed; court costs, expert fees and deposition costs are deducted from the recovery before the fee is calculated; the client pays the filing fee whether or not she recovers." That covers every required term.
  • Exam trap: "Before or after expenses" changes the client's net recovery, which is why it must be stated.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(c)
  • Related terms: Contingent fee · Closing statement

FC-0036 (concept card · OUT-2.8.1)

  • Front: Four grounds for mandatory withdrawal
  • Definition: Continuing will violate the Rules or other law; the lawyer's own health, physical or mental, materially impairs her handling of the matter; the lawyer is discharged; or the client persists in using the lawyer's services for a crime or fraud after the lawyer explains the limits.
  • Explanation: The same grounds require declining a representation at the start. A tribunal may still order the lawyer to continue.
  • Example: A lawyer undergoing treatment that leaves him unable to concentrate on a complex trial must withdraw.
  • Exam trap: None of these grounds covers mere dislike of the client. Dislike alone never requires withdrawal and permits it only if another MR 1.16(b) ground applies (such as leaving without material adverse effect, or the client insisting on action the lawyer finds repugnant); court permission and termination duties still apply.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(a)(1)–(4)
  • Related terms: Mandatory withdrawal

FC-0037 (concept card · OUT-2.8.2)

  • Front: When may a lawyer withdraw for nonpayment?
  • Definition: When the client substantially fails to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer, such as paying the fee, after reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is met.
  • Explanation: In a pending case, the tribunal's permission may also be needed, and the lawyer must still protect the client's interests on the way out.
  • Example: After two written warnings about a six-month-old unpaid bill, the lawyer may move to withdraw.
  • Exam trap: No warning, no withdrawal on this ground.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(b)(5), (c), (d)
  • Related terms: Permissive withdrawal

FC-0038 (concept card · OUT-2.8.4)

  • Front: Must a lawyer refund part of a flat fee if fired early?
  • Definition: Yes. On termination, the lawyer must refund any advance payment of a fee that hasn't been earned, even if the agreement called it nonrefundable.
  • Explanation: The client may fire the lawyer at any time. The lawyer keeps only what was reasonably earned for the work done.
  • Example: A lawyer paid a $6,000 flat fee who is fired after drafting one letter must refund most of it.
  • Exam trap: A "nonrefundable" label doesn't defeat MR 1.16(d).
  • Cite: MR 1.16(d); MR 1.5 cmt. [4]
  • Related terms: Nonrefundable fee · Duties on termination

FC-0039 (concept card · OUT-2.7.5)

  • Front: May a lawyer accept property as a fee?
  • Definition: Yes, if the fee is reasonable. But taking an interest in the client's business or other property may be a business transaction under MR 1.8(a), and an interest in the subject of the litigation is generally barred by MR 1.8(i).
  • Explanation: Property fees raise valuation and overreaching risks, so the business-transaction safeguards apply: terms fair and reasonable and fully disclosed in writing the client can understand; written advice that the client should seek independent counsel, and a reasonable opportunity to do so; and the client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms and the lawyer's role, including whether the lawyer represents the client in the transaction.
  • Example: A lawyer who takes 5% of a start-up's shares as the fee for forming it must meet MR 1.8(a)'s requirements.
  • Exam trap: Taking a share of the very claim being litigated isn't allowed, except a contingent fee in a civil case or a lawful lien.
  • Cite: MR 1.5 cmt. [4]; MR 1.8(a), (i)
  • Related terms: Reasonable fee · Advance fee

FC-0040 (term card · OUT-2.5.1)

  • Front: Supported decision-making
  • Definition: An arrangement in which a client chooses trusted people to help her understand information and make and communicate her own decisions. The client still decides.
  • Explanation: The amended MR 1.14 asks lawyers to consider supports like this before anything more restrictive, such as a guardianship.
  • Example: A client with an intellectual disability asks her sister to attend meetings and help her go over settlement options. The lawyer allows it, keeps privilege in mind, and takes instructions from the client.
  • Exam trap: The helper doesn't become the decision-maker or the client.
  • Cite: MR 1.14 (as amended Feb. 2026) and cmts.
  • Related terms: Decision-making limitations · Protective action
  • v1.1: new card for the amended rule.

FC-0041 (concept card · OUT-2.2.4)

  • Front: Malpractice arbitration clause vs. malpractice cap
  • Definition: An agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims is allowed if it is enforceable under applicable law and the client is fully informed of its scope and effect. An agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's malpractice liability is banned unless the client is independently represented in making it.
  • Explanation: An enforceable arbitration clause chooses the forum but leaves the lawyer's substantive liability intact. A cap or waiver reduces what the client can recover, so the client needs independent representation before agreeing to it.
  • Example: An engagement letter says malpractice disputes go to binding arbitration. The lawyer fully explains the clause's scope and effects, including giving up a jury and most appeal rights, and the clause is enforceable under local law. Proper. A clause capping liability at the fees paid, signed without independent counsel, is not.
  • Exam trap: Don't treat the arbitration clause as a liability limit.
  • Cite: MR 1.8(h)(1); cmt. [17]
  • Related terms: Limited-scope representation

Multiple choice

MC-0001 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.1 · OUT-2.1.1)

At a neighborhood cookout, Hartley tells Attorney Beaumont that she slipped on a grocery store's wet floor eight months ago. Beaumont says, "You have a good case. In this state you have three years to file, so no rush." Hartley thanks him and relies on his advice. Beaumont charges nothing and never signs an agreement. The actual limitations period is one year.

Did a client-lawyer relationship arise?

  • A. No, because a person who consults about possibly hiring a lawyer is a prospective client, and Hartley just chatted with Beaumont at a cookout.
  • B. No, because a lawyer is free to decline a representation, and Beaumont never said he would take Hartley's case.
  • C. Yes, because a relationship arises when a lawyer gives advice he should know will be relied on, and Hartley relied on Beaumont's advice.
  • D. No, because MR 6.5 relaxes the conflict rules for short-term advice through a court or nonprofit program, and Beaumont's advice was brief.
  • Answer: C. A relationship can form without a fee or written agreement when a lawyer gives specific advice about a person's own problem and the person reasonably relies on it.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.18 covers someone consulting about a possible representation. Beaumont went further: he gave specific advice on Hartley's own problem that he should have known she would rely on, which made her a client.
  • B is wrong: A lawyer may decline, but Beaumont didn't. He gave the advice, and a relationship forms when the lawyer provides services knowing the person reasonably relies on them (Rest. § 14).
  • D is wrong: MR 6.5 applies only to services through a program sponsored by a nonprofit or a court. A cookout isn't one, and even under MR 6.5 a client-lawyer relationship exists.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 14; MR 1.18; MR 6.5 · Key terms: Client-lawyer relationship

MC-0002 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.1 · OUT-2.1.1)

Attorney Ramsey handled an earlier matter for Nguyen and told her at its end, "Send me anything new and I'll take care of it." A year later Nguyen emails Ramsey a detailed description of a contract dispute, notes that the limitations period runs in a month, and writes that she will "assume you're handling this unless I hear otherwise." Ramsey reads the email the same day but never replies. Nguyen does nothing further, and the limitations period expires.

Which is the most accurate statement?

  • A. No relationship formed, because MR 1.18 governs a person who discusses a possible representation, and Nguyen merely described a new dispute.
  • B. A relationship formed, because failing to decline despite known reliance can create one, and Ramsey read Nguyen's email and stayed silent.
  • C. No relationship formed, because duties to a former client are governed by MR 1.9, and Ramsey's earlier matter for Nguyen had ended.
  • D. No relationship formed, because a person's one-sided statement can't by itself create one, and Nguyen merely wrote that she would "assume" Ramsey had it.
  • Answer: B. A relationship can arise when a lawyer fails to clearly decline and knows or reasonably should know the person is relying on the lawyer. Ramsey invited new matters, read the email and stayed silent.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.18 covers a person discussing a possible representation, but Ramsey's invitation to send new matters, his reading of the email and his silence despite known reliance can make Nguyen a current client.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.9 governs duties on the old matter. It doesn't stop a new relationship forming on a new matter, which Ramsey's invitation and silence can create.
  • D is wrong: Her statement alone wouldn't do it, but it isn't alone: Ramsey had invited new matters and stayed silent after reading her email, knowing of the deadline and her reliance (Rest. § 14).
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 14; MR 1.9; MR 1.18 · Key terms: Client-lawyer relationship

MC-0003 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.1 · OUT-2.1.2)

A new client asks Attorney Solberg to buy a $3 million condominium through a newly formed company, pay with a wire from an overseas account the client won't identify, and close within 48 hours. The client refuses to explain the source of the funds. Solberg sees no other work involved.

What is Solberg's proper course before accepting the matter?

  • A. Accept, because the client sets the objectives of the representation, and buying a condominium through a company is lawful.
  • B. Inquire first, because a lawyer must look into facts suggesting a risk of assisting crime, and Solberg's client hides the funds' source.
  • C. Accept, because MR 1.2(d) bars assisting conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, and Solberg doesn't know the funds are illicit.
  • D. Report the client, because MR 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure to prevent a client crime or fraud using the lawyer's services, and the wire suggests laundering.
  • Answer: B. The duty to inquire is risk-based, and these facts are classic warning signs. A lawyer must decline a representation that would result in assisting a crime or fraud.
  • A is wrong: The client does set lawful objectives, but that doesn't relieve the lawyer of the duty to inquire when red flags suggest the lawful-looking purchase may be used for a crime or fraud (MR 1.16(a) cmts.).
  • C is wrong: Knowledge can be inferred from circumstances (MR 1.0(f)), and the 2023 comments require inquiry when facts like these show a risk. Solberg can't avoid knowledge by not asking.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.6(b)(2) reaches only a client's fraud or crime that is reasonably certain to cause another person substantial financial injury, and only where the client has drawn on the lawyer's work to carry it out. Solberg has only unexplained red flags, no reasonably certain injury, and, independently, the client hasn't used his services.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(a) and cmts. (2023); MR 1.2(d); MR 1.0(f); MR 1.6(b)(2) · Key terms: Duty to inquire, Assisting client crime or fraud

MC-0004 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.1 · OUT-2.1.2)

Attorney Keller is recovering from surgery and is taking medication that makes it difficult to concentrate for more than a few minutes. A longtime client asks Keller to try a complex two-week commercial case starting next month. Keller's doctor says the effects will last at least three months.

What must Keller do?

  • A. Accept, because a client can give informed consent to many conflicts of interest, and Keller's longtime client is willing to accept the risk.
  • B. Accept, because a lawyer can become competent through study and preparation, and Keller has a month before the trial starts.
  • C. Accept, because a lawyer may withdraw when other good cause exists, and Keller can withdraw later if his medication still impairs him.
  • D. Decline, because a lawyer must decline when his condition materially impairs the representation, and Keller's medication does.
  • Answer: D. MR 1.16(a)(2) requires declining (or withdrawing) when the lawyer's own health, physical or mental, materially impairs his handling of the matter.
  • A is wrong: Consent can cure many conflicts under MR 1.7(b), but Keller's problem isn't a conflict. MR 1.16(a)(2) is a mandatory ground the client can't waive.
  • B is wrong: Preparation cures a lack of knowledge or skill (MR 1.1 cmt. [4]). Keller's medication will impair him for at least three months, so study won't fix it before trial.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.16(b)(7) permits withdrawal for good cause, but Keller's impairment already exists, so MR 1.16(a)(2) requires him to decline now.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(a)(2); MR 1.1 cmt. [4]; MR 1.7(b) · Key terms: Mandatory withdrawal

MC-0005 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.2 · OUT-2.2.1)

Attorney Ferris represents Defendant Sandoval on a felony charge. On the morning of trial, the prosecutor offers to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor in exchange for a guilty plea. Ferris is confident of an acquittal and rejects the offer on the spot, without telling Sandoval. Sandoval had never discussed plea offers with Ferris.

Is Ferris subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because clients normally defer to the lawyer on tactical matters, and Ferris responded to a last-minute offer on the morning of trial.
  • B. Yes, because the client decides whether to accept a plea offer, and Ferris rejected the prosecutor's offer without telling Sandoval.
  • C. No, because a lawyer need not relay an offer the client has said in advance is unacceptable, and Ferris was confident Sandoval would refuse.
  • D. Yes, because a conflict arises when a lawyer's own interests materially limit the representation, and Ferris was confident of an acquittal.
  • Answer: B. MR 1.2(a) reserves the plea decision to the client, and MR 1.4 requires prompt communication of plea offers absent prior instruction.
  • A is wrong: Clients do normally defer on tactics, but the plea decision isn't a tactic. MR 1.2(a) reserves it to the client.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.4 cmt. [2] excuses relaying an offer only when the client has said so in advance. Sandoval never discussed plea offers; Ferris's own confidence isn't the client's instruction.
  • D is wrong: A lawyer's honest view of the case isn't a personal interest under MR 1.7(a)(2). The violation is taking a reserved decision and failing to relay the offer.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); MR 1.4(a)(1); cmt. [2]; MR 1.7(a)(2) · Key terms: Objectives of representation, Reasonable communication

MC-0006 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.2 · OUT-2.2.1)

Attorney Alvarez represents Client Byrne in a breach-of-contract suit. Byrne insists that Alvarez call Byrne's brother as a witness. Alvarez believes the brother's testimony, though relevant and admissible, would damage Byrne's credibility with the jury. Alvarez explains this to Byrne, who still insists.

Which statement about Alvarez's authority is most accurate?

  • A. Alvarez must call the brother, because a lawyer must abide by the client's decisions about objectives, and Byrne insists on the witness.
  • B. Alvarez must defer to Byrne, because a lawyer must reasonably consult the client about means, and Byrne has now stated his view twice.
  • C. Alvarez should keep consulting and may withdraw if the rift is fundamental, because clients normally defer on tactics, and Byrne's witness is one.
  • D. Alvarez must withdraw, because withdrawal is mandatory when the representation will result in a rules violation, and Byrne insists on calling his brother.
  • Answer: C. Witness choice is a means question on which clients normally defer to the lawyer. MR 1.2 doesn't say who wins a continuing disagreement about means; the lawyer should seek a mutually acceptable resolution, and if the disagreement is fundamental, the lawyer may withdraw or the client may discharge the lawyer. (cmt. [2])
  • A is wrong: MR 1.2(a) makes the client's objectives binding, but which witness to call is a question of means, not an objective.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.4(a)(2) requires consultation, which Alvarez gave. Consultation doesn't mean deferring, and MR 1.2 doesn't give either side the final word on means (cmt. [2]).
  • D is wrong: MR 1.16(a)(1) applies when continuing will violate the Rules. Calling a relevant, admissible witness whose testimony is strategically harmful violates no rule; this is a tactical disagreement, and even a fundamental one only permits withdrawal (MR 1.16(b)(4)).
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); cmt. [2]; MR 1.4(a)(2); MR 1.16(b)(4) · Key terms: Means of representation

MC-0007 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.2 · OUT-2.2.1)

Client Soto tells Attorney Iverson, "Settle my wrongful-termination case for anything over $80,000; don't bother calling me unless it's less." Two weeks later, the employer offers $95,000. Iverson accepts the offer that day and informs Soto afterward.

Did Iverson act properly?

  • A. Yes, because a client may authorize a lawyer in advance to accept offers, and Soto authorized any offer over $80,000.
  • B. No, because a lawyer must promptly tell the client of a settlement offer, and Iverson accepted the $95,000 before telling Soto.
  • C. No, because the decision whether to settle belongs to the client, and Soto didn't approve the $95,000 offer itself.
  • D. Yes, because apparent authority arises from the client's words to a third party, and the employer believed Iverson could settle.
  • Answer: A. A client may authorize the lawyer in advance to accept offers within limits. Iverson acted within express actual authority.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.4 cmt. [2] excuses prompt consultation when the client has said in advance which offers are acceptable, as Soto did.
  • C is wrong: The client decides, but can decide in advance by giving express authority (MR 1.2 cmt. [3]). Soto did that; he needn't approve the specific offer.
  • D is wrong: Nothing in the facts shows Soto said anything to the employer, and apparent authority answers whether a client is bound, not whether the lawyer acted properly. Iverson had actual authority.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); cmt. [3]; MR 1.4 cmt. [2] · Key terms: Actual authority, Objectives of representation

MC-0008 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.2 · OUT-2.2.1)

Attorney Kaur represents Defendant Ellis on a theft charge. Ellis wants to testify. Kaur believes Ellis's prior convictions will come out on cross-examination and that testifying will almost certainly lead to a conviction. Kaur explains the risks carefully. Ellis still wants to testify. Kaur tells the court that the defense will rest without calling Ellis.

Is Kaur subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because clients normally defer to the lawyer on which witnesses to call, and Kaur judged Ellis a harmful witness.
  • B. Yes, because a criminal defendant decides whether to testify, and Kaur rested over Ellis's wish to take the stand.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may take impliedly authorized actions to carry out the representation, and resting the defense was a trial step.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer must explain matters enough for informed client decisions, and Kaur left Ellis unaware of the risks.
  • Answer: B. MR 1.2(a) reserves the decision to testify to the criminal defendant. Kaur must advise, but Ellis decides.
  • A is wrong: Witness choice is normally a means decision, but whether a criminal defendant testifies is reserved to the client by MR 1.2(a).
  • C is wrong: Implied authority covers means. It can't take a reserved decision away from Ellis.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.4(b) does require that explanation, but Kaur gave it: she explained the risks carefully. The violation is overriding Ellis's decision.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); MR 3.3(a)(3); MR 1.16(b)(4) · Key terms: Objectives of representation

MC-0009 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.2 · OUT-2.2.1)

Client Duarte is charged with a felony. Her lawyer, Attorney Weiss, believes a bench trial before a particular judge would be better than a jury trial. Duarte wants a jury. Weiss files a jury waiver anyway, reasoning that the choice of fact-finder is a matter of trial strategy.

Is Weiss subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a criminal defendant decides whether to waive a jury trial, and Weiss waived one over Duarte's objection.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may take impliedly authorized actions to carry out the representation, and Weiss's waiver was a trial filing.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must reasonably consult the client about the means to be used, and Weiss never discussed the choice with Duarte.
  • D. No, because competence requires the skill reasonably necessary for the matter, and Weiss's bench-trial judgment reflected that skill.
  • Answer: A. The jury-waiver decision is one of the four decisions reserved to the client under MR 1.2(a).
  • B is wrong: Implied authority covers means. MR 1.2(a) reserves the jury-waiver decision to the criminal defendant.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.4(a)(2) requires consultation about means, but the facts show Weiss knew Duarte wanted a jury, and jury waiver isn't a means decision. Consulting wouldn't have let him override her.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.1 concerns knowledge, skill and preparation. Sound judgment doesn't let a lawyer take a reserved decision from the client.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); MR 1.4(a)(2); MR 1.1 · Key terms: Objectives of representation

MC-0010 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.2 · OUT-2.2.3)

For a flat fee of $400, Attorney Kim agrees to review a residential lease for Client Obi and identify risky terms, but not to negotiate with the landlord or appear in any dispute. Kim explains the limits and their consequences, and Obi agrees. Kim does a careful review.

Is the arrangement proper?

  • A. No, because a lawyer can't prospectively limit malpractice liability without independent counsel for the client, and Kim excluded disputes.
  • B. No, because a contingent-fee agreement must be in a writing signed by the client, and Kim's arrangement with Obi wasn't signed.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may limit the scope if the limit is reasonable and the client gives informed consent, and Obi did so.
  • D. No, because a lawyer must explain enough for informed client decisions, and Kim left Obi to handle any landlord dispute alone.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.2(c) permits a limit that is reasonable under the circumstances when the client gives informed consent, and Kim's review within the scope was competent.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.8(h)(1) restricts limits on malpractice liability. A reasonable limit on the scope of the work isn't one (MR 1.2 cmt. [6]).
  • B is wrong: MR 1.5(c) applies to contingent fees. Kim's $400 fee is a flat fee, and MR 1.2(c) requires informed consent, not a signed writing.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.4(b) requires that explanation, and Kim gave it: she explained the limits and their consequences.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(c); cmts. [6]–[8]; MR 1.8(h); MR 1.5(c) · Key terms: Limited-scope representation

MC-0011 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.2 · OUT-2.2.3)

Attorney Levin agrees to defend Client Petrosian at a felony trial for a reduced fee on condition that Levin will "not investigate the facts or interview any witnesses; I'll just go with what the police report says." Petrosian, who can't afford more, agrees in writing after Levin explains the arrangement.

Is the agreement proper?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may limit scope with the client's informed consent, and Petrosian consented in writing after Levin's explanation.
  • B. No, because a limit on scope must be reasonable, and trying Petrosian's felony without investigation can't be done competently.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may charge a reduced fee for reduced services, and Levin cut his fee to match the narrower work.
  • D. No, because a contingent fee in a criminal case is prohibited, and Levin's fee is tied to Petrosian's criminal defense.
  • Answer: B. Defending a felony trial without any investigation isn't a reasonable limit. MR 1.2(c) doesn't allow a client to waive competence.
  • A is wrong: Informed consent is necessary but not sufficient. MR 1.2(c) also requires the limit to be reasonable, and this one isn't.
  • C is wrong: Reduced fees for reduced work are fine only when the reduced work is a reasonable limit. No limit makes a felony defense without investigation competent.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.5(d)(2) bars fees contingent on the outcome. Levin's reduced fee doesn't depend on the outcome; the defect is the unreasonable limit.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(c); cmt. [7]; MR 1.1; MR 1.0(e) · Key terms: Limited-scope representation

MC-0012 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.2 · OUT-2.2.3)

Attorney Brooks agrees with a self-represented tenant to prepare an answer to an eviction complaint that the tenant will file herself. Brooks will not appear in court. The tenant understands and agrees. Brooks drafts a competent answer.

Has Brooks acted properly?

  • A. No, because a lawyer must not make false statements to a tribunal, and Brooks's help will be hidden from the court.
  • B. No, because a lawyer must not assist another in the unauthorized practice of law, and Brooks helped the tenant prepare a court filing.
  • C. No, because a lawyer must provide competent representation, and Brooks won't be in court to defend the answer he drafted.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may reasonably limit scope with informed consent, and Brooks drafted only the tenant's answer with her agreement.
  • Answer: D. Drafting a document for a self-represented person is a classic reasonable limitation, and MR 1.2(c) permits it with informed consent.
  • A is wrong: MR 3.3 bars false statements, but undisclosed drafting help isn't one, and the Model Rules don't require disclosing it (ABA Formal Op. 07-446 (advisory)). Local court rules may differ.
  • B is wrong: MR 5.5(a) bars assisting another in the unauthorized practice of law. A party lawfully representing herself isn't engaged in unauthorized practice (MR 5.5 cmt. [3]).
  • C is wrong: MR 1.1 applies within the agreed scope, and Brooks met it by drafting a competent answer. Not appearing was part of the agreed limit.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(c); MR 5.5 cmt. [3]; MR 3.3; ABA Formal Op. 07-446 · Key terms: Limited-scope representation

MC-0013 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.3 · OUT-2.3.1)

Client Nwosu, who owns a restaurant, asks Attorney Ibarra what would happen if he stopped reporting cash tips on his tax returns. Ibarra explains the civil penalties, interest, and possible criminal prosecution. Nwosu thanks her and leaves. Ibarra does nothing further.

Is Ibarra subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer must not counsel a client to engage in criminal conduct, and Ibarra discussed Nwosu's plan to hide cash tips.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must not assist conduct the lawyer knows is criminal, and Ibarra detailed the penalties Nwosu would face.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may assist a client's good-faith effort to test a law's validity, and Nwosu asked about the tax law.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of a proposed course of conduct, and Ibarra explained Nwosu's.
  • Answer: D. MR 1.2(d) expressly permits explaining the consequences of proposed conduct. Ibarra didn't counsel or assist a crime.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.2(d) bars recommending the crime. Describing its consequences isn't counseling it (cmt. [9]).
  • B is wrong: Assisting means helping carry out the conduct, for example by showing how to hide the income. Explaining penalties does neither.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.2(d) does protect assisting a good-faith effort to determine a law's validity, but Nwosu raised no challenge to the tax law; he asked what would happen if he broke it.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(d); cmts. [9], [12] · Key terms: Assisting client crime or fraud

MC-0014 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.3 · OUT-2.3.1)

Attorney Voss prepares a loan application package for Client Nash's company. After it is submitted, Voss learns from Nash's own files that Nash inflated the company's revenues in documents Voss attached to the application. The bank has not yet funded the loan, and Nash refuses to correct the documents. If Voss withdraws and notifies the bank that she disaffirms the documents she attached, the bank will not rely on them, and no further disclosure is needed to stop the fraud.

What must Voss do?

  • A. Continue, because a lawyer who acts without knowledge of a fraud doesn't violate MR 1.2(d), and Voss prepared the loan package innocently.
  • B. Withdraw and disaffirm, because a lawyer must withdraw when continuing would assist a client fraud, and Nash refuses to correct Voss's documents.
  • C. Disclose to the bank, because a lawyer may reveal information to prevent a client fraud that uses her services, and the loan isn't yet funded by the bank.
  • D. Continue quietly, because a lawyer must keep client information confidential, and Nash's true revenues came from his own confidential files.
  • Answer: B. Voss now knows her services are being used in a fraud. MR 1.2(d) and MR 1.16(a) require her to stop and withdraw, and the comments contemplate disaffirming her work product.
  • A is wrong: Voss's past work was innocent, but she now knows it's being used in an ongoing fraud. Continuing would be assisting it (MR 1.2 cmt. [10]).
  • C is wrong: MR 1.6(b)(2)–(3) permits disclosure but doesn't require it, and the question asks what Voss must do. MR 4.1(b) requires disclosure only when needed to avoid assisting the fraud, and here withdrawal with disaffirmance is enough.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.6(a) governs disclosure, not whether she may keep working. Continuing while her documents are used in the fraud is assisting it, and MR 1.16(a) requires withdrawal.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(d); cmt. [10]; MR 1.16(a)(1), (4); MR 1.6(b)(2)–(3); MR 4.1(b) · Key terms: Assisting client crime or fraud, Mandatory withdrawal

MC-0015 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.3 · OUT-2.3.1)

Client Pryor believes a new city ordinance banning food trucks near restaurants is unconstitutional. Violating the ordinance is a misdemeanor. He asks Attorney Dunn to help him park his food truck in a restricted zone and receive a citation so that he can challenge the ordinance in court. Dunn believes in good faith that the ordinance is invalid, and there is a nonfrivolous basis for the challenge.

May Dunn assist Pryor?

  • A. No, because a lawyer must not assist conduct she knows is criminal, and Pryor's parking would violate the ordinance.
  • B. No, because a lawyer needs a nonfrivolous basis to assert a claim, and no court has yet held Pryor's ordinance invalid.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may assist a good-faith effort to test a law's validity, and Dunn believes the ordinance invalid.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may refer to moral considerations in advising, and Pryor considers the food-truck ban unjust.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.2(d) protects good-faith challenges to a law's validity, even if they require technically violating it to obtain a test case.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.2(d) has an express exception for a good-faith test of a law's validity, even when that requires violating it.
  • B is wrong: MR 3.1 needs a nonfrivolous basis, not a prior ruling, and the facts supply one. The point of a test case is to get a ruling.
  • D is wrong: MR 2.1 permits moral advice but doesn't authorize assisting a violation. And Pryor's claim is that the ordinance is unconstitutional; the test-case exception is what applies.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(d); cmt. [12]; MR 3.1; MR 2.1 · Key terms: Assisting client crime or fraud

MC-0016 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.3 · OUT-2.3.1)

Client Mercer tells Attorney Ahn that he plans to transfer all his assets to his sister to keep them from a creditor who has just won a judgment against him. He asks Ahn to prepare the deeds. Ahn knows the transfers would be fraudulent under state law.

How should Ahn respond?

  • A. Prepare the deeds, because the client decides the objectives of the representation, and Mercer wants his assets moved to his sister.
  • B. Prepare the deeds, because a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of conduct with a client, and Ahn can warn Mercer first.
  • C. Decline and tell the creditor, because a lawyer may reveal information to prevent a client fraud using her services, and Mercer plans a fraud.
  • D. Decline and explain, because a lawyer must not assist known fraud and must explain that limit, and Ahn knows the transfers are fraudulent.
  • Answer: D. MR 1.2(d) bars assisting known fraud. MR 1.4(a)(5) requires explaining the limits on what she can do, and she may explain the consequences.
  • A is wrong: Client control of objectives doesn't extend to an objective the lawyer knows is fraudulent (MR 1.2(d)).
  • B is wrong: Discussing consequences is permitted, but preparing the deeds would be assisting a known fraud, which a warning doesn't cure.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.6(b)(2) applies when the lawyer's services are being used. Ahn declines, so her services aren't used, and the rule permits disclosure without requiring it.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a), (d); MR 1.4(a)(5); MR 1.6(b)(2) · Key terms: Assisting client crime or fraud

MC-0017 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.4 · OUT-2.4.1)

Client Burke hires Attorney Fontaine to sue a contractor for $150,000. Burke never discusses settlement with Fontaine. The contractor's lawyer offers $60,000. Fontaine, believing it's the best Burke will get, accepts in writing on Burke's behalf without contacting Burke.

Is Burke bound by the settlement?

  • A. No, because authority to sue doesn't include authority to settle, and Burke gave Fontaine no settlement authority of any kind, express or implied.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer has implied authority to take steps that carry out the representation, and Fontaine settled Burke's suit.
  • C. Yes, because apparent authority binds a client when a third party reasonably relies on it, and opposing counsel relied on Fontaine.
  • D. No, because settling a malpractice claim with an unrepresented client requires written advice to seek independent counsel, and Fontaine settled without Burke.
  • Answer: A. Settlement authority must come from the client. Retaining a lawyer to sue doesn't give actual authority to settle, and Burke did nothing to create apparent authority, so the settlement generally doesn't bind Burke, and Fontaine is subject to discipline.
  • B is wrong: Implied authority covers steps in carrying out the representation, but settlement is reserved to the client (MR 1.2(a)).
  • C is wrong: Apparent authority must come from the client's own words or conduct toward the third party. Opposing counsel relied on Fontaine's acceptance, not on anything Burke did.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.8(h)(2)'s written advice and reasonable opportunity to consult independent counsel apply only to settling a malpractice claim against the lawyer. Burke's claim is against the contractor.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); MR 1.8(h)(2); Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 26–27 · Key terms: Actual authority, Apparent authority

MC-0018 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.4 · OUT-2.4.1)

Client Espinoza is the plaintiff in a contract suit. Before a mediation, Espinoza privately tells her lawyer, Attorney Pemberton, not to accept less than $200,000. At the mediation, Espinoza tells the defendant and its lawyer, "Attorney Pemberton has full authority to settle this for me; I have to leave early." The defense knows nothing of the private limit. After Espinoza leaves, Pemberton accepts $150,000 and signs the settlement on Espinoza's behalf. Relying on Espinoza's statement, the defendant signs too and dismisses its counterclaim. Nothing gave the defense reason to doubt Pemberton's authority. When Espinoza learns the terms that evening, she immediately objects.

Is Espinoza likely bound by the settlement?

  • A. Yes, because apparent authority arises from the client's words to a third party, and Espinoza told the defense Pemberton had full authority.
  • B. No, because a lawyer has no actual authority beyond the client's instructions, and Pemberton accepted less than Espinoza's $200,000 floor.
  • C. No, because the client decides whether to settle, and Espinoza had left the mediation before Pemberton accepted $150,000.
  • D. Yes, because a client can ratify an unauthorized settlement by accepting its benefits, and Espinoza kept the benefit of the dismissed counterclaim.
  • Answer: A. Apparent authority arises from the client's manifestations to a third party. Espinoza told the defense Pemberton had full authority, the defense didn't know of the limit, and it relied on her words by signing and dismissing its counterclaim.
  • B is wrong: Pemberton did exceed his actual authority, but a client who creates apparent authority is bound to a third party who reasonably relies on it. Pemberton may be liable to Espinoza.
  • C is wrong: The client decides, but can exercise that decision by giving authority. Espinoza's statement gave it as far as the defense was concerned.
  • D is wrong: Ratification is a real doctrine, but Espinoza objected as soon as she learned the terms, so she didn't ratify. She is bound because of her statement before it.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 26–27; MR 1.2(a) · Key terms: Apparent authority

MC-0019 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.4 · OUT-2.4.1)

During discovery in a contract case, Attorney Olsen agrees with opposing counsel to extend the deadline for responding to interrogatories by two weeks and to stipulate that certain business records are authentic. Olsen does not consult his client about either decision, and neither harms the client's position.

Did Olsen act within his authority?

  • A. No, because a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation, and Olsen agreed to a two-week extension.
  • B. Yes, because clients normally defer to lawyers on procedural matters, and Olsen's extension and stipulation were routine.
  • C. No, because the client decides whether to settle a matter, and Olsen's stipulation resolved part of the dispute.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may take protective action for a client with a decision-making limitation, and Olsen acted to protect his client.
  • Answer: B. Routine scheduling and evidentiary stipulations are means decisions the lawyer may make as impliedly authorized to carry out the representation.
  • A is wrong: MR 3.2 requires expediting consistent with the client's interests. A short, harmless extension is a routine courtesy.
  • C is wrong: Settlement is reserved to the client, but an authenticity stipulation doesn't settle any claim. It's a routine evidentiary matter.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.14(b) applies when the client has a decision-making limitation and faces substantial harm. Nothing suggests either.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); cmt. [2]; MR 3.2; MR 1.14(b) · Key terms: Actual authority, Means of representation

MC-0020 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.5 · OUT-2.5.2)

Attorney Thibodeaux has represented Client Farrow, age 84, for years. Farrow has begun to show significant memory loss. Thibodeaux learns that a new acquaintance has persuaded Farrow to sign over her house next week. Thibodeaux meets Farrow at her home, explains the transfer in plain language with a trusted friend present at Farrow's request, and suggests waiting. Farrow still can't explain what the document does, and she plans to sign anyway. Farrow has a close adult daughter.

What may Thibodeaux do?

  • A. Take protective action, such as consulting the daughter, because a lawyer may act to protect a client with diminished capacity who faces substantial harm, and Farrow does.
  • B. Do nothing, because a lawyer must not reveal client information without informed consent, and Farrow hasn't consented to any disclosure to her daughter at all.
  • C. Do nothing, because a lawyer must abide by the client's decisions about objectives, and Farrow has decided to sign the deed.
  • D. Take direction from the daughter, because family members may take part in discussions with the lawyer, and Farrow's daughter is close to her and attends every single meeting.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.14(b) and (c) permit protective action, and disclosure as far as reasonably necessary, when the lawyer reasonably believes the client has a decision-making limitation, faces substantial harm, and can't adequately protect herself.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.14(c) now expressly allows the disclosures the protective step reasonably requires, so Farrow's consent isn't needed.
  • C is wrong: Farrow's authority under MR 1.2(a) continues as far as reasonably possible (MR 1.14(a)), but it is subject to authorized protective action. Farrow can't explain the document and faces substantial harm, so MR 1.14(b) permits it.
  • D is wrong: Family members may take part in discussions (MR 1.14 cmt. [5]), but decisions still come from the client, not the family. Thibodeaux still represents Farrow.
  • Cite: MR 1.14(a)–(c) (2026); cmts. [5], [12], [15], [18]; MR 1.6(a); ABA Formal Op. 525 (2026) (advisory) (ethics opinion) · Key terms: Decision-making limitations, Protective action

MC-0021 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.5 · OUT-2.5.1)

Attorney Gallagher represents a 15-year-old in a juvenile proceeding. No guardian or other legal representative has been appointed for him. The teenager's parents attend every meeting and repeatedly answer questions directed to their son. The teenager is capable of understanding the proceeding and has views about how it should be handled.

How should Gallagher conduct the representation?

  • A. Take direction from the parents, because a lawyer ordinarily looks to a court-appointed representative for decisions, and the parents speak for their son.
  • B. Seek a guardian ad litem, because a lawyer may take protective action for a client at risk of substantial harm, and the client is 15.
  • C. Treat him as an ordinary client as far as possible, because minors can often direct their lawyers, and the teenager understands the proceeding.
  • D. Let the parents answer, because family members may take part in discussions with the lawyer, and the parents attend every meeting.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.14(a) requires an ordinary relationship as far as reasonably possible with a client whose decision-making is limited, including by age. That means speaking with the teenager directly and giving weight to his views; a lawyer for a minor who can give direction ordinarily advocates for the minor's own objectives (cmt. [9]).
  • A is wrong: That applies only to decisions within the authority of a representative actually appointed (cmt. [7]; a guardian ad litem isn't a substitute decision-maker, cmt. [15]). None has been appointed, and Gallagher represents the teenager, not the parents.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.14(b) requires a risk of substantial harm and inability to act in one's own interest. Age alone doesn't show either, and the teenager can take part.
  • D is wrong: Family members may take part when it helps the client (cmt. [5]), but they can't replace the client's own voice. The teenager is capable and has views.
  • Cite: MR 1.14(a), (b); cmts. [4], [5], [7], [9], [15]; ABA Formal Op. 525 (2026) (advisory) (ethics opinion) · Key terms: Decision-making limitations

MC-0022 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.5 · OUT-2.5.1, OUT-2.5.2)

Attorney Novak represents Client Haines, who has a mental illness, in a dispute with a landlord. Haines insists on rejecting a favorable settlement and going to trial. Novak thinks this is unwise but finds that Haines understands the offer, the risks and the likely outcome, and has consistent reasons based on his values.

May Novak take protective action, such as seeking a guardian to accept the settlement?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may take protective action for a client with a decision-making limitation, and Haines has a mental illness.
  • B. Yes, because protective action is allowed when the client risks substantial harm, and rejecting the favorable settlement risks a loss for Haines.
  • C. No, because a client's condition is confidential information, and seeking a guardian would reveal Haines's illness.
  • D. No, because protective action requires a decision-making limitation, and Haines understands the offer, the risks and the likely outcome.
  • Answer: D. Protective action requires a reasonable belief that the client has a decision-making limitation and can't act in his own interest. Disagreement with a capable client's choice doesn't meet that test.
  • A is wrong: A diagnosis alone doesn't establish a decision-making limitation. The lawyer looks at functional abilities for the decision at hand (cmt. [13]).
  • B is wrong: Risk of harm is only one condition. MR 1.14(b) also requires a decision-making limitation, and Haines understands his choice.
  • C is wrong: When protective action is justified, MR 1.14(c) expressly permits disclosure the lawyer reasonably believes necessary. Confidentiality isn't what bars it here; the missing limitation is.
  • Cite: MR 1.14(a)–(c); cmts. [2], [13]; MR 1.2(a); ABA Formal Op. 525 (2026) (advisory) (ethics opinion) · Key terms: Decision-making limitations, Protective action

MC-0023 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.5 · OUT-2.5.2)

Attorney Pike reasonably believes her client, who has advanced dementia, is being financially exploited by a caregiver. To seek a protective order, Pike plans to give the court the client's complete medical history, including decades-old conditions unrelated to her dementia; financial records for the past ten years, although the exploitation began six months ago; and her notes of every conversation with the client, including talks about unrelated estate matters. No court has ordered Pike to produce anything.

Is Pike's planned disclosure proper?

  • A. Yes, because MR 1.14(c) permits disclosure reasonably believed necessary in protective action, and Pike is seeking a protective order.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may reveal information reasonably necessary to comply with a court order, and Pike's filing is going directly to the court.
  • C. No, because a lawyer must not reveal client information without informed consent, and Pike's client can't give consent.
  • D. No, because disclosure is authorized only as far as reasonably necessary to protect the client, and Pike's plan includes unrelated material.
  • Answer: D. MR 1.14(c) limits disclosure to what the lawyer reasonably believes necessary. Unrelated medical conditions, years of records predating the exploitation and unrelated conversations go beyond that.
  • A is wrong: The permission reaches only what Pike reasonably believes necessary. Seeking an order doesn't make decades-old conditions or unrelated conversations necessary.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.6(b)(6) covers complying with an order. No court has ordered anything; Pike is choosing what to file.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.14(c) permits reasonably necessary disclosure without consent. The problem is the excess, not the lack of consent.
  • Cite: MR 1.14(c); cmt. [18]; MR 1.6(a), (b)(6); ABA Formal Op. 525 (2026) (advisory) (ethics opinion) · Key terms: Protective action

MC-0024 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.6 · OUT-2.6.1)

Attorney Grady represents a plaintiff in a car-accident case. On Monday, the defense offers $25,000. Grady thinks the case is worth at least $100,000 and doesn't mention the offer to the client, planning to wait for a better one. The client had never given Grady instructions about settlement offers.

Is Grady subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer need not relay an offer the client has already said is unacceptable, and Grady judged $25,000 to be far too low.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must promptly tell the client of a settlement offer, and Grady's client never gave instructions about offers.
  • C. No, because a lawyer must keep the client reasonably informed about the matter, and Grady planned to tell the client before trial.
  • D. No, because clients normally defer to lawyers on tactics, and Grady was holding out for a better offer.
  • Answer: B. MR 1.4(a)(1) and its comment require prompt communication of settlement offers. The decision to accept or reject is the client's under MR 1.2(a).
  • A is wrong: MR 1.4 cmt. [2] turns on the client's prior instruction, not the lawyer's view. Grady's client gave none.
  • C is wrong: For settlement offers, reasonable communication means prompt communication (cmt. [2]). Waiting until trial isn't prompt.
  • D is wrong: Negotiating tactics can be means, but accepting or rejecting an offer is the client's decision (MR 1.2(a)), so the client must hear of it.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(a)(1); cmt. [2]; MR 1.2(a) · Key terms: Reasonable communication

MC-0025 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.6 · OUT-2.6.1)

Client Yates has left Attorney Bell four voicemails over three weeks asking about the status of his case. Bell is busy with a trial and hasn't responded. Nothing important has happened in Yates's case during that time.

Is Bell subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer must report significant developments, and nothing important happened in Yates's case.
  • B. No, because a lawyer must act with reasonable diligence, and Bell was busy with another client's trial.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must promptly respond to reasonable requests for information, and Bell ignored four voicemails from Yates.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer must explain enough for the client to make informed decisions, and Yates had a decision pending in his case.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.4(a)(4) requires prompt responses. When a prompt substantive answer isn't possible, the comments call for acknowledging the request, which staff can do, and saying when a response can be expected.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.4(a)(3) is only one duty. MR 1.4(a)(4) separately requires responding to requests for information, whether or not anything happened.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.3 concerns diligence in the matter. A trial doesn't suspend the MR 1.4(a)(4) duty, and staff could have acknowledged the calls.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.4(b) concerns explanation needed for decisions, and the facts show no decision pending. The violation is ignoring requests for information.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(a)(3), (4), (b); cmt. [4]; MR 1.3 · Key terms: Reasonable communication

MC-0026 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.6 · OUT-2.6.1)

Client Kowalski asks Attorney Lamb to "get my ex-partner's bank records any way you can, even if you have to pretend to be him." Lamb explains the lawful discovery tools available but says nothing about the request to impersonate the ex-partner.

Has Lamb fully met her duty to communicate?

  • A. Yes, because clients normally defer to the lawyer on means, and Lamb chose lawful discovery tools for the records.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must not engage in deceit, and Lamb didn't impersonate Kowalski's ex-partner.
  • C. No, because a lawyer must explain limits when a client expects prohibited help, and Kowalski asked Lamb to impersonate someone.
  • D. No, because a lawyer must withdraw if the representation will result in a rules violation, and Kowalski asked Lamb to deceive.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.4(a)(5) requires Lamb to consult with Kowalski about the limit on her conduct: she must explain that she can't use deception to get the records.
  • A is wrong: Choosing lawful means is proper, but when a client expects forbidden conduct, MR 1.4(a)(5) separately requires explaining the limit.
  • B is wrong: Avoiding deceit satisfies MR 8.4(c), not the separate duty to tell Kowalski why she won't do what he asked.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.16(a)(1) applies when the representation will result in a violation. Lamb refuses the request, so no violation results.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(a)(5); MR 8.4(c); MR 1.16(a)(1) · Key terms: Reasonable communication

MC-0027 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 2.6 · OUT-2.6.1)

Attorney Price represents Client Shah in an appeal. The court affirms the trial court's judgment against Shah. Price's engagement letter covers the appeal "through decision." Shah has 30 days to seek further review. Price mails a one-line note saying, "The judgment was affirmed," and closes the file.

Did Price adequately communicate with Shah?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may limit scope with informed consent, and Price's letter ended the appeal "through decision."
  • B. No, because a lawyer must explain enough for informed decisions, and Shah had only 30 days to seek further review.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must keep the client informed about the matter's status, and Price told Shah the judgment was affirmed.
  • D. No, because a lawyer must act with diligence until the matter is completed, and Price didn't seek further review for Shah.
  • Answer: B. MR 1.4(b) requires enough explanation for informed decisions. Shah needs to know about the deadline and his options, even if Price won't handle them.
  • A is wrong: The scope limit ends Price's duty to seek review, not his duty to explain the result enough for Shah to decide.
  • C is wrong: Reporting status satisfies MR 1.4(a)(3), but MR 1.4(b) also requires enough explanation for a decision, and Shah faced a 30-day deadline.
  • D is wrong: The scope agreement excluded further review. MR 1.3 cmt. [4] calls for consulting about further review, not pursuing it.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(b); MR 1.2(c); MR 1.3 cmt. [4] · Key terms: Reasonable communication, Limited-scope representation

MC-0028 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.6 · OUT-2.6.2)

Attorney Whitaker missed a deadline to designate an expert in Client Dorsey's malpractice case, and the court barred the expert. Whitaker believes he can win without the expert, so he tells Dorsey only that "discovery is going well."

Is Whitaker subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may delay information when the client would react imprudently, and Dorsey would be upset about the expert.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may make technical decisions without consulting the client, and the expert ruling was procedural.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may withhold information when a court order requires it, and the court barred Dorsey's expert.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer must keep the client informed of significant developments, and Whitaker hid the loss of Dorsey's expert.
  • Answer: D. Hiding the lawyer's own error violates MR 1.4: the client must be kept reasonably informed of significant developments, and information can't be withheld to serve the lawyer's interest. The permitted delay exists only for the client's benefit.
  • A is wrong: The cmt. [7] delay is for the client's benefit. Whitaker is protecting himself, not Dorsey.
  • B is wrong: Lawyers may handle technical matters without consulting, but losing a key expert is a significant development the client must hear about (MR 1.4(a)(3)).
  • C is wrong: Cmt. [7] covers orders limiting disclosure. The court's order barred the expert; it didn't forbid telling Dorsey.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(a)(3), (b); cmt. [7]; MR 8.4(c) · Key terms: Withholding information

MC-0029 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.6 · OUT-2.6.2)

Attorney Crane represents Client Delacroix in a custody dispute. A court-appointed psychiatrist gives Crane a report diagnosing Delacroix with a serious condition, with a note saying that immediate disclosure to Delacroix, before a planned treatment meeting next week, would likely cause a harmful reaction. No court rule or order restricts sharing the report. Crane decides to wait until the treatment meeting to share the report.

May Crane delay sharing the report?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may delay information when the client would react imprudently, and the psychiatrist warned of a harmful reaction.
  • B. No, because a lawyer must keep the client reasonably informed, and the diagnosis is significant news for Delacroix.
  • C. No, because a lawyer must surrender the client's papers when the representation ends, and the report belongs in Delacroix's file.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may withhold information a court order forbids sharing, and the psychiatrist who wrote the report was appointed by the court.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.4 cmt. [7] gives this very example: a psychiatric diagnosis the examining psychiatrist indicates would harm the client.
  • B is wrong: The duty to inform is real, but cmt. [7] allows a brief delay for the client's benefit in these circumstances.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.16(d) applies on termination. Crane's representation continues.
  • D is wrong: Cmt. [7] covers court orders limiting disclosure, but no order exists here. A court-appointed psychiatrist isn't an order.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(a)(3); cmt. [7]; MR 1.16(d) · Key terms: Withholding information

MC-0030 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.1)

Last month Attorney Okafor spent eight hours researching a question of state lien law for one client. This week a new client, billed hourly, asks the same question. Okafor spends one hour adapting the legal analysis in her earlier memo, after removing the first client's identifying facts and strategy, and bills the new client eight hours, reasoning that the research is worth that much to the new client.

Is Okafor's bill proper?

  • A. Yes, because a fee may reflect the results obtained and the skill required, and Okafor's memo fully answers the question.
  • B. No, because an hourly fee covers time actually spent, and Okafor spent one hour on the new client's question.
  • C. Yes, because the customary local fee is a reasonableness factor, and eight hours at Okafor's rate is within it.
  • D. No, because a lawyer must not reveal one client's confidential information to another, and Okafor reused the first client's memo.
  • Answer: B. An hourly fee is a charge for time actually spent. Billing hours not worked for this client is an unreasonable fee and a misrepresentation. (ABA Formal Op. 93-379 (advisory))
  • A is wrong: Results and skill are MR 1.5(a) factors in setting a fee, but they don't let a lawyer bill fictional hours under an hourly agreement.
  • C is wrong: The customary fee (MR 1.5(a)(3)) goes to the rate, not to the number of hours billed.
  • D is wrong: A client memo can contain protected facts or strategy, but Okafor reused only the legal analysis with those removed, so the reuse discloses nothing (MR 1.6(a); MR 1.9(c)). The problem is the billing.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(a); MR 8.4(c); MR 1.6(a); MR 1.9(c); ABA Formal Op. 93-379 · Key terms: Reasonable fee

MC-0031 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.1)

Attorney Tan agrees to a $2,000 flat fee to handle a client's uncontested name change. The matter takes much less time than Tan expected. Tan's customary hourly rate would have produced a fee of $600. The fee is within the range local lawyers charge for similar flat-fee name changes. Tan completes the name change.

Is the $2,000 fee proper?

  • A. No, because the time and labor required is a fee factor, and Tan's name change took far less time than expected.
  • B. No, because a lawyer must refund unearned fees when the representation ends, and Tan's time was worth only $600.
  • C. Yes, because a flat fee is judged on all the reasonableness factors, and Tan's $2,000 is the customary local flat fee.
  • D. Yes, because preclusion of other work, if apparent to the client, is a fee factor, and Tan turned away other matters to take this one.
  • Answer: C. Reasonableness weighs all the MR 1.5(a) factors, including the customary fee and the fixed-fee nature of the agreement. A flat fee doesn't become unreasonable merely because the work went quickly.
  • A is wrong: Time and labor is one factor. Flat fees are judged on all the MR 1.5(a) factors, and this one is customary.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.16(d) applies when this representation ends, but it requires refunding only unearned fees. Tan completed the work under a reasonable flat fee, so the fee was earned.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.5(a)(2) is a real factor when the preclusion is apparent to the client, but nothing in the facts shows Tan turned away other work or that the client knew of it.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(a)(1)–(3), (8); MR 1.16(d) · Key terms: Reasonable fee

MC-0032 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.1)

Attorney Mbeki's engagement letter says the client will pay for "reasonable expenses." At the end of the matter, Mbeki adds a 15% "administrative expense" to every bill to cover rent, staff salaries and utilities, without any prior agreement to do so.

Is the charge proper?

  • A. No, because a contingent-fee agreement must state how expenses are handled, and Mbeki's letter didn't mention overhead at all.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may charge a reasonable amount for in-house services, and Mbeki's staff worked on the matter.
  • C. Yes, because a client may agree to pay reasonable expenses, and Mbeki's engagement letter says the client will.
  • D. No, because general overhead isn't a separately billable expense absent agreement, and Mbeki's 15% covers rent and salaries.
  • Answer: D. The comments to MR 1.5 allow charging the actual cost of in-house services, but general overhead is part of the fee, not a separately billable expense.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.5(c) applies to contingent fees. This is an ordinary engagement, and the problem is billing overhead as an expense.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.5 cmt. [1] covers in-house services such as copying. Rent, salaries and utilities are general overhead, not a service to this client.
  • C is wrong: The client agreed to reasonable expenses, but overhead isn't an expense under the ordinary understanding of that term.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(a), (b), (c); cmt. [1] · Key terms: Reasonable fee

MC-0033 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.2)

Attorney Voight begins representing a new client in a contract dispute at $300 per hour. Voight explains the hourly rate and the expected costs in a phone call during the first week and never puts the terms in writing.

Has Voight violated the fee-communication rule?

  • A. No, because the rate may be communicated within a reasonable time after work begins, and Voight explained it in the first week.
  • B. Yes, because a contingent-fee agreement must be in a writing signed by the client, and Voight never put the terms in writing.
  • C. Yes, because the fee basis should be communicated in writing, and Voight's explanation was only oral.
  • D. No, because a regularly represented client needn't be told an unchanged rate, and Voight charged his usual $300 rate.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.5(b) requires communicating the basis or rate, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after the representation begins. A writing isn't required for an ordinary hourly fee.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.5(c) applies to contingent fees. Voight charges by the hour.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.5(b) prefers a writing but doesn't require one. An oral explanation within the first week is enough.
  • D is wrong: That exception covers regularly represented clients. Voight's client is new.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(b), (c) · Key terms: Reasonable fee

MC-0034 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.2)

Attorney Cho has represented Larkspur Co. for six years at $250 per hour, confirmed in writing when the relationship began. Cho decides to raise her rate to $325 for all new matters starting next month and begins billing Larkspur Co. at the new rate without telling it.

Is Cho subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a change in the basis or rate of the fee must be communicated to the client, and Cho raised Larkspur's rate without telling it.
  • B. No, because a regularly represented client needn't be told an unchanged basis or rate, and Larkspur has been a client for six years.
  • C. No, because a fee must be reasonable under the MR 1.5(a) factors, and Cho's $325 rate is a reasonable one.
  • D. Yes, because business transactions with clients need informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, and Cho changed her terms with Larkspur.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.5(b) requires communication of changes, even for a regularly represented client.
  • B is wrong: The exception covers an unchanged rate. Cho changed it.
  • C is wrong: A reasonable fee still has to be communicated when it changes (MR 1.5(b)).
  • D is wrong: MR 1.8(a) doesn't apply to ordinary fee arrangements (MR 1.8 cmt. [1]). The violation is under MR 1.5(b).
  • Cite: MR 1.5(b); MR 1.8(a) cmt. [1] · Key terms: Reasonable fee

MC-0035 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.3)

Client Adeyemi retains Attorney Nakamura to seek a divorce and "the biggest alimony award possible." Nakamura agrees to represent Adeyemi for 20% of any alimony awarded, confirmed in a writing Adeyemi signs.

Is the fee agreement proper?

  • A. Yes, because a contingent fee must be in a writing signed by the client, and Adeyemi signed Nakamura's 20% agreement.
  • B. Yes, because a contingent fee may be used to collect past-due support, and Adeyemi wants alimony paid.
  • C. No, because a fee contingent on the amount of alimony is prohibited, and Nakamura's fee is 20% of the award.
  • D. No, because a fee must be reasonable, and Nakamura's 20% share of alimony is excessive.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.5(d)(1) prohibits contingent fees whose payment or amount depends on securing a divorce or on the amount of alimony, support or a property settlement.
  • A is wrong: A signed writing satisfies MR 1.5(c) but can't validate a fee MR 1.5(d)(1) prohibits.
  • B is wrong: The collection exception covers support already owed. Adeyemi is seeking a new award.
  • D is wrong: Nothing shows 20% is excessive. The fee is barred because it depends on the alimony amount.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(c), (d)(1); cmt. [6]; MR 1.8(i) · Key terms: Contingent fee

MC-0036 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.3)

Two years after her divorce, Client Wexler's ex-husband owes her $40,000 in unpaid child support under the decree. Attorney Bryce agrees to pursue collection for 25% of whatever he collects, in a signed writing that meets all the requirements for a contingent-fee agreement.

Is the fee arrangement proper?

  • A. Yes, because collecting past-due support is outside the domestic-relations ban, and Wexler's $40,000 is already owed.
  • B. No, because a fee contingent on the amount of support is prohibited, and Bryce's fee depends on support.
  • C. No, because a contingent fee in a criminal case is prohibited, and Wexler's ex-husband could face contempt.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may not acquire a proprietary interest in a client's cause of action, and Bryce's fee is a share of it.
  • Answer: A. The domestic-relations ban covers fees for securing a divorce or the amount of support, not collection of amounts already owed.
  • B is wrong: The ban targets fees depending on the support a court will award. Cmt. [6] excludes collecting amounts already owed.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.5(d)(2) covers defending a criminal case. Bryce represents Wexler in a civil collection.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.8(i) bars acquiring a proprietary interest in a client's claim, but MR 1.8(i)(2) expressly allows a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case. Bryce's 25% collection fee is such a fee, so the ban isn't triggered.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(c), (d)(1); cmt. [6]; MR 1.8(i) · Key terms: Contingent fee

MC-0037 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.3)

Attorney Ruiz represents Client Mwangi in a personal-injury case under a one-third contingent fee. The agreement, signed by Mwangi, states the percentages but doesn't say whether expenses will be deducted before or after the fee is calculated. The case settles for $90,000 with $9,000 in expenses. Ruiz calculates the fee on the full $90,000 and gives Mwangi a written closing statement showing the calculation.

Which is the most accurate statement?

  • A. The agreement is proper, because a contingent-fee agreement must state the percentages, and Mwangi's signed agreement does.
  • B. The agreement is deficient, because a contingent-fee lawyer must give a written closing statement, and Ruiz's calculation used the gross.
  • C. The agreement is proper, because the basis of a fee must be communicated to the client, and Ruiz told Mwangi the one-third rate.
  • D. The agreement is deficient, because it must say whether expenses come out before the fee, and Mwangi's agreement is silent.
  • Answer: D. MR 1.5(c) requires this term. The omission matters here: the fee is $30,000 if calculated on the gross, but $27,000 if expenses come out first.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.5(c) also requires the writing to say whether expenses come out before or after the fee.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.5(c) does require a closing statement, and Ruiz gave one. The defect is in the agreement.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.5(b) is the general rule. Contingent fees must meet the more specific requirements of MR 1.5(c).
  • Cite: MR 1.5(b), (c) · Key terms: Contingent fee

MC-0038 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.3)

Attorney Lindqvist represents a defendant charged with fraud. The defendant has no money now but will inherit $500,000 if acquitted, because the will disinherits anyone convicted of a felony. Lindqvist proposes a fee of 10% of the inheritance, payable only if the defendant is acquitted and inherits.

Is the proposed fee proper?

  • A. Yes, because contingent fees are permitted in civil matters, and this fee depends on the defendant's inheritance.
  • B. No, because a fee contingent on a criminal case's outcome is prohibited, and this fee is payable only on acquittal.
  • C. Yes, because a contingent fee must be in a signed writing stating the percentage, and Lindqvist can put it in one.
  • D. No, because a lawyer must not acquire an interest in property that is the subject of litigation, and the inheritance is in dispute.
  • Answer: B. The fee depends on the outcome of the criminal case, which MR 1.5(d)(2) prohibits, however it is framed.
  • A is wrong: The inheritance turns on acquittal, so the fee is contingent on the criminal outcome.
  • C is wrong: A writing is required for permitted contingent fees. It doesn't save one MR 1.5(d)(2) prohibits.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.8(i) is real, but nothing shows the inheritance is being litigated. The bar is MR 1.5(d)(2).
  • Cite: MR 1.5(c), (d)(2); MR 1.8(i) · Key terms: Contingent fee

MC-0039 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.4)

Attorney Abernathy refers a client with a products-liability claim to Attorney Castillo at another firm. Abernathy assumes joint responsibility for the representation, and the lawyers agree that Abernathy will receive one-quarter of any fee. In a phone call, Castillo explains the arrangement to the client, including Abernathy's one-quarter share, and the client says that is fine. Nothing about the division is ever put in writing. The total fee is reasonable.

Is the fee division proper?

  • A. No, because the client's agreement to a division, including the shares, must be confirmed in writing, and nothing was written.
  • B. Yes, because the client must agree to a division including each lawyer's share, and the client agreed by phone.
  • C. Yes, because a referring lawyer who assumes joint responsibility may share without proportionate work, and Abernathy assumed it.
  • D. No, because a lawyer must not give anything of value for a recommendation, and Abernathy recommended Castillo to the client.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.5(e)(2) requires the client's agreement, including the share each lawyer will receive, confirmed in writing. The oral agreement alone isn't enough.
  • B is wrong: The client's agreement is necessary but must also be confirmed in writing.
  • C is wrong: Joint responsibility allows a share without proportionate work, but the written confirmation MR 1.5(e)(2) requires is missing.
  • D is wrong: A fee division that meets MR 1.5(e) isn't a payment for a recommendation under MR 7.2(b). The defect is the missing writing.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(e); MR 7.2(b) · Key terms: Fee division between lawyers

MC-0040 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.4)

Attorney Varga leaves the firm of Varga & Reyes to open her own practice. Under the firm's separation agreement, Varga receives 20% of the fees the firm collects after she leaves for work she performed on client matters while she was still at the firm. The clients involved are not told about the payments.

Must the clients agree to these payments under the fee-division rule?

  • A. Yes, because a division between lawyers in different firms requires the client's agreement, confirmed in writing, and Varga now has her own firm.
  • B. Yes, because a client must agree to a fee division between firms, and Varga's clients weren't told of the payments.
  • C. No, because the rule doesn't reach future fees for work done while lawyers were associated, and Varga did the work at the firm.
  • D. No, because a firm may agree to pay a lawyer's estate after the lawyer's death, and Varga's payments come after she left the firm for good.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.5 cmt. [8]: paragraph (e) doesn't prohibit or regulate dividing fees received in the future for work done when the lawyers were associated in a firm. Varga did the work while at the firm.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.5(e) governs divisions between firms, but fees for work done while the lawyers were associated are outside it (cmt. [8]).
  • B is wrong: Consent is required for divisions MR 1.5(e) governs. These fees are for work done while Varga was at the firm, so the rule doesn't reach them.
  • D is wrong: MR 5.4(a)(1) covers a firm agreement to pay a lawyer's estate after death. Varga is alive and left the firm; cmt. [8] to MR 1.5 is what applies.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(e); cmt. [8]; MR 5.4(a)(1) · Key terms: Fee division between lawyers

MC-0041 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.5)

Client Ames pays Attorney Holt a $5,000 advance against hourly fees. Holt deposits the check in her firm's operating account and plans to bill against it as she works. She has done no work yet.

Did Holt handle the payment properly?

  • A. No, because advance fees must be held in trust until they are earned, and Holt hasn't done any of the work yet.
  • B. Yes, because a true general retainer is earned when received, and Holt received $5,000 at the start.
  • C. Yes, because fees may be withdrawn from trust as they are earned, and Holt will bill as she works.
  • D. No, because business deals with clients need informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, and Holt took Ames's $5,000.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.15(c) requires advance fees and expenses to be deposited in a client trust account and withdrawn only as earned or incurred.
  • B is wrong: A general retainer pays for availability. Ames paid an advance against hourly fees, which belongs to the client until earned.
  • C is wrong: Withdrawal as earned assumes the money was first deposited in trust. Holt put it straight into the operating account.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.8(a) doesn't cover ordinary fee arrangements (cmt. [1]). The violation is under MR 1.15(c).
  • Cite: MR 1.15(c); MR 1.8(a) cmt. [1] · Key terms: Advance fee

MC-0042 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.7 · OUT-2.7.5)

Client Rivera pays Attorney Wolfe a $10,000 flat fee, labeled "nonrefundable," to defend a misdemeanor case through trial. After one meeting and a short phone call with the prosecutor, Rivera fires Wolfe and hires another lawyer. Wolfe keeps the full $10,000, citing the agreement.

Is Wolfe subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because the fee basis must be communicated to the client, and Rivera agreed to the nonrefundable flat fee.
  • B. No, because a client who fires a lawyer still owes for work done, and Rivera fired Wolfe after a meeting and a call.
  • C. Yes, because a contingent fee in a criminal case is prohibited, and Wolfe's fee was for a misdemeanor defense.
  • D. Yes, because unearned fees must be refunded when representation ends, and Wolfe did little before Rivera fired him.
  • Answer: D. MR 1.16(d) requires refunding unearned fees. The "nonrefundable" label doesn't make an unearned fee earned or reasonable.
  • A is wrong: Communicating the fee satisfies MR 1.5(b), but it doesn't override the duty to refund unearned fees (MR 1.16(d)).
  • B is wrong: Rivera owes for work done, but that is one meeting and one call, not $10,000. The rest is unearned.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.5(d)(2) bars fees contingent on the outcome. Wolfe's flat fee isn't contingent.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(d); MR 1.5(a), (b), (d)(2); cmt. [4] · Key terms: Nonrefundable fee, Duties on termination

MC-0043 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 2.8 · OUT-2.8.1)

Client Tremblay fires Attorney Garland midway through a transactional matter, saying only, "I've decided to go another direction." There is no pending litigation. Garland believes she has done excellent work and asks Tremblay to reconsider. Tremblay refuses.

What must Garland do?

  • A. Continue, because withdrawal is permitted if it causes no material adverse effect, and Garland's exit midway would hurt Tremblay.
  • B. Continue, because a lawyer may keep client papers to the extent other law permits, and Tremblay owes Garland fees.
  • C. Withdraw, because a lawyer must withdraw when discharged by the client, and Tremblay fired Garland from the matter.
  • D. Withdraw with a tribunal's permission, because a tribunal's rules may require it, and Garland is midway through the matter.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.16(a)(3) requires withdrawal on discharge, and a client may discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause. Tremblay still owes a reasonable fee for work done.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.16(b)(1) is a permissive ground. Discharge makes withdrawal mandatory under MR 1.16(a)(3).
  • B is wrong: A lien on papers under MR 1.16(d) doesn't let a lawyer keep working after being fired.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.16(c) applies when a tribunal's rules require permission. There is no pending litigation.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(a)(3), (b)(1), (c), (d); cmt. [4] · Key terms: Mandatory withdrawal

MC-0044 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.8 · OUT-2.8.2)

Client Quint has not paid Attorney Marchetti for five months, despite monthly invoices. Marchetti has never warned Quint that she might withdraw. The matter is a pending lawsuit, and trial is three months away. The case is complex, and a change of lawyers would seriously set Quint back. Marchetti's practice is financially sound, and the unpaid balance is modest. Marchetti files a motion to withdraw citing nonpayment.

Should the court grant the motion under the Model Rules' grounds for withdrawal?

  • A. Yes, because failure to pay fees can be a ground for withdrawal, and Quint hasn't paid Marchetti for five months.
  • B. No, because nonpayment is a ground for withdrawal only after a reasonable warning, and Marchetti never warned Quint.
  • C. Yes, because withdrawal is permitted when it causes no material adverse effect, and Quint's trial is three months away.
  • D. Yes, because an unreasonable financial burden permits withdrawal, and Quint's balance has gone unpaid for five months.
  • Answer: B. MR 1.16(b)(5) requires a reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled. Invoices alone aren't a warning that Marchetti will withdraw.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.16(b)(5) requires a reasonable warning first, and Marchetti gave none.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.16(b)(1) requires no material adverse effect, but a change of lawyers would seriously set Quint back.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.16(b)(6) requires an unreasonable burden. Marchetti's practice is sound and the balance is modest.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(b)(1), (5), (6), (c) · Key terms: Permissive withdrawal

MC-0045 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.8 · OUT-2.8.2)

Attorney Bram represents Client Fairbanks in a business dispute. Fairbanks insists that Bram send a series of demand letters that are lawful but that Bram considers abusive and personally repugnant toward a small, struggling competitor. The matter is at a delicate stage, and Fairbanks would be set back by having to find and brief a new lawyer. No court proceeding is pending.

May Bram withdraw?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may withdraw when the client insists on action the lawyer finds repugnant, and Fairbanks does.
  • B. No, because a lawyer must abide by the client's decisions about objectives, and Fairbanks decided to send the letters.
  • C. No, because withdrawal under MR 1.16(b)(1) requires no material adverse effect, and Fairbanks would be set back.
  • D. Yes, with a tribunal's permission, because a tribunal's rules may require it, and Bram's matter is at a delicate stage.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.16(b)(4) is an independent ground. It doesn't depend on the absence of harm to the client, which matters only under (b)(1). Bram must still protect Fairbanks's interests on the way out (MR 1.16(d)).
  • B is wrong: MR 1.2(a) governs decisions while the lawyer stays. It doesn't bar withdrawal under MR 1.16(b)(4).
  • C is wrong: MR 1.16(b)(1) is only one ground. MR 1.16(b)(4) applies even when withdrawal will hurt the client.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.16(c) applies when a tribunal's rules require permission. No proceeding is pending.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(b)(1), (4); MR 1.16(c), (d); MR 1.2(a) · Key terms: Permissive withdrawal

MC-0046 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.8 · OUT-2.8.3)

Two weeks before a criminal trial, Attorney Mendoza learns facts showing that her client intends to testify falsely. Mendoza moves to withdraw. The court, noting the trial date, denies the motion and orders her to proceed. Mendoza stops working on the case.

Is Mendoza subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer must withdraw if the representation will result in a rules violation, and Mendoza's client plans perjury.
  • B. No, because a lawyer must not knowingly offer false evidence, and Mendoza stopped work to avoid presenting it.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must take remedial measures after false evidence is offered, and Mendoza's client lied on the stand.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer ordered to continue must do so despite good cause, and the court ordered Mendoza to proceed.
  • Answer: D. MR 1.16(c) requires a lawyer ordered by a tribunal to continue to do so, notwithstanding good cause for withdrawal. Mendoza must handle the perjury problem under MR 3.3, not by abandoning the case.
  • A is wrong: Even a mandatory ground under MR 1.16(a) doesn't override a court order to continue (MR 1.16(c)).
  • B is wrong: MR 3.3 forbids offering false evidence; it doesn't permit abandoning the case in defiance of the court. Mendoza must remonstrate and handle the testimony under MR 3.3.
  • C is wrong: The trial hasn't happened, so no false evidence has been offered. The violation is disobeying the order.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(a)(1), (c); MR 3.3(a)(3), (b); cmt. [6] · Key terms: Leave of court, Mandatory withdrawal

MC-0047 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 2.8 · OUT-2.8.4)

After a reasonable warning, Attorney Sorensen obtains the court's permission to withdraw from Client Osei's civil case because Osei hasn't paid in four months. The withdrawal takes effect the next day. Sorensen mails Osei the complete file but doesn't mention that Osei's response to a pending summary-judgment motion is due in five days. Osei doesn't notice the deadline and misses it.

Is Sorensen subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because withdrawal from pending litigation requires the court's permission, and Sorensen obtained it after warning Osei.
  • B. No, because a withdrawing lawyer must surrender the client's papers, and Sorensen mailed Osei the complete file.
  • C. Yes, because a withdrawing lawyer must take steps to protect the client, and Sorensen didn't warn Osei of the deadline.
  • D. Yes, because withdrawal under MR 1.16(b)(1) requires no material adverse effect, and Osei missed the deadline.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.16(d) applies however the representation ends: a withdrawing lawyer must take reasonably practicable steps to protect the client, such as warning of imminent deadlines. Returning the file isn't enough when the lawyer knows of an imminent deadline the client needs to meet.
  • A is wrong: Permission satisfies MR 1.16(c), not the separate duties on termination under MR 1.16(d).
  • B is wrong: Surrendering the file is one MR 1.16(d) step. Protecting the client from a known deadline is another.
  • D is wrong: Sorensen withdrew for nonpayment under MR 1.16(b)(5), after a warning and with permission, not under (b)(1). The violation is failing to protect Osei.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(b)(1), (5), (c), (d); cmt. [9] · Key terms: Duties on termination

MC-0048 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 2.2 · OUT-2.2.4)

Attorney Hsu's engagement letter for Client Brightline LLC contains two clauses. The first, which the letter says stands on its own even if any other term is invalid, sends any malpractice claim against Hsu to binding arbitration. Arbitration clauses of this kind are enforceable in the state. Hsu fully explains the clause's scope and effects, including giving up a jury trial and most rights of appeal, and Brightline's owner understands. The second caps Hsu's malpractice liability at the total fees paid. Brightline has no other lawyer, and the owner signs the letter after reading both clauses.

Which statement is correct?

  • A. Both are proper, because a client may give informed consent in writing, and Brightline's owner signed after reading both clauses.
  • B. Both are improper, because a prospective limit on malpractice liability requires independent counsel, and Brightline had no other lawyer.
  • C. Only the cap is proper, because a lawyer may limit scope with informed consent, and Brightline's owner agreed to the cap.
  • D. Only arbitration is proper, because arbitration doesn't limit liability but a cap requires independent counsel, and Brightline had none.
  • Answer: D. An agreement to arbitrate malpractice claims doesn't limit liability, so it is allowed when it is enforceable and the client is fully informed of its scope and effect (cmt. [17]). A prospective cap on malpractice liability is allowed only if the client is independently represented in making it (MR 1.8(h)(1)).
  • A is wrong: Informed consent suffices for the arbitration clause but not the cap, which MR 1.8(h)(1) allows only with independent representation.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.8(h)(1) reaches the cap, but an arbitration clause changes the forum without limiting liability (cmt. [17]).
  • C is wrong: MR 1.2(c) limits the scope of services, not liability for malpractice.
  • Cite: MR 1.8(h)(1); cmt. [17]; MR 1.2(c) · Key terms: Limited-scope representation

True / False

TF-0001 (OUT-2.1.1)

  • Statement: A client-lawyer relationship can arise even though the lawyer charges no fee and signs no agreement.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: The relationship forms when the lawyer agrees to help or fails to decline despite known reliance. A fee and a writing aren't required.
  • Exam trap: Students tie the relationship to money or paperwork.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (Tier 3 — persuasive)

TF-0002 (OUT-2.1.2)

  • Statement: A lawyer must accept every representation offered unless a conflict of interest exists.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: A lawyer generally has no duty to accept a representation, apart from court appointments. The lawyer must decline only on the mandatory grounds.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer generally may decline any representation, and must decline when the representation would violate the Rules or other law or the lawyer's condition would materially impair it.
  • Exam trap: Don't confuse "may decline" with "must accept."
  • Cite: MR 1.16(a); MR 6.2

TF-0003 (OUT-2.2.1)

  • Statement: In a criminal case, the client decides whether to waive a jury trial, after consulting with the lawyer.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.2(a) reserves the plea, jury waiver and whether to testify to the criminal client.
  • Exam trap: Students treat the choice of fact-finder as strategy.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a)

TF-0004 (OUT-2.2.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer may reject a settlement offer without telling the client if the lawyer reasonably believes the offer is too low.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: Whether to settle is the client's decision, and settlement offers must be promptly communicated unless the client gave prior instructions.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer must promptly communicate a settlement offer to the client unless the client has already said how to handle offers of that kind.
  • Exam trap: The lawyer's judgment of value doesn't replace the client's decision.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); MR 1.4(a)(1); cmt. [2]

TF-0005 (OUT-2.2.1)

  • Statement: Clients normally defer to the lawyer on technical and tactical decisions, such as which motions to file, but the lawyer must still reasonably consult the client about them.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Clients normally defer to the lawyer's skill on means, though lawyers usually defer to clients on expense and effects on third persons. MR 1.2(a) and MR 1.4(a)(2) require consultation either way.
  • Exam trap: "Lawyer controls" doesn't mean "lawyer need not consult."
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); cmt. [2]; MR 1.4(a)(2)

TF-0006 (OUT-2.2.3)

  • Statement: Under the Model Rules, a limited-scope representation agreement must be in a writing signed by the client.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: MR 1.2(c) requires that the limitation be reasonable and that the client give informed consent. It doesn't require a signed writing.
  • Corrected statement: Under the Model Rules, a limited-scope representation requires a reasonable limitation and the client's informed consent; a writing is advisable but not required.
  • Exam trap: Don't import the contingent-fee writing rule into MR 1.2(c).
  • Cite: MR 1.2(c)

TF-0007 (OUT-2.2.3)

  • Statement: A client can't agree to a limitation on scope that would prevent the lawyer from providing competent representation.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Limits must be reasonable, and the client can't waive the lawyer's duty of competence.
  • Exam trap: Informed consent alone isn't enough; reasonableness is also required.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(c); cmt. [7]

TF-0008 (OUT-2.3.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer who explains to a client the penalties for a crime the client is considering is assisting the client's criminal conduct.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: A lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct. Explaining isn't assisting.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer who explains the penalties for a crime the client is considering is not assisting the crime, because discussing legal consequences is expressly permitted.
  • Exam trap: The line is between explaining and helping.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(d); cmt. [9]

TF-0009 (OUT-2.3.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer may assist a client in a good-faith effort to test the validity of a law, even if doing so involves violating it.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.2(d) permits counseling or assisting a client in making a good-faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
  • Exam trap: Students assume any violation is off-limits.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(d); cmt. [12]

TF-0010 (OUT-2.4.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer retained to file a lawsuit has implied authority to settle it.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: Settlement requires the client's actual authority. Retaining a lawyer to sue doesn't include authority to settle.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer retained to file a lawsuit may settle it only with the client's authority.
  • Exam trap: Authority to litigate isn't authority to settle.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a); Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 26

TF-0011 (OUT-2.4.1)

  • Statement: A client can be bound by a lawyer's unauthorized act if the client's own conduct led a third party reasonably to believe the lawyer had authority.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: That's apparent authority, which arises from the client's manifestations to the third party.
  • Exam trap: The lawyer's own claims don't create apparent authority. The client's conduct does.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 27 (Tier 3 — persuasive)

TF-0012 (OUT-2.5.2)

  • Statement: A lawyer must seek appointment of a guardian as soon as the lawyer believes a client has a decision-making limitation.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: A lawyer must keep an ordinary relationship as far as reasonably possible. Protective action is permitted when the MR 1.14(b) conditions are met, and guardianship is a last resort.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer must, as far as reasonably possible, maintain an ordinary relationship with a client with decision-making limitations, and may take the least restrictive reasonably necessary protective action when the conditions of MR 1.14(b) are met.
  • Exam trap: Protective action is "may," and the least restrictive option comes first.
  • Cite: MR 1.14(a), (b); cmts. [12], [15]

TF-0013 (OUT-2.5.2)

  • Statement: When taking protective action for a client with decision-making limitations, a lawyer may reveal the client's information without the client's consent, but no more than the protective step reasonably calls for.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.14(c) expressly permits this limited disclosure. The old rule called it "impliedly authorized."
  • Exam trap: It isn't a blanket waiver of confidentiality.
  • Cite: MR 1.14(c); cmt. [18]

TF-0014 (OUT-2.6.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer must promptly inform a client of a plea offer unless the client has already told the lawyer how to handle offers of that kind.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.4(a)(1) and its comment require prompt communication of plea offers and settlement offers.
  • Exam trap: The lawyer's view of the offer doesn't matter.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(a)(1); cmt. [2]

TF-0015 (OUT-2.6.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer who is in trial on another matter is excused from responding to other clients' requests for information until the trial ends.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The duty to promptly comply with reasonable requests continues. If the lawyer can't respond personally, the request should be acknowledged, for example by staff, with an indication of when to expect a response.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer in trial must still promptly comply with other clients' reasonable requests for information; when a prompt substantive answer isn't possible, the lawyer or staff must acknowledge the request and say when a response can be expected.
  • Exam trap: Being busy isn't an exception.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(a)(4); cmt. [4]

TF-0016 (OUT-2.6.2)

  • Statement: A lawyer who missed a filing deadline that may bar a current client's claim may keep it from the client, even while the client is deciding whether to accept a pending settlement offer, and plans to mention it only if her motion to accept a late filing fails.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The missed deadline is a material error, and the client needs to know it now to decide about the settlement offer. A brief, reasonable attempt to correct an error can sometimes precede disclosure, but not when waiting affects the client's decisions, and never as a way to conceal the error.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer must promptly tell a current client about a material error, such as a missed deadline that may bar the claim, and may not delay to protect her own interests.
  • Exam trap: Disclosure must be prompt under the circumstances. Delay that serves the lawyer or leaves the client deciding without the facts is never allowed.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(a)(3), (b); cmt. [8] (Aug. 2026); ABA Formal Op. 481 (advisory)

TF-0017 (OUT-2.7.1)

  • Statement: A fee can violate the Rules even if the client agreed to it in advance.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.5(a) bars agreeing to, charging or collecting an unreasonable fee, whatever the client agreed.
  • Exam trap: Consent doesn't cure an unreasonable fee.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(a)

TF-0018 (OUT-2.7.2)

  • Statement: Every fee agreement must be in writing.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: Under MR 1.5, only contingent-fee agreements (signed by the client) and fee divisions between firms (confirmed in writing) require writings. Other fees must be communicated, preferably in writing. (A fee paid in property may separately trigger MR 1.8(a).)
  • Corrected statement: Under MR 1.5, contingent-fee agreements and fee divisions between firms must be in writing; other fee arrangements must be communicated, preferably in writing, though other rules (such as MR 1.8(a) for a fee paid in property) can add writing requirements.
  • Exam trap: "Preferably" isn't "must."
  • Cite: MR 1.5(b), (c), (e)

TF-0019 (OUT-2.7.3)

  • Statement: A contingent-fee agreement must be in a writing signed by the client.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.5(c) requires a writing signed by the client stating the method of calculation and the other listed terms.
  • Exam trap: A lawyer's confirming letter or email isn't enough.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(c)

TF-0020 (OUT-2.7.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer may represent a criminal defendant for a fee payable only if the defendant is acquitted, if the agreement is in a signed writing.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: MR 1.5(d)(2) prohibits contingent fees for representing a defendant in a criminal case, however documented.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer may not charge a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
  • Exam trap: A signed writing can't validate a prohibited contingent fee.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(d)(2)

TF-0021 (OUT-2.7.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer may charge a contingent fee to collect past-due child support owed under a divorce decree.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: The domestic-relations ban covers fees for securing a divorce or the amount of alimony or support, not collecting amounts already due.
  • Exam trap: The ban isn't on every family-law contingent fee.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(d)(1); cmt. [6]

TF-0022 (OUT-2.7.4)

  • Statement: Lawyers in different firms may divide a fee in any proportion they choose as long as the total fee is reasonable.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: A division must be in proportion to the services performed, or each lawyer must assume joint responsibility, and the client must agree to each lawyer's share, confirmed in writing.
  • Corrected statement: Lawyers in different firms may divide a fee only in proportion to the services each performs or with joint responsibility, with the client's agreement to each share confirmed in writing, and a reasonable total fee.
  • Exam trap: A reasonable total is only one of three requirements.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(e)

TF-0023 (OUT-2.7.5)

  • Statement: An advance fee paid against future hourly work belongs in the client trust account until it is earned.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.15(c) requires advance fees and expenses to be deposited in trust and withdrawn only as earned or incurred.
  • Exam trap: Depositing it in the operating account is commingling.
  • Cite: MR 1.15(c)

TF-0024 (OUT-2.8.1)

  • Statement: A client may discharge a lawyer only for good cause.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: A client may ordinarily discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to paying for services already provided. The narrow exceptions are appointed counsel and a client who lacks capacity to discharge.
  • Corrected statement: A client may ordinarily discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause.
  • Exam trap: Good cause matters for the lawyer's withdrawal, not the client's discharge.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(a)(3); cmt. [4]

TF-0025 (OUT-2.8.2)

  • Statement: Subject to any required tribunal permission, a lawyer may withdraw from a representation for any reason if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.16(b)(1) permits withdrawal on that basis alone, subject to any required court permission.
  • Exam trap: Students think withdrawal always needs a specific justification.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(b)(1)

TF-0026 (OUT-2.8.4)

  • Statement: A lawyer who is fired by a client has no further duties to that client.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: On any termination, the lawyer must take reasonably practicable steps to protect the client, including giving notice, allowing time to hire counsel, surrendering papers and property, and refunding unearned fees.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer who is fired must still take reasonably practicable steps to protect the client's interests, including surrendering papers and property and refunding unearned fees.
  • Exam trap: The duties on termination apply however the relationship ends.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(d)

TF-0027 (OUT-2.5.2)

  • Statement: When a client's family petitions a court to appoint a guardian for the client, and the client opposes it, the client's lawyer may support the petition if she believes a guardian would serve the client.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: When someone else has petitioned for a guardianship or other restriction on the client's capacity, the lawyer may not advocate for it if the client opposes it. In capacity proceedings, the lawyer advocates for the client's expressed position.
  • Corrected statement: When another person petitions for a guardianship that the client opposes, the client's lawyer may not advocate for the appointment.
  • Exam trap: The lawyer's view of the client's "best interest" doesn't override the client's objection.
  • Cite: MR 1.14 cmts. [12], [16] (as amended Feb. 2026) (the lawyer advocates the client's expressed position in capacity proceedings); ABA Formal Op. 525 (2026) (advisory) (related point: the lawyer also may not represent the third party who petitions for guardianship over her own client)
  • v1.4: rewritten against the official text. The earlier version overstated the rule and cited the wrong Comment.

TF-0028 (OUT-2.5.2)

  • Statement: A lawyer who takes protective action for a client with decision-making limitations need not tell the client about it.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The lawyer must inform the client of the protective action, and should consider whether MR 1.16(a) now requires withdrawal, for example because of a conflict.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer who takes protective action must inform the client of it, and should consider whether withdrawal has become necessary.
  • Exam trap: Protective action is not a secret workaround. The client stays informed.
  • Cite: MR 1.14 cmt. [17] (as amended Feb. 2026)
  • v1.4: new item (duty from the official text).

TF-0029 (OUT-2.2.4)

  • Statement: A lawyer may include in an engagement agreement a clause requiring binding arbitration of any malpractice claim, if the client is fully informed of the clause's scope and effect and the clause is enforceable under applicable law.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: An arbitration agreement doesn't limit the lawyer's liability, so MR 1.8(h)(1) doesn't bar it. Full disclosure of its scope and effect is required, and the clause must be enforceable under applicable law.
  • Exam trap: Arbitration is allowed; a prospective cap on malpractice liability needs independent counsel for the client.
  • Cite: MR 1.8(h)(1); cmt. [17]

TF-0030 (OUT-2.8.3)

  • Statement: A court may require a lawyer to stay in a case even though the lawyer has grounds that would otherwise justify withdrawing.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Leaving a pending matter is not the lawyer's decision alone. Where the tribunal's rules require permission, the lawyer must ask for it, and if the judge refuses and directs her to carry on, she must carry on.
  • Exam trap: Students treat a good reason to withdraw as self-executing. Having grounds and having permission are separate questions.
  • Cite: MR 1.16(c)

Scenario Walkthroughs

SW-0001 · The Handshake Retainer

Facts. Attorney Bishop has done two small matters for Mrs. Ellery over the years at $250 an hour. Ellery calls about a new problem: her contractor abandoned a kitchen job after taking a $40,000 deposit. Bishop says, "Send me the contract and I'll take a look." Ellery emails the contract and writes, "Thank you for taking this on." Bishop does not reply. Three weeks later she sends a demand letter to the contractor without discussing strategy with Ellery and bills the work at $325 an hour, her rate since January. The contractor's lawyer offers $22,000. Bishop thinks it is too low and does not mention it to Ellery; she counters at $38,000. Ellery, who has since stopped paying Bishop's invoices, learns of the offer from a neighbor who knows the contractor and fires Bishop by text. Bishop replies that she will release the file once the outstanding balance is paid.

Issues.

  1. When, if ever, did a client-lawyer relationship form?
  2. Was the fee properly communicated?
  3. Who decides whether to counter at $38,000, and what did Bishop owe Ellery about the $22,000?
  4. May Bishop hold the file for payment?

Analysis.

  • Formation. Under the widely followed Restatement formulation, a relationship forms when a person asks for legal services and the lawyer agrees — or when the lawyer fails to say no while she knows, or reasonably should know, the person is reasonably counting on her to provide them. "Send me the contract and I'll take a look" is at least an invitation; "thank you for taking this on," met with silence and then a demand letter, is reliance the lawyer knew of and did nothing to correct. A relationship formed no later than the demand letter, and the duties in this section attach from that point. (Rest. 3d § 14 (Tier 3 — persuasive); S02 OUT-2.1)
  • Fee communication. MR 1.5(b) requires the scope and the basis or rate of the fee to be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after starting — except for a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Ellery is a regular client, but the rate changed from $250 to $325, and a change in the basis or rate must always be communicated. Bishop's silence on the new rate violated 1.5(b). (MR 1.5(b))
  • Decisions and communication. The offer belongs to the client. MR 1.2(a) gives Ellery the decision whether to settle, and MR 1.4(a)(1) with cmt. [2] requires Bishop to promptly inform her of a settlement offer unless Ellery had already said such an offer would be unacceptable or had authorized Bishop to accept or reject within limits. Neither happened. Countering at $38,000 without consulting Ellery also violated MR 1.4(a)(2), which requires reasonable consultation about the means — and here the counter effectively rejected an offer only the client could reject. That Bishop's judgment about the offer's value may have been sound is no defense; 1.4 protects the client's right to decide with the information. (MR 1.2(a); MR 1.4(a)(1)–(2); cmt. [2])
  • The file. Ellery's text is a discharge; MR 1.16(a)(3) then requires Bishop to withdraw. On termination MR 1.16(d) requires her to take reasonably practicable steps to protect the client's interests, including surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled. A lawyer may retain papers only "to the extent permitted by other law" — a retaining lien where state law allows one, and even then not where doing so would prejudice the client. A pending negotiation with a live offer is exactly that prejudice. Conditioning release of the entire file on payment is, under the Model Rules alone, a 1.16(d) violation; Bishop's remedy for the unpaid fees is a fee claim, not the file. Note also that nonpayment was a ground on which Bishop could have withdrawn under 1.16(b)(5) after a reasonable warning — she never gave one, and in any event the client fired her first. (MR 1.16(a)(3), (b)(5), (d))

Conclusion. A relationship formed by reliance and silence; the rate change was never communicated (MR 1.5(b)); the $22,000 offer had to be relayed and the counter required consultation (MR 1.2(a), 1.4(a)); and on discharge the file must be surrendered without holding it hostage to the fee (MR 1.16(a)(3), (d)).

Rules. MR 1.5(b) · MR 1.2(a) · MR 1.4(a)(1)–(2); cmt. [2] · MR 1.16(a)(3), (b)(5), (d)

Key terms

ID Term Outline Flashcard
KT-0001 Actual authority OUT-2.4.1 FC-0007
KT-0002 Advance fee OUT-2.7.5 FC-0017
KT-0003 Apparent authority OUT-2.4.1 FC-0008
KT-0004 Assisting client crime or fraud OUT-2.3.1 FC-0006
KT-0005 Client-lawyer relationship OUT-2.1.1 FC-0001
KT-0006 Closing statement OUT-2.7.3 FC-0015
KT-0007 Contingent fee OUT-2.7.3 FC-0014
KT-0008 Decision-making limitations OUT-2.5.1 FC-0009
KT-0009 Duties on termination OUT-2.8.4 FC-0023
KT-0010 Duty to inquire OUT-2.1.2 FC-0002
KT-0011 Fee division between lawyers OUT-2.7.4 FC-0016
KT-0012 General retainer OUT-2.7.5 FC-0018
KT-0013 Leave of court OUT-2.8.3 FC-0022
KT-0014 Limited-scope representation OUT-2.2.3 FC-0005
KT-0015 Mandatory withdrawal OUT-2.8.1 FC-0020
KT-0016 Means of representation OUT-2.2.1 FC-0004
KT-0017 Nonrefundable fee OUT-2.7.5 FC-0019
KT-0018 Objectives of representation OUT-2.2.1 FC-0003
KT-0019 Permissive withdrawal OUT-2.8.2 FC-0021
KT-0020 Protective action OUT-2.5.2 FC-0010
KT-0021 Reasonable communication OUT-2.6.1 FC-0011
KT-0022 Reasonable fee OUT-2.7.1 FC-0013
KT-0023 Withholding information OUT-2.6.2 FC-0012
KT-0024 Supported decision-making OUT-2.5.1 FC-0040

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