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Legal Ethics Prep & Practice / Client Confidentiality FREE

Subject 3: Client Confidentiality

Free MPRE Study Material · NCBE weight: 6–12% · © 2026 PryvixLabs LLC. All rights reserved.

In this packet: Client Confidentiality Outline, 32 multiple-choice questions, 18 true/false statements, 27 flashcards, 1 scenario walkthrough and 15 key terms.

Outlines1 outline
Multiple Choice32 questions
True/False18 statements
Flashcards27 cards
Walkthroughs1 walkthrough
Key Terms15 terms

3. Client Confidentiality

3.0 The Framework: Three Different Protections

Three separate doctrines protect client information, and the exam tests the differences between them.

  1. Attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence. It lets the client refuse to disclose, and prevent the lawyer from disclosing, confidential communications made for legal advice, when testimony or production of the communications is compelled in a proceeding (it covers written communications as well as spoken ones).
  2. Work product is a rule of discovery. It protects materials prepared in anticipation of litigation from the other side's discovery.
  3. The duty of confidentiality (MR 1.6) is an ethics rule. It is the broadest: it covers all information relating to the representation, whatever its source, at all times, not just in court.

For any question, first ask which protection is at stake. Then ask whether an exception applies.

Privilege Work product Confidentiality (MR 1.6)
Source Evidence law Discovery rules Ethics rules
What it covers Confidential lawyer-client communications for legal advice Materials prepared in anticipation of litigation All information relating to the representation, from any source
When it applies When testimony or documents are compelled In discovery Always

Spoken summary: Privilege is an evidence rule covering confidential communications for legal advice, and it applies when testimony or the production of those communications is compelled. Work product is a discovery rule covering materials prepared for litigation. Confidentiality is an ethics rule covering all information relating to the representation, from any source, at all times.


3.1 The Attorney-Client Privilege

3.1.1 Elements

Rule: The attorney-client privilege protects a communication made between privileged persons, in confidence, for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.

Attorney-client privilege: an evidence rule that lets the client refuse to disclose, and prevent others from disclosing, protected communications. There are four elements: (Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 68)

  1. A communication (not the underlying facts).
  2. Between privileged persons: the client, the lawyer, and their agents who help with the communication, such as an interpreter, a secretary, or an expert the lawyer hires to help understand the client's information.
  3. Made in confidence: intended to be private, with no outsiders present who aren't needed.
  4. For the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance, not business or personal advice.

Explanation:

  • Facts aren't privileged. A client can be asked, "Did you run the red light?" The client can't be asked, "What did you tell your lawyer about the red light?"
  • The client holds the privilege. The lawyer asserts it for the client but can't waive it without the client's authority.
  • The privilege survives the client's death. (Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998)) The main exception is testamentary: in a dispute among people claiming through the deceased client, such as heirs contesting a will, relevant communications may be disclosed (3.1.3).
  • The client's identity and the fee arrangement are generally not privileged, unless revealing them would reveal a confidential communication.

Example: Client Ortiz tells Attorney Blake, alone in Blake's office, "I signed the contract without reading it." The statement is privileged. But Ortiz can be asked at deposition whether he read the contract before signing.

⚠ Exam trap: A friend brought along "for moral support" who isn't needed for the communication can destroy confidentiality. An interpreter needed for the client to communicate does not, and a support person a client with decision-making limitations needs in order to communicate is generally treated the same way (S02 OUT-2.5.1). The February 2026 MR 1.14 cmt. [5] adds safeguards: get the client's informed consent before the person takes part, and document the person's assisting role when that could help avoid a privilege waiver. That is ethics guidance, not a guarantee: whether the privilege survives is decided under the applicable evidence law.

Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 68–72; Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998); MR 1.14 cmt. [5] (Feb. 2026)

3.1.2 Organizations as clients

Rule: When the client is an organization, the organization holds the privilege, not its employees. An employee's communication with the organization's lawyer is covered when it is confidential and made to get legal advice for the organization concerns the employee's job duties, and the employee knows that getting legal advice for the organization is the purpose. Upjohn treats a superior's direction as an important factor, not a required element.

Corporate privilege (Upjohn): the privilege for communications between an organization's lawyers and its employees. Under Upjohn Co. v. United States (1981), federal courts protect communications with employees at any level, not only top management, when they are made in confidence, made to secure legal advice for the company, concern the employee's duties, and the employee is aware that this is the purpose. A chat about the employee's job that isn't confidential or isn't for legal advice doesn't qualify.

Explanation:

  • The organization holds the privilege. Its management can waive it, even over an employee's objection.
  • An employee does not become the lawyer's individual client just by being interviewed for the company. Company lawyers should make clear whom they represent when interests may conflict. This is often called an "Upjohn warning". (See MR 1.13(f), Section 8) Company counsel may also represent the employee individually, but only if the conflict rules allow it. (MR 1.13(g); MR 1.7)
  • State courts may apply a narrower test for organizational privilege. On the MPRE, Upjohn is the landmark case.

Example: In-house counsel privately interviews a warehouse worker about a safety incident, telling the worker the purpose is to advise the company on potential liability. The interview is privileged, and the company, not the worker, controls the privilege.

⚠ Exam trap: The employee can't prevent the company from waiving the privilege and sharing the interview with regulators.

Cite: Upjohn Co. v. United States (1981); MR 1.13(a), (f), (g); MR 1.7

3.1.3 Exceptions and waiver

Rule: The privilege does not protect communications made to obtain help in committing a future or ongoing crime or fraud, and it is waived when the client voluntarily discloses the communication to a third party or puts it at issue.

Crime-fraud exception: no privilege for communications in which the client seeks the lawyer's help to commit or plan a future or ongoing crime or fraud. Communications about past crimes, made to get legal advice or a defense, remain privileged.

Waiver of privilege: loss of the privilege because the client, or someone with authority to act for the client, voluntarily discloses the communication to a third party, or puts the lawyer's advice in issue (for example, by claiming "I relied on my lawyer's advice").

Other exceptions: there are three more common ones.

  1. Joint clients: in a later dispute between clients who shared a lawyer, communications made in the joint representation are generally not privileged as between them. (Compare MR 1.7 cmt. [30], Section 4)
  2. Lawyer-client disputes: a lawyer may use privileged communications to the extent needed to establish a fee claim or defend against the client's accusations. (Compare MR 1.6(b)(5))
  3. Testamentary exception: in a dispute among people who claim through a deceased client (for example, heirs or will beneficiaries contesting the estate), relevant communications with the deceased client aren't privileged. This is a narrow exception to survival after death; it doesn't reach, for example, a criminal investigation of someone else. (Swidler & Berlin (1998); Rest. § 81)

Not a waiver: common interest. Sharing a privileged communication with an ordinary outsider waives the privilege. But when separately represented parties who share a common legal interest (for example, co-defendants) exchange privileged communications in confidence to advance that interest, the privilege is preserved against outsiders. (Rest. § 76) A shared business interest alone isn't enough.

Explanation:

  • Inadvertent disclosure doesn't always waive the privilege. In federal proceedings, it doesn't operate as a waiver if the holder took reasonable steps to prevent it and promptly took reasonable steps to fix it. (FRE 502(b)) The receiving lawyer's duties are covered by MR 4.4(b) (Section 7).
  • Subject-matter waiver is limited. In federal proceedings, a disclosure waives the privilege for other, undisclosed communications only if the waiver was intentional, they concern the same subject, and fairness requires considering them together. (FRE 502(a)) This prevents using privilege as both sword and shield.
  • Nonwaiver orders vs. agreements. A federal court order that disclosure in the case isn't a waiver binds everyone, in that case and in other proceedings. (FRE 502(d)) A private clawback agreement binds only its parties unless it is made part of a court order. (FRE 502(e))

Example: Client Kerr asks Attorney Wu how to structure a sale to hide assets from a creditor who has already sued. The request is to further a fraud, so it isn't privileged, and Wu must refuse to help (MR 1.2(d)).

⚠ Exam trap: "The client confessed a past crime to his lawyer, so the crime-fraud exception applies." No. A confidential consultation about a past crime to get legal advice or a defense is exactly what the privilege protects. The exception turns on purpose: seeking the lawyer's help with a future or ongoing crime or fraud, which can include ongoing concealment of a past offense or a new fraud about it.

Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 76, 78–82; Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998); FRE 502(a), (b), (d), (e)


3.2 The Work-Product Doctrine

3.2.1 Ordinary and opinion work product

Rule: Work product has two levels of protection. First, documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, by or for a party or its representative, are protected from discovery. The other side can get them only by showing substantial need and that it can't get their substantial equivalent without undue hardship. Second, the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions and legal theories of a party's lawyer or other representative about the litigation get nearly absolute protection.

Work product: materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or its representative, including the lawyer, an investigator or a consultant. The doctrine comes from Hickman v. Taylor (1947) and appears in federal discovery rules such as FRCP 26(b)(3).

Two levels of protection:

  1. Ordinary (fact) work product, such as witness statements an investigator collected for the litigation. It can be discovered if the other side shows substantial need and can't get the equivalent without undue hardship (for example, the witness has since died). - Own-statement exception: any party or witness may get a copy of their own previous statement about the case without showing need or hardship. A qualifying statement is one the person signed or otherwise adopted or approved, or a contemporaneous recording or transcription that is substantially verbatim. (FRCP 26(b)(3)(C))
  2. Opinion work product: the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions and legal theories of the party's lawyer or other representative (such as an investigator, insurer or consultant) concerning the litigation. It is protected almost absolutely, even when ordinary work product must be produced. (FRCP 26(b)(3)(B))

Explanation: The doctrine protects the adversary system. Each side should prepare its own case without taking over the other side's preparation. Unlike privilege, work product covers material from non-client sources, such as a witness interview, but only if it was prepared because of anticipated litigation. When a question doesn't say why material was prepared, treat it as only potentially work product.

Example: Attorney Park interviews a bystander and writes a memo with the bystander's account and Park's own notes that "this witness seems unreliable." If the bystander dies, opposing counsel may be able to get the factual account on a showing of need, but not Park's assessment of reliability.

⚠ Exam trap: Documents prepared in the ordinary course of business, not in anticipation of litigation, aren't work product, even if a lawyer later uses them.

Cite: Hickman v. Taylor (1947); FRCP 26(b)(3)(A)–(C); Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 87–88


3.3 The Ethical Duty of Confidentiality

3.3.1 What the duty covers

Rule: The default is silence. A lawyer may not disclose any information relating to a client's representation, whatever its source, unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is implicitly needed to do the work, one of the listed exceptions applies, or another rule (such as MR 1.13(c) or MR 1.14(c)) permits it.

Information relating to the representation: the subject of the confidentiality duty. It is much broader than privilege:

  1. Any source. It includes information from the client, from witnesses, from public records, or overheard, as long as it relates to the representation. (MR 1.6 cmt. [3])
  2. Any time. It applies whether or not a proceeding is pending, and it continues after the representation ends (MR 1.9(c)) and even after the client dies. It can also begin before any engagement: a lawyer may not use or reveal information learned from a prospective client in a consultation, even if no representation follows, except as MR 1.9 would allow for a former client. A person who sends information unilaterally, with no reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss a possible representation, isn't a prospective client. (MR 1.18(a)–(b); Section 4)
  3. Even if public or known. Information in a public record is still protected under MR 1.6. (The separate MR 1.9(c) "generally known" rule concerns the use of former-client information, not revealing it. Even for use, information is generally known only if it is widely recognized by the public in the relevant geographic area or in the former client's industry, profession or trade; being publicly available, disclosed in open court or in a court record doesn't by itself make it generally known. And even generally known information may only be used, not revealed. See S04 OUT-4.3.3; MR 1.9 cmt. [8], Aug. 2026.)

Five routes to permitted disclosure:

  1. The client's informed consent (defined in S01 OUT-1.1.2 and S04 OUT-4.0).
  2. Implied authorization to carry out the representation.
  3. One of the exceptions in MR 1.6(b) (3.4).
  4. Protective action for a client with decision-making limitations: when taking protective action under MR 1.14(b), the lawyer may reveal information to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client's interests. Since February 2026, MR 1.14(c) grants this permission directly; it is no longer described as implied authorization. (MR 1.14(c), as amended Feb. 2026; see S02 OUT-2.5.2)
  5. Reporting out for an organizational client: a lawyer for an organization may reveal information outside the organization, whether or not MR 1.6 permits it, but only if the illegal conduct is connected to the lawyer's work for the organization and (a) the lawyer has taken the matter to the organization's highest authority, (b) that authority insists on or fails to address a clearly illegal act or refusal to act, (c) the lawyer reasonably believes the violation is reasonably certain to cause substantial injury to the organization, and (d) disclosure is limited to what is reasonably necessary to prevent that injury. This permission doesn't apply to information learned while the lawyer was hired to investigate the alleged violation or to defend the organization or its constituents against a claim arising from it. (MR 1.13(b)–(d); Section 8)

Explanation: A lawyer may discuss a case with others using hypotheticals, as long as there's no reasonable likelihood the listener could figure out the client's identity or situation. (cmt. [4])

Example: Attorney Reyes represents a celebrity in a sealed settlement. Reyes tells her book club that the celebrity "settled for millions," a fact a tabloid has already published. Reyes violates MR 1.6: the information relates to the representation, and its appearance elsewhere doesn't remove the duty.

⚠ Exam trap: "The information was already public, so the lawyer could share it." Not under MR 1.6.

⚠ Exam trap: Confidentiality is broader than privilege. Information that isn't privileged (for example, facts learned from a witness) is still confidential.

Cite: MR 1.6(a); cmts. [2]–[4]; MR 1.13(b)–(d); MR 1.18(a)–(b)

3.3.2 Implied authorization

Rule: Some disclosure comes with the job. A lawyer may disclose client information when doing so is a normal part of carrying out the representation, and lawyers in the same firm may share a firm client's information with one another, unless the client has told the firm to keep particular information within certain lawyers.

Implied authorization: permission, implied by the nature of the representation, to reveal what's needed to do the work. Examples:

  1. Admitting a fact in a pleading that can't properly be disputed.
  2. Disclosing information during negotiations to reach a settlement the client wants.
  3. Sharing information with other lawyers and staff in the firm.

Exception: if the client instructs that some information go only to certain lawyers, the firm must honor that. (cmt. [5])

⚠ Exam trap: Implied authority covers what's needed to carry out the representation. It doesn't cover sharing client information for the lawyer's own purposes, such as marketing.

Limits on sharing inside the firm:

  • If a lawyer has been screened from a matter (S04 OUT-4.5.1; MR 1.10(a)(2); MR 1.0(k)), colleagues may not share that matter's information with the screened lawyer.
  • Joint clients: in a common representation, each client is ordinarily entitled to information bearing on the matter, and the lawyer should say at the outset that information will be shared (S04 OUT-4.1.3; MR 1.7 cmt. [31]).

Cite: MR 1.6(a); cmt. [5]; MR 1.0(k); MR 1.7 cmt. [31]

3.3.3 Safeguarding information

Rule: A lawyer must take reasonable steps to keep client information from leaking out by accident and from being seen or taken by people who have no right to it.

Duty to safeguard information: a lawyer must take reasonable security measures to protect client information. (MR 1.6(c))

Factors for reasonableness: the comment identifies five; the list isn't exhaustive. (cmt. [18])

  1. The sensitivity of the information.
  2. The likelihood of disclosure if more safeguards aren't used.
  3. The cost of more safeguards.
  4. The difficulty of putting them in place.
  5. The extent to which they would make the lawyer's work harder, such as software that is too hard to use.

Explanation:

  • The duty is reasonable efforts, not perfection. A lawyer whose reasonable safeguards are defeated by a sophisticated hack hasn't necessarily violated MR 1.6(c). (cmt. [18])
  • A client may ask for more security, or may give informed consent to less. (cmt. [19])
  • The same duty extends to outside vendors through MR 5.3 (Section 1).
  • Generative AI: ABA Formal Opinion 512 (2024) (advisory) applies these duties to AI tools. Before putting client information into an AI tool that may learn from or share what it's given, a lawyer generally needs the client's informed consent. This is an ethics opinion, not rule text: the exam tests MR 1.6(c) itself.

⚠ Exam trap: "Any data breach is a violation." No. The question is whether the lawyer made reasonable efforts.

Cite: MR 1.6(c); cmts. [18]–[19]


3.4 Exceptions: When a Lawyer May Reveal Information

3.4.1 Preventing death or substantial bodily harm

Rule: A lawyer is permitted, but not required, to disclose client information when she reasonably believes it is needed to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm, and only as much as is needed.

Bodily-harm exception: permits disclosure to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. (MR 1.6(b)(1))

Key features:

  1. No crime or client act is required. The harm can come from anyone or anything. The standard example is a client who has dumped toxic waste into a town's water supply.
  2. "Reasonably certain" means the harm will be suffered imminently, or there is a present and substantial threat that it will be suffered later if the lawyer doesn't act. (cmt. [6])
  3. Permissive. The rule says "may," not "must."

Example: A client tells Attorney Hart that he plans to kill his business partner tonight. Hart may reveal what is reasonably necessary to prevent the killing, for example by calling the police.

⚠ Exam trap: The Model Rule's bodily-harm exception is permissive. Some states make it mandatory, but on the MPRE the answer is "may."

Cite: MR 1.6(b)(1); cmt. [6]

3.4.2 Client crime or fraud causing financial harm

Rule: Two financial exceptions, both requiring that the client used the lawyer's services. The lawyer may disclose what is reasonably necessary (1) to stop a client's crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to cause substantial financial or property harm to someone else, and (2) to prevent, limit or repair that kind of harm once it is reasonably certain or has already happened.

Client-fraud exceptions: permit disclosure about a client's crime or fraud that causes substantial financial or property harm. There are two: (MR 1.6(b)(2), (3))

  1. To prevent the crime or fraud (b)(2).
  2. To prevent, mitigate or rectify the injury after the fact (b)(3).

Both require three things:

  1. A client's crime or fraud (not a third party's).
  2. Substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another, reasonably certain to result or already resulting.
  3. The client used the lawyer's services to further it.

Explanation: The lawyer's services are the key. A client who confides a financial crime the lawyer had nothing to do with doesn't trigger these exceptions. The lawyer who discovers the misuse must also stop assisting (MR 1.2(d)). Whether withdrawal is required depends on the facts: the lawyer must withdraw if continuing would assist the crime or fraud, or if the client persists in using the lawyer's services for it after the lawyer explains the limits (MR 1.16(a)(1), (4)); past misuse alone makes withdrawal permitted (MR 1.16(b)(3)). See S02 OUT-2.3.1 and OUT-2.8.1.

Example: Attorney Lowe learns that a client used Lowe's closing documents to sell the same property to two buyers. Lowe may reveal what's reasonably necessary to rectify the second buyer's loss.

⚠ Exam trap: If the client committed a fraud without using the lawyer's services, the financial-harm exceptions don't apply. (The bodily-harm exception has no such requirement.)

Cite: MR 1.6(b)(2), (3); cmts. [7]–[8]

3.4.3 Other exceptions

Rule: There are four more exceptions, and each allows only what is reasonably necessary. First, the lawyer may disclose to get legal advice about her own compliance with the Rules. Second, she may disclose to press or defend a claim in a dispute with the client, to defend against criminal or civil charges based on conduct involving the client, or to answer allegations made in a proceeding about her work for the client. Third, she may disclose to comply with other law or a court order. Fourth, she may disclose to check for and resolve conflicts when a lawyer changes firms or firms combine. The fourth applies only once substantive discussions have occurred, and only if disclosure won't compromise privilege or otherwise hurt the client.

Four more exceptions:

  1. Ethics-advice exception: to get legal advice about the lawyer's own compliance with the Rules, for example from ethics counsel. (MR 1.6(b)(4))
  2. Self-defense exception: (MR 1.6(b)(5)) - to establish a claim, such as collecting a fee, or a defense in a controversy between lawyer and client; - to defend against a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based on conduct involving the client; - to respond to allegations in any proceeding about the lawyer's representation of the client.

Each branch has its own trigger. For the defense branch, once someone asserts a legal claim or charge that the lawyer took part in the client's wrongdoing, the lawyer need not wait for a suit or charge to be filed; she may respond directly to the person making the assertion. The respond-to-allegations branch requires a proceeding. A bare accusation that is neither a claim or charge nor made in a proceeding, such as a negative online review, doesn't open the exception. (cmt. [10])

  1. Required-by-law exception: to comply with other law or a court order. (MR 1.6(b)(6)) The lawyer should first assert any non-frivolous claim that the information is protected, and consult the client about an appeal. (cmts. [12]–[15])
  2. Conflict-check exception: to detect and resolve conflicts arising from a lawyer's move to a new firm or a change in a firm's composition or ownership, but only if the disclosure won't compromise privilege or otherwise prejudice the client. (MR 1.6(b)(7); cmt. [13]) - Timing: disclosure ordinarily comes only after substantive discussions about the new relationship have occurred. Merely thinking about a move isn't enough. - Scope: usually no more than the client's identity and a brief summary of the matter. - Later use: anyone who receives the information may use or further disclose it only as needed to detect and resolve conflicts. (cmt. [14])

The overall limit: every exception permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary. Where practicable, the lawyer should first ask the client to take corrective action, and in a court proceeding should seek protective orders to limit access. (cmts. [16]–[17])

Example: A former client files a grievance claiming Attorney Singh never told her about a settlement offer. Singh may reveal the letters in which she communicated the offer, but not unrelated confidences about the client's finances.

⚠ Exam trap: The self-defense exception lets the lawyer respond to a claim, charge or allegation in a proceeding, not to every accusation. It doesn't let the lawyer reveal unrelated embarrassing information to retaliate, or post confidential details online to answer a bad review.

Compare: The exceptions in MR 1.6 are permissive. But other rules can require disclosure even of confidential information: most importantly the duty of candor to a tribunal in MR 3.3 (Section 6), and MR 4.1(b), which requires disclosing a material fact to a third person when that is necessary to avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud, unless MR 1.6 prohibits it. Where MR 1.6(b)(2)–(3) permits disclosure, MR 4.1(b) can turn that permission into a duty. (See S02 OUT-2.3.1; Section 7.) Separately, MR 1.13(c) lets an organization's lawyer report outside the organization even where MR 1.6 wouldn't permit it, for a violation connected to the lawyer's work for the organization (see the conditions and the investigation/defense limit in 3.3.1, route 5).

Update note (August 2026): the online-review rule, taken from ABA Formal Op. 496 (advisory), is now written into MR 1.6 cmt. [10] (adopted ABA Res. 101C, Aug. 2026): a negative online review, by itself, isn't a "controversy" that opens the self-defense exception. The rule taught here is unchanged; it just has a firmer source. Until NCBE treats the new comment as testable (no earlier than about August 2027), the same answer follows from the rule text and Op. 496.

Cite: MR 1.6(b)(4)–(7); cmts. [9]–[17]; MR 1.13(c)–(d); MR 4.1(b)


Section 3: Must-Know Checklist

  1. Privilege (evidence) covers confidential communications for legal advice. Work product (discovery) covers litigation materials. Confidentiality (ethics) covers all information relating to the representation, from any source.
  2. Facts aren't privileged; communications are. The client holds the privilege, and it survives death, except for the testamentary exception (disputes among those claiming through the deceased client).
  3. For organizations, the privilege covers confidential employee communications that the employee knows are made so the company can get legal advice, and the company controls it. An interview alone doesn't make the employee a client. (Upjohn)
  4. No privilege for communications to further a future or ongoing crime or fraud. The test is purpose, not the offense's date: consulting about a past crime for advice or a defense is protected; seeking help to conceal it or commit a new fraud isn't.
  5. Opinion work product (the mental impressions and theories of the lawyer or another party representative) is almost absolutely protected. Ordinary work product yields to substantial need and undue hardship.
  6. MR 1.6 covers public information too, and continues after the representation ends.
  7. Use reasonable efforts to safeguard information. A breach despite reasonable efforts isn't a violation. (MR 1.6(c))
  8. May reveal to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm, whether or not a crime is involved. (MR 1.6(b)(1))
  9. May reveal what is reasonably necessary to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial financial or property injury that is reasonably certain to result or has already resulted from a client's crime or fraud, but only if the client used the lawyer's services. (MR 1.6(b)(2), (3))
  10. Other exceptions: ethics advice, self-defense and fee claims, other law or court order, and conflict checks. Reveal only what is reasonably necessary.

Section 3: Common Traps

  • "It was already public, so it isn't confidential." MR 1.6 still protects it.
  • "The client confessed a past crime, so the crime-fraud exception applies." It turns on purpose: a consultation about a past crime for advice or a defense is privileged; seeking help with ongoing concealment or a new fraud isn't.
  • "The bodily-harm exception needs a crime by the client." It doesn't.
  • "The financial-fraud exceptions apply to any client fraud." Only where the client used the lawyer's services.
  • "The exceptions require disclosure." MR 1.6(b) is permissive; MR 3.3 and MR 4.1(b) can require disclosure.
  • "The self-defense exception allows answering an online review with confidential details." It doesn't.

Part B: Items

Flashcards

FC-0001 (term card · OUT-3.1.1)

  • Front: Attorney-client privilege
  • Definition: An evidence rule protecting communications between privileged persons, made in confidence, for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client.
  • Explanation: The client holds the privilege and it survives the client's death. It protects communications, not the underlying facts, and it applies when testimony or documents are compelled.
  • Example: A client's private statement to her lawyer that she didn't read the contract is privileged, but she can be asked at deposition whether she read it.
  • Exam trap: Facts don't become privileged by being told to a lawyer.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 68; Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998)
  • Related terms: Waiver of privilege · Information relating to the representation

FC-0002 (term card · OUT-3.1.2)

  • Front: Corporate privilege (Upjohn)
  • Definition: Privilege for confidential communications between an organization's lawyer and its employees, at any level, made to secure legal advice for the organization about matters within the employees' duties, where the employee knows that is the purpose.
  • Explanation: Upjohn Co. v. United States (1981) rejected a test limited to top management. The organization holds the privilege and may waive it over an employee's objection.
  • Example: Company counsel's private interview of a warehouse worker about an accident, explained as being for the company's legal advice, is privileged, and the company controls it.
  • Exam trap: Being interviewed doesn't make the employee the lawyer's individual client (though counsel may also represent the employee if the conflict rules allow), and the employee can't block the company's waiver.
  • Cite: Upjohn Co. v. United States (1981); MR 1.13(a), (g); MR 1.7
  • Related terms: Attorney-client privilege

FC-0003 (term card · OUT-3.1.3)

  • Front: Crime-fraud exception
  • Definition: No privilege for communications in which the client seeks the lawyer's help to commit or plan a future or ongoing crime or fraud.
  • Explanation: Communications about past crimes, made to get advice or a defense, stay privileged. The exception targets using the lawyer as a tool for wrongdoing.
  • Example: A client's request for help structuring a sale to hide assets from a creditor who has already sued isn't privileged.
  • Exam trap: A confession of a past crime made to get advice or a defense is privileged. The exception turns on purpose: help with future or ongoing wrongdoing, including continued concealment.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 82
  • Related terms: Attorney-client privilege · Client-fraud exceptions

FC-0004 (term card · OUT-3.1.3)

  • Front: Waiver of privilege
  • Definition: Loss of the privilege when the client, or someone authorized to act for the client, voluntarily discloses the communication to a third party or puts the lawyer's advice in issue.
  • Explanation: The client holds the privilege and controls waiver. In federal proceedings, inadvertent disclosure doesn't waive it if reasonable steps were taken to prevent and promptly fix the disclosure; a waiver extends to undisclosed communications only if it was intentional, they share the same subject, and fairness requires it; and a court's nonwaiver order binds everyone, while a private agreement binds only its parties.
  • Example: A client who forwards her lawyer's advice email to a business partner generally waives the privilege for that email. Sharing it in confidence with a separately represented co-defendant to advance a common legal defense generally doesn't (common-interest doctrine).
  • Exam trap: The lawyer can't waive the client's privilege without the client's authority.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 76, 78–80; FRE 502(a), (b), (d), (e)
  • Related terms: Attorney-client privilege

FC-0005 (term card · OUT-3.2.1)

  • Front: Work product
  • Definition: Materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or its representative. They are protected from discovery unless the other side shows substantial need and can't get the equivalent without undue hardship.
  • Explanation: The doctrine comes from Hickman v. Taylor (1947). Unlike privilege, it covers material from non-client sources, such as a witness statement.
  • Example: An investigator's notes of a bystander interview taken for an expected lawsuit are work product. If the bystander dies, the other side may get the factual account on a showing of need.
  • Exam trap: Documents made in the ordinary course of business aren't work product just because a lawyer later uses them.
  • Cite: Hickman v. Taylor (1947); FRCP 26(b)(3)
  • Related terms: Opinion work product

FC-0006 (term card · OUT-3.2.1)

  • Front: Opinion work product
  • Definition: The mental impressions, conclusions, opinions and legal theories of a party's lawyer or other representative concerning the litigation. It is protected almost absolutely from discovery.
  • Explanation: Even when ordinary work product must be produced because of substantial need, this thinking stays protected, whether it is the lawyer's or, for example, an investigator's or insurer's.
  • Example: A lawyer's note that "this witness seems unreliable" stays protected even if the witness's factual statement is produced.
  • Exam trap: Substantial need can overcome ordinary work product, but generally not opinion work product.
  • Cite: FRCP 26(b)(3)(B); Hickman v. Taylor (1947)
  • Related terms: Work product

FC-0007 (term card · OUT-3.3.1)

  • Front: Information relating to the representation
  • Definition: The information MR 1.6 protects: anything relating to the representation, whatever its source, including public information, during and after the representation.
  • Explanation: This is far broader than privilege. It includes information from witnesses, documents, public records and conversations with third parties.
  • Example: A lawyer may not repeat a client's settlement amount at a dinner party even if a newspaper already reported it.
  • Exam trap: "It's public" is no defense under MR 1.6.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(a); cmt. [3]
  • Related terms: Attorney-client privilege · Implied authorization

FC-0008 (term card · OUT-3.3.2)

  • Front: Implied authorization
  • Definition: Permission, implied by the representation itself, to disclose information as appropriate to carry it out, including to other lawyers and staff in the firm.
  • Explanation: Examples include admitting an undisputed fact in a pleading and disclosing information in negotiations to reach the client's goals. A client may instruct that certain information be confined to specified lawyers.
  • Example: Sharing the client's medical records with the firm's paralegal who prepares the damages summary is impliedly authorized.
  • Exam trap: Implied authority doesn't cover disclosures for the lawyer's own benefit, such as marketing.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(a); cmt. [5]
  • Related terms: Information relating to the representation

FC-0009 (term card · OUT-3.3.3)

  • Front: Duty to safeguard information
  • Definition: The lawyer's obligation to use reasonable, not flawless, security measures so that client information is neither revealed by mistake or without permission nor reached by people who have no right to it.
  • Explanation: Reasonableness weighs, among other factors, the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure, and the cost, difficulty and burden of extra safeguards. A client may ask for more security or consent to less.
  • Example: Emailing a client's tax returns unencrypted may be reasonable for some information but not for highly sensitive data where the client asked for secure transmission.
  • Exam trap: The standard is reasonable efforts, not perfect security.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(c); cmts. [18]–[19]
  • Related terms: Information relating to the representation

FC-0010 (term card · OUT-3.4.1)

  • Front: Bodily-harm exception
  • Definition: A lawyer may reveal information to the extent reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.
  • Explanation: No crime or wrongful act by the client is required, and the person at risk can be anyone. For example, a client's accidental discharge of toxic waste into a town's water supply qualifies. "Reasonably certain" includes harm that will be suffered imminently or a present and substantial threat of later harm.
  • Example: A lawyer whose client says he will shoot his neighbor tonight may call the police.
  • Exam trap: It's permissive ("may") under the Model Rule.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(1); cmt. [6]
  • Related terms: Client-fraud exceptions

FC-0011 (term card · OUT-3.4.2)

  • Front: Client-fraud exceptions
  • Definition: A lawyer may reveal information reasonably necessary to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial financial or property injury, reasonably certain to result or already resulting, from a client's crime or fraud in which the client used the lawyer's services.
  • Explanation: Paragraph (b)(2) covers preventing the crime or fraud; (b)(3) covers preventing, mitigating or rectifying the injury afterward. Both require the client's use of the lawyer's services.
  • Example: A lawyer whose closing documents a client used to sell the same land twice may reveal what's needed to limit the second buyer's loss.
  • Exam trap: No use of the lawyer's services, no financial-fraud exception.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(2), (3); cmts. [7]–[8]
  • Related terms: Bodily-harm exception · Crime-fraud exception

FC-0012 (term card · OUT-3.4.3)

  • Front: Ethics-advice exception
  • Definition: A lawyer may reveal information reasonably necessary to secure legal advice about the lawyer's own compliance with the Rules.
  • Explanation: Consulting ethics counsel or a bar ethics hotline often requires sharing some client facts. The exception permits that to the extent reasonably necessary.
  • Example: A lawyer unsure whether a client's plan triggers a disclosure duty may describe the situation to an ethics lawyer.
  • Exam trap: Use hypotheticals where they will do. Reveal only what's needed.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(4); cmt. [9]
  • Related terms: Self-defense exception

FC-0013 (term card · OUT-3.4.3)

  • Front: Self-defense exception
  • Definition: A lawyer may reveal information reasonably necessary to establish a claim or defense in a lawyer-client controversy, to defend against charges based on conduct involving the client, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding about the representation.
  • Explanation: It covers fee suits, malpractice defense, disciplinary complaints and criminal charges. Each branch has its own trigger: once a legal claim or charge of complicity is asserted, the lawyer may defend without waiting for it to be filed, but responding to allegations requires a proceeding. A bare accusation isn't enough.
  • Example: A lawyer sued for malpractice may reveal the emails showing she advised the client against the transaction.
  • Exam trap: It doesn't allow revealing unrelated confidences to retaliate, or answering an online review with client details.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(5); cmts. [10]–[11]
  • Related terms: Ethics-advice exception

FC-0014 (term card · OUT-3.4.3)

  • Front: Required-by-law exception
  • Definition: A lawyer may reveal information reasonably necessary to comply with other law or a court order.
  • Explanation: Before complying with a subpoena or order, the lawyer should assert any non-frivolous claim that the information is protected and consult the client about appeal.
  • Example: A lawyer ordered by a court, after objecting unsuccessfully, to produce a document may produce it.
  • Exam trap: The lawyer should resist first on any non-frivolous ground, not simply hand over the information.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(6); cmts. [12]–[15]
  • Related terms: Self-defense exception

FC-0015 (term card · OUT-3.4.3)

  • Front: Conflict-check exception
  • Definition: When a lawyer is weighing a move to another firm, or firms are merging or changing owners, the lawyer may share limited client details with the other side. The purpose is to spot and clear conflicts, and the sharing must stay within what that purpose reasonably requires. It is off-limits if it would waive privilege or harm the client.
  • Explanation: Disclosure ordinarily comes only after substantive discussions about the new relationship have occurred, and is usually limited to the client's identity and a brief description of the matter. Anyone receiving it may use or further disclose it only to detect and resolve conflicts.
  • Example: A lawyer in substantive discussions about joining another firm may share client names and matter summaries for the conflict check.
  • Exam trap: Not if the mere fact of the consultation would harm the client, for example a client who is considering a divorce that isn't public.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(7); cmts. [13]–[14]
  • Related terms: Information relating to the representation

FC-0016 (concept card · OUT-3.0)

  • Front: Privilege vs. work product vs. confidentiality
  • Definition: Privilege is an evidence rule for confidential communications for legal advice. Work product is a discovery rule for litigation materials. Confidentiality is an ethics rule covering all information relating to the representation.
  • Explanation: Privilege and work product apply when disclosure is compelled. Confidentiality applies at all times and is the broadest of the three.
  • Example: An independent bystander's statement to the lawyer isn't privileged, because the bystander has no employment or agency tie to the client. (Nonclient status alone isn't decisive: an organization's employee or other representative can make privileged communications under Upjohn.) It is confidential under MR 1.6, and it is work product if the lawyer took it in anticipation of litigation.
  • Exam trap: Students treat the three as interchangeable. Each has its own scope and exceptions.
  • Cite: MR 1.6 cmt. [3]; Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 68, 87
  • Related terms: Attorney-client privilege · Work product · Information relating to the representation

FC-0017 (concept card · OUT-3.1.1)

  • Front: Four elements of the attorney-client privilege
  • Definition: A communication; between privileged persons; made in confidence; for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance.
  • Explanation: Privileged persons include the client, the lawyer and their agents who help with the communication, such as interpreters.
  • Example: A client's business-strategy discussion with a lawyer who is also a business partner isn't privileged if it wasn't for legal advice.
  • Exam trap: An unnecessary third person present can defeat confidentiality.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 68
  • Related terms: Attorney-client privilege

FC-0018 (concept card · OUT-3.1.1)

  • Front: Does the privilege survive the client's death?
  • Definition: Yes, as a general rule. The attorney-client privilege survives the client's death, subject to the testamentary exception.
  • Explanation: Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998) held the privilege survives death, even in a criminal investigation. It recognized the testamentary exception: in disputes among those claiming through the deceased client, such as a will contest, relevant communications may be disclosed. The duty of confidentiality also continues.
  • Example: After a client's death, prosecutors can't compel the lawyer to reveal the client's confidential communications about a matter under investigation.
  • Exam trap: Death doesn't end either protection, but survival isn't absolute in an estate dispute among the client's heirs or beneficiaries.
  • Cite: Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998); Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 81
  • Related terms: Attorney-client privilege

FC-0019 (concept card · OUT-3.1.1)

  • Front: Are a client's identity and fee arrangement privileged?
  • Definition: Generally no, unless revealing them would disclose a confidential communication.
  • Explanation: The privilege protects communications for legal advice. Who the client is and how the lawyer is paid are usually not communications of that kind.
  • Example: A lawyer can usually be required to identify who paid a fee, though MR 1.6 still bars voluntary disclosure.
  • Exam trap: Not privileged isn't the same as not confidential. MR 1.6 still applies outside compelled disclosure.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 69
  • Related terms: Attorney-client privilege · Information relating to the representation

FC-0020 (concept card · OUT-3.1.3)

  • Front: Privilege between joint clients
  • Definition: In a later dispute between clients who shared a lawyer, communications made in the joint representation generally aren't privileged as between them.
  • Explanation: Joint clients should be told at the start that information will be shared and that privilege won't protect it if they later sue each other.
  • Example: Two business partners who jointly consulted a lawyer can't later claim privilege against each other for those consultations.
  • Exam trap: The privilege still protects them against outsiders.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 75; MR 1.7 cmt. [30]
  • Related terms: Attorney-client privilege

FC-0021 (concept card · OUT-3.2.1)

  • Front: When can ordinary work product be discovered?
  • Definition: When the other side shows substantial need for the materials and can't obtain their substantial equivalent without undue hardship. No showing is needed for a person to get their own previous statement.
  • Explanation: A typical example is a witness statement taken shortly after an event, when the witness has since died or become unavailable. Separately, any party or witness may obtain a copy of their own signed, adopted or approved statement, or a contemporaneous, substantially verbatim recording or transcript of it.
  • Example: If the only eyewitness has died, her statement to the defendant's investigator may be discoverable.
  • Exam trap: Opinion work product generally stays protected even then.
  • Cite: FRCP 26(b)(3)(A), (C)
  • Related terms: Work product · Opinion work product

FC-0022 (concept card · OUT-3.3.1)

  • Front: Can a lawyer discuss a client matter using a hypothetical?
  • Definition: Yes, as long as there's no reasonable likelihood the listener will be able to figure out the client's identity or the situation involved.
  • Explanation: Hypotheticals let lawyers seek advice and teach without breaching confidentiality. Thin disguises that make the client identifiable don't qualify.
  • Example: A lawyer in a small town who describes "a client who owns the only hardware store on Main Street" has made the client identifiable.
  • Exam trap: Changing the names isn't enough if the facts still point to the client.
  • Cite: MR 1.6 cmt. [4]
  • Related terms: Information relating to the representation

FC-0023 (concept card · OUT-3.3.3)

  • Front: Five listed factors for reasonable safeguards
  • Definition: The comment's five identified factors (not an exhaustive list): the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure without more safeguards, the cost of more safeguards, the difficulty of implementing them, and how much they would burden the lawyer's work.
  • Explanation: MR 1.6(c) requires reasonable efforts, not guarantees. Clients may require more, or consent to less.
  • Example: Highly sensitive merger documents may call for encryption where routine scheduling emails don't.
  • Exam trap: A breach doesn't prove a violation if the efforts were reasonable.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(c); cmt. [18]
  • Related terms: Duty to safeguard information

FC-0024 (concept card · OUT-3.4.1)

  • Front: Are the MR 1.6(b) exceptions mandatory?
  • Definition: No. They're permissive: the lawyer "may" reveal. Other rules, such as the duty of candor to a tribunal, can require disclosure.
  • Explanation: A lawyer who chooses not to disclose under MR 1.6(b) doesn't violate that rule. The decision is a matter of professional judgment.
  • Example: A lawyer who decides not to reveal a client's plan to commit a financial fraud that used her services hasn't violated MR 1.6, but must still refuse to assist and may have to withdraw. If disclosure is the only way to avoid assisting the fraud, MR 4.1(b) can require it, because MR 1.6(b)(2) permits it.
  • Exam trap: MR 3.3 is the classic rule that makes disclosure mandatory, even of confidential information; MR 4.1(b) can do the same for a client fraud.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b); cmt. [17]; MR 3.3(c); MR 4.1(b), cmt. [3]
  • Related terms: Bodily-harm exception · Client-fraud exceptions

FC-0025 (concept card · OUT-3.4.2)

  • Front: What must be true for the financial-fraud exceptions?
  • Definition: A client's crime or fraud; substantial injury, reasonably certain or already occurred, to the financial interests or property of another; and the client's use of the lawyer's services to further it.
  • Explanation: These three conditions separate MR 1.6(b)(2)–(3) from the broader bodily-harm exception, which has no services requirement.
  • Example: A client who embezzled from his employer without involving the lawyer doesn't trigger these exceptions.
  • Exam trap: The "used the lawyer's services" element is the one students forget.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(2), (3)
  • Related terms: Client-fraud exceptions

FC-0026 (concept card · OUT-3.4.3)

  • Front: How much may a lawyer reveal under an exception?
  • Definition: Only what the lawyer reasonably believes is necessary to accomplish the purpose of the exception.
  • Explanation: Where practicable, the lawyer should first ask the client to take corrective action. In court proceedings, the lawyer should seek protective orders limiting access.
  • Example: Responding to a fee dispute, a lawyer may disclose the engagement letter and billing records, but not the client's unrelated medical history.
  • Exam trap: An exception is a narrow door, not a full waiver.
  • Cite: MR 1.6 cmts. [16]–[17]
  • Related terms: Self-defense exception · Required-by-law exception

FC-0027 (concept card · OUT-3.3.1)

  • Front: Does confidentiality end when the representation ends?
  • Definition: No. The duty continues after the representation ends and after the client's death.
  • Explanation: MR 1.9(c) bars using former-client information to the former client's disadvantage (unless generally known) and revealing it except as the Rules permit.
  • Example: Ten years after a divorce case ends, the lawyer still may not reveal the former client's finances.
  • Exam trap: "Generally known" is an exception only to the use restriction, not to revealing.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(a); MR 1.9(c)
  • Related terms: Information relating to the representation

Multiple choice

MC-0001 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 3.0 · OUT-3.0)

Attorney Novak is subpoenaed to testify about a conversation in which an independent eyewitness, a bystander with no employment, agency or other tie to the client, told him what she saw at an accident scene. Novak prepared a memo of the interview. The client has not consented to any disclosure.

Which protection is most clearly unavailable for the witness's statement to Novak?

  • A. The duty of confidentiality, because MR 1.6(b)(6) permits disclosure to comply with a court order, and Novak has been subpoenaed.
  • B. The work-product doctrine, because substantial need plus undue hardship can overcome ordinary work product, and the subpoena seeks the witness's account.
  • C. The attorney-client privilege, because it covers client-lawyer communications, and the witness is not Novak's client or the client's agent.
  • D. The work-product doctrine, because a person may obtain her own prior statement, and the witness gave her statement to Novak.
  • Answer: C. Privilege protects communications between privileged persons: the client, the lawyer and their agents (and, for an organization, employees under Upjohn). An independent eyewitness is none of these, so her statement isn't privileged. It is confidential under MR 1.6, and it may also be work product, depending on facts the stem doesn't give.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.6(b)(6) permits compliance with a final order after the lawyer raises available protections; it doesn't end the duty, and Novak has only a subpoena. MR 1.6 covers information from any source (cmt. [3]).
  • B is wrong: Ordinary work product yields only to substantial need plus inability to obtain the substantial equivalent without undue hardship (FRCP 26(b)(3)(A)(ii)), and the stem shows neither. Work product isn't clearly unavailable; privilege is.
  • D is wrong: The own-statement rule (FRCP 26(b)(3)(C)) gives the witness herself a right to a copy. It gives the subpoenaing party nothing.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 68, 70, 73; Upjohn Co. v. United States (1981); FRCP 26(b)(3); MR 1.6 cmt. [3] · Key terms: Attorney-client privilege, Work product

MC-0002 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 3.1 · OUT-3.1.1)

Client Pratt meets Attorney Ellis alone in her office and says, "I ran the red light because I was looking at my phone." Pratt has not relied on or revealed Ellis's advice in the case. At deposition, opposing counsel asks Pratt, "Were you looking at your phone when you entered the intersection?"

May Pratt refuse to answer on the ground of attorney-client privilege?

  • A. Yes, because confidential client statements to a lawyer for legal advice are privileged, and Pratt told Ellis about the phone in private.
  • B. Yes, because the privilege applies at a deposition as it does at trial, and Pratt is being questioned at his deposition.
  • C. No, because the privilege protects communications, not underlying facts, and the question asks what Pratt did at the intersection.
  • D. No, because a party who relies on privileged advice impliedly waives the privilege, and Pratt is a party to this case.
  • Answer: C. Pratt can't be asked what he told Ellis, but he must answer questions about the facts themselves.
  • A is wrong: The rule protects Pratt's statement to Ellis, but the question asks about the fact itself, which Pratt knows independently (Rest. § 69 cmt. d).
  • B is wrong: The privilege does apply at depositions, but it still covers only communications, and nothing privileged is being asked.
  • D is wrong: At-issue waiver requires reliance on privileged advice or communications; being a party isn't enough, and the stem says Pratt hasn't relied on Ellis's advice.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 68–69, 80 · Key terms: Attorney-client privilege

MC-0003 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.1 · OUT-3.1.1)

Client Varga, who speaks only Hungarian, brings her adult nephew to interpret at a meeting with Attorney Cole about a contract dispute. She also brings a neighbor who "just wanted to come along" and has no involvement in the dispute. Varga describes her dealings with the other party.

Is the conversation privileged?

  • A. Probably not, because an unneeded outsider's presence defeats confidentiality, and the neighbor wasn't needed to help Varga communicate.
  • B. Probably, because an interpreter needed for communication doesn't break confidentiality, and Varga's nephew came to interpret.
  • C. Probably not, because privilege requires a legal-advice purpose, and Varga was describing her business dealings with the other party.
  • D. Probably, because the common-interest doctrine protects sharing among allied parties, and the neighbor came as Varga's friend.
  • Answer: A. An agent needed to communicate, such as an interpreter, doesn't break confidentiality. An unnecessary outsider like the neighbor generally does, even though the interpreter alone would not.
  • B is wrong: The interpreter rule covers the nephew, but not the neighbor, whose presence is the problem.
  • C is wrong: The legal-advice purpose is met: Varga described her dealings to get a lawyer's help with a contract dispute.
  • D is wrong: The common-interest doctrine requires parties with a shared legal interest, usually each with counsel. Friendship isn't a legal interest, and the neighbor has no role in the dispute.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 70–72, 76 · Key terms: Attorney-client privilege

MC-0004 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.1 · OUT-3.1.1)

Client Delacroix confided to Attorney Byrne details of a business dispute with his former partner, including statements that could expose Delacroix to criminal liability. Delacroix died last year, and his executor has not waived any privilege. A grand jury investigating the former partner subpoenas Byrne to testify about what Delacroix told her. The prosecutor argues that Delacroix can no longer be harmed.

Must Byrne testify about Delacroix's communications?

  • A. No, because the privilege generally survives the client's death, and Delacroix's statements were confidential communications with Byrne.
  • B. Yes, because the crime-fraud exception removes protection from communications furthering a crime or fraud, and Delacroix's statements involved crimes.
  • C. Yes, because a deceased client's personal representative may generally waive the privilege, and Delacroix left an executor.
  • D. No, because MR 1.6 generally bars revealing information relating to the representation, and Byrne learned these details from Delacroix.
  • Answer: A. The Supreme Court held in Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998) that the privilege survives death, even in a criminal investigation.
  • B is wrong: The exception requires that the communication further a crime or fraud. Describing past conduct to get advice about a dispute doesn't, however incriminating it is.
  • C is wrong: A personal representative can generally waive, but the stem says Delacroix's executor hasn't.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.6 governs voluntary disclosure; it is not a testimonial privilege, so it isn't Byrne's ground for refusing to testify. Her ground is the evidentiary privilege (A). If a court later overrules the privilege claim, MR 1.6(b)(6) then permits her to comply.
  • Cite: Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998); Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 77, 82; MR 1.6(b)(6) · Key terms: Attorney-client privilege

MC-0005 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.1 · OUT-3.1.2)

In-house counsel for Brightline Corp. interviews a mid-level plant supervisor, at the CEO's direction, about a chemical spill to advise Brightline on its legal exposure. The supervisor knew the interview was for that purpose and never asked for advice about himself. Later, Brightline's board decides to share the interview notes with a federal agency to earn cooperation credit. The supervisor objects.

Can the supervisor prevent disclosure of the interview?

  • A. Yes, because an employee who seeks personal advice from company counsel may hold his own privilege, and the supervisor spoke with counsel.
  • B. No, because a corporation holds its privilege and may waive it, and Brightline's board has decided to share the notes.
  • C. Yes, because Upjohn protects employee interviews held for legal advice, and the supervisor knew the interview had that purpose.
  • D. No, because underlying facts are not privileged, and the agency wants information about the chemical spill.
  • Answer: B. Under Upjohn, communications with employees for the company's legal advice are privileged, but the company holds and controls the privilege.
  • A is wrong: A personal privilege arises when the employee sought advice for himself, and the stem says the supervisor never did.
  • C is wrong: That is when the company's privilege attaches. It makes the interview privileged for Brightline; it gives the supervisor no veto.
  • D is wrong: The facts aren't privileged, but the notes record communications with counsel, which are. The supervisor loses because the privilege is Brightline's to waive.
  • Cite: Upjohn Co. v. United States (1981); MR 1.13(a); Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 73 · Key terms: Corporate privilege (Upjohn)

MC-0006 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 3.1 · OUT-3.1.3)

Client Mason tells Attorney Pike that last year he submitted false invoices to a customer, and asks Pike to defend him in the resulting fraud lawsuit. Pike had no role in the invoicing, and Mason has stopped the practice. The customer's lawyer seeks to depose Pike about the conversation, arguing the crime-fraud exception applies.

Is the conversation privileged?

  • A. No, because the crime-fraud exception applies on a prima facie showing that a communication furthered a fraud, and Mason's talk concerned his invoices.
  • B. Yes, because communications seeking a defense for completed conduct are privileged, and Mason stopped the invoicing before consulting Pike.
  • C. No, because a party's own statement is admissible against him as nonhearsay, and Mason made his statement to Pike.
  • D. Yes, but MR 1.6(b)(3) permits disclosure to rectify losses from a client fraud using the lawyer's services, and Mason's customer lost money.
  • Answer: B. Communications about a completed past fraud, made to obtain representation, are privileged. The crime-fraud exception applies to communications in furtherance of future or ongoing crime or fraud, not to seeking a defense for past acts.
  • A is wrong: The showing must be that the communication furthered a fraud. Mason's conversation concerned a past fraud and sought a defense; it furthered nothing.
  • C is wrong: The party-admission rule (FRE 801(d)(2)) answers a hearsay objection. It doesn't override privilege, which is a separate bar.
  • D is wrong: Paragraph (b)(3) requires that the client used the lawyer's services, and the stem says Pike had no role in the invoicing.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 82; FRE 801(d)(2); MR 1.6(b)(3) · Key terms: Crime-fraud exception

MC-0007 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.1 · OUT-3.1.3)

Client Rennick asks Attorney Wu to help him draft backdated minutes of a board meeting that never happened, to use in a pending tax audit. He does not ask whether doing so would be lawful. Wu refuses. The government later subpoenas Wu to testify about Rennick's request.

Is Rennick's request protected by the attorney-client privilege?

  • A. Yes, because communications seeking legal help with an audit are generally privileged, and Rennick's request concerned his tax audit.
  • B. Yes, because asking whether proposed conduct is lawful is privileged, and Rennick asked Wu about preparing board minutes.
  • C. No, because the crime-fraud exception reaches requests to further a fraud, and Rennick asked Wu to backdate the board minutes.
  • D. No, because MR 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosing a client fraud that uses the lawyer's services, and Rennick sought Wu's services for one.
  • Answer: C. The crime-fraud exception removes privilege for communications made to further a crime or fraud, even if the lawyer refuses to help. Backdating minutes for an audit is such a fraud.
  • A is wrong: The general rule gives way to the crime-fraud exception, and Rennick's purpose was to deceive the auditors.
  • B is wrong: Asking about legality is protected, but the stem says Rennick didn't ask that; he asked for help fabricating minutes.
  • D is wrong: Paragraph (b)(2) requires that the client actually used the lawyer's services, and Wu refused. An ethics permission also doesn't decide privilege.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 82 & cmt. c; MR 1.6(b)(2) · Key terms: Crime-fraud exception

MC-0008 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.1 · OUT-3.1.3)

Client Doyle deliberately forwards an email from her lawyer, analyzing weaknesses in her case, to a friend who is not involved in the dispute, asking, "What do you think?" The opposing party later learns of the email and seeks it in discovery.

Which is the most accurate statement?

  • A. The email remains privileged, because FRE 502(b) protects inadvertent disclosures made despite reasonable precautions, and Doyle sent it to only one friend.
  • B. Doyle likely waived the privilege, because voluntary disclosure to an outsider generally waives it, and she forwarded the email to an uninvolved friend.
  • C. The email remains privileged, because sharing among parties with a common legal interest doesn't waive it, and Doyle asked her friend for input.
  • D. The email remains privileged, because a lawyer's confidential advice to a client is privileged, and the email contains her lawyer's case analysis.
  • Answer: B. The client holds the privilege and waives it by voluntary disclosure to an outsider who isn't a privileged agent.
  • A is wrong: FRE 502(b) spares a disclosure made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency only if it was inadvertent, the holder took reasonable steps to prevent it, and the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify it. It never reaches a deliberate disclosure. Doyle forwarded the email deliberately; the number of recipients doesn't matter.
  • C is wrong: The common-interest doctrine requires a shared legal interest in the matter. Doyle's friend has none.
  • D is wrong: The email was privileged when Doyle received it; her voluntary disclosure to an outsider waived it.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 69, 76, 79; FRE 502(b) · Key terms: Waiver of privilege

MC-0009 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.2 · OUT-3.2.1)

The day after a warehouse fire, an investigator hired by defense counsel interviews the night guard, the only person who saw how the fire started, and writes a detailed statement. The guard dies a month later, and no other record of what he saw exists. Plaintiff seeks the statement in discovery, along with defense counsel's memo evaluating the guard's credibility.

What is the likely result?

  • A. Both are likely protected, because material prepared in anticipation of litigation is work product, and both were prepared after the fire for the defense.
  • B. Both are likely discoverable, because substantial need plus undue hardship can overcome work-product protection, and the guard who gave the statement has died.
  • C. Neither is likely protected, because a person may obtain his own prior statement, and the plaintiff seeks the guard's statement.
  • D. The statement is likely discoverable for substantial need and hardship because the guard died, but the credibility memo is likely protected opinion work product.
  • Answer: D. Ordinary work product, like the guard's factual statement, yields to substantial need and inability to obtain its equivalent without undue hardship. Opinion work product, like counsel's credibility assessment, is protected almost absolutely.
  • A is wrong: Both are work product, but ordinary work product yields to substantial need plus undue hardship in obtaining an equivalent, and the guard alone saw the fire start and no equivalent record exists.
  • B is wrong: The need-and-hardship showing overcomes only ordinary work product. Counsel's credibility assessment is opinion work product.
  • C is wrong: The own-statement rule (FRCP 26(b)(3)(C)) belongs to the person who gave the statement. The plaintiff didn't give it.
  • Cite: Hickman v. Taylor (1947); FRCP 26(b)(3) · Key terms: Work product, Opinion work product

MC-0010 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.2 · OUT-3.2.1)

Two years before any dispute arose, a manufacturer's safety department prepared routine monthly inspection reports as part of its normal operations. After a product-injury lawsuit is filed, the manufacturer's lawyer gathers the reports and claims work-product protection. The plaintiff has made no showing of need.

Are the inspection reports protected as work product?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer's selection of documents can disclose the lawyer's mental impressions, and the lawyer chose which reports to gather.
  • B. No, because ordinary business records are not work product, and the reports were routine inspections made before any dispute.
  • C. Yes, because documents prepared because of anticipated litigation are work product, and the reports concern the product's safety.
  • D. No, because substantial need plus undue hardship can overcome work-product protection, and the plaintiff is suing over a product injury.
  • Answer: B. Work product covers materials prepared in anticipation of litigation. A lawyer's later collection of existing business records doesn't change their nature.
  • A is wrong: Some courts protect a lawyer's selection itself, but that doesn't make the underlying reports work product, and the question asks about the reports.
  • C is wrong: The "because of" test is real, but these reports were routine operational records made before any dispute, not because of litigation.
  • D is wrong: Substantial need and undue hardship matter only for overcoming protection that exists, and the plaintiff has shown neither. Neither is relevant here: the routine reports weren't prepared in anticipation of litigation, so they fail at the first step.
  • Cite: FRCP 26(b)(3); Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 87 · Key terms: Work product

MC-0011 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 3.3 · OUT-3.3.1)

Attorney Reyes represented a well-known athlete in a confidential settlement that ended the representation. A news site later publishes the settlement amount from an unknown source. At a dinner party, Reyes confirms the amount and adds details about the negotiations.

Is Reyes subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because MR 1.9(c) protects former-client information whatever its source, and Reyes revealed the amount and negotiation details at a dinner party.
  • B. No, because MR 1.9(c) lets a lawyer use a former client's generally known information, and a news site had published the settlement amount.
  • C. No, because a lawyer may make disclosures impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, and Reyes was the athlete's settlement counsel in the matter.
  • D. Yes, because the client holds the privilege and decides on waiver, and Reyes discussed the settlement without the athlete's consent.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.6 and MR 1.9(c) protect all information relating to the representation, whatever its source and whether or not publicly available.
  • B is wrong: The generally-known exception in MR 1.9(c)(1) covers using information, not revealing it (MR 1.9(c)(2)), and the negotiation details weren't known at all.
  • C is wrong: Implied authorization covers disclosures that advance the client's matter. Dinner-party talk after the case ended advances nothing.
  • D is wrong: A lawyer's unauthorized remark doesn't waive the client's privilege, and a settlement figure isn't a privileged communication. The violation is of the confidentiality duty.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(a); cmt. [3]; MR 1.9(c) · Key terms: Information relating to the representation

MC-0012 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.3 · OUT-3.3.1)

At a monthly bar-association lunch in a restaurant's open dining room, Attorney Chen, who practices in a town of 5,000 people, describes "a client who owns the only bakery in town and is being sued by her landlord," and asks the table for thoughts on a lease-renewal clause. The clause is standard language found in most commercial leases in the county. She doesn't use the client's name.

Did Chen violate her duty of confidentiality?

  • A. No, because a lawyer may discuss a matter by hypothetical, and Chen did not use her client's name at the lunch.
  • B. Yes, because disclosure is improper if listeners could likely identify the client, and Chen described a small town's sole bakery.
  • C. No, because consulting other lawyers can be impliedly authorized, and Chen asked for advice on her client's lease clause.
  • D. Yes, because MR 1.6(b)(4) permits disclosure to get ethics advice, and Chen's question concerned a lease rather than her ethics duties.
  • Answer: B. Hypotheticals are permitted only where there's no reasonable likelihood the listener could determine the client's identity or situation. In a town this size, "the only bakery" names the client.
  • A is wrong: The hypothetical rule requires no reasonable likelihood that listeners can identify the client. Omitting the name doesn't meet it here.
  • C is wrong: Implied authorization reaches disclosures that advance the representation. A question about a standard clause needed none of the identifying details.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.6(b)(4) is one exception, not a limit on all consultation; implied authorization can cover others. The violation comes from the identifying details.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(a); cmts. [4]–[5]; MR 1.6(b)(4) · Key terms: Information relating to the representation

MC-0013 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 3.3 · OUT-3.3.2)

Attorney Gomez represents a client in a personal-injury case. Without asking the client, Gomez gives the client's medical records to the firm's paralegal to prepare a damages summary, and in settlement talks tells opposing counsel the client's treatment costs.

Were these disclosures proper?

  • A. No, because a lawyer generally needs informed consent to reveal client information, and Gomez did not ask the client first.
  • B. Yes, because disclosures impliedly authorized to carry out the representation are permitted, and Gomez's disclosures advanced the damages claim.
  • C. No, because a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized disclosure of client information, and Gomez shared the client's private medical records.
  • D. Yes, because MR 1.6(b)(5) permits disclosure to establish a lawyer's claim, and Gomez disclosed the treatment costs to establish a claim.
  • Answer: B. MR 1.6(a) and its comments recognize implied authorization for disclosures appropriate to carrying out the representation, including to firm staff and to opposing counsel in negotiations.
  • A is wrong: Informed consent is one route, but MR 1.6(a) also permits impliedly authorized disclosures, which these are.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.6(c) guards against unauthorized disclosure; these disclosures were impliedly authorized.
  • D is wrong: Paragraph (b)(5) covers the lawyer's own claim in a lawyer-client controversy. Gomez was pressing the client's claim against the other side.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(a), (b)(5), (c); cmt. [5] · Key terms: Implied authorization

MC-0014 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.3 · OUT-3.3.2)

A small firm represents a nonprofit in ongoing litigation. To attract new clients, Attorney Frost posts on the firm's website a detailed case study naming the nonprofit and describing strategy discussions with its board. The nonprofit wasn't asked, and the post has not hurt its position in the case.

Is Frost subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because marketing isn't impliedly authorized to carry out a representation, and Frost named the nonprofit to attract clients.
  • B. No, because disclosures impliedly authorized to carry out a representation are permitted, and Frost is the nonprofit's litigation counsel.
  • C. Yes, because MR 1.8(b) bars using client information to the client's disadvantage, and Frost used the nonprofit's information without asking.
  • D. No, because MR 7.1 permits truthful, nonmisleading communications about a lawyer's services, and Frost's case study is accurate.
  • Answer: A. Marketing isn't within implied authority, and the nonprofit didn't give informed consent, so MR 1.6 is violated.
  • B is wrong: Being counsel isn't enough; implied authorization covers disclosures that advance the client's matter, and promoting the firm doesn't.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.8(b) requires use to the client's disadvantage, and the stem says there was none. The violation is revealing information under MR 1.6.
  • D is wrong: A communication that is truthful and not misleading satisfies MR 7.1, but compliance with MR 7.1 doesn't authorize disclosure under MR 1.6.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(a); cmt. [5]; MR 1.8(b); MR 7.1 · Key terms: Implied authorization, Information relating to the representation

MC-0015 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.3 · OUT-3.3.3)

Attorney Lamb's firm uses a reputable cloud provider after reviewing its security terms, requires strong passwords and two-factor authentication, trains staff on phishing, and encrypts its most sensitive files. A sophisticated criminal group nonetheless breaches the provider and accesses some client files containing material confidential information. Lamb promptly notifies the affected clients.

Did Lamb violate the duty to safeguard client information?

  • A. No, because MR 1.6(c) requires reasonable efforts rather than perfect security, and Lamb's firm used encryption, two-factor authentication and training.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure vendors act compatibly with the lawyer's duties, and Lamb's cloud provider was breached.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must notify current clients of a breach that compromises their material confidential information, and criminals accessed Lamb's client files.
  • D. No, because a lawyer is responsible for a nonlawyer's violation if the lawyer orders or ratifies it, and Lamb did neither.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.6(c) requires reasonable efforts, and its comments make clear that unauthorized access despite reasonable efforts isn't a violation. A breach alone doesn't establish one.
  • B is wrong: MR 5.3 requires reasonable efforts, and choosing a reputable provider after reviewing its terms meets that standard. A breach doesn't show otherwise.
  • C is wrong: The notice duty (ABA Formal Op. 483 (advisory)) arises when a breach involves, or is reasonably suspected to involve, material confidential client information, and Lamb met it. Notice doesn't turn a breach into a violation.
  • D is wrong: MR 5.3(c) addresses responsibility for a nonlawyer's conduct, but the breach was by outside criminals and the question is Lamb's own MR 1.6(c) duty.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(c); cmt. [18]; MR 5.3; ABA Formal Op. 483 (2018) · Key terms: Duty to safeguard information

MC-0016 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 3.3 · OUT-3.3.3)

Client Ortiz, involved in a high-profile corporate merger, specifically instructs Attorney Pell to send all documents through an encrypted portal. To save time, Pell emails an unencrypted draft merger agreement to Ortiz's personal account. Pell tells Ortiz the draft has been sent.

Is Pell subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because unencrypted email is generally acceptable where privacy is reasonably expected, and Pell emailed the draft to Ortiz's account.
  • B. No, because unauthorized access despite reasonable efforts is not a violation, and nothing shows that anyone intercepted Pell's email.
  • C. Yes, because MR 1.4 requires keeping a client reasonably informed, and Pell sent the draft without using Ortiz's portal.
  • D. Yes, because a client may require added security measures, and Pell ignored Ortiz's clear instruction to use the encrypted portal.
  • Answer: D. A lawyer must make reasonable efforts to safeguard client information, and a client may require greater security measures. Ignoring that instruction for highly sensitive documents isn't reasonable under MR 1.6(c).
  • A is wrong: Ordinary email is often acceptable (ABA Formal Op. 477R (advisory)), but not when the client has required more protection for sensitive documents.
  • B is wrong: That comment applies only when efforts were reasonable, and ignoring the client's instruction wasn't, whether or not anyone intercepted the email.
  • C is wrong: Pell told Ortiz the draft was sent, so MR 1.4 is satisfied. The violation is under MR 1.6(c).
  • Cite: MR 1.6(c); cmts. [18]–[19]; ABA Formal Op. 477R (2017) · Key terms: Duty to safeguard information

MC-0017 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.1)

Attorney Hart represents Client Jarvis in a dispute over Jarvis's late mother's estate. During a meeting, Jarvis tells Hart that he plans to shoot his estranged brother that evening and shows Hart a handgun in his bag. Hart believes Jarvis is serious.

May Hart reveal this information to the police?

  • A. No, because MR 1.6(a) protects information relating to the representation, and Jarvis made his threat during a meeting with Hart.
  • B. Yes, because the crime-fraud exception removes privilege from communications furthering a crime, and Jarvis told Hart about a planned shooting.
  • C. No, because MR 1.6(b)(2) requires that the client used the lawyer's services, and Jarvis hasn't used Hart's services in the shooting plan.
  • D. Yes, because MR 1.6(b)(1) permits disclosure to prevent reasonably certain death, and Jarvis showed Hart a gun and named his target.
  • Answer: D. MR 1.6(b)(1) permits disclosure to the extent Hart reasonably believes necessary to prevent the threatened killing.
  • A is wrong: The threat is confidential under MR 1.6(a), but MR 1.6(b)(1) is an exception to that duty and applies here.
  • B is wrong: Jarvis wasn't seeking Hart's help, and in any case privilege is an evidence rule about compelled testimony. A voluntary warning depends on MR 1.6(b)(1).
  • C is wrong: The services element belongs to MR 1.6(b)(2)–(3). The bodily-harm exception has no such element.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(1); cmt. [6] · Key terms: Bodily-harm exception

MC-0018 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.1)

Attorney Soto represents an individual landlord in an eviction. While inspecting the building, he learns that the landlord's contractor disabled the carbon-monoxide detectors in several occupied apartments. A utility technician tells Soto that a gas leak in the building will likely cause serious poisoning within days. The landlord refuses to act. Soto's work in the eviction involves neither the detectors nor the gas system.

May Soto reveal the danger to the tenants or authorities?

  • A. Yes, because MR 1.6(b)(1) permits disclosure to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm, and the technician predicts poisoning within days, not months.
  • B. No, because MR 1.6(b)(2) requires a client crime or fraud, and Soto's landlord client did not create the gas danger.
  • C. No, because MR 1.2(a) gives the client authority over the representation's objectives, and the landlord refuses to make repairs.
  • D. Yes, because MR 1.13(c) lets an organization's lawyer report out when its highest authority won't address a clear violation likely to injure it, and the landlord's inaction endangers tenants.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.6(b)(1) doesn't require a crime or conduct by the client, or any use of the lawyer's services. A gas leak likely to cause serious poisoning within days is reasonably certain harm.
  • B is wrong: That describes paragraph (b)(2), but this is a bodily-harm case, and MR 1.6(b)(1) has no crime element.
  • C is wrong: The client controls objectives, but that allocation doesn't limit the lawyer's permission to disclose under MR 1.6(b)(1).
  • D is wrong: MR 1.13(c) permits reporting out only for a lawyer for an organization, about a violation connected to the representation, after escalation to the highest authority fails, for a clearly illegal act reasonably certain to cause substantial injury to the organization, and to the extent necessary (not for lawyers retained to investigate or defend, MR 1.13(d)). Soto's client is an individual landlord.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(1); cmt. [6]; MR 1.2(a); MR 1.13(c) · Key terms: Bodily-harm exception

MC-0019 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.2)

Attorney Lowe handled the closing when her client sold a parcel of land to Buyer A. Weeks later, Lowe discovers that the client used documents Lowe prepared to sell the same parcel to Buyer B, who has paid in full. The client refuses to return the money and has no plans to use Lowe's documents again.

May Lowe reveal the client's conduct to Buyer B?

  • A. No, because MR 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure to prevent a client fraud, and the client's sale to Buyer B is already complete.
  • B. No, because MR 1.16(b) permits withdrawal when a client used the lawyer's services for fraud, and the client used Lowe's closing documents.
  • C. Yes, and Lowe must, because MR 4.1(b) requires disclosure needed to avoid assisting a client fraud unless MR 1.6 bars it, and the client used Lowe's documents.
  • D. Yes, because MR 1.6(b)(3) permits disclosure to rectify injury from a fraud that used her services, and Buyer B paid for land already sold.
  • Answer: D. MR 1.6(b)(3) permits disclosure to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial financial injury resulting from a client fraud in which the client used the lawyer's services, as happened here.
  • A is wrong: Paragraph (b)(2) is about preventing an ongoing or future fraud, but paragraph (b)(3) covers preventing, mitigating or rectifying injury from a fraud already committed, as this one was.
  • B is wrong: Withdrawal is permitted, but it doesn't bar disclosure; MR 1.6(b)(3) separately permits it.
  • C is wrong: MR 4.1(b) applies only when disclosure is needed to avoid assisting. The stem says the client won't use Lowe's work again, so disclosure is permitted, not required.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(3); cmt. [8]; MR 1.16(b); MR 1.2(d); MR 4.1(b) · Key terms: Client-fraud exceptions

MC-0020 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.2)

Client Rudd, a warehouse manager, tells Attorney Fisk, who is handling Rudd's divorce, that Rudd has been embezzling from his employer for months. Fisk has done no work related to Rudd's job, and Rudd has not used Fisk's services in the scheme.

May Fisk reveal the embezzlement to Rudd's employer under the financial-fraud exceptions?

  • A. Yes, because MR 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure to prevent financial crimes using the lawyer's services, and Rudd's embezzlement continues.
  • B. No, because the privilege protects confidential client communications, and Rudd told Fisk about the embezzlement in confidence.
  • C. No, because MR 1.6(b)(2)–(3) both require use of the lawyer's services, and Fisk's only work for Rudd is on the divorce.
  • D. Yes, because MR 8.3 requires reporting known serious misconduct by lawyers, and Fisk knows of Rudd's embezzlement.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.6(b)(2) and (3) apply only when the client has used the lawyer's services to further the crime or fraud. Rudd hasn't, so no exception permits disclosure of this financial crime.
  • A is wrong: That rule includes a services element, and the stem says Rudd hasn't used Fisk's services in the scheme.
  • B is wrong: Privilege is an evidence rule about compelled testimony. Whether Fisk may voluntarily disclose depends on MR 1.6 and its exceptions.
  • D is wrong: MR 8.3 covers lawyers and judges, and Rudd is a warehouse manager, not a lawyer. It also excepts MR 1.6 information.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(2), (3); MR 8.3(a), (c) · Key terms: Client-fraud exceptions

MC-0021 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.2)

Attorney Kwan prepares offering documents for a client's investment fund. Before the offering closes, Kwan learns that the client has secretly inserted false financial statements into the documents to attract investors. The client refuses to correct them. Kwan withdraws.

What else may Kwan do?

  • A. Nothing more, because MR 1.16(a) requires withdrawal when continuing would assist a fraud, and Kwan has withdrawn.
  • B. Reveal the client's other business dealings, because MR 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure to prevent a client fraud, and the client falsified documents.
  • C. Disclose what is needed to stop the fraud and disaffirm her work, because MR 1.6(b)(2) applies, and the offering hasn't closed.
  • D. Nothing more, because MR 1.6(b)(3) addresses injury from a client fraud already completed, and the offering has not yet closed.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure because the client is using Kwan's services in a fraud reasonably certain to cause substantial financial injury. Because the false documents she prepared would still be used, withdrawal alone doesn't end her assistance: she must give notice of withdrawal and disaffirm them (MR 1.2(d) and cmt. [10]), and MR 4.1(b) requires disclosure if that is the only way to avoid assisting the fraud.
  • A is wrong: Withdrawal is required, but it isn't enough while Kwan's documents can still further the fraud. Disaffirmance, and disclosure if needed to avoid assisting, become obligatory.
  • B is wrong: Paragraph (b)(2) permits only what's reasonably necessary to prevent the fraud, not the client's unrelated dealings.
  • D is wrong: Paragraph (b)(3) covers preventing, mitigating or rectifying injury from a crime or fraud already committed. This fraud is still under way, so paragraph (b)(2) fits and permits disclosure to prevent it.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(2), (3); MR 1.2(d), cmt. [10]; MR 4.1(b), cmt. [3]; MR 1.16(a) · Key terms: Client-fraud exceptions

MC-0022 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.3)

Attorney Dunn is unsure whether a client's plan triggers any duty to disclose. She calls an experienced ethics lawyer outside her firm and describes the client's situation in enough detail to get meaningful advice, leaving out the client's name. The details would let the ethics lawyer work out who the client is.

Was Dunn's disclosure proper?

  • A. Yes, because MR 1.6(b)(4) permits disclosure to get advice on complying with the Rules, and Dunn called an ethics lawyer.
  • B. No, because a lawyer generally needs informed consent to reveal client information, and Dunn did not ask her client first.
  • C. No, because MR 1.6(c) requires reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized disclosure, and Dunn described the client's situation in detail.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer may use a hypothetical when listeners can't identify the client, and Dunn left out the client's name.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.6(b)(4) permits disclosure reasonably necessary to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with the Rules.
  • B is wrong: Informed consent is one route, but the ethics-advice exception permits this disclosure without it.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.6(c) targets unauthorized disclosure, and a disclosure permitted by MR 1.6(b)(4) is authorized.
  • D is wrong: The hypothetical rule requires that the listener can't identify the client, and the stem says the ethics lawyer could. The exception, not the hypothetical rule, makes this proper.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(4); cmts. [4], [9] · Key terms: Ethics-advice exception

MC-0023 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.3)

Former client Ibsen posts an online review claiming Attorney Marsh "never told me about the settlement offer and lost my case." No claim, charge or proceeding has been filed. To respond, Marsh posts a reply quoting Ibsen's emails and describing Ibsen's financial troubles and a prior arrest Marsh learned of during the representation.

Is Marsh subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because the self-defense exception requires a claim, charge or proceeding, and Ibsen's online review is none of these.
  • B. No, because MR 1.6(b)(5) permits responding to allegations in any proceeding about the representation, and Ibsen publicly accused Marsh.
  • C. Yes, because the client holds the privilege and decides on waiver, and Marsh's reply quoted Ibsen's emails without consent.
  • D. No, because MR 1.9(c) permits using a former client's generally known information, and Ibsen's review is public.
  • Answer: A. An online review isn't a claim, charge or proceeding of the kind the exception addresses. The unrelated details about finances and an arrest go far beyond anything necessary in any event.
  • B is wrong: That branch requires a proceeding, and the stem says none has been filed.
  • C is wrong: The discipline rests on MR 1.6 and MR 1.9(c), which protect far more than privileged communications. Privilege is an evidence rule, not the basis here.
  • D is wrong: The exception covers using information, not revealing it, and Ibsen's finances and arrest weren't generally known.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(5), cmt. [10] (2026); MR 1.9(c); ABA Formal Op. 496 (2021) (advisory) · Key terms: Self-defense exception

MC-0024 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.3)

Former client Tobin refuses to pay a $12,000 invoice. Attorney Grant sues to collect it. To prove the value of the services, Grant attaches her detailed time records and engagement letter, which describe the matter's subject and the work performed.

May Grant reveal this information?

  • A. No, because the comments urge lawyers to consider fee arbitration first, and Grant sued Tobin without trying it.
  • B. Yes, because MR 1.6(b)(5) permits disclosure to establish a fee claim, and Grant's records prove her work's value.
  • C. No, because confidential client-lawyer communications are privileged, and Grant's engagement letter was exchanged with Tobin.
  • D. Yes, and she may reveal Tobin's other affairs too, because MR 1.6(b)(5) covers fee disputes, and Tobin owes Grant $12,000.
  • Answer: B. MR 1.6(b)(5) permits disclosure to establish a claim in a lawyer-client controversy, including fee collection.
  • A is wrong: The comments encourage fee arbitration, but they don't bar a fee suit or the disclosure needed to prove it.
  • C is wrong: Privilege has its own exception for lawyer-client disputes (Rest. § 83(1)): communications relevant and reasonably necessary to the fee claim aren't privileged there. Separately, MR 1.6(b)(5) permits proportionate disclosure.
  • D is wrong: Paragraph (b)(5) permits only what's reasonably necessary to establish the claim, and Tobin's other affairs aren't.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(5); cmt. [11]; MR 1.5 cmt. [9]; Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 83(1) · Key terms: Self-defense exception

MC-0025 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.3)

A prosecutor subpoenas Attorney Ward to produce a client's documents. Ward believes in good faith that the documents are privileged. No court has ruled on the subpoena. Ward considers simply producing them to avoid a fight with the prosecutor.

What should Ward do?

  • A. Produce the documents, because MR 1.6(b)(6) permits compliance with a court order or other law, and the prosecutor served a subpoena on Ward.
  • B. Refuse to produce them, because MR 1.6(a) generally bars revealing client information without consent, and the documents are the client's own.
  • C. Assert the privilege and await a court order, because a lawyer should raise non-frivolous objections, and Ward believes the documents are privileged.
  • D. Return the documents, because MR 1.16(d) requires surrendering papers the client is entitled to, and the documents belong to the client, not Ward.
  • Answer: C. When disclosure is sought by other law or order, the lawyer should assert non-frivolous protections and consult the client about appeal. MR 1.6(b)(6) then permits compliance with a final order.
  • A is wrong: The exception permits compliance, but the lawyer should first raise non-frivolous objections, and no court has ruled.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.6(b)(6) permits compliance once a court orders production, so Ward can't simply refuse.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.16(d) applies when a representation ends, which hasn't happened. Moving subpoenaed documents out of reach would violate MR 3.4(a).
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(6); cmts. [12]–[15]; MR 1.16(d); MR 3.4(a) · Key terms: Required-by-law exception

MC-0026 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.3)

Attorney Adeyemi, after several substantive discussions about joining another firm, is asked for a list of his clients and matters to run a conflict check. One of his clients has consulted him about a divorce that the client's spouse doesn't yet know is being considered.

What may Adeyemi disclose to the new firm about that client?

  • A. The client's name and the matter's nature, because that is usually enough for a conflict check, and the new firm asked for Adeyemi's matters.
  • B. Everything relevant, because MR 1.10 imputes a lateral lawyer's conflicts to the new firm, and Adeyemi plans to join that firm.
  • C. Not the divorce consultation, because MR 1.6(b)(7) excludes disclosures that would prejudice the client, and the spouse doesn't know of it.
  • D. Nothing, because MR 1.6(b)(7) applies once substantive discussions have occurred, and Adeyemi's move is not yet final.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.6(b)(7) is limited to disclosures that wouldn't compromise privilege or otherwise prejudice the client. The comments give a confidential divorce consultation the spouse doesn't know about as an example.
  • A is wrong: Identity and a brief summary are usually enough, but not where even that would prejudice the client.
  • B is wrong: Imputation is why the check matters, but MR 1.6(b)(7) still permits only what's reasonably necessary and not prejudicial.
  • D is wrong: That is the correct trigger, and the stem says substantive discussions have occurred; finality isn't required.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(7); cmt. [13]; MR 1.10 · Key terms: Conflict-check exception

MC-0027 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.3)

A former client files a disciplinary complaint alleging that Attorney Singh never communicated a settlement offer. Singh responds to the disciplinary authority by attaching the letter in which she described the offer to the client, and the client's reply rejecting it.

Was Singh's disclosure proper?

  • A. No, because MR 8.1(b) does not require disclosing information protected by MR 1.6, and the letters relate to Singh's representation.
  • B. No, because confidential client-lawyer communications are privileged, and Singh's letters were exchanged with her client.
  • C. Yes, because MR 1.6(b)(5) permits disclosure to respond to allegations in a proceeding, and the complaint alleges Singh hid the offer.
  • D. Yes, and she may attach her whole file, because MR 8.1 requires responding to disciplinary authorities, and the client filed a complaint.
  • Answer: C. MR 1.6(b)(5) permits a lawyer to reveal what is reasonably necessary to respond to allegations in a proceeding about the representation. The letters are directly relevant to the allegation.
  • A is wrong: MR 8.1 doesn't require the disclosure, but MR 1.6(b)(5) permits it, so Singh may make it.
  • B is wrong: Privilege law has an exception for disputes over the lawyer's performance (Rest. § 83), and MR 1.6(b)(5) permits the disclosure.
  • D is wrong: MR 8.1 requires responding, but it doesn't expand what may be revealed beyond what's reasonably necessary.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(5); MR 8.1(b); Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 83 · Key terms: Self-defense exception

MC-0028 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.1)

Client Pierce's lawyer, Attorney Fuller, learns during a meeting that Pierce, a pilot, has been flying commercial flights while taking medication that his doctor warned makes him prone to sudden blackouts. Pierce says he'll keep flying starting next week. Fuller represents Pierce in an unrelated contract dispute.

Which is the most accurate statement?

  • A. Fuller must reveal it, because MR 3.3 requires remedial measures for a client's crime related to a proceeding, and Pierce's flying endangers passengers.
  • B. Fuller may not reveal it, because MR 1.6(b)(2) requires use of the lawyer's services, and Fuller handles Pierce's unrelated contract dispute.
  • C. Fuller may not reveal it, because MR 1.6(b)(1) requires reasonably certain harm, and Pierce's next flight is a week away.
  • D. Fuller may reveal it, because MR 1.6(b)(1) permits disclosure to prevent reasonably certain death, and Pierce plans to fly while prone to blackouts.
  • Answer: D. The bodily-harm exception applies to any source of reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm, and the lawyer need not have been involved in the conduct or the subject matter.
  • A is wrong: MR 3.3's remedial duty concerns conduct related to a proceeding before a tribunal, and Pierce's flying has nothing to do with the contract case.
  • B is wrong: That describes paragraph (b)(2), but paragraph (b)(1) covers bodily harm with no services element.
  • C is wrong: Harm is reasonably certain if it will occur without action, even if not imminent (cmt. [6]). A week away is enough.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(1); cmt. [6]; MR 3.3(b) · Key terms: Bodily-harm exception

MC-0029 (difficulty 1 · subtopic 3.1 · OUT-3.1.1)

Attorney Quinn represents Client Abara in a contract dispute. During a deposition, opposing counsel asks Abara a question calling for the content of her confidential emails with Quinn. Quinn, thinking the emails help Abara, tells opposing counsel he will produce them. Abara has not been consulted and has given Quinn no prior or implied authority to disclose the emails.

Does Quinn have authority to disclose the emails, waiving Abara's privilege?

  • A. Yes, because MR 1.2(a) lets a lawyer take many tactical steps as to means, and Quinn decided the emails help Abara.
  • B. Yes, because impliedly authorized disclosures need no express consent, and Quinn believed disclosure would help Abara.
  • C. No, because FRE 502(b) protects inadvertent disclosures made despite reasonable care, and Quinn's disclosure would be unauthorized.
  • D. No, because the client holds the privilege and decides on waiver, and Abara hasn't authorized Quinn to waive it.
  • Answer: D. The client holds the privilege. A lawyer asserts it for the client but may not waive it without the client's express or implied authorization, and the stem rules out both.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.2(a) calls for consultation about means but lets a lawyer take impliedly authorized action without advance consultation. The stem excludes any authority to disclose these emails, and waiving the client's privilege isn't a mere tactic.
  • B is wrong: Implied authorization is real, but the stem says Abara gave Quinn no implied authority.
  • C is wrong: FRE 502(b) addresses inadvertent disclosures, and Quinn's announced production would be deliberate, so the rule doesn't fit.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 78; MR 1.2(a); MR 1.6(a); FRE 502(b) · Key terms: Attorney-client privilege, Waiver of privilege

MC-0030 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.1 · OUT-3.1.3)

Business partners Lindqvist and Tate jointly hired Attorney Okafor to form their company, and both attended all meetings. Years later, Lindqvist sues Tate for breach of fiduciary duty and seeks Okafor's testimony about what Tate said in those meetings. Tate claims privilege. Tate has not relied on any advice in his defense.

Is Tate's claim of privilege likely to succeed against Lindqvist?

  • A. Yes, because the privilege survives the end of a representation, and Okafor's work for Tate ended years ago.
  • B. Yes, because MR 1.9(c) protects former clients' information, and Tate is Okafor's former client.
  • C. No, because relying on privileged advice in litigation waives the privilege, and Lindqvist has sued Tate over the company's affairs.
  • D. No, because joint clients' communications generally aren't privileged between them, and Tate and Lindqvist jointly hired Okafor.
  • Answer: D. Under the joint-client rule, communications in a joint representation generally aren't privileged as between the co-clients in a later dispute between them.
  • A is wrong: The privilege does outlast the representation, but it was never effective between the joint clients.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.9(c) governs voluntary disclosure. Whether Okafor can be compelled to testify is governed by the joint-client rule.
  • C is wrong: At-issue waiver applies to the party relying on privileged material, and the stem says Tate hasn't.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers §§ 75, 80; MR 1.7 cmt. [30] · Key terms: Attorney-client privilege

MC-0031 (difficulty 2 · subtopic 3.4 · OUT-3.4.3)

Attorney Faris, an associate at a litigation firm, has had several substantive discussions with a larger firm about joining it. The larger firm asks her for a list of the matters she has worked on, with client names and the general nature of each matter, to check for conflicts. None of the matters is secret or sensitive.

May Faris provide the information?

  • A. No, because MR 1.6(a) generally bars revealing client identities without consent, and the list would name Faris's clients.
  • B. Yes, because MR 1.6(b)(7) permits nonprejudicial conflict-check disclosures, and none of Faris's matters is sensitive.
  • C. Yes, and she may share her files, because MR 1.10 imputes conflicts to the new firm, and it asked about her matters.
  • D. No, because MR 1.9(c) protects former clients' information, and the list covers matters Faris has already worked on.
  • Answer: B. MR 1.6(b)(7) permits limited disclosure reasonably necessary to detect and resolve conflicts, if it won't compromise privilege or otherwise prejudice the clients. Substantive discussions about the move have occurred, so the timing condition is met. Client identity and a brief summary of each matter are usually enough, and the new firm may use them only for the conflict check.
  • A is wrong: Identities are confidential, but the conflict-check exception permits limited disclosure without consent.
  • C is wrong: Imputation is why the check matters, but the exception permits only what's reasonably necessary, not files.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.9(c) allows disclosures the Rules permit, and MR 1.6(b)(7) permits this one.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(7); cmts. [13]–[14]; MR 1.9(c); MR 1.10 · Key terms: Conflict-check exception

MC-0032 (difficulty 3 · subtopic 3.1 · OUT-3.1.2)

Company counsel Attorney Castellano interviews Employee Petrakis about possible bribery of a foreign official, a matter in which Petrakis may be personally at fault. Petrakis asks, "Is this conversation just between us?" Castellano says nothing about whom she represents, and Petrakis makes damaging admissions. The company later gives the interview notes to prosecutors.

What should Castellano have done at the start of the interview?

  • A. Nothing, because Upjohn protects interviews held to obtain legal advice for the company, and Castellano interviewed Petrakis on the company's behalf.
  • B. Assure Petrakis of confidentiality, because Upjohn covers employees at all levels, and Petrakis is a company employee.
  • C. Offer to represent Petrakis too, because MR 1.13(g) permits dual representation subject to MR 1.7, and Petrakis asked whether the conversation would stay private.
  • D. Explain that she represents the company, because MR 1.13(f) requires it when she reasonably should know interests are adverse, and Petrakis may be at fault.
  • Answer: D. MR 1.13(f) requires the lawyer to explain whom she represents when she knows or reasonably should know the organization's interests are adverse to the constituent's. Here that threshold is met: Castellano is investigating bribery in which Petrakis may be personally at fault, and the company may use his statements against him. Where adversity is only a possibility, a warning is a prudent precaution rather than a mandate. Petrakis's question also shows he misunderstands her role, and MR 4.3 requires reasonable efforts to correct that misunderstanding. This explanation is often called an Upjohn warning.
  • A is wrong: Privilege may attach either way, but MR 1.13(f) separately requires the explanation when the lawyer reasonably should know interests are adverse, as Petrakis's are, and MR 4.3 requires correcting his evident misunderstanding.
  • B is wrong: Upjohn reaches all levels, but the privilege is the company's, so promising Petrakis confidentiality would be false.
  • C is wrong: Dual representation must satisfy MR 1.7, and Petrakis's possible fault makes his interests adverse to the company's.
  • Cite: Upjohn Co. v. United States (1981); MR 1.13(f), (g); MR 1.7; MR 4.3 · Key terms: Corporate privilege (Upjohn)

True / False

TF-0001 (OUT-3.0)

  • Statement: The ethical duty of confidentiality is broader than the attorney-client privilege.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.6 covers all information relating to the representation from any source, while the privilege covers only confidential communications for legal advice.
  • Exam trap: Students assume the two cover the same ground.
  • Cite: MR 1.6 cmt. [3]

TF-0002 (OUT-3.1.1)

  • Statement: Facts that a client tells a lawyer become privileged and can't be discovered from the client.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The privilege protects the communication, not the underlying facts. The client can be asked about the facts themselves.
  • Corrected statement: The privilege protects the client's communication to the lawyer, but the underlying facts can still be discovered from the client.
  • Exam trap: Telling a lawyer doesn't hide a fact.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 68

TF-0003 (OUT-3.1.1)

  • Statement: The attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: The Supreme Court so held in Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998), even in a criminal investigation. The narrow testamentary exception applies in disputes among those claiming through the deceased client.
  • Exam trap: Death doesn't end the privilege.
  • Cite: Swidler & Berlin v. United States (1998)

TF-0004 (OUT-3.1.2)

  • Statement: When a corporation's lawyer interviews an employee, the privilege belongs to the employee.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The privilege belongs to the corporation, which may waive it over the employee's objection.
  • Corrected statement: When a corporation's lawyer interviews an employee to advise the corporation, the privilege belongs to the corporation.
  • Exam trap: Being interviewed doesn't make the employee an individual client; the corporation is the client.
  • Cite: Upjohn Co. v. United States (1981); MR 1.13(a), (g)

TF-0005 (OUT-3.1.3)

  • Statement: A client's communication to a lawyer about a crime the client committed last year is not privileged because of the crime-fraud exception.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The crime-fraud exception depends on the client's purpose: it covers communications seeking the lawyer's help with a future or ongoing crime or fraud. A confidential consultation about a past crime to get legal advice or a defense is privileged.
  • Corrected statement: A client's confidential communication seeking legal advice or a defense about a crime committed last year is privileged; the crime-fraud exception applies only if the client seeks help with a future or ongoing crime or fraud, such as continuing concealment.
  • Exam trap: Purpose, not the date of the offense, decides it.
  • Cite: Rest. (Third) Law Governing Lawyers § 82 (Tier 3 — persuasive)

TF-0006 (OUT-3.2.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer's mental impressions and legal theories receive greater protection from discovery than other work product.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Opinion work product (the mental impressions and theories of the lawyer or another party representative) is protected almost absolutely, while ordinary work product yields to substantial need and undue hardship.
  • Exam trap: Students treat all work product alike.
  • Cite: FRCP 26(b)(3)(B)

TF-0007 (OUT-3.2.1)

  • Statement: Work product protects only materials prepared by the lawyer personally.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: Work product covers materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or its representative, including investigators and consultants.
  • Corrected statement: Work product protects materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or its representative, not only by the lawyer.
  • Exam trap: Investigators' notes can be work product.
  • Cite: FRCP 26(b)(3)

TF-0008 (OUT-3.3.1)

  • Statement: Information in a public court record is not protected by the duty of confidentiality.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: MR 1.6 protects information relating to the representation whether or not it is public.
  • Corrected statement: Information relating to the representation is protected by MR 1.6 even if it appears in a public court record.
  • Exam trap: "Public" doesn't end MR 1.6.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(a); cmt. [3]

TF-0009 (OUT-3.3.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer may discuss a client's matter using a hypothetical if there's no reasonable likelihood the listener could identify the client or the situation.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.6 cmt. [4] permits such hypotheticals.
  • Exam trap: Identifying details defeat the disguise.
  • Cite: MR 1.6 cmt. [4]

TF-0010 (OUT-3.3.2)

  • Statement: Lawyers in a firm may generally share a client's information with one another without the client's express consent.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Disclosure within the firm is impliedly authorized, unless the client instructs that information be confined to specified lawyers.
  • Exam trap: Clients may restrict sharing, and the firm must honor that.
  • Cite: MR 1.6 cmt. [5]

TF-0011 (OUT-3.3.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer violates the duty to safeguard client information whenever client data is stolen in a cyberattack.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: MR 1.6(c) requires reasonable efforts. A breach despite reasonable efforts isn't a violation.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer violates the duty to safeguard client information only if the lawyer failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent unauthorized disclosure or access.
  • Exam trap: The duty isn't strict liability.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(c); cmt. [18]

TF-0012 (OUT-3.4.1)

  • Statement: The bodily-harm exception permits disclosure even when the threatened harm doesn't involve any crime by the client.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.6(b)(1) requires only reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. It has no crime or client-conduct requirement.
  • Exam trap: Don't import the financial-fraud exceptions' requirements.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(1)

TF-0013 (OUT-3.4.1)

  • Statement: Under the Model Rules, a lawyer must reveal a client's plan to kill someone.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: MR 1.6(b)(1) permits, but doesn't require, disclosure to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.
  • Corrected statement: Under the Model Rules, a lawyer may reveal information reasonably necessary to prevent a client from killing someone.
  • Exam trap: Some states make it mandatory; the Model Rule doesn't.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(1)

TF-0014 (OUT-3.4.2)

  • Statement: The financial-fraud exceptions to confidentiality apply only if the client used the lawyer's services to further the crime or fraud.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.6(b)(2) and (3) both require the client's use of the lawyer's services.
  • Exam trap: This is the element students forget.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(2), (3)

TF-0015 (OUT-3.4.2)

  • Statement: Once a client's fraud has been completed, a lawyer may no longer reveal information about it under any exception.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: MR 1.6(b)(3) permits disclosure to mitigate or rectify substantial financial injury that has resulted from a client's crime or fraud in which the client used the lawyer's services.
  • Corrected statement: After a client's fraud is completed, a lawyer may reveal information reasonably necessary to mitigate or rectify the resulting substantial injury to another's financial interests or property, if the client used the lawyer's services in the fraud.
  • Exam trap: Paragraph (b)(3) looks backward as well as forward.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(3)

TF-0016 (OUT-3.4.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer may reveal confidential information reasonably necessary to collect a fee from a former client.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: The self-defense exception covers establishing a claim in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.
  • Exam trap: Only what's reasonably necessary to establish the claim.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(5)

TF-0017 (OUT-3.4.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer may reveal confidential information about a former client to respond to a negative online review.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: An online review isn't the kind of claim, charge or proceeding the self-defense exception addresses, so disclosure isn't permitted.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer may not reveal confidential information about a former client to respond to a negative online review; a response that reveals nothing confidential is allowed.
  • Exam trap: The self-defense exception isn't a license to retaliate publicly.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(5), cmt. [10] (2026); ABA Formal Op. 496 (2021) (advisory)

TF-0018 (OUT-3.4.3)

  • Statement: Absent the client's informed consent to do otherwise, when a court orders disclosure of client information, a lawyer should first assert any non-frivolous claim that the information is protected.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: The comments direct the lawyer to raise non-frivolous claims of protection and consult the client about appeal before complying.
  • Exam trap: Don't simply hand over information on demand.
  • Cite: MR 1.6(b)(6); cmts. [12]–[15]

Scenario Walkthroughs

SW-0001 · The Spreadsheet in the Shared Folder

Facts. Attorney Ferro represents Calder Holdings in a dispute with a former supplier. Calder's CFO emails Ferro a spreadsheet titled "Real margins — attorney eyes only" and writes, "This is what we actually made on the supplier's parts; the numbers we gave the bank last year were higher. Tell me how exposed we are." Ferro answers with a memo analyzing the bank-fraud risk. A paralegal later uploads the memo and the spreadsheet to a cloud folder shared with the supplier's counsel for document exchange. The supplier's lawyer opens the memo, realizes what it is, and keeps reading. The CFO, learning of the upload, tells Ferro: "Good thing that's all privileged anyway. And by the way, we're about to refinance with the same bank next month using the same numbers." Ferro says nothing and continues the representation.

Issues.

  1. Are the spreadsheet and memo privileged, confidential, or both — and does the upload change that?
  2. What must the supplier's lawyer do?
  3. What did MR 1.6(c) require of Ferro's firm?
  4. What may or must Ferro do about the refinancing?

Analysis.

  • Privilege versus confidentiality. The CFO's email and Ferro's memo are communications between a corporate client's constituent and its lawyer, made in confidence to obtain legal advice — privileged under the attorney-client privilege. The spreadsheet is different: it is a pre-existing business record, and attaching it to a request for advice does not make the underlying data privileged; the communication of it is protected, the numbers themselves are discoverable if relevant. Everything here — email, memo and spreadsheet alike — is "information relating to the representation" under MR 1.6(a), which is broader than the privilege and does not depend on confidentiality of source. The two doctrines answer different questions: the privilege decides what a tribunal can compel; 1.6 decides what Ferro may reveal. (3.1; 3.3)
  • Waiver by the upload. Voluntary disclosure to an outsider waives the privilege; inadvertent disclosure generally does not if the holder took reasonable precautions and acts promptly to retrieve the material — the standard codified for federal proceedings in FRE 502(b). The upload was a mistake, not a choice, so the question is reasonableness and prompt action. Ferro must act at once: request return or destruction and, if the case is in a tribunal, seek a protective order. The privilege belongs to Calder, not Ferro, so Calder decides whether to assert or waive it — but Ferro's duties of competence and communication require her to protect it and to tell Calder what happened. (3.1)
  • The receiving lawyer. MR 4.4(b) requires a lawyer who receives a document relating to the representation of her client and knows or reasonably should know it was sent inadvertently to promptly notify the sender. The Rule stops there; whether she must stop reading or return it is left to other law and the tribunal. The supplier's lawyer violated 4.4(b) by not notifying Ferro; the Model Rules alone do not discipline her for continuing to read, though a court may sanction or disqualify. (3.4)
  • Reasonable efforts. MR 1.6(c) requires reasonable efforts to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure. A shared exchange folder into which privileged work product can be dropped without a second look is a process failure; MR 5.3 makes Ferro, as the paralegal's supervisor, responsible for reasonable measures to ensure her conduct is compatible with Ferro's duties. One mistake by a trained paralegal under a sensible protocol is not a violation; the absence of any protocol is. (3.3)
  • The refinancing. The CFO has told Ferro that Calder intends to obtain a loan next month using figures it knows are false. That is a future fraud reasonably certain to cause substantial financial injury to the bank. MR 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure to prevent it — but only if the client is using or has used the lawyer's services in furtherance of it. Ferro's memo analyzed exposure for last year's loan; nothing shows her services are being used for the refinancing. Unless that changes, 1.6(b)(2) is not open, and neither is 1.6(b)(3). What is open — and mandatory — is MR 1.2(d) and 1.4(a)(5): Ferro may not assist the fraud, and she must tell the client what the Rules prevent her from doing. If Calder asks her to paper the refinancing on those numbers, she must refuse and, if the representation would then require assisting the fraud, withdraw under MR 1.16(a)(1). Silence and continuing as if nothing was said is the wrong answer. (3.4)

Conclusion. The email and memo are privileged and everything is confidential; the upload is an inadvertent disclosure Ferro must move promptly to cure, and the supplier's lawyer had to notify her (MR 4.4(b)); the firm's process fell short of MR 1.6(c) and 5.3; and the refinancing does not yet open a 1.6(b) exception, but it triggers the counsel-and-refuse duties of MR 1.2(d) and 1.4(a)(5), with 1.16(a)(1) behind them.

Rules. Attorney-client privilege; FRE 502(b) · MR 1.6(a), (b)(2)–(3), (c) · MR 4.4(b) · MR 5.3 · MR 1.2(d) · MR 1.4(a)(5) · MR 1.16(a)(1)

Key terms

ID Term Outline Flashcard
KT-0001 Attorney-client privilege OUT-3.1.1 FC-0001
KT-0002 Bodily-harm exception OUT-3.4.1 FC-0010
KT-0003 Client-fraud exceptions OUT-3.4.2 FC-0011
KT-0004 Conflict-check exception OUT-3.4.3 FC-0015
KT-0005 Corporate privilege (Upjohn) OUT-3.1.2 FC-0002
KT-0006 Crime-fraud exception OUT-3.1.3 FC-0003
KT-0007 Duty to safeguard information OUT-3.3.3 FC-0009
KT-0008 Ethics-advice exception OUT-3.4.3 FC-0012
KT-0009 Implied authorization OUT-3.3.2 FC-0008
KT-0010 Information relating to the representation OUT-3.3.1 FC-0007
KT-0011 Opinion work product OUT-3.2.1 FC-0006
KT-0012 Required-by-law exception OUT-3.4.3 FC-0014
KT-0013 Self-defense exception OUT-3.4.3 FC-0013
KT-0014 Waiver of privilege OUT-3.1.3 FC-0004
KT-0015 Work product OUT-3.2.1 FC-0005

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