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Legal Ethics Prep & Practice / Competence, Legal Malpractice, and Other Civil Liability FREE

Subject 5: Competence, Legal Malpractice, and Other Civil Liability

Free MPRE Study Material · NCBE weight: 6–12% · © 2026 PryvixLabs LLC. All rights reserved.

In this packet: Competence, Legal Malpractice, and Other Civil Liability Outline, 32 multiple-choice questions, 20 true/false statements, 30 flashcards, 4 scenario walkthroughs and 22 key terms.

Outlines1 outline
Multiple Choice32 questions
True/False20 statements
Flashcards30 cards
Walkthroughs4 walkthroughs
Key Terms22 terms

— Competence, Diligence, and Communication with Clients

Header Record

Field Value
Packet ID
Section S05 — Competence, Diligence, and Communication with Clients
NCBE Topic II (Client-Lawyer Relationship, 10–16%) + V (Competence, Malpractice, Civil Liability, 6–12%)
Law-as-of date September 2026
Part A — Outline only
OUT blocks 24

Attack Sheet — S05

Issue-spotting checklist (analyze in this order):

  1. Competence threshold — does the lawyer have the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation the matter requires? [MR 1.1]
  2. Acquisition — can the lawyer become competent by study/association before the representation begins? [MR 1.1 cmt. [2]]
  3. Technology competence — does the representation require tech knowledge? [MR 1.1 cmt. [8]]
  4. Diligence / procrastination — is the lawyer pursuing the matter with reasonable promptness and follow-through? [MR 1.3]
  5. Zeal trigger — does the fact pattern suggest the lawyer is being less than committed? [MR 1.3]
  6. Communication — informing — has the lawyer kept the client reasonably informed of status? [MR 1.4(a)(3)]
  7. Communication — explaining — has the lawyer explained enough for the client to make an informed decision? [MR 1.4(b)]
  8. Communication — responding — has the lawyer promptly complied with reasonable client requests for information? [MR 1.4(a)(4)]
  9. Communication — objectives vs. means — who decides what? Client sets objectives; lawyer selects means. [MR 1.2(a) / 1.4]
  10. Advisor / candor — in a non-litigation context, has the lawyer given independent, honest advice even if unwelcome? [MR 2.1]
  11. Malpractice / civil liability — did the lawyer fall below the standard of care and cause cognizable harm? [Rest. 3d §§ 48–53 (Tier 3 — persuasive); MR Scope [20]]
  12. Discipline vs. civil liability — is the fact pattern testing discipline (no harm needed) or malpractice (causation + harm required)?

Trigger words: inexperienced, unfamiliar area, associate, emergency, cutting corners, delay, deadline missed, no response, kept in the dark, client unaware, didn't explain, didn't ask, independent advice, honest opinion, standard of care, damages, causation.


Part A — Outline

OUT-5.1 Competence — The Core Duty

Rule [MR 1.1]: A lawyer must bring to each client matter the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation that the work reasonably requires. Whether a lawyer is competent depends on the complexity of the matter and what a comparable lawyer in the relevant field would bring to it.

Elements:

  1. Legal knowledge and skill adequate for the representation.
  2. Thoroughness — attention to the relevant facts and applicable law.
  3. Preparation — readiness to handle the specific tasks the matter calls for.

What counts toward competence:

  • Prior experience in the relevant area of law.
  • Study and research necessary to acquire competence (see OUT-5.2).
  • Consulting with or associating a more experienced lawyer.
  • General professional preparation when the matter is not unusually complex.

Exam Trap: Competence is judged by the demands of the particular matter, not the lawyer's credentials generally. A highly experienced litigator who takes on a specialized tax transaction without adequate preparation is still incompetent for that transaction.

Exam Trap: A lack of experience in an area does not automatically mean the lawyer is incompetent. The MPRE asks whether the lawyer rectified the gap before or during the representation.

Competence — having the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation the representation requires. [MR 1.1]

Cite: MR 1.1; MR 1.1 cmts. [1]–[8]


OUT-5.2 Acquiring Competence — Emergency and Study

Rule [MR 1.1 cmt. [2]]: A lawyer who lacks the experience a matter calls for is not necessarily barred from taking it. If the lawyer can acquire the necessary competence through reasonable preparation — independent study, research, or consultation — the lawyer may proceed. In a true emergency, a lawyer may give assistance even on matters outside normal competence, limited to what the emergency requires.

Elements:

  1. Study path: the lawyer studies or researches and acquires competence before or during the representation, without unreasonably delaying or prejudicing the client.
  2. Association path: the lawyer retains or consults a lawyer who is competent in the area, with client consent if the association creates additional costs.
  3. Emergency exception: genuine emergency + assistance limited to the emergency need + prompt referral or handoff to a qualified lawyer when the emergency is past.

Exceptions and nuances:

  • Emergency assistance does not make a lawyer generally competent in the area — it is a narrow permission to provide limited help in a crisis.
  • "Reasonable preparation" is judged against the complexity of the matter: a simple will requires less study than a first-ever securities offering.

Exam Trap: If the lawyer purports to handle a complex matter by doing hurried last-minute research without disclosing the inexperience, that is not "acquiring competence" — it is taking on work the lawyer was not prepared for.

Emergency exception (competence) — limited latitude to assist a client on a matter outside one's competence when a genuine emergency demands it, restricted to the scope of the emergency.

Cite: MR 1.1 cmts. [2], [3]


OUT-5.3 Technology Competence

Rule [MR 1.1 cmt. [8]]: Competence includes keeping abreast of the benefits and risks of relevant technology. A lawyer whose practice involves technological tools — document management systems, e-discovery platforms, encrypted communications, cloud storage — must understand enough about those tools to use them responsibly on behalf of clients.

Elements:

  1. Awareness of the benefits and risks of the technology being used.
  2. Supervision of non-lawyer assistants who operate the technology, to the extent the lawyer is responsible under MR 5.1–5.3.

Nuances:

  • A lawyer need not be a technology expert, but must understand the material risks that relevant technology poses to client data and the representation.
  • The obligation is ongoing: as technology changes, the competent lawyer stays current.

Exam Trap: Technology competence is tested in data-breach and cybersecurity scenarios. A lawyer who stores client files in an obviously insecure system and fails to recognize the risk may be subject to discipline even if no breach has yet occurred.

Technology competence — the component of MR 1.1 requiring a lawyer to keep up with the benefits and risks of technology relevant to the representation.

Cite: MR 1.1 cmt. [8] (added 2012 amendment to comment)


OUT-5.4 Diligence — Pursuing the Matter

Rule [MR 1.3]: A lawyer owes every client conscientious, persistent follow-through. That means taking timely action at each stage of a matter and seeing it through to a proper conclusion — not setting it aside, letting it drift, or walking away without good reason.

Elements:

  1. Reasonable diligence — follow-through on all tasks the matter requires.
  2. Promptness — timely action at each stage, without unnecessary delay.
  3. Completion — seeing the matter through to its conclusion or properly withdrawing.

What "diligence" does not require:

  • Unreasonable or abusive tactics against opposing parties or counsel. [MR 1.3 cmt. [1]]
  • Action that would violate the Rules (e.g., filing a meritless claim to generate delay).

Exam Trap: Diligence is separate from competence. A lawyer who knows what to do but fails to do it promptly violates MR 1.3, not MR 1.1. Procrastination that prejudices the client is a diligence violation.

Exam Trap: The workload defense does not excuse inaction. A lawyer who takes on more work than can be handled with reasonable diligence may be subject to discipline even if each delay results from workload rather than intent.

Diligence — the duty to act with reasonable follow-through and promptness, and to see a matter through to completion. [MR 1.3]

Cite: MR 1.3; MR 1.3 cmts. [1]–[4]


OUT-5.5 Workload and Declining Representation

Rule [MR 1.3 cmt. [2]]: A lawyer's workload must be controlled so that each client's matter can be handled competently and diligently. Taking on a volume of work that makes it impossible to serve all clients is itself a form of neglect.

Elements:

  1. Lawyer controls workload — does not accept more matters than can be handled with the care each deserves.
  2. If workload builds after accepting a matter — the lawyer takes steps to address the backlog (associate assistance, withdrawal if necessary) rather than letting deadlines slip.

Exam Trap: A new, large case does not justify neglecting existing clients. The MPRE may test a lawyer who is distracted by a high-profile matter while missing deadlines for other clients.

Cite: MR 1.3 cmt. [2]; MR 1.16 (withdrawal when representation is impractical)


OUT-5.6 Communication — Keeping the Client Informed

Rule [MR 1.4(a)]: A lawyer carries five distinct communication obligations toward every client: surface anything requiring the client's consent without delay; talk through how the lawyer plans to pursue the client's goals; keep the client reasonably current on where things stand; answer reasonable information requests promptly; and tell the client about any Rule or other legal restraint that limits what the lawyer can do.

Elements — the five sub-duties:

  1. Prompt disclosure of consent-triggering events (sub-duty 1): whenever a development arises that needs client authorization — under MR 1.2, 1.7, 1.8, or elsewhere — the lawyer surfaces it without unnecessary delay.
  2. Consulting on means (sub-duty 2): the client controls the goals; the lawyer controls the strategy. But the lawyer must discuss the approach so the client can meaningfully weigh in before the lawyer proceeds.
  3. Status updates (sub-duty 3): the lawyer proactively keeps the client reasonably current on progress. Silence is acceptable only when there genuinely is nothing new to report.
  4. Responding to requests (sub-duty 4): a reasonable client inquiry demands a prompt answer, even if that answer is only that nothing has changed.
  5. Disclosure of limitations (sub-duty 5): if a Rule or other law bars the lawyer from doing something the client wants — such as presenting testimony the lawyer knows is false — the lawyer must explain that constraint.

Exam Trap: A lawyer who never responds to client calls does not escape discipline because the client "should have known" there was nothing to report. The duty is to communicate, not to wait to be asked.

Exam Trap: Sub-duty 4 is a responding duty, not a volunteering duty. But sub-duty 3 is a proactive duty: reasonably keeping the client informed without waiting to be asked.

Status update duty — the obligation under MR 1.4(a)(3) to proactively keep the client reasonably informed about the matter's progress.

Cite: MR 1.4(a)(1)–(5); MR 1.4 cmts. [3]–[4]


OUT-5.7 Communication — Explaining for Informed Decision-Making

Rule [MR 1.4(b)]: A lawyer owes the client enough of an explanation that the client can actually decide what to do — not a lecture on every legal detail, but a clear enough picture of the options, risks, and consequences that the client's choice is a real one.

Elements:

  1. Adequate explanation — the lawyer provides enough information (about options, consequences, and risks) for the client to decide.
  2. Client's understanding — the explanation is calibrated to the client's background; a sophisticated corporate client needs a different depth of explanation than an individual with no legal training.

Nuances:

  • The duty applies to decisions — it does not require the lawyer to walk the client through every legal detail of the entire matter.
  • "Informed consent" as defined in MR 1.0(e) requires explanation of material risks and alternatives: this is the standard for consent-dependent decisions under the conflict rules.

Exam Trap: A client who "said yes" to an action has not given informed consent if the lawyer did not explain the material risks and alternatives beforehand.

Informed decision — a client's decision made after the lawyer has explained the material information the decision requires, including risks and alternatives. [MR 1.4(b)]

Cite: MR 1.4(b); MR 1.0(e) (defining "informed consent")


OUT-5.8 Objectives vs. Means — Who Decides What

Rule [MR 1.2(a)]: A lawyer must abide by a client's decisions about the objectives of the representation and must reasonably consult with the client about the means. In criminal matters, the client also decides specifically: whether to plead guilty, whether to waive a jury, whether to testify.

Elements:

  1. Objectives — the end goals of the representation (e.g., "get a dismissal," "close the deal") — set by the client.
  2. Means — the tactics and strategies used to achieve the objectives — selected by the lawyer, after consultation.
  3. Criminal exceptions — three specific decisions reserved to the client even within the "means" space: plea, jury waiver, whether to testify.

Exam Trap: The MPRE distinguishes "objectives" from "means." The client decides what to pursue; the lawyer decides how to pursue it (within the Rules). Ignoring the client's stated objective (e.g., overriding a client's clear choice to settle) is a violation.

Exam Trap: A lawyer who makes a tactical decision that turns out to be wrong has not necessarily violated the Rules — the question is whether the decision was within the lawyer's authority over "means" and was made competently.

Client objectives — the ends the client seeks from the representation; the client controls these under MR 1.2(a). [MR 1.2(a)]

Lawyer means — the tactics and strategies the lawyer uses to achieve client objectives; within the lawyer's authority after consultation. [MR 1.2(a)]

Cite: MR 1.2(a); MR 1.4(a)(2)


OUT-5.9 Communication — Client With Decision-Making Limitations

Amended rule. On Feb 9, 2026 (Res. 100) the ABA retitled MR 1.14 "Client With Decision-Making Limitations" (formerly "Client With Diminished Capacity") and rewrote it. NCBE tests an amendment no earlier than about one year after adoption and may test the prior rule until then, so the amended text is not expected on the exam before about February 2027. This block teaches the amended rule and notes where the prior rule differs. Full treatment: S02 OUT-2.5.

Rule [MR 1.14 (as amended Feb 2026)]: When a client has decision-making limitations, the lawyer must still keep up an ordinary client-lawyer relationship as far as reasonably possible. Protective action is allowed only when three conditions are met, and the least restrictive step comes first.

Elements:

  1. Default: treat the client as a client — communicate, consult, explain — and try supports and accommodations first (plain language, a familiar setting, trusted helpers chosen by the client). [MR 1.14(a); cmts. [3]–[5], [11]]
  2. Three conditions for protective action [MR 1.14(b)]: the lawyer reasonably believes the client (a) has decision-making limitations, AND (b) faces a risk of substantial harm, whether physical, financial or otherwise, unless someone acts, AND (c) cannot adequately protect her own interest. (Prior rule: "diminished capacity" in place of (a); same structure.)
  3. Protective action: permissive, not required. Examples: consulting family members or others able to help, a reconsideration period, voluntary surrogate tools; seeking a guardian is the most intrusive step and a last resort. No client consent is required for the consultation, but the lawyer must tell the client about the action taken. [cmts. [12], [15], [17]]
  4. Confidentiality: the lawyer may share client information without consent, but only what she reasonably judges the protective step requires, keeping the disclosure narrow. The amended rule says this directly; the prior rule called the disclosure "impliedly authorized." [MR 1.14(c); cmt. [18]]

Exam Trap: A limitation does not mean the client loses control over the representation. The lawyer does not substitute her judgment for a client who can still decide; protective action is reserved for clients at risk of substantial harm. A diagnosis, old age or an unwise choice does not by itself establish a decision-making limitation. [cmts. [13]–[14]]

Decision-making limitations — significant trouble, even with supports, in taking in and understanding information, weighing it, or making and communicating decisions; triggers special duties under MR 1.14 (as amended Feb 2026).

Diminished capacity — the prior rule's term for a reduced ability to make adequately considered decisions; still the term the MPRE may use until about February 2027.

Cite: MR 1.14 (as amended Feb 2026, Res. 100); cmts. [3]–[5], [11]–[18]; ABA Formal Op. 525 (2026) (ethics opinion — advisory, not binding); prior MR 1.14 and cmts. [1]–[9]


OUT-5.10 The Advisor Role — Candor and Independent Judgment

Rule [MR 2.1]: A lawyer giving advice must bring genuine, honest professional judgment — not the answer the client wants to hear. The advice may go beyond the strictly legal dimension: when moral, economic, social, or other practical considerations bear on the client's situation, the lawyer is free (and sometimes expected) to address them.

Elements:

  1. Independent judgment — the lawyer does not merely tell the client what the client wants to hear.
  2. Candor — the advice is honest and complete, including about risks the client might prefer to ignore.
  3. Non-legal factors — the lawyer may go beyond pure legal analysis when doing so serves the client's interests (e.g., pointing out that a legally permissible action is likely to harm a business relationship).

Exam Trap: A lawyer who softens advice to avoid upsetting a client, or who omits material risks to preserve the relationship, violates MR 2.1. The duty is to be candid, not comfortable.

Exam Trap: MR 2.1 is an advisors rule — it applies when the lawyer is giving advice, not when the lawyer is in the role of advocate. In advocacy, the zealous representation norms of MR 3.1–3.4 govern.

Candid advice — honest, complete professional advice that reflects the lawyer's independent judgment rather than what the client hopes to hear. [MR 2.1]

Cite: MR 2.1; MR 2.1 cmts. [1]–[5]


OUT-5.11 Malpractice — Civil Liability Overview

Restatement position [Rest. 3d § 48] (Tier 3 — persuasive, not binding): Under the widely followed formulation, a lawyer who breaches the duty of care owed to a client, and whose breach causes harm, is liable for the resulting damages. Courts measure the duty against the care a reasonably competent lawyer in the same or similar circumstances would exercise.

Elements of legal malpractice (negligence-based):

  1. Duty — a lawyer-client relationship or another relationship recognized by law as giving rise to a duty of care.
  2. Breach — the lawyer's conduct fell below the standard of the reasonably competent lawyer.
  3. Causation — the breach caused the harm (both actual cause and proximate cause; in litigation malpractice, a "case within a case" showing that the client would have prevailed but for the breach).
  4. Damages — actual, cognizable harm to the client.

Exam Trap — discipline vs. malpractice: A Rule violation is not itself a cause of action for malpractice [MR Scope [20]]. Conversely, conduct that falls below the standard of care can give rise to malpractice even if no specific Rule names it. The two standards overlap but are not the same.

Exam Trap: In litigation malpractice, the plaintiff must prove the "case within a case" — i.e., that they would have won (or won more) in the underlying matter but for the negligent lawyering. This is a higher bar than the discipline standard.

Legal malpractice — a claim against a lawyer for negligent representation, requiring duty, breach, causation, and damages. [Rest. 3d § 48 (Tier 3 — persuasive)]

Standard of care (malpractice) — the level of skill and care a reasonably competent lawyer in similar circumstances would provide. [Rest. 3d § 48 (Tier 3 — persuasive)]

Case within a case — the litigation malpractice requirement that the plaintiff prove the underlying case would have been won but for the lawyer's negligence.

Cite: Rest. 3d § 48 (Tier 3 — persuasive); MR Scope [20]


OUT-5.12 Malpractice — Duty and Its Extent

Restatement position [Rest. 3d § 50] (Tier 3 — persuasive, not binding): Under the Restatement's formulation, a lawyer owes a duty of care to the client in all matters for which the lawyer is retained or undertakes to provide assistance. The duty extends to the full scope of the representation, including any matter the lawyer knows the client is relying on the lawyer to handle.

Elements:

  1. Scope of duty follows the scope of the representation agreed to by the parties.
  2. Reliance: if the lawyer undertakes a task (even informally) and the client reasonably relies on that undertaking, the duty attaches.
  3. Non-clients: in limited circumstances, a duty of care may run to intended third-party beneficiaries (e.g., the named beneficiary in a will the lawyer negligently fails to execute). [Rest. 3d § 51]

Exam Trap: A lawyer who says "just ask me if you have questions" about a matter outside the representation has not assumed a duty of care for that matter — the client's unilateral reliance does not create a duty without the lawyer's undertaking.

Cite: Rest. 3d §§ 50–51


OUT-5.13 Malpractice — Breach: The Reasonably Competent Lawyer

Restatement position [Rest. 3d § 52(1)] (Tier 3 — persuasive, not binding): Under the formulation most courts follow, a lawyer's conduct is measured against the level of skill and care that a reasonably proficient lawyer would bring to comparable work. When the lawyer has held out expertise in a particular field, that benchmark shifts upward: the standard is what an experienced practitioner in that specialty would ordinarily do.

Elements:

  1. General standard: the competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances. [Rest. 3d § 52(1)]
  2. Specialist standard: where the lawyer holds out expertise in a field, the benchmark is the competence specialists in that field ordinarily bring to comparable work. [Rest. 3d § 52 and its commentary (Tier 3 — persuasive)]
  3. Local vs. national: the Restatement does not choose between local and national community in the black letter of § 52; the phrase "similar circumstances" leaves room for both approaches. Jurisdictions vary; modern trend favors a national standard for specialists. This is a fact-specific, jurisdiction-dependent issue on the MPRE.

Exam Trap: A lawyer who holds themselves out as a specialist (e.g., "Board Certified in Immigration Law") is held to the specialist standard even if the client did not specifically seek them out for that expertise.

Exam Trap — what a Rule violation proves: Start with MR Scope [20], which the MPRE tests: breaking a Rule does not by itself give the client a lawsuit or raise a presumption that a legal duty was breached, but because the Rules set standards of conduct, a violation may be offered as evidence that the lawyer fell below the standard. Rest. 3d § 52(2) takes the same approach (Tier 3 — persuasive): a violation creates no implied cause of action and does not bar other proof, and the factfinder may consider the Rule in applying the standard of care when the Rule was meant to protect people in the claimant's position. States differ on the weight a violation gets (for example, N.M. UJI-Civil 13-2411 lets a jury treat it as evidence of breach). § 52(2) does not define the standard of care; do not confuse it with § 52(1).

Specialist standard (malpractice) — under the widely followed Restatement formulation, lawyers who hold themselves out as specialists are measured against the competence specialists in that field ordinarily exercise. [Rest. 3d § 52 and its commentary (Tier 3 — persuasive)]

Cite: Rest. 3d § 52(1) and its commentary; § 52(2) (role of a Rule violation — distinct) (all Tier 3 — persuasive); MR Scope [20]; N.M. UJI-Civil 13-2411 NMRA (2025)


OUT-5.14 Malpractice — Causation

Restatement position [Rest. 3d § 53] (Tier 3 — persuasive, not binding): Under the widely followed formulation, to prevail on a malpractice claim a client must prove that the lawyer's breach of duty actually caused the harm alleged. In litigation malpractice, this typically requires the plaintiff to prove the "case within a case": that the underlying matter would have been resolved more favorably but for the lawyer's negligence.

Elements:

  1. Actual cause: but-for the breach, the harm would not have occurred.
  2. Proximate cause: the harm was a foreseeable consequence of the breach.
  3. Case within a case (litigation context): the plaintiff proves (1) the underlying litigation would have succeeded and (2) the defendant lawyer's negligence caused it to fail.

Nuances:

  • In transactional malpractice, the "case within a case" does not apply; the plaintiff must show a favorable outcome would have been obtained but for the error (e.g., the deal would have closed).
  • Damages must be real and provable, not speculative.

Exam Trap: The causation element is where most malpractice claims fail. On the MPRE, look for fact patterns where a lawyer erred but the client would have lost anyway — the claim fails for lack of causation, not for lack of breach.

Cite: Rest. 3d § 53 and cmt. b (Tier 3 — persuasive)


OUT-5.15 Discipline vs. Malpractice vs. Disqualification — Comparison

Core distinction:

Issue Standard Harm required? Authority
Discipline Violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct No State bar / disciplinary board
Malpractice Breach of standard of care + causation + damages Yes (actual) Civil court
Disqualification Risk of prejudice to party in pending litigation No — risk alone sufficient Trial court

Key rules:

  • A Rule violation does not automatically create a malpractice claim. [MR Scope [20]]
  • A malpractice judgment does not automatically require discipline.
  • Disqualification is a court remedy; discipline and malpractice are separate proceedings.

Exam Trap: The MPRE frequently asks whether conduct "subjects the lawyer to discipline" vs. whether it gives rise to "civil liability." These are different standards. Discipline requires a Rule violation. Civil liability requires duty, breach, causation, and damages — independent of whether any Rule was violated.

Cite: MR Scope [20]; Rest. 3d § 48; MR 1.7 cmt. [6] (disqualification)


OUT-5.16 Limiting the Scope of Representation

Rule [MR 1.2(c)]: A lawyer and client may agree to narrow what the representation covers, as long as two conditions are satisfied: the agreed scope is genuinely workable — meaning the lawyer can do the limited work competently and diligently — and the client gives informed consent to the boundaries.

Elements:

  1. Reasonable limitation: the limited scope still allows the lawyer to provide competent and diligent representation within the agreed scope.
  2. Informed consent: the client understands and agrees to the limitation before it takes effect.

Nuances:

  • A scope limitation does not reduce the lawyer's obligation to be competent and diligent within the agreed scope.
  • "Unbundled legal services" — in which a lawyer handles only discrete tasks — are permissible under this rule if the limitations are clear and the client consents.

Exam Trap: A scope limitation cannot be used to evade the duty of competence for the agreed work. If the lawyer agrees to review only one contract clause and negligently reviews that clause, the limitation does not bar a malpractice claim for that task.

Limited scope representation — an arrangement under MR 1.2(c) where, with client informed consent, the lawyer handles only specified aspects of the matter.

Cite: MR 1.2(c); MR 1.2 cmt. [7]


OUT-5.17 Duty to Decline or Withdraw — Relation to Competence

Rule [MR 1.16(a)/(b)]: Withdrawal is sometimes mandatory and sometimes permissive. A lawyer must decline or withdraw when the representation would require violating the Rules or other law, when the lawyer's own health, physical or mental, materially impairs her handling of the matter, when the client discharges the lawyer, or when the client keeps trying to use the lawyer's services for a crime or fraud after the lawyer has explained what she cannot do (MR 1.16(a)(4), added 2023). Separately, a lawyer may withdraw — subject to court permission where applicable — when staying on would leave her carrying a financial burden that is unreasonable, or when the client has made the work unreasonably difficult (for example, by failing to cooperate or comply with the lawyer's reasonable requests).

Interaction with competence:

  • If a lawyer cannot acquire competence through study or association in time to serve the client, the lawyer should not accept the representation. [MR 1.1 cmt. [2]]
  • A lawyer already in a representation who discovers a competence gap must either cure it (study/association) or withdraw under MR 1.16.
  • Note: the fact that a matter is complex or technically demanding does not itself give the lawyer permission to withdraw. Permissive withdrawal under MR 1.16(b)(6) requires that the client — not the subject matter — has rendered the lawyer's work unreasonably difficult.

Exam Trap: A lawyer cannot simply withdraw mid-case to avoid a competence problem — withdrawal must comply with MR 1.16, and the lawyer must take steps to protect the client's interests (e.g., providing reasonable notice, returning the file, cooperating in transition to successor counsel).

Cite: MR 1.16(a)–(b); MR 1.16 cmt. [4]


OUT-5.18 Fees and Communication — Promptness

Rule [MR 1.5(b)]: A lawyer must tell the client, before the work begins or very shortly afterward, what the representation will cover and what the fee will be — how it is calculated or what the flat amount is. Written confirmation is preferred but not required in most jurisdictions. The exception: this disclosure obligation does not apply when the lawyer regularly represents the client and is charging on the same basis or at the same rate as in prior matters.

Elements:

  1. Scope disclosure: what the lawyer will and will not do.
  2. Fee disclosure: the basis or rate of the fee (hourly, flat, contingent, etc.).
  3. Timing: before commencement, or within a reasonable time after — not weeks or months into the representation.
  4. Exception: a lawyer who regularly represents the same client at the same rate or on the same basis as previous matters need not repeat the fee communication for each new matter — but must communicate any change in fee basis or rate.

Exam Trap: MR 1.5(b) does not require a written fee agreement in most jurisdictions (contingent fees are the exception under MR 1.5(c), which does require writing). Failure to communicate promptly on fees is a separate violation from having an unreasonable fee.

Exam Trap: The exception is narrow: "regularly represented" + "same basis or rate." A client who was previously represented on a flat-fee basis but is now being billed hourly is entitled to a fresh fee communication even if the lawyer has worked with that client many times before.

Fee communication duty — the obligation under MR 1.5(b) to communicate the scope of representation and fee basis before or promptly after the representation begins.

Cite: MR 1.5(b); MR 1.5(c) (contingent fees)


OUT-5.19 Communication in the Digital Age

Rule [MR 1.4; applied in ABA Formal Op. 477R (2017) and ABA Formal Op. 498 (2021) (ethics opinions — advisory, not binding)]: A lawyer must use reasonable means to communicate with clients, including making reasonable judgments about the security of the channel chosen. Highly sensitive information requires more secure channels; routine information requires less. For virtual and remote practice, a lawyer must take reasonable precautions to protect client confidentiality across all technology used.

Elements:

  1. Reasonable security: match the communication channel to the sensitivity of the information.
  2. Virtual practice: lawyers practicing remotely or using cloud-based tools must apply the same competence and confidentiality duties as in-office practice. [ABA Formal Op. 498 (2021)]
  3. Competence + communication overlap: using an unreasonably insecure channel for sensitive information may violate both MR 1.1 (technology competence) and MR 1.4 (communication).

Nuances:

  • ABA Formal Op. 477R (2017): the duty to protect confidential information during electronic communications is governed by a reasonable-security analysis, not a perfect-security standard. Unencrypted email is generally acceptable for routine matters; higher sensitivity requires stronger measures.
  • ABA Formal Op. 498 (2021): virtual practice raises no new ethical obligations but requires lawyers to apply existing duties — competence, confidentiality, supervision — in the remote context.

Exam Trap: A lawyer who uses obviously insecure channels for extremely sensitive client information without the client's knowledge or consent may be subject to discipline under both MR 1.1 and MR 1.4.

Cite: MR 1.4; MR 1.1 cmt. [8]; ABA Formal Op. 477R (2017); ABA Formal Op. 498 (2021)


OUT-5.20 Supervisory Duties — Competence Through Others

Rule [MR 5.1 / 5.3]: Partners and other lawyers with managerial authority over a firm must put reasonable structures in place so that all the firm's lawyers work within the Rules. A supervising lawyer who gives a direct order that leads to a violation, approves of the conduct after the fact, or learns of the violation in time to prevent or mitigate harm but does nothing is responsible for what follows. The same logic extends to non-lawyer staff under MR 5.3: the supervising lawyer must give reasonable guidance and follow up.

Interaction with competence:

  • A lawyer who is otherwise competent but who fails to supervise an incompetent associate has violated MR 5.1, not MR 1.1 directly — though the client may have suffered the same harm.
  • For non-lawyers, the obligation is to give reasonable instructions and monitor compliance. [MR 5.3]

Exam Trap: The supervisory duty under MR 5.1 is not strict liability — the supervisor must have ordered, ratified, or known of the violation in time to prevent it. A supervisor who genuinely did not know and could not reasonably have known is not disciplined for the subordinate's isolated violation.

Cite: MR 5.1; MR 5.3; MR 5.1 cmts. [2]–[5]


OUT-5.23 Prospective Limitation of Malpractice Liability — MR 1.8(h)

Rule [MR 1.8(h)]: A lawyer must not make an agreement prospectively limiting liability to a client for the lawyer's own malpractice unless (1) the client is independently represented in making the agreement. A lawyer must not settle a malpractice claim with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing to seek independent counsel and giving that person reasonable opportunity to do so.

Elements:

  1. Prospective limitation [MR 1.8(h)(1)]: permissible only if the client is independently represented in negotiating the limitation. The client's own consent alone is insufficient — separate counsel is required.
  2. Settlement of existing malpractice claim [MR 1.8(h)(2)]: if the client or former client is unrepresented, the lawyer must: (a) advise in writing that the person should seek independent counsel, and (b) give a reasonable opportunity to do so before settlement.

Nuances:

  • An agreement limiting malpractice liability differs from a scope limitation under MR 1.2(c). A scope limitation defines what the lawyer will do; a liability cap limits recovery for what the lawyer does negligently. Both require client consent, but only MR 1.8(h)(1) requires independent representation of the client.
  • State law may impose additional restrictions or prohibit prospective limitations entirely.

Exam Trap: "Informed consent" is not enough for MR 1.8(h)(1). The client must be independently represented — a separate lawyer, not the drafting lawyer giving an explanation.

Exam Trap — discipline vs. malpractice: A violation of MR 1.8(h) is a disciplinary matter. It does not by itself make the limitation void as a matter of civil law, though courts often refuse to enforce improperly obtained limitations.

Prospective malpractice limitation — an agreement made before a representation capping the lawyer's liability for negligence; requires the client to be independently represented. [MR 1.8(h)(1)]

Cite: MR 1.8(h)(1)–(2); MR 1.8 cmt. [14]


OUT-5.24 Fee Forfeiture — Distinct Remedy for Serious Breach

Restatement position [Rest. 3d § 37] (Tier 3 — persuasive, not binding): Under the Restatement's formulation, which many courts follow (varies by state), a lawyer who commits a serious breach of fiduciary duty or another fundamental obligation owed to a client may forfeit some or all of the fees otherwise earned, even when the client cannot prove the traditional elements of malpractice. Fee forfeiture is a distinct equitable remedy; it does not require the client to show that the breach caused provable damages.

Elements:

  1. Serious breach: the lawyer's misconduct must be sufficiently grave — a mere technical violation does not automatically trigger forfeiture.
  2. Link to services: forfeiture applies to fees for the services tainted by the breach, not necessarily all fees for the entire representation.
  3. No damages required: unlike malpractice, the client does not need to prove harm from the breach; the forfeiture is based on the lawyer's disloyalty or fundamental failure, not on compensating the client for loss.
  4. Degree of forfeiture: courts have discretion; partial forfeiture (reducing rather than eliminating the fee) is available and common.

Nuances:

  • Fee forfeiture and malpractice damages are cumulative, not alternative — a client may potentially recover both.
  • Forfeiture is most commonly applied in conflict-of-interest cases and cases involving serious dishonesty, not mere negligence.
  • Some jurisdictions recognize forfeiture only on restitutionary grounds; others treat it as an independent prophylactic remedy.

Exam Trap — discipline vs. forfeiture vs. malpractice: These are three separate consequences for lawyer misconduct. Discipline requires a Rule violation; malpractice requires harm + causation + damages; fee forfeiture requires a serious breach and may arise even where the client suffered no provable loss.

Exam Trap: A lawyer who negligently handles a matter may face malpractice liability but not automatic fee forfeiture; the breach must reach the level of "serious" before forfeiture becomes available as an equitable remedy.

Fee forfeiture — the equitable remedy of stripping a lawyer of some or all earned fees following a serious breach of duty, available without proof of damages. [Rest. 3d § 37 (Tier 3 — persuasive)]

Cite: Rest. 3d § 37 (Tier 3 — persuasive)


OUT-5.21 Competence — Must-Know Summary Checklist

Quick-reference checklist for exam attack:

  • [ ] MR 1.1 threshold: Does the lawyer have, or can the lawyer acquire, the competence the matter requires?
  • [ ] MR 1.1 cmt. [8] tech: Does the matter involve technology the lawyer must understand?
  • [ ] MR 1.3 diligence: Is the lawyer doing the work (not just knowing how)?
  • [ ] MR 1.3 cmt. [2] workload: Has the lawyer's caseload made neglect of this matter inevitable?
  • [ ] MR 1.4(a)(3) status: Has the client been kept reasonably informed?
  • [ ] MR 1.4(a)(4) response: Has the lawyer responded to reasonable client inquiries?
  • [ ] MR 1.4(b) explanation: Has the lawyer explained enough for informed client decisions?
  • [ ] MR 2.1 candor: Has the lawyer given honest advice, not just comfortable advice?
  • [ ] Discipline vs. malpractice: Is this a bar-discipline question (Rule violation, no harm needed) or a civil liability question (harm + causation required)?

OUT-5.22 Common Exam Traps — S05

  1. "Competent but negligent" — a lawyer can be competent under MR 1.1 (knows the law) but still commit malpractice (failed to apply it with reasonable care). The standards overlap but are not identical.

  2. "Violation = malpractice" — MR Scope [20] expressly bars this inference. A Rule violation is not itself a cause of action.

  3. "Client said okay" — a client's assent is not informed consent unless the lawyer explained material risks and alternatives first.

  4. "No response needed — no news is good news" — wrong. MR 1.4(a)(3) requires proactive status updates; MR 1.4(a)(4) requires prompt responses to client inquiries.

  5. "Specialist must be better" — actually, a specialist who holds out as such is held to a higher standard: that of competent specialists in the same field.

  6. "Emergency excuse" — emergency permission under MR 1.1 cmt. [2] is limited to the emergency need. It does not grant general competence in an unfamiliar area.

  7. "Advisor = advocate" — MR 2.1 governs advice-giving. The distinction matters for context, not client type: a lawyer representing a litigation client still owes candid advice when counseling that client (e.g., whether to settle, whether to testify). Once acting as advocate before a tribunal, MR 3.1–3.4 govern the advocacy conduct itself. The roles can coexist; the MPRE tests which hat the lawyer is wearing at the moment in question.


Comparison Chart — Discipline vs. Malpractice vs. Disqualification

Discipline Civil Malpractice Disqualification
Governing standard Rules of Professional Conduct Tort law + Rest. 3d §§ 48–53 Court discretion; fairness in pending litigation
Harm required? No Yes — actual, provable damages No — risk of prejudice sufficient
Who pursues? State bar / disciplinary authority Client (in civil court) Opposing party (in court)
Result Reprimand, suspension, disbarment Money damages Order removing lawyer from case
Rule violation = liability? Yes — if Rule is violated No — Rule violation alone ≠ cause of action Not directly — court assesses prejudice
Civil judgment = discipline? No — independent proceedings N/A No
Key cite State Rules + MR Rest. 3d §§ 48–53; MR Scope [20] MR 1.7 cmt. [6]; MR 1.9 cmt. [4]

Sources and Verification Log

Item Source Status
MR 1.1 competence rule and comments ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2024 ed.) CONFIRMED
MR 1.3 diligence rule and comments ABA Model Rules (2024 ed.) CONFIRMED
MR 1.4 communication rule and comments ABA Model Rules (2024 ed.) CONFIRMED
MR 1.2(a) objectives vs. means ABA Model Rules (2024 ed.) CONFIRMED
MR 2.1 advisor rule and comments ABA Model Rules (2024 ed.) CONFIRMED
MR 1.14 diminished capacity (prior rule) / decision-making limitations (amended Feb 2026) ABA Model Rules (2024 ed.); ABA Res. 100 (Midyear 2026), checked against official text in S02 on 2026-09-24 CONFIRMED (prior); amended text per S02 OUT-2.5 — v1.5
MR 1.16 withdrawal ABA Model Rules (2024 ed.) CONFIRMED
MR 1.5(b) fee communication ABA Model Rules (2024 ed.) CONFIRMED
MR 5.1 / 5.3 supervision ABA Model Rules (2024 ed.) CONFIRMED
MR Scope [20] Rule violation ≠ cause of action ABA Model Rules (2024 ed.) CONFIRMED
ABA Formal Op. 477R (2017) electronic comm. security ABA Standing Committee on Ethics (2017) CONFIRMED
ABA Formal Op. 498 (2021) virtual practice ABA Standing Committee on Ethics (2021) CONFIRMED — added to OUT-5.19; governs remote/tech-assisted representations
MR 1.1 cmt. [8] technology competence (2012 amendment) ABA Model Rules (2024 ed.) CONFIRMED

— Multiple Choice Items (MC)

Why-right / why-wrong lines follow each item.

Update note — MR 1.14 (Res. 100, Feb 9, 2026). MR 1.14 was retitled "Client With Decision-Making Limitations" and rewritten. Under NCBE's testing lag the amended text is not expected on the exam before about February 2027. MC-0008 and MC-0026 are drafted to be correct under both the prior and the amended rule and use the amended title; comment numbers are the amended ones, with the prior number noted.

Key distribution (measured by script): A=8, B=8, C=8, D=8 (25% each); MC-0021…0032 keys C A D B D A C B A D B C (no cycle) · Difficulty (measured): d1 10 / d2 16 / d3 6 = 31/50/19 · Key uniquely longest: 3 of 32 (MC-0011 +7c, MC-0012 +2c, MC-0017 +5c) · Distractors >20c longer than key: 0


MC-0001 (difficulty 1 · Competence / Acquiring Competence · OUT-5.2)

Navarro has practiced employment law for fifteen years. A longtime client, a small business owner, asks Navarro to handle the sale of the owner's business — a transaction that involves complex partnership and tax issues Navarro has never worked with before. Navarro agrees and immediately begins researching partnership and tax law relevant to the deal. Three months later, after substantial study, she successfully closes the transaction.

Was Navarro's conduct proper?

  • A. No, because Navarro had never handled a business sale transaction before, making her incompetent to take the matter.
  • B. Yes, because any lawyer may take any matter if the client consents to the representation.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer may acquire competence through the study and research necessary to become competent before or during the representation.
  • D. No, because a lawyer who takes a matter in an unfamiliar area must associate experienced co-counsel rather than attempt to learn the field alone.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.1 does not bar a lawyer from taking a matter outside prior experience; it asks whether the lawyer can acquire competence. Navarro did so.
  • B is wrong: Client consent is not the test for competence; a client cannot consent to incompetent representation.
  • Answer: C. Under MR 1.1 cmt. [2], a lawyer may acquire competence through study and research. Navarro studied the applicable law before closing the deal — this is the paradigm case.
  • D is wrong: Association is one path to competence, not the only path. Study and research is equally valid under MR 1.1 cmt. [2].

MC-0002 (difficulty 1 · Diligence · OUT-5.4)

Perkins is a solo practitioner. Over the past year, he accepted so many new cases that he cannot give adequate attention to all of them. He missed a statute-of-limitations deadline on a client's personal injury claim, resulting in dismissal. When the client complained, Perkins explained that he had too many other cases demanding his attention.

Which of the following best describes Perkins's conduct?

  • A. Perkins is not subject to discipline because missing a deadline while overworked does not constitute intentional misconduct.
  • B. Perkins is subject to discipline for lack of diligence, because taking on more matters than he can properly handle is itself a form of neglect.
  • C. Perkins is subject to discipline for malpractice, because the client suffered a cognizable loss.
  • D. Perkins is not subject to discipline because the client could have monitored the case and reminded Perkins of the deadline before it passed, as careful clients do.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.3 does not require intentional misconduct; neglect from an overloaded caseload is still a diligence violation.
  • Answer: B. MR 1.3 cmt. [2] treats an unmanageable caseload as a diligence problem in itself: a lawyer who cannot give each matter the attention it needs has taken on too much. The missed limitations deadline is the harm that flowed from that overload. (MR 1.3; cmt. [2]–[3])
  • C is wrong: "Malpractice" is a civil remedy, not a disciplinary ground. Perkins may face both malpractice and discipline, but the discipline is for violating MR 1.3, not "malpractice."
  • D is wrong: The duty to communicate status and meet deadlines is the lawyer's, not the client's; a client's failure to self-monitor does not excuse neglect.

MC-0003 (difficulty 2 · Communication Sub-Duties · OUT-5.6)

Osei represents Gallardo in a breach-of-contract action. The opposing party makes a settlement offer. Osei believes the offer is lower than Gallardo would accept and decides not to pass it along, reasoning that communicating the offer would only distract Gallardo and the case is likely to settle for more at trial. Osei does not inform Gallardo of the offer.

Is Osei subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer must promptly inform the client of any settlement offer, as the decision whether to accept belongs to the client.
  • B. No, because the lawyer has authority over litigation strategy and may filter information that would distract the client from the optimal outcome.
  • C. Yes, because Osei violated MR 2.1 by substituting his judgment for the client's on a question of candor.
  • D. No, because settlement offers that fall below the client's stated minimum are not material information requiring prompt disclosure.
  • Answer: A. Under MR 1.4(a)(1) and (3), and MR 1.2(a), the decision whether to accept a settlement offer belongs to the client. A lawyer must promptly communicate the offer and may not withhold it based on the lawyer's prediction of the outcome.
  • B is wrong: The decision to settle is an objective — reserved to the client — not a strategic means in the lawyer's control. Authority over litigation strategy does not extend to filtering information about client-controlled decisions.
  • C is wrong: The violation is MR 1.4 (communication), not MR 2.1 (candor in advice-giving). MR 2.1 governs honest advice; the issue here is failure to communicate a settlement offer, not giving dishonest counsel.
  • D is wrong: There is no "below minimum" exception to the duty to communicate settlement offers. The client's own minimum estimate is not a basis for the lawyer to filter information.

MC-0004 (difficulty 2 · Objectives vs. Means · OUT-5.8)

Ware represents Hutchinson in a bitter commercial dispute. Hutchinson instructs Ware to take an extremely aggressive litigation stance: file a voluminous discovery request targeting every document the opponent has ever created, depose every officer of the opposing company, and seek every possible continuance. Ware believes these tactics will increase costs substantially without improving Hutchinson's position. Ware files targeted discovery and takes three focused depositions rather than following Hutchinson's specific instructions.

Has Ware acted properly?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may override a client's tactical preferences when the lawyer's professional judgment indicates the client's approach is counterproductive.
  • B. No, because Hutchinson's instructions are about objectives — the kind of litigation to pursue — and the client controls objectives.
  • C. Yes, because choosing the means of pursuing a client's objectives is within the lawyer's authority, and targeted discovery is a reasonable strategic choice.
  • D. No, because Ware violated MR 1.3 by failing to diligently execute the aggressive litigation strategy the client requested.
  • A is wrong: This states the correct result for the wrong reason. The lawyer's authority to select means does not rest on "overriding" the client — it rests on the MR 1.2(a) division between objectives (client) and means (lawyer). Framing it as "overriding" misstates the structure.
  • B is wrong: Hutchinson's instructions are about how to litigate (means), not about what outcome to seek (objectives). The objectives — prevailing in the dispute — are properly the client's; the specific discovery tactics are within the lawyer's authority over means.
  • D is wrong: Diligence under MR 1.3 is the duty to pursue the matter, not to use any particular tactic the client specifies. Selecting focused rather than voluminous discovery is not neglect — it is a professional judgment about means.

MC-0005 (difficulty 2 · Candid Advice / Duty to Volunteer Advice · OUT-5.10)

Fontaine, a real estate developer, asks his lawyer Pratt a single question about a proposed project: whether it is permitted under the current zoning code. Pratt confirms that it is. Pratt also knows that the county commission votes next month on a building moratorium that would almost certainly halt the project after Fontaine has spent millions on site work. Because Fontaine asked only about zoning, Pratt says nothing about the moratorium. Fontaine begins site work.

Is Pratt subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer must give the client the information needed for informed decisions about the representation, and the looming moratorium was exactly that.
  • B. Yes, because MR 2.1 permits a lawyer to bring economic and political factors into advice, and Pratt's silence on a political vote breached that rule.
  • C. No, because a lawyer ordinarily need not volunteer advice the client has not asked for, and Fontaine's question was limited to zoning.
  • D. No, because a lawyer may narrow the scope of the advice given to a client, and Fontaine effectively consented to a zoning-only opinion by the way he framed his question.
  • Answer: A. MR 2.1 cmt. [5] says a lawyer is generally not expected to give unrequested advice, but when the lawyer knows the client's planned course is likely to bring substantial adverse legal consequences, the communication duty of MR 1.4 may require the lawyer to speak up. A moratorium that would stop a multimillion-dollar project after site work begins is that kind of consequence, and Pratt knew of it. (MR 2.1 cmt. [5]; MR 1.4(b))
  • B is wrong: the rule that a lawyer may raise economic and political considerations is accurate, but it is permissive; Pratt's problem is a looming legal consequence, so the permissive branch of MR 2.1 is not the basis for discipline. (MR 2.1; cmt. [2]–[3])
  • C is wrong: the general no-duty-until-asked principle is real, but cmt. [5] carves out exactly this situation — a known, substantial, adverse legal consequence of the client's plan. (MR 2.1 cmt. [5])
  • D is wrong: a limited-scope representation requires the client's informed consent under MR 1.2(c); a narrowly phrased question is not informed consent to withholding a known legal risk. (MR 1.2(c))

MC-0006 (difficulty 3 · Discipline vs. Malpractice · OUT-5.15)

Lorenz represented Tanaka in a contract negotiation. Lorenz made a significant legal error — she overlooked a standard boilerplate clause — and as a result the contract contained an unfavorable term for Tanaka. However, Tanaka's business prospered under the contract, and Tanaka suffered no financial loss attributable to the unfavorable clause. A disciplinary body reviews Lorenz's conduct.

Which of the following most accurately states the outcome?

  • A. Lorenz is subject to discipline and to a malpractice judgment, because the same conduct gives rise to both.
  • B. Neither discipline nor malpractice is available, because the conduct caused no harm.
  • C. A malpractice claim succeeds because a significant legal error by definition breaches the standard of care, regardless of whether damages resulted.
  • D. Lorenz may be subject to discipline for a Rule violation, even though a malpractice claim would fail because Tanaka suffered no provable damages.
  • A is wrong: Discipline and malpractice are independent; the same conduct does not automatically give rise to both. Malpractice requires actual, provable damages — which are absent here.
  • B is wrong: The absence of harm bars malpractice but does not bar discipline. Discipline is available for a Rule violation without requiring proof of client harm.
  • C is wrong: A breach of the standard of care is a necessary but not sufficient element of malpractice — causation and actual damages are also required. A breach without damages does not produce a malpractice judgment.
  • Answer: D. Discipline does not require actual harm — a Rule violation is sufficient. A significant failure of competence (overlooking a material clause) may constitute a violation of MR 1.1 regardless of whether the client suffered a loss. Malpractice, however, fails here because Tanaka has no provable damages.

MC-0007 (difficulty 3 · Fee Forfeiture vs. Malpractice · OUT-5.24)

Chen was retained to negotiate a business acquisition for her client Okonkwo. Throughout the representation, Chen secretly kept the opposing party informed of Okonkwo's confidential negotiating positions — a serious breach of her fiduciary duty. The deal ultimately closed on terms that were acceptable to Okonkwo, who learned of Chen's conduct only after closing. Okonkwo cannot prove that Chen's breach caused any financial loss.

Which of the following best describes the legal consequences Chen may face?

  • A. Okonkwo's only remedy is disgorgement of Chen's fees as restitution within a malpractice action, which requires proof that the breach caused actual financial harm.
  • B. Chen faces no civil consequences because Okonkwo suffered no provable financial loss.
  • C. Okonkwo may seek forfeiture of Chen's fee, a remedy most courts recognize following the Restatement, even without proof that the breach caused a financial loss.
  • D. Chen faces malpractice liability only if Okonkwo can show the deal would have closed on better terms but for the breach.
  • A is wrong: Forfeiture is not restitution inside a malpractice claim; it is a separate remedy that does not carry malpractice's causation and damages elements. (Rest. 3d § 37 (Tier 3 — persuasive))
  • B is wrong: Forfeiture does not depend on provable financial loss; that is the point of the remedy. (Rest. 3d § 37 (Tier 3 — persuasive))
  • Answer: C. Fee forfeiture is a distinct remedy for a clear and serious breach of duty. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 37 states the formulation most courts follow — an ALI persuasive source, not a Model Rule — and under it the client need not prove the breach caused a financial loss. Secretly feeding the other side a client's negotiating positions is a paradigm clear-and-serious breach. (Rest. 3d § 37 (Tier 3 — persuasive); varies by state)
  • D is wrong: This states the malpractice causation requirement accurately, but it ignores forfeiture, which is available without that showing. (Rest. 3d §§ 37, 53 (Tier 3 — persuasive))

MC-0008 (difficulty 2 · Client With Decision-Making Limitations · OUT-5.9)

Delacroix, 84 years old, has been a client of attorney Reyes for twenty years. Recently, Reyes has observed that Delacroix sometimes forgets prior conversations, seems confused about the terms of a transaction she is trying to complete, and has told Reyes she wants to wire $800,000 to someone she met online last month. Reyes reasonably believes Delacroix is being scammed and faces a risk of substantial financial harm. Reyes consults Delacroix's daughter, a trusted person with no financial interest in the transaction, to discuss the situation and explore options for protecting Delacroix.

Did Reyes act properly under MR 1.14?

  • A. No, because Reyes revealed information relating to the representation to the daughter without Delacroix's informed consent, which the confidentiality rule requires before any disclosure.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer may disclose confidences to stop a client fraud that uses the lawyer's services and is reasonably certain to cause others substantial financial harm.
  • C. No, because a lawyer taking protective action may seek a guardian for the client, and a threatened loss this large called for a court-appointed guardian, not a family talk.
  • D. Yes, because Reyes reasonably believed capacity was impaired and Delacroix faced substantial harm she could not guard against, so the consultation was a permitted protective step.
  • A is wrong: MR 1.14(c) lets a lawyer who takes protective action reveal information about the client, but only as far as needed to protect her; a consultation with a trusted family member on these facts fits inside that allowance, and the client's consent is not required. The amended rule says this directly; the prior rule treated the disclosure as impliedly authorized. (MR 1.14(c) (as amended Feb 2026); cmt. [18]; prior MR 1.14(c), cmt. [8])
  • B is wrong: MR 1.6(b)(2) lets a lawyer disclose to stop a client's own fraud or crime that is reasonably certain to cause substantial financial injury to another, where the client has used the lawyer's services in it. Delacroix is the likely victim, not the wrongdoer, and Reyes's services play no part in the scam. The consultation is justified under MR 1.14(b)–(c), not MR 1.6(b)(2). (MR 1.6(b)(2); MR 1.14(b)–(c))
  • C is wrong: seeking a guardian is a permitted protective step, but it is the most intrusive one, and the lawyer should generally favor the least restrictive action. Nothing required Reyes to go to court before consulting a trusted family member. (MR 1.14(b); cmts. [12], [15] (as amended Feb 2026))
  • Answer: D. All three conditions of MR 1.14(b) are present: Reyes reasonably believes Delacroix has decision-making limitations (impaired capacity, in the prior rule's terms), the $800,000 wire puts her at risk of substantial financial harm, and she appears unable to protect her own interest. Consulting a family member is a permissible (not required) protective step that does not need the client's consent. Under the amended rule Reyes must also tell Delacroix about the step afterward. (MR 1.14(b) (as amended Feb 2026); cmts. [12], [17])

MC-0009 (difficulty 2 · Scope Limitation / Malpractice Interaction · OUT-5.16)

Park agreed to represent Lindqvist in a real estate transaction with a written scope-limiting agreement: Park would review only the purchase contract and provide a written opinion on its enforceability; she would not review the title, arrange title insurance, or conduct any due diligence beyond the contract. Lindqvist signed the agreement and gave informed consent to the limited scope. Park reviewed the contract, found it enforceable, but negligently failed to spot a standard fraudulent-misrepresentation clause that would have protected Lindqvist from losses caused by the seller's undisclosed defects. Lindqvist suffered significant losses.

Which of the following most accurately describes Park's liability?

  • A. Park is not liable for malpractice because the scope limitation agreement waived Lindqvist's claims arising from the review of the purchase contract.
  • B. Park is liable for malpractice for the work she agreed to do, because limiting the scope does not lower the standard of care within that scope.
  • C. Park is not liable for malpractice because the losses arose from defects that were outside the scope of her representation (title and due diligence).
  • D. Park is not liable because Lindqvist gave informed consent to the limited scope representation, which includes any errors made within that scope.
  • A is wrong: A scope limitation agreement under MR 1.2(c) does not function as a malpractice waiver. It limits what the lawyer will do, not the lawyer's obligation to do the agreed work competently.
  • Answer: B. Under MR 1.2(c), a scope limitation is permissible, but the lawyer must still be competent and diligent within the agreed scope. Park agreed to review the contract — she performed that work negligently by missing the fraudulent-misrepresentation clause. The limitation does not bar a claim for negligent performance of the agreed task.
  • C is wrong: This would be correct as to the title and due-diligence losses, but Park faces liability for the losses caused by her negligent contract review — the work she actually agreed to do. The scope limitation shields her only from claims about what she did not agree to do.
  • D is wrong: Informed consent to a limited scope means the client understands the limits of what the lawyer will cover — it is not consent to negligent performance of the covered work.

MC-0010 (difficulty 3 · MR 1.8(h) / Prospective Limitation · OUT-5.23)

Moran, a solo litigation attorney, represents several small business clients on a regular basis. When onboarding a new client, Vasquez, Moran presents a retainer agreement that includes a clause capping Moran's malpractice liability at $25,000. Moran carefully explains the cap to Vasquez and its implications. Vasquez, an experienced business owner who has dealt with attorneys before, reads the agreement, understands it, and signs it.

Was Moran's conduct proper?

  • A. Yes, because Vasquez is an experienced business owner who gave knowing and voluntary consent to the liability cap.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may not settle a malpractice claim with an unrepresented client without first advising the client in writing to seek independent counsel.
  • C. No, because a prospective limit on malpractice liability is allowed only if the client is independently represented in making the agreement.
  • D. Yes, because Moran is a solo practitioner, and the independent-representation requirement applies only to firms large enough to absorb malpractice judgments.
  • A is wrong: Knowing and voluntary consent satisfies most MR provisions, but MR 1.8(h)(1) goes further — it requires independent representation by separate counsel, not merely the client's own informed consent.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.8(h)(2) does govern settling a malpractice claim with an unrepresented client (written advice to seek independent counsel and a chance to do so). This clause is a prospective limitation, which is 1.8(h)(1)'s subject and needs actual independent representation. (MR 1.8(h)(1)–(2))
  • Answer: C. MR 1.8(h)(1) expressly requires independent representation of the client in negotiating the limitation. Vasquez's sophistication and consent — without a separate lawyer — do not satisfy this requirement.
  • D is wrong: The independent-representation requirement of MR 1.8(h)(1) applies to all lawyers regardless of firm size. Firm size is irrelevant to the rule.

MC-0011 (difficulty 1 · Mandatory vs. Permissive Withdrawal · OUT-5.17)

Abe has been representing Castillo in a securities litigation matter for eight months. Castillo is increasingly hostile: she misses meetings, ignores Abe's requests for key documents, and has accused Abe of incompetence in front of opposing counsel. Abe wants to withdraw. The court has not yet ruled on Abe's withdrawal motion.

Which of the following most accurately describes the situation?

  • A. Abe must withdraw because Castillo's conduct has made Abe incompetent to continue the representation.
  • B. Abe may not withdraw because permissive withdrawal requires a showing that continued representation would impose a financial burden on the lawyer, not merely that the relationship has become difficult.
  • C. Abe may withdraw immediately without court approval because permissive withdrawal becomes mandatory when the client is actively uncooperative.
  • D. Abe may seek to withdraw under MR 1.16(b) because the client has made the representation unreasonably difficult by her conduct, but withdrawal requires court permission and protection of Castillo's interests.
  • A is wrong: Castillo's hostility and non-cooperation do not make Abe incompetent; they make the representation unreasonably difficult. The MR 1.16(b) ground is client-caused difficulty, not lawyer incompetence.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.16(b) lists multiple permissive withdrawal grounds. Financial hardship is one ground under MR 1.16(b)(6); client-caused unreasonable difficulty is a separate ground under MR 1.16(b). The rule is not limited to financial hardship.
  • C is wrong: Permissive withdrawal does not become mandatory simply because the client is uncooperative. And in litigation, withdrawal requires court permission even when permissive grounds exist.
  • Answer: D. Under MR 1.16(b), a lawyer may seek to withdraw when the client has made the representation unreasonably difficult — Castillo's conduct qualifies. But withdrawal in pending litigation requires court approval and the lawyer must take steps to protect the client's interests (notice, file transfer, etc.).

MC-0012 (difficulty 1 · Fee Communication · OUT-5.18)

Novak has represented the Wu family's business for twelve years, billing at an hourly rate of $400. When Novak takes on a new matter for the Wus involving a licensing dispute, she does not send a new fee agreement or engagement letter. She bills the Wus at $500 per hour, the rate she has charged all clients since increasing her rate six months ago.

Was Novak's conduct proper regarding fee communication?

  • A. Yes, because the Wus are regular clients and Novak is not required to send a new engagement letter for each matter.
  • B. No, because Novak changed the billing rate from prior matters, and a change in the fee basis or rate requires a new fee communication even for regular clients.
  • C. Yes, because Novak's rate increase applied to all clients uniformly, making it a market adjustment rather than a client-specific change requiring disclosure.
  • D. No, because a fee agreement must be set out in a writing signed by the client, and Novak never obtained a signed writing for the licensing matter.
  • A is wrong: The regular-client exception to MR 1.5(b) applies only when the lawyer charges on the same basis or at the same rate as in prior matters. A rate change from $400 to $500 takes the new matter outside the exception.
  • Answer: B. The MR 1.5(b) exception is narrow: same basis and same rate. Novak increased her hourly rate, so she is required to communicate the new fee before or promptly after commencing the representation, even though the Wus are long-standing clients.
  • C is wrong: Whether the rate increase applies to all clients is irrelevant to the Wus' right to receive fee communication. MR 1.5(b) focuses on whether this matter is on the same terms as prior matters with this client.
  • D is wrong: A contingent fee must be in a writing signed by the client under MR 1.5(c); an hourly fee is not. For an hourly fee MR 1.5(b) requires communication of the basis or rate, "preferably in writing," not a signed agreement — so the signed-writing rule is real but misapplied here. (MR 1.5(b)–(c))

MC-0013 (difficulty 1 · Technology Competence · OUT-5.3)

Watanabe is a litigator who recently started using a new AI-assisted document review platform to process large discovery productions. Watanabe has not taken any time to learn how the platform works, has not tested its output for accuracy, and relies entirely on the platform's review to identify responsive documents, submitting the results to opposing counsel without independent verification. A significant number of responsive documents are missed.

Which statement best describes Watanabe's conduct?

  • A. Watanabe may be subject to discipline for failing to understand the benefits and risks of the technology she relied on, as competence requires.
  • B. Watanabe is not subject to discipline because using AI tools is discretionary, and technology-related errors are not yet clearly regulated by the Model Rules.
  • C. Watanabe is subject to discipline under MR 1.4 for failing to communicate the use of AI tools to the client.
  • D. Watanabe is subject to discipline under MR 5.3 for failing to supervise non-lawyers who operated the AI platform.
  • B is wrong: MR 1.1 cmt. [8] (added in 2012) expressly requires lawyers to keep abreast of the benefits and risks of relevant technology. AI-assisted document review is squarely within that obligation.
  • C is wrong: MR 1.4 governs communication with the client. The issue here is not failure to inform the client but failure to use the tool competently.
  • D is wrong: MR 5.3 applies to supervising non-lawyer assistants. Although an AI tool arguably involves supervision of non-lawyer work, the more direct and primary issue is Watanabe's own technology competence under MR 1.1. MR 5.3 is a secondary issue at best.

MC-0014 (difficulty 2 · Malpractice Causation / Case Within a Case · OUT-5.14)

Hendricks represented Patel in a breach of contract claim. Due to Hendricks's negligent preparation, the case went to trial poorly supported by evidence. Patel lost. Patel now sues Hendricks for malpractice. At trial on the malpractice claim, Patel proves only that Hendricks prepared the case inadequately and that Patel's case was worth approximately $500,000. Patel does not present evidence that the underlying claim would have succeeded.

Which of the following best describes the likely outcome of the malpractice claim?

  • A. Patel's claim fails, because Patel never proved the underlying contract claim would have succeeded but for the negligence — the case-within-a-case element.
  • B. Patel prevails, because proving that Hendricks's preparation was inadequate establishes a breach of the standard of care, which is sufficient to support a judgment.
  • C. Patel prevails, because the $500,000 value of the underlying claim establishes damages without proof that the underlying suit would have succeeded.
  • D. Patel's claim fails, because a malpractice claim arising from litigation requires proof that the underlying case was meritless.
  • Answer: A. Under the widely followed formulation in Rest. 3d § 53 (Tier 3 — persuasive), a plaintiff in a litigation malpractice case must prove the "case within a case" — that the underlying litigation would have been resolved more favorably but for the lawyer's negligence. Patel did not present this evidence, so the causation element fails.
  • B is wrong: Breach of the standard of care is necessary but not sufficient; causation and damages are also required. Proving inadequate preparation shows breach but not that the breach caused any loss.
  • C is wrong: The value of the claim at the time is not the same as proving that the claim would have succeeded. Damages in a malpractice case are measured by what was lost — which requires proving the underlying case would have produced a recovery.
  • D is wrong: This inverts the requirement. The plaintiff must prove the underlying case would have succeeded, not that it was meritless. A losing case can still have been properly handled; the question is whether negligent handling caused a better outcome to be lost.

MC-0015 (difficulty 2 · Supervision / MR 5.1 · OUT-5.20)

Nakamura is the managing partner at a mid-size firm. She learns on Monday morning that one of her associates, Petrov, filed an answer in a commercial case containing a factual assertion Petrov knew was false when he filed it. The deadline for amending the answer without leave of court passed two days before Nakamura learned of this. Nakamura decides to wait and see whether opposing counsel notices the error before taking any action.

Which of the following best describes Nakamura's potential liability?

  • A. Nakamura is not subject to discipline because she did not order Petrov to make the false assertion and had no knowledge of the misconduct when it occurred.
  • B. Nakamura is subject to discipline because a partner must have measures in place giving reasonable assurance that firm lawyers follow the Rules, and Petrov did not.
  • C. Nakamura is subject to discipline for violating MR 3.3 (candor to the tribunal) because a partner's obligation to ensure truthful filings extends to all firm submissions.
  • D. Nakamura may be subject to discipline because she learned of the violation while its consequences could still be mitigated and took no reasonable remedial action.
  • A is wrong: MR 5.1 imposes liability not only on supervisors who ordered misconduct, but also on those who learned of the violation in time to prevent or mitigate harm and did nothing. Nakamura learned of the issue while there may still have been time to act; her failure to do so is a basis for discipline.
  • B is wrong: MR 5.1(a) does require partners to keep reasonable measures in place so the firm's lawyers comply with the Rules, but that is a duty to build a system, not strict liability for every associate's act. Responsibility for a specific violation comes only through 5.1(c). (MR 5.1(a), (c))
  • C is wrong: MR 3.3 imposes a personal duty on the advocate who is appearing before the tribunal. Nakamura's MR 5.1 supervisory duty is the issue here, not a direct violation of MR 3.3, which would apply to Petrov (and potentially to Nakamura in her own tribunal appearances).
  • Answer: D. MR 5.1(c)(2) reaches a supervising or managing lawyer who learns of another lawyer's violation while there is still time to head off or lessen its effects and who does not respond reasonably. Nakamura chose to wait rather than seek leave to amend, correct the record, or otherwise act; that is the failure the rule targets. (MR 5.1(c)(2))

MC-0016 (difficulty 2 · Informed Consent / Communication for Decisions · OUT-5.7)

Estrada represents Bloom in a personal injury lawsuit. During settlement negotiations, the defendant offers $150,000. Estrada telephones Bloom and says: "You should take this deal — it's a good offer." Bloom, trusting Estrada's judgment, says, "Okay, if you say so." Estrada conveys acceptance and settles the case. Later, Bloom learns that the case involved a spinal injury that is likely to require $300,000 in future medical care, which Estrada knew but did not mention.

Is Estrada subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because Bloom expressly authorized Estrada to settle, and a client's authorization ends the analysis.
  • B. No, because the decision to recommend settlement was within Estrada's authority as the lawyer, and giving a strong recommendation is not the same as failing to communicate.
  • C. Yes, because Estrada failed to explain the material information — the likely $300,000 in future medical costs — that Bloom needed to decide on the settlement.
  • D. Yes, because Estrada violated MR 2.1 by recommending settlement when a competent attorney would not have done so.
  • A is wrong: Bloom's "okay" is not informed consent if the material information necessary to make the decision was not provided. A client's bare authorization is not the same as an informed decision.
  • B is wrong: The decision to recommend is within the lawyer's authority; the decision to accept is the client's, and it must be an informed one. Estrada's strong recommendation without disclosing material risks fails MR 1.4(b).
  • Answer: C. Whether to accept a settlement is the client's decision under MR 1.2(a), and MR 1.4(b) requires the lawyer to explain what the client reasonably needs to know to make it. The likely $300,000 in future medical care was plainly material and Estrada knew it; Bloom's "okay" was not an informed decision. (MR 1.2(a); MR 1.4(b); cmt. [5])
  • D is wrong: MR 2.1 governs the quality and candor of advice. The primary issue here is informed decision-making under MR 1.4(b) — the client's right to the information needed to decide. MR 2.1 is a secondary concern.

MC-0017 (difficulty 1 · Malpractice — Breach / Judgment on Unsettled Law · OUT-5.13)

Okafor represents Lyle in a boundary dispute. After careful research, Okafor concludes that a particular defense is unlikely to succeed because the law on the point is unsettled and most trial courts in the state have rejected it. He explains this to Lyle and recommends not raising it; Lyle agrees. Lyle loses. A year later, the state supreme court adopts the very defense Okafor set aside, in a different case. Lyle sues Okafor for malpractice.

Is Okafor likely liable?

  • A. No, because a lawyer who makes an informed, reasonable judgment on an unsettled legal point is not negligent just because it later proves wrong.
  • B. No, because a violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct does not by itself create a cause of action, and Okafor violated no Rule.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer owes the client competent representation, and advice that proves wrong on the decisive issue breaches that duty.
  • D. Yes, because the case-within-a-case element is satisfied once the client shows that a later court adopted the very defense Okafor rejected.
  • Answer: A. The standard of care asks whether the lawyer acted as a reasonably competent lawyer would; it does not guarantee results. An informed, reasonable choice among defensible positions on an unsettled question is not a breach even if hindsight favors the other choice. (Rest. 3d § 52 (Tier 3 — persuasive); OUT-5.13)
  • B is wrong: the Scope [20] principle is accurate, but it cuts the other way: malpractice is a common-law negligence claim that never required a Rule violation, so "no Rule violation" does not answer the question. (MR Scope [20])
  • C is wrong: competence is a real duty, but it is measured by the reasonableness of the lawyer's process, not by whether the advice turned out to be right. (MR 1.1; Rest. 3d § 52 (Tier 3 — persuasive))
  • D is wrong: causation is a real element, but proving it does not establish breach; Lyle must first show that Okafor's judgment fell below the standard of care. (Rest. 3d § 53 (Tier 3 — persuasive))

MC-0018 (difficulty 3 · Malpractice / Third-Party Duty · OUT-5.12)

Quintero prepared a will for her client Garland, who intended to leave her entire estate to her nephew. Due to Quintero's negligent failure to have the will witnessed properly, the will is invalid and Garland's estate passes by intestacy to Garland's estranged siblings, not to the nephew. Garland has since died. The nephew sues Quintero for malpractice. Quintero moves to dismiss on the grounds that the nephew was never her client.

Which of the following is most accurate?

  • A. Quintero prevails on the motion, because a lawyer owes a duty of care only to clients, and the nephew was not Quintero's client.
  • B. The nephew has a viable claim in most jurisdictions, because a non-client the representation was meant to benefit may recover when negligence defeats that purpose.
  • C. The nephew's claim fails because a malpractice plaintiff must be in privity with the lawyer, a requirement all jurisdictions still apply to will beneficiaries.
  • D. Quintero is not liable because a violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct does not by itself create a civil cause of action, and negligent will drafting is such a violation.
  • A is wrong: Rest. 3d § 51 recognizes that in limited circumstances a duty of care may run to intended third-party beneficiaries — and a named will beneficiary whose bequest is frustrated by the lawyer's negligence is the paradigm case.
  • Answer: B. Most jurisdictions allow an intended beneficiary of a will to sue the drafting lawyer for negligence that defeats the bequest; the Restatement (Third) § 51(3) states that formulation, which is persuasive rather than binding. The nephew was the person the representation was meant to benefit, and Quintero's error is what deprived him of it. (Rest. 3d § 51(3) (Tier 3 — persuasive); majority rule, varies by state)
  • C is wrong: A strict privity bar survives in only a minority of states; the majority recognize the intended-beneficiary claim, so "all jurisdictions" is the misapplication. (Rest. 3d § 51 (Tier 3 — persuasive); minority rule)
  • D is wrong: The principle that a Rule violation is not itself a cause of action is accurate (MR Scope [20]), but the nephew's claim rests on common-law negligence, not on a Rule; the Scope statement does not immunize negligent drafting. (MR Scope [20])

MC-0019 (difficulty 2 · Communication / Limitations on Conduct · OUT-5.8)

Sato represents Bauer in a commercial litigation matter. The opposing party's attorney makes an ex parte communication to the judge in violation of court rules. Bauer wants Sato to respond to the judge with a counter-communication, also ex parte. Sato explains that ex parte communications with the judge are prohibited without the consent of all parties, and that she cannot make such a communication even at Bauer's direction. Bauer insists, telling Sato to do it anyway. Sato refuses.

Is Sato's refusal proper?

  • A. No, because Sato must follow the client's instructions on the means of the representation, even if the method is one Sato personally disagrees with.
  • B. Yes, because a client's control of the means does not extend to ordering a Rule violation, and Sato must tell the client about that limit.
  • C. No, because opposing counsel violated the ex parte rule first, giving Sato a defensive exception to respond similarly.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer decides tactical questions after consulting the client, so Sato may refuse any instruction about litigation strategy she disagrees with.
  • A is wrong: A client's authority to direct the representation does not include authority to direct a Rule violation. MR 1.2(a) gives the client control over objectives and reasonable influence over means, but never authority to require conduct that violates the Rules.
  • Answer: B. MR 1.4(a)(5) requires the lawyer to disclose any limitation on conduct under the Rules. Sato correctly informed Bauer of the restriction and refused to violate it. The client cannot override a Rule prohibition, and Sato acted properly.
  • C is wrong: There is no "defensive exception" to the prohibition on ex parte communications. An opposing party's violation does not authorize the lawyer to commit a similar violation.
  • D is wrong: MR 1.2(a) lets a lawyer decide tactical means after consulting the client, but a lawyer may not simply refuse instructions over a strategy disagreement; here the refusal is proper because the instruction would violate a Rule, not because Sato prefers another strategy. (MR 1.2(a); MR 1.4(a)(5))

MC-0020 (difficulty 3 · Communication + Malpractice Interaction · OUT-5.15)

Lau represents Kovacs in negotiating a commercial lease. Kovacs tells Lau her absolute bottom line: she will not sign a lease without a 10-year term. The landlord offers a 7-year term with a renewal option. Lau, without consulting Kovacs, decides this is equivalent to a 10-year commitment and signs the lease on Kovacs's behalf using a power of attorney Kovacs gave her for the transaction. The renewal option is later terminated by the landlord pursuant to lease terms Kovacs did not know about. Kovacs loses the business location she needed for long-term planning.

Which of the following best describes Lau's potential liability?

  • A. Lau is not subject to discipline because she acted in Kovacs's best interest, using professional judgment to determine the lease was equivalent to what Kovacs wanted.
  • B. Lau is not subject to discipline because deciding whether a 7-year term with renewal is "equivalent" to a 10-year term is a judgment about means.
  • C. Lau is subject only to malpractice, not discipline, because the power of attorney authorized her to sign the lease on Kovacs's behalf, making the signature legally valid.
  • D. Lau may be subject to discipline for overriding a client-set objective — the lease term — without consulting Kovacs, and may also face malpractice liability for any loss.
  • A is wrong: A lawyer cannot override a stated client objective — no matter how good the lawyer's intentions. Kovacs specified a 10-year term as her minimum; that is an objective she controls under MR 1.2(a). Lau had no authority to determine "equivalence" without consulting Kovacs.
  • B is wrong: Determining lease terms was not Lau's call to make — it was Kovacs's. The 10-year minimum was an objective Kovacs expressly identified, not a tactic within the lawyer's strategic authority.
  • C is wrong: A power of attorney authorizes the lawyer to sign on the client's behalf — it does not authorize the lawyer to deviate from the client's stated instructions. Legal validity of the signature is distinct from compliance with the client's authority over objectives.
  • Answer: D. The lease term was a client-controlled objective under MR 1.2(a), not a means decision for the lawyer. Lau was required to consult with Kovacs when the landlord's offer diverged from Kovacs's stated requirement. Acting unilaterally violated both MR 1.2(a) (objectives belong to the client) and MR 1.4(a)(1)/(2) (duty to consult and to disclose matters requiring consent). If the departure from the stated term caused Kovacs to lose business opportunities, malpractice liability may also follow.

MC-0021 (difficulty 1 · Competence — Measured by the Matter · OUT-5.1)

Halvorsen has tried civil jury cases for twenty-five years and is widely respected as a trial lawyer. A longtime client asks him to draft a retirement plan for the client's growing company, a document governed by detailed federal tax and benefits requirements. Halvorsen has never drafted such a plan. He does no research on the governing requirements and adapts a form he finds in an old file from an unrelated matter. The plan fails to qualify under federal law, and the company is assessed penalties.

Is Halvorsen subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer's general experience is a recognized factor in judging competence, and Halvorsen's long career at the bar satisfies it.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may become competent in a new field through study, and nothing prevented Halvorsen from researching the requirements.
  • C. Yes, because competence is measured by what the particular matter demands, and Halvorsen did nothing to gain the knowledge this plan required.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer who holds himself out as a specialist is held to the standard of that specialty, and Halvorsen fell below that standard.
  • A is wrong: general experience is one factor in the competence analysis, but it does not substitute for the specific knowledge a specialized matter requires; a trial career says nothing about benefit-plan drafting. (MR 1.1; cmt. [1])
  • B is wrong: the study path is real, but it helps only a lawyer who actually takes it. Halvorsen did no research, so the possibility that he could have studied is no defense. (MR 1.1 cmt. [2])
  • Answer: C. Competence under MR 1.1 is judged against the demands of the particular matter. A qualified retirement plan requires knowledge Halvorsen did not have, and he made no effort to acquire it by study or by associating a lawyer who had it. (MR 1.1; cmts. [1]–[2])
  • D is wrong: the specialist standard is a malpractice benchmark for lawyers who hold themselves out as specialists; Halvorsen made no such claim, and the question asks about discipline, which turns on MR 1.1. (Rest. 3d § 52 (Tier 3 — persuasive); OUT-5.13)

MC-0022 (difficulty 2 · Acquiring Competence — Emergency · OUT-5.2)

Ferreira practices only commercial real estate law. Late on a Friday, a neighbor calls her in distress: his adult son was arrested that afternoon, and a bail hearing is set for 9 a.m. Saturday. The family has called every criminal defense lawyer they can find, and none is available before Monday. Ferreira appears at the Saturday hearing, argues for pretrial release, and on Monday refers the family to an experienced criminal defense lawyer, who takes over the case.

Was Ferreira's conduct proper?

  • A. Yes, because when no qualified lawyer can be reached in time, a lawyer may step in to meet an urgent need, confining her help to that need.
  • B. No, because competence may be gained by associating a lawyer experienced in the field, and Ferreira should have brought in defense counsel first.
  • C. No, because a lawyer must decline a matter unless she already has, or can gain beforehand through study, the knowledge the matter reasonably requires.
  • D. Yes, because the duty of diligence required Ferreira to act promptly once she learned that the bail hearing would be held the next morning.
  • Answer: A. In a genuine emergency, where referral or association is impractical, a lawyer may assist on a matter outside her usual competence, but only as far as the emergency requires. Ferreira handled the one urgent hearing and then handed the case to a qualified lawyer. (MR 1.1 cmt. [3])
  • B is wrong: association is a real path to competence, but the facts rule it out: no criminal defense lawyer could be reached before the hearing. (MR 1.1 cmts. [2]–[3])
  • C is wrong: the general rule is accurate, but MR 1.1 cmt. [3] recognizes a narrow emergency allowance for exactly this situation, where waiting to become competent would leave the person without help. (MR 1.1 cmts. [2]–[3])
  • D is wrong: MR 1.3 governs how a lawyer pursues a matter she has properly undertaken; it neither requires her to take on an unfamiliar matter nor answers the competence question that the emergency allowance resolves. (MR 1.3; MR 1.1 cmt. [3])

MC-0023 (difficulty 1 · Workload · OUT-5.5)

Brandt, a solo practitioner, is retained in a high-profile class action that takes nearly all of his time for four months. During that period he stops reviewing his other files. He fails to answer interrogatories in a client's collection suit, and the court enters a default against that client. Brandt knew the answers were due and how to prepare them. When the client complains, Brandt says the class action "had to come first."

Is Brandt subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer decides how to carry out a representation after consulting the client, and allocating time among cases is a question of means.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may withdraw when a representation would impose an unreasonable burden on him, and the class action created such a burden.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer violates the competence rule when he lacks the knowledge a matter requires, and the default shows Brandt lacked it.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer must keep his workload at a level that lets him handle every matter diligently, and a new large case does not excuse neglect.
  • A is wrong: the lawyer does choose the means of a representation, but no choice of means includes letting a client's case go into default. The means rule does not license neglect. (MR 1.2(a); MR 1.3)
  • B is wrong: permissive withdrawal for an unreasonable burden is real, but Brandt never sought to withdraw; he stayed on the file and neglected it. (MR 1.16(b); MR 1.3)
  • C is wrong: Brandt knew what to do and how to do it; his failure was in doing it. Knowing but not acting is a diligence problem under MR 1.3, not a competence problem under MR 1.1. (OUT-5.4)
  • Answer: D. Under MR 1.3 cmt. [2], keeping the caseload manageable is the lawyer's own responsibility; he may not take on so much that he cannot give every client competent attention. A case so large that existing clients go unattended is a diligence failure, and the default is its result. (MR 1.3; cmt. [2])

MC-0024 (difficulty 1 · Communication — Responding to Requests · OUT-5.6)

Moreau represents Ibekwe in a wrongful-termination suit. Discovery is on hold while the court considers a motion, and nothing in the case has changed for two months. Over five weeks, Ibekwe emails Moreau three times asking where the case stands. Moreau reads each email but does not reply, reasoning that there is nothing new to report.

Is Moreau subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a lawyer's duty to report on the status of a matter arises when there is a significant development, and none had occurred in the case.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must promptly answer a client's reasonable requests for information, even when the only answer is that nothing has changed.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must act with reasonable promptness, and allowing the case to sit idle for two months was a failure of diligence.
  • D. No, because a lawyer chooses the means of the representation, which includes deciding when and how often to communicate with the client.
  • A is wrong: the proactive status duty of MR 1.4(a)(3) is real, but it is separate from the duty to respond to requests; the lack of developments does not excuse ignoring three direct inquiries. (MR 1.4(a)(3)–(4))
  • Answer: B. MR 1.4(a)(4) is a responding duty: a reasonable client request for information calls for a prompt reply. "Nothing has changed" is itself an answer the client is entitled to hear. (MR 1.4(a)(4); cmt. [4])
  • C is wrong: the case was idle because the court had not ruled, not because Moreau delayed; the diligence rule is misapplied to a pause the lawyer did not cause. (MR 1.3)
  • D is wrong: the lawyer's authority over means covers tactics for pursuing the client's objectives; it does not displace the separate communication duties of MR 1.4. (MR 1.2(a); MR 1.4(a))

MC-0025 (difficulty 2 · Objectives vs. Means — Criminal Defendant's Decisions · OUT-5.8)

Achterberg defends Dunmore on a burglary charge. Achterberg believes Dunmore's account is true but that testifying would expose him to damaging impeachment with two prior convictions. The two discuss the question at length, and Achterberg explains the risks in detail. Dunmore still insists that he wants to testify. At trial, Achterberg rests the defense case without calling Dunmore to the stand.

Did Achterberg act properly?

  • A. Yes, because the lawyer selects the means of a representation, and deciding which witnesses to call at trial is ordinarily a tactical choice.
  • B. No, because a lawyer must consult the client about the means to be used, and Achterberg had to discuss the question with Dunmore first.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer must give candid advice, and Achterberg reasonably judged that testifying would do Dunmore more harm than good.
  • D. No, because in a criminal case the decision whether the defendant will testify belongs to the client, after consultation with the lawyer.
  • A is wrong: witness selection is ordinarily a tactical matter for the lawyer, but MR 1.2(a) carves out the defendant's own testimony as a decision reserved to the client in a criminal case. (MR 1.2(a))
  • B is wrong: the consultation requirement is real, but the facts show it was met; the two discussed the question at length. The violation is overriding the client's decision, not a failure to consult. (MR 1.4(a)(2); MR 1.2(a))
  • C is wrong: MR 2.1 requires candid advice, and Achterberg gave it; but candid advice informs the client's decision rather than replacing it. (MR 2.1; MR 1.2(a))
  • Answer: D. Under MR 1.2(a), a criminal defendant decides, after consulting the lawyer, whether to plead guilty, whether to waive a jury, and whether to testify. Achterberg could advise against testifying but could not override Dunmore's choice. (MR 1.2(a))

MC-0026 (difficulty 2 · Client With Decision-Making Limitations — No Substituted Judgment · OUT-5.9)

Oduya, age 79, retains Salcedo to revise her will. She has occasional lapses in short-term memory, but she understands what she owns, who her family members are, and what the changes will do. She wants to leave a larger share to the daughter who cares for her and a smaller share to her son. Salcedo believes the change is unfair to the son. Citing Oduya's age and memory lapses, he drafts the new will to keep the equal shares of her old will and does not tell her.

Is Salcedo subject to discipline?

  • A. Yes, because a client with some decision-making limitations still sets her own goals, and Salcedo put his choice in place of hers without telling her.
  • B. No, because a lawyer may bring moral considerations into his advice, and fairness among a client's children is such a consideration.
  • C. No, because a lawyer who reasonably believes a client has decision-making limitations may take protective steps that the situation reasonably calls for.
  • D. Yes, because a lawyer who doubts a client's capacity may consult family members, and Salcedo was obliged to talk with the son before drafting the will.
  • Answer: A. MR 1.14(a) directs the lawyer to keep up an ordinary client-lawyer relationship as far as reasonably possible with a client who has decision-making limitations (the prior rule said the same of diminished capacity). How to divide her estate is Oduya's objective under MR 1.2(a), and Salcedo both overrode it and concealed that he had done so, which also breaches MR 1.4. (MR 1.14(a) (as amended Feb 2026); MR 1.2(a); MR 1.4)
  • B is wrong: MR 2.1 lets a lawyer raise moral considerations in advising the client, but advice informs her decision; it does not authorize the lawyer to carry out his own view in secret. (MR 2.1; MR 1.2(a))
  • C is wrong: protective action under MR 1.14(b) requires a reasonable belief in three things: her decision-making is limited, she risks harm that is substantial, and she cannot look after her own interest. Oduya understands her decision, and a lawful change in her own bequests is not the harm the rule addresses. The prior rule ("diminished capacity") gives the same result. (MR 1.14(b) (as amended Feb 2026); prior MR 1.14(b))
  • D is wrong: consulting family members is a permitted protective step, not a duty, and it is available only when the MR 1.14(b) trigger is met; here it is not, and the son's interests are adverse to his mother's wishes. (MR 1.14(b); cmt. [12] (as amended Feb 2026); cmt. [5] in the prior version)

MC-0027 (difficulty 2 · Malpractice — Specialist Standard · OUT-5.13)

Kaminski's website and letterhead describe her as "a patent litigation specialist." A manufacturer retains her to defend a patent infringement suit. She fails to raise a defense that experienced patent litigators routinely raise in suits of this kind, though a general litigator might reasonably have overlooked it. The manufacturer loses and sues Kaminski for malpractice.

Which standard of care will the court most likely apply to Kaminski?

  • A. The care of a reasonably competent general litigator, because the malpractice standard is measured against lawyers acting in similar circumstances.
  • B. The level of care set by the engagement letter, because the lawyer's duty of care follows the scope of what she agreed to do for the client.
  • C. The care of a reasonably competent patent litigator, because a lawyer who holds herself out as a specialist is judged against the specialty.
  • D. Ordinary care that excuses the omission, because an informed and reasonable judgment on an unsettled point of law is not negligence.
  • A is wrong: the general standard is the starting point, but when a lawyer holds herself out as having special expertise, the "similar circumstances" benchmark becomes lawyers in that specialty. (Rest. 3d § 52 and its commentary (Tier 3 — persuasive); majority approach)
  • B is wrong: the scope of the engagement determines which tasks the duty covers, not how carefully they must be done; defending the suit was within the scope. (Rest. 3d § 50 (Tier 3 — persuasive))
  • Answer: C. A lawyer who presents herself as a specialist is measured against the skill that lawyers practicing in that specialty ordinarily bring to comparable work. Kaminski advertised patent litigation expertise, so the specialist benchmark applies. (Rest. 3d § 52 and its commentary (Tier 3 — persuasive); majority approach, varies by state)
  • D is wrong: the judgment rule protects informed choices on unsettled law, but this defense was routine among patent litigators, and Kaminski made no informed choice to omit it. (Rest. 3d § 52 (Tier 3 — persuasive); OUT-5.13)

MC-0028 (difficulty 2 · Limiting the Scope — Reasonableness · OUT-5.16)

Iverson faces an eviction hearing in ten days. He has a strong defense: the landlord did not give the notice that state law requires before filing. He asks attorney Castellanos to help him defend the case. Castellanos offers only a "limited scope" package of one 15-minute phone call, after which Iverson will handle the case alone, and Iverson signs a form consenting to that limit. On the call, Castellanos gives general information about eviction procedure but has no time to examine the notice issue.

Was the scope limitation proper?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer and client may agree to narrow the scope of a representation, and Iverson gave his consent by signing the form.
  • B. No, because a limit on scope must still leave the lawyer able to give competent help, and a single short call could not address Iverson's defense.
  • C. Yes, because a brief consultation giving general legal information is allowed when the client faces a common, uncomplicated legal problem.
  • D. No, because a prospective limit on a lawyer's malpractice liability requires the client to be independently represented, and Iverson had no other lawyer.
  • A is wrong: client consent is one requirement, but MR 1.2(c) also requires that the limitation be reasonable. Consent does not cure an unreasonable limit. (MR 1.2(c))
  • Answer: B. MR 1.2(c) allows a narrowed scope only when the limit is reasonable in the circumstances. Iverson sought help defending an eviction that turned on a specific statutory defense; a 15-minute call with no chance to examine that defense does not let the lawyer serve him competently. (MR 1.2(c); cmt. [7])
  • C is wrong: that allowance is real, but it fits a client who wants only general information on a simple problem. Iverson asked for help defending a case with a specific legal defense. (MR 1.2 cmt. [7])
  • D is wrong: MR 1.8(h)(1) governs agreements that cap the lawyer's liability for malpractice. A scope limitation defines what work the lawyer will do; it is not a liability cap. (MR 1.8(h)(1); OUT-5.23)

MC-0029 (difficulty 1 · Communication Security · OUT-5.19)

Albrecht represents a hardware store in a routine renewal of its commercial lease. Using her firm's standard email account, she emails the store's owner to schedule a signing meeting and attaches a draft of the lease's rent-increase clause. The owner has never asked for special precautions, and nothing about the matter is unusually sensitive.

Was Albrecht's use of ordinary email proper?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer must take reasonable security measures, and ordinary email is generally reasonable for routine client information.
  • B. No, because a lawyer must protect information relating to the representation, and a draft lease clause is plainly information of that kind.
  • C. Yes, because the lawyer controls the means of the representation, and choosing how to communicate is a purely tactical question.
  • D. No, because competence requires keeping up with the risks of the technology a lawyer uses, and ordinary email can be intercepted.
  • Answer: A. The standard is reasonable security matched to the sensitivity of the information. For routine, non-sensitive communications with no special client instructions, ordinary email generally meets it. (ABA Formal Op. 477R (2017) (advisory); MR 1.6(c))
  • B is wrong: MR 1.6 does protect this information, but the duty is to make reasonable efforts to safeguard it, not to guarantee security; ordinary email is a reasonable effort for routine material. (MR 1.6(a), (c); ABA Formal Op. 477R (2017))
  • C is wrong: the lawyer does choose means, but the choice of channel is still subject to the confidentiality and competence duties; it is not purely tactical. (MR 1.2(a); MR 1.6(c))
  • D is wrong: technology competence is real, but it asks the lawyer to understand risks and respond reasonably, not to avoid every channel that could be intercepted. (MR 1.1 cmt. [8]; ABA Formal Op. 477R (2017))

MC-0030 (difficulty 2 · Settling a Malpractice Claim · OUT-5.23)

Ruiz missed a filing deadline in a contract suit he was handling for Beaulieu, and the suit was dismissed. The representation has ended, and Beaulieu, who has no lawyer, calls Ruiz to complain. Ruiz offers $40,000 to settle any malpractice claim. He sends Beaulieu a letter stating, in bold type, that Beaulieu should consult an independent lawyer before signing, and gives him three weeks to decide. Beaulieu consults no one and signs a release.

Is Ruiz subject to discipline for the settlement?

  • A. Yes, because an agreement limiting a lawyer's liability for malpractice is improper unless the client is independently represented in making it.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer must keep a client reasonably informed about a matter, and Ruiz learned of the dismissal before Beaulieu complained.
  • C. No, because the conflict rules protect current clients, and Beaulieu was a former client by the time the settlement was negotiated.
  • D. No, because Ruiz advised Beaulieu in writing to seek independent counsel and gave him a reasonable opportunity to do so before settling.
  • A is wrong: independent representation is required for a prospective limit on malpractice liability under MR 1.8(h)(1). Settling an existing claim is governed by MR 1.8(h)(2), which requires written advice and an opportunity to consult counsel, not actual representation. (MR 1.8(h)(1)–(2))
  • B is wrong: the status duty under MR 1.4 is real, but the call asks about the settlement, and nothing in the facts shows Ruiz delayed telling Beaulieu about the dismissal. (MR 1.4(a)(3))
  • C is wrong: MR 1.8(h)(2) expressly reaches former clients, so Beaulieu's status does not take the settlement outside the rule. Ruiz is not subject to discipline because he complied with the rule, not because it did not apply. (MR 1.8(h)(2))
  • Answer: D. MR 1.8(h)(2) permits settling a malpractice claim with an unrepresented client or former client if the lawyer first advises the person in writing to seek independent counsel and gives a reasonable opportunity to do so. Ruiz did both; Beaulieu's choice not to consult a lawyer does not make the settlement improper. (MR 1.8(h)(2))

MC-0031 (difficulty 2 · Supervising Nonlawyer Assistants · OUT-5.20)

Laszlo, a partner at a small firm, hires a paralegal, Wren, and assigns her to calendar all court deadlines. He gives her no guidance on how appellate deadlines are computed and never checks any of her entries. Wren miscalculates the deadline in a client's appeal, and the appeal is dismissed as untimely. Laszlo did not learn of the error until the dismissal.

Is Laszlo subject to discipline?

  • A. No, because a supervising lawyer answers for another's misconduct only if he ordered it, ratified it, or learned of it while it could still be fixed.
  • B. Yes, because a lawyer who supervises a nonlawyer must make reasonable efforts to see that her work fits his professional duties, and Laszlo made none.
  • C. Yes, because a lawyer who assists a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law is subject to discipline, and computing deadlines is legal work.
  • D. No, because the Rules of Professional Conduct do not bind nonlawyers, so Wren's calendaring error cannot be a violation for which anyone is disciplined.
  • A is wrong: that test governs when a lawyer is responsible for a specific act of another under MR 5.3(c). Separately, MR 5.3(b) imposes the supervisor's own duty to make reasonable efforts, and Laszlo breached that duty whether or not he knew of the error. (MR 5.3(b)–(c))
  • Answer: B. MR 5.3(b) requires a lawyer with direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer to take reasonable steps so that the nonlawyer's work is consistent with the lawyer's own duties. Assigning deadline work with no guidance and no checking is not a reasonable effort. (MR 5.3(b); cmts. [1]–[2])
  • C is wrong: MR 5.5(a) bars assisting unauthorized practice, but delegating calendaring to a paralegal under a lawyer's supervision is not unauthorized practice. The problem is the absent supervision. (MR 5.5(a); cmt. [2])
  • D is wrong: nonlawyers are not bound by the Rules, but the lawyer who supervises them is; Laszlo is disciplined for his own failure to supervise, not for Wren's error. (MR 5.3)

MC-0032 (difficulty 3 · Mandatory Withdrawal — Lawyer's Own Impairment · OUT-5.17)

Sørensen is sole counsel for Achebe in a complex commercial arbitration set for hearing in three months. She begins chemotherapy, and her doctor tells her that for at least six months she will be able to work only a few hours a week. No one else at her small firm handles this kind of matter. Sørensen explains her prognosis to Achebe in detail. Achebe, who trusts her, says he would rather keep her and accept any delays. She continues as sole counsel, and the hearing goes forward with Sørensen unable to prepare adequately.

Was Sørensen's conduct proper?

  • A. Yes, because a lawyer may withdraw when continuing would impose an unreasonable burden on her, which makes the decision to stay her own choice.
  • B. Yes, because a client may give informed consent to a representation despite a significant risk that the lawyer's own personal interests will materially limit it.
  • C. No, because a lawyer must withdraw when her health keeps her from representing the client adequately, and the client's wishes do not waive that duty.
  • D. No, because a lawyer must keep the client reasonably informed, and Sørensen needed to tell Achebe how much her treatment would limit her work.
  • A is wrong: permissive withdrawal under MR 1.16(b) is real, but it does not apply when MR 1.16(a) makes withdrawal mandatory. (MR 1.16(a)–(b))
  • B is wrong: client consent can cure a material-limitation conflict under MR 1.7(b), but mandatory withdrawal under MR 1.16(a) is not a conflict the client can waive. (MR 1.7(b); MR 1.16(a)(2))
  • Answer: C. MR 1.16(a)(2) makes withdrawal compulsory when the lawyer's own health, physical or mental, materially impairs her handling of the matter. The duty does not depend on the client's consent. Sørensen had to withdraw (with the tribunal's permission where required, MR 1.16(c)) unless she actually cured the problem, for example by bringing in competent counsel able to handle the arbitration. (MR 1.16(a)(2), (c); MR 1.1 cmt. [2])
  • D is wrong: the MR 1.4 duty to inform is real, but the facts show Sørensen explained her prognosis in detail; the violation is staying on while impaired, not a failure to inform. (MR 1.4(b); MR 1.16(a)(2))

— True/False Items (T/F)

Update note — MR 1.14 (Res. 100, Feb 9, 2026). MR 1.14 was retitled "Client With Decision-Making Limitations" and rewritten. Under NCBE's testing lag the amended text is not expected on the exam before about February 2027. TF-0012 is drafted to be correct under both the prior and the amended rule, and uses the amended title.

Controls — measured by script, reported at the end.


TF-0001 (OUT-5.1)

  • Statement: A lawyer who lacks prior experience in a new area of law may still take the matter if she can acquire the necessary competence through reasonable study, research or consultation before or during the representation.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Competence can be acquired; the question is whether the lawyer can reasonably bring herself to the required level in time, including by associating a lawyer of established competence.
  • Cite: MR 1.1; MR 1.1 cmt. [2]

TF-0002 (OUT-5.1)

  • Statement: Under MR 1.1, a lawyer's competence is judged by her general credentials and years of experience, not by the demands of the specific matter.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The standard is matter-specific: what a lawyer of ordinary skill in the relevant field would bring to work of this complexity.
  • Corrected statement: Competence under MR 1.1 is judged against the demands of the particular matter — the knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation that work of this kind and complexity reasonably requires — not against the lawyer's credentials in the abstract.
  • Cite: MR 1.1; MR 1.1 cmt. [1]

TF-0003 (OUT-5.2)

  • Statement: A lawyer who takes on so many matters that she cannot give each client adequate attention may be subject to discipline even if the resulting delays are caused by workload rather than intentional neglect.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Diligence is an objective duty; the comment expects a lawyer to keep her caseload small enough that every matter gets competent attention. Good intentions are not a defense to neglect.
  • Cite: MR 1.3; MR 1.3 cmt. [2]

TF-0004 (OUT-5.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer satisfies the duty to keep a client informed so long as she promptly answers when the client asks about the matter's status; she has no independent duty to provide updates the client has not requested.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The rule contains both a proactive duty and a responsive duty; answering questions satisfies only the second.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer must update the client on how the matter is progressing without waiting to be asked, and must also promptly answer the client's reasonable requests for information; the two duties are separate.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(a)(3)–(4)

TF-0005 (OUT-5.3)

  • Statement: A client who says "yes" to a proposed course of action has given informed consent even if the lawyer did not explain the material risks and alternatives beforehand.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: Consent is "informed" only if it follows adequate explanation; the label attaches to the process, not the word.
  • Corrected statement: Informed consent requires that the lawyer first communicate adequate information and explanation about the material risks of, and reasonably available alternatives to, the proposed course; a bare "yes" without that explanation is not informed consent.
  • Cite: MR 1.0(e); MR 1.4(b)

TF-0006 (OUT-5.4)

  • Statement: In a criminal case, the decision whether to plead guilty belongs to the client.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.2(a) reserves to the client, in a criminal case, the plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial, and whether to testify — after consultation with the lawyer.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(a)
  • v1.4: the editorial clause characterising pleas as a "strategic means choice" was removed (Grok Bot); it is not in the Rule.

TF-0007 (OUT-5.14)

  • Statement: A lawyer who violates a Rule of Professional Conduct is automatically subject to civil liability in a malpractice action, because the violation establishes breach of the standard of care as a matter of law.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The Rules govern discipline; they are not a source of civil liability and a violation does not by itself prove breach.
  • Corrected statement: A Rule violation is not itself a cause of action and does not automatically establish breach of the standard of care. A court may consider the violation as evidence of the standard only to the extent the rule was designed to protect persons in the plaintiff's position and is relevant to the claimed breach — a proposition the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers states as persuasive authority.
  • Cite: MR Scope [20]; Rest. 3d § 52(2) (Tier 3 — persuasive)

TF-0008 (OUT-5.14)

  • Statement: In a litigation malpractice case, the plaintiff must prove that the underlying litigation would have been resolved more favorably but for the lawyer's negligence — the "case within a case" requirement.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Causation in litigation malpractice is proved by showing what the underlying case would have produced with competent handling; this is the Restatement's persuasive formulation and the general rule in the courts.
  • Cite: Rest. 3d § 53 (Tier 3 — persuasive)

TF-0009 (OUT-5.14)

  • Statement: A lawyer who holds herself out as a specialist in a field is held only to the standard of care applicable to lawyers in general, unless the client specifically sought out a specialist.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The representation of expertise, not the client's reason for hiring, sets the standard.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer who holds herself out as a specialist is held to the standard of care of competent specialists in that field, whether or not the client sought a specialist — the Restatement's persuasive formulation, followed generally by the courts.

TF-0010 (OUT-5.5; OUT-5.14)

  • Statement: A lawyer who enters a valid scope-limiting agreement under MR 1.2(c) is not liable in malpractice for negligent performance of the work within the agreed scope, because the client's informed consent to the limitation operates as a waiver.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: A scope limitation narrows what the lawyer undertakes; it does not lower the standard for what she does undertake, and consent to a limit is not consent to negligence.
  • Corrected statement: A limitation of scope under MR 1.2(c) defines what the lawyer will do; it does not reduce her duty of competence within that scope, and negligent performance of the agreed work remains actionable. The client's consent to the limit is not a prospective waiver of malpractice liability, which MR 1.8(h)(1) permits only where the client is independently represented in making the agreement. And even as to matters outside the scope, a lawyer may still need to alert the client to reasonably apparent risks that the limited engagement does not address.
  • Cite: MR 1.2(c); MR 1.2 cmt. [7]; MR 1.8(h)(1)
  • v1.4: the overbroad "bars only claims arising from work the lawyer did not agree to perform" replaced (Grok Bot Minor); the 1.8(h)(1) cross-reference added.

TF-0011 (OUT-5.6)

  • Statement: Under MR 2.1, a lawyer may address economic, moral or social factors when giving advice, even if the client asked only for legal analysis.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 2.1 permits advice that goes beyond the law. The comment adds a nuance that does not change the answer: a lawyer may take an experienced client's request for purely technical advice at face value, so she is not required to add such factors — she may.
  • Cite: MR 2.1; MR 2.1 cmts. [2]–[3]
  • v1.4: cmt. [3] nuance added to the Why line (Grok Bot Minor); key unchanged.

TF-0012 (OUT-5.10)

  • Statement: When a client with decision-making limitations faces a risk of substantial harm, seeking the appointment of a guardian is a last resort, to be considered only where less restrictive protective measures would not adequately protect the client.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Protective action is a ladder. The lawyer first maintains as normal a relationship as she can, then considers consultation with family, supports and accommodations, and other less intrusive measures; a guardian is sought only where those would not do. The amended rule and Formal Op. 525 (advisory) both treat guardianship as a serious deprivation to be avoided where a less restrictive alternative exists.
  • Cite: MR 1.14(a)–(b) (as amended Feb 2026, Res. 100); ABA Formal Op. 525 (2026)

TF-0013 (OUT-5.7)

  • Statement: The regular-client exception to the fee-communication requirement applies only when the new matter is on the same basis or at the same rate as the lawyer's prior work for that client; any change in the basis or rate must be communicated.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: MR 1.5(b) excuses a fresh communication only where the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate; a change must be communicated, and after Res. 101B (Aug 2026) a mid-engagement change must also be reasonable and accepted by the client.
  • Cite: MR 1.5(b); MR 1.5 cmts. [1], [7] (as amended Aug 2026, Res. 101B)

TF-0014 (OUT-5.15)

  • Statement: A lawyer may enter a prospective agreement limiting her malpractice liability to a client if the client gives knowing and voluntary written consent to the limitation.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The rule requires independent counsel, not merely informed written consent.
  • Corrected statement: A lawyer may make an agreement prospectively limiting her liability to a client for malpractice only if the client is independently represented in making the agreement; the client's own consent, written or not, does not suffice.
  • Cite: MR 1.8(h)(1)

TF-0015 (OUT-5.16)

  • Statement: Under the Restatement's persuasive formulation, a lawyer who commits a clear and serious violation of a duty to the client may be required to forfeit some or all of her fee even though the client cannot prove any financial loss from the violation.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Fee forfeiture is a remedy for breach of the lawyer's duties, not a damages claim. Under the Restatement's formulation — an ALI synthesis that courts treat as persuasive, not as law — a clear and serious violation may justify forfeiting all or part of the fee, and the client's provable loss is one factor bearing on the amount, not a prerequisite to the remedy.
  • Cite: Rest. 3d § 37 (Tier 3 — persuasive)

TF-0016 (OUT-5.12)

  • Statement: A supervising lawyer is subject to discipline for a subordinate lawyer's Rule violation only if the supervisor directly ordered or ratified the violating conduct.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: Ordering or ratifying is one route to the supervisor; it is not the only one.
  • Corrected statement: A supervisor also answers for a subordinate's violation where she learned of it early enough to stop or soften its consequences and failed to take reasonable steps to do so. Separately, a lawyer with managerial authority must put reasonable measures in place to ensure the lawyers she supervises comply with the Rules, and a direct supervisor must make reasonable efforts to the same end — failures that are her own violations, not vicarious ones.
  • Cite: MR 5.1(a)–(c)

TF-0017 (OUT-5.3)

  • Statement: A lawyer ordinarily must promptly tell the client of a settlement offer, because accepting or rejecting it is the client's decision — unless the client has already said that such an offer would be acceptable or unacceptable, or has authorized the lawyer to accept or reject it.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Prompt communication of offers follows from the client's control of settlement; the comment excuses it where the client has already given the answer or the authority.
  • Cite: MR 1.4(a)(1); MR 1.4 cmt. [2]; MR 1.2(a)
  • v1.4: the absolute "all settlement offers" qualified per cmt. [2] (Grok Bot Major). Key unchanged.

TF-0018 (OUT-5.1; OUT-5.11)

  • Statement: A lawyer who discovers during a representation that she lacks the competence the matter requires must address the gap — by acquiring the competence, associating competent counsel, limiting the scope with the client's informed consent, or withdrawing where the Rules require or permit it — rather than continuing unaided.
  • Answer: True
  • Why: Competence is a continuing duty. The lawyer's options are broader than "cure or quit": she may associate another lawyer, or narrow the engagement with informed consent; and where she cannot provide competent representation, withdrawal is mandatory — though a tribunal may refuse to let her go.
  • Cite: MR 1.1 cmts. [1]–[2]; MR 1.2(c); MR 1.16(a)(1), (c)
  • v1.4: the "two options" dichotomy reworded and the mandatory-withdrawal basis pinpointed (Grok Bot Minor).

TF-0019 (OUT-5.8)

  • Statement: ABA Formal Op. 477R holds that all client communications must be encrypted to satisfy the lawyer's duty of communication security.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: The standard is reasonable efforts, judged on the facts, not universal encryption.
  • Corrected statement: Formal Op. 477R (advisory) applies MR 1.6(c)'s reasonable-efforts standard through a fact-specific analysis — the sensitivity of the information, the likelihood and cost of disclosure, the burden of safeguards. Unencrypted email is generally acceptable for routine matters. Stronger measures are required where the information is highly sensitive, where the client has asked for them, or where law or agreement requires them.
  • Cite: ABA Formal Op. 477R (2017); MR 1.6(c); MR 1.1 cmt. [8]
  • v1.4: the client-agreement and legal-requirement triggers and the multi-factor test added (Grok Bot Major); MR 1.6(c) added to the cite (Grok Bot Minor).

TF-0020 (OUT-5.15)

  • Statement: A court's order disqualifying a lawyer from a pending case is a disciplinary sanction and amounts to a finding that the lawyer violated a Rule.
  • Answer: False
  • Why: Disqualification protects the fairness of the pending case; discipline protects the public and the profession. They are decided by different bodies on different standards.
  • Corrected statement: Disqualification is a remedy a court applies to protect the integrity of pending litigation; it is not a disciplinary sanction and is not a finding of a Rule violation. The Rules are not designed to be a basis for procedural remedies, and a disqualification order and a disciplinary finding are independent of each other.
  • Cite: MR Scope [20]; see OUT-5.15 (cross-reference, not authority)

— Flashcards (FC)

One fact per card. Front = the question or prompt. Back = the answer. Mapped to OUT block.


FC-0001 Front: What are the four components of competence under MR 1.1? Back: Legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation adequate for the representation. → OUT-5.1


FC-0002 Front: What is the benchmark for judging whether a lawyer is competent on a matter? Back: What a comparable lawyer in the relevant field would bring to work of similar complexity — judged by the demands of this matter, not the lawyer's general credentials. → OUT-5.1


FC-0003 Front: A lawyer lacks experience in a new area of law. Under what two paths may the lawyer still take the matter? Back: (1) Study or research to acquire competence before or during representation; (2) associate or consult a lawyer who is competent, with client consent if additional cost results. → OUT-5.2


FC-0004 Front: Under the emergency exception to MR 1.1, what limits apply to the assistance a lawyer may give? Back: Assistance must be limited to what the emergency requires; the lawyer must refer the client to qualified counsel promptly once the emergency has passed. → OUT-5.2


FC-0005 Front: What does technology competence require of a lawyer under MR 1.1 cmt. [8]? Back: A lawyer must keep abreast of the benefits and risks of technology relevant to the representation — not expert-level knowledge, but understanding of material risks to client data and the matter. → OUT-5.3


FC-0006 Front: What three things does diligence under MR 1.3 require? Back: (1) Reasonable follow-through on all tasks the matter requires; (2) promptness at each stage; (3) seeing the matter through to completion or properly withdrawing. → OUT-5.4


FC-0007 Front: Does a heavy workload excuse a lawyer from the duty of diligence? Back: No. A lawyer who takes on more work than can be handled with reasonable care violates MR 1.3 even if each delay results from workload rather than intent. → OUT-5.5


FC-0008 Front: What does MR 1.4(a) require a lawyer to communicate? Back: Think of it in three groups. Decisions the client owns — tell the client promptly about anything that needs the client's informed consent, and talk through how the goals will be pursued. Staying in touch — keep the client reasonably up to date and answer reasonable questions promptly. Limits on the lawyer — say so when the Rules or other law keep the lawyer from doing what the client expects. → OUT-5.6


FC-0009 Front: Which MR 1.4(a) sub-duty is proactive (does not require the client to ask)? Back: Sub-duty (3): the lawyer must update the client on how the matter is going on her own initiative, without waiting to be asked. → OUT-5.6


FC-0010 Front: What must a lawyer do before a client's "yes" counts as informed consent under MR 1.4(b)? Back: Explain the material information the decision requires, including options, risks, and consequences — enough for the client to make a real, considered choice. → OUT-5.7


FC-0011 Front: Under MR 1.2(a), who controls the objectives of the representation, and who controls the means? Back: The client controls the objectives (the ends to be pursued); the lawyer controls the means (the tactics and strategies), subject to consultation with the client. → OUT-5.8


FC-0012 Front: In a criminal case, which three decisions belong to the client under MR 1.2(a), even though they might otherwise be considered "means"? Back: (1) Whether to plead guilty; (2) whether to waive a jury trial; (3) whether to testify. → OUT-5.8


FC-0013 Front: What three things must a lawyer reasonably believe before taking protective action under MR 1.14(b)? Back: That the client (1) has decision-making limitations ("diminished capacity" in the prior rule), AND (2) faces a risk of substantial harm, whether physical, financial or otherwise, unless someone acts, AND (3) cannot adequately protect her own interest. (MR 1.14(b), as amended Feb 2026) → OUT-5.9


FC-0014 Front: Does a lawyer need the client's consent before consulting family members to protect a client with decision-making limitations under MR 1.14? Back: No, once the (b) conditions are met — but she may share only what she reasonably judges the protective step requires, and should keep the disclosure narrow. The amended MR 1.14(c) says this directly; the prior rule called the disclosure impliedly authorized. (MR 1.14(c); cmt. [18], as amended Feb 2026) → OUT-5.9


FC-0015 Front: Under MR 2.1, what is a lawyer's duty when giving legal advice? Back: The lawyer must exercise independent judgment and give candid advice — not the answer the client wants to hear. The lawyer may also address moral, economic, social, or practical considerations when they bear on the client's situation. → OUT-5.10


FC-0016 Front: What are the four elements of a legal malpractice claim under Rest. 3d § 48 (Tier 3 — persuasive)? Back: (1) Duty (a lawyer-client or recognized relationship); (2) breach (conduct below the standard of the reasonably competent lawyer); (3) causation; (4) damages (actual, cognizable harm). → OUT-5.11


FC-0017 Front: What is the "case within a case" requirement in litigation malpractice? Back: The plaintiff must prove that the underlying case would have been resolved more favorably — i.e., the client would have won or won more — but for the lawyer's negligence. → OUT-5.14


FC-0018 Front: Under Rest. 3d § 52(1) (Tier 3 — persuasive), what standard of care is a specialist lawyer held to? Back: A lawyer who holds themselves out as having expertise in a field is held to the level of skill and care that competent specialists in that field ordinarily exercise — a higher bar than the general reasonably competent lawyer standard. → OUT-5.13


FC-0019 Front: What does MR Scope [20] say about using a Rule violation to prove malpractice? Back: A violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not itself give rise to a civil cause of action for malpractice — the two systems are independent. → OUT-5.15


FC-0020 Front: What two conditions must be satisfied for a valid limited-scope representation under MR 1.2(c)? Back: (1) The limited scope must be reasonable — the lawyer can do the agreed work competently and diligently; (2) the client must give informed consent to the limitation. → OUT-5.16


FC-0021 Front: When is withdrawal mandatory rather than optional? Back: Two functional situations. The lawyer can't lawfully or physically do the job — continuing would force a Rule or legal violation, or the lawyer's own health has deteriorated enough to compromise the work. The client has ended it — a discharged lawyer must step aside. Everything else is permissive withdrawal under MR 1.16(b). → OUT-5.17


FC-0022 Front: When is fee communication under MR 1.5(b) not required for a new matter? Back: When the lawyer regularly represents the client and the fee for the new matter is on the same basis or at the same rate as prior matters. Any change in basis or rate requires a fresh disclosure. → OUT-5.18


FC-0023 Front: What is the standard for selecting a communication channel under ABA Formal Op. 477R (2017)? Back: A lawyer must match the security of the communication channel to the sensitivity of the information — not a perfect-security standard, but a reasonable-security analysis. Unencrypted email is generally acceptable for routine matters. (ABA Formal Op. 477R is advisory guidance, not binding law.) → OUT-5.19


FC-0024 Front: When is a supervising lawyer responsible for a subordinate lawyer's Rule violation under MR 5.1? Back: When the supervisor (1) ordered the violating conduct, (2) ratified it after the fact, or (3) knew of the violation in time to prevent or mitigate harm but failed to act. → OUT-5.20


FC-0025 Front: What is the critical difference between discipline, malpractice, and disqualification in terms of the harm requirement? Back: Discipline: no actual harm required (Rule violation alone suffices). Malpractice: actual, provable harm required (duty + breach + causation + damages). Disqualification: no actual harm required — risk of prejudice in pending litigation is sufficient. → OUT-5.15


FC-0026 Front: Under MR 1.8(h)(1), what is required for a lawyer to enter a prospective agreement limiting the lawyer's malpractice liability? Back: The client must be independently represented by separate counsel in negotiating the limitation. The client's informed consent alone is not enough — independent representation is required. → OUT-5.23


FC-0027 Front: Before settling a malpractice claim with an unrepresented client or former client, what must a lawyer do under MR 1.8(h)(2)? Back: The lawyer must (1) advise the person in writing to seek independent counsel, and (2) give that person a reasonable opportunity to seek counsel before settlement. → OUT-5.23


FC-0028 Front: Under Rest. 3d § 37 (Tier 3 — persuasive), what is fee forfeiture, and does it require proof of damages? Back: Fee forfeiture is an equitable remedy stripping a lawyer of some or all earned fees after a serious breach of duty. It does not require the client to prove actual damages — it is based on the lawyer's disloyalty or fundamental failure. → OUT-5.24


FC-0029 Front: What level of misconduct is required to trigger fee forfeiture under Rest. 3d § 37 (Tier 3 — persuasive)? Back: A "serious breach" — a mere technical violation does not automatically trigger forfeiture. Courts have discretion; partial forfeiture (reducing rather than eliminating the fee) is available. → OUT-5.24


FC-0030 Front: A lawyer is competent under MR 1.1 — does that mean the lawyer cannot be liable for malpractice? Back: No. Competence and the malpractice standard overlap but are not identical. A lawyer who knows the law (MR 1.1) but fails to apply it with reasonable care (Rest. 3d § 52, Tier 3 — persuasive) may still be liable for malpractice. → OUT-5.22, trap #1


End of FC — 30 flashcards — Oct 1 2026

— Scenario Walkthroughs (WT)

Each walkthrough applies multiple rules from the outline to a fact pattern, showing the analytical process step by step.


WT-0001 — The Overwhelmed New Associate

Facts: Aidoo is a third-year associate at a mid-size firm. His supervising partner, Nguyen, assigns him to handle a complex derivatives transaction for a major client. Aidoo has no experience in derivatives or financial products. He tells Nguyen he is not familiar with derivatives work; Nguyen says, "You'll figure it out — start with the client." Without doing any research or disclosing his inexperience to the client, Aidoo begins the representation. Several weeks in, Aidoo realizes the transaction involves CFTC regulatory issues he does not understand. He does not inform the client, does not research the issue, and does not tell Nguyen. The deal closes with an undisclosed regulatory problem that later results in agency proceedings against the client.

Step-by-step analysis:

Issue 1 — Competence [MR 1.1]: Aidoo had no experience in derivatives and did not acquire competence before beginning the representation. The matter was complex; hurried improvisation does not satisfy the study-or-association path under MR 1.1 cmt. [2]. Aidoo violated MR 1.1 by proceeding without competence and without taking steps to acquire it.

Issue 2 — Disclosure of Inexperience: When Aidoo encountered a regulatory issue he did not understand, MR 1.4(a) required him to communicate the situation to the client. At minimum, the client was entitled to know that the representation had encountered issues beyond the current lawyer's competence so the client could make an informed decision about how to proceed.

Issue 3 — Diligence [MR 1.3]: After identifying the CFTC issue, Aidoo neither researched it nor escalated it. Setting it aside is a failure of diligence.

Issue 4 — Nguyen's Supervisory Duty [MR 5.1]: Two separate questions. First, the supervision system: MR 5.1(b) requires a lawyer with direct supervisory authority to make reasonable efforts to ensure the supervised lawyer follows the Rules. Assigning a complex derivatives deal to an associate who has just said he does not know the field, with no plan for guidance or review, is a failure of that effort. Second, responsibility for Aidoo's specific violations: MR 5.1(c)(1) applies only if Nguyen ordered the conduct or ratified it with knowledge of the specifics, which these facts do not show; MR 5.1(c)(2) would apply if Nguyen learned of the CFTC problem while it could still be fixed and did nothing — but Aidoo never told him. So Nguyen's exposure rests on 5.1(b), not on (c). Had Aidoo escalated and Nguyen sat on it, (c)(2) would be the added basis.

Issue 5 — Potential Malpractice: The client suffered harm in the form of regulatory proceedings it would not have faced had the regulatory issues been identified and addressed. Elements: (1) duty — Aidoo/the firm represented the client; (2) breach — fell below the standard of the reasonably competent derivatives lawyer; (3) causation — the unaddressed CFTC issue directly led to the proceedings; (4) damages — agency proceedings and resulting costs and penalties.

Discipline vs. Malpractice Distinction:

  • Aidoo faces discipline: MR 1.1 (incompetence without cure), MR 1.3 (failure to pursue the regulatory issue), MR 1.4 (failure to communicate).
  • Nguyen faces discipline: MR 5.1 (supervisory failure).
  • Both may face civil malpractice liability given that the client suffered provable harm.

WT-0002 — The Settled Case Without Full Explanation

Facts: Bhatia represents Singh in a personal injury case arising from a car accident in which Singh suffered a serious back injury. The defendant's insurer offers $200,000. Bhatia reviews the offer and calls Singh: "They've offered $200,000 — I think you should take it. These cases are hard to predict at trial." Singh says, "If you think so, I'll accept." Bhatia accepts the offer. Later, Singh learns that Bhatia had obtained a medical expert's report stating Singh would likely require two spinal surgeries at a combined cost of $350,000. Bhatia never shared the report with Singh or mentioned the future surgery costs before the settlement.

Step-by-step analysis:

Issue 1 — Settlement Decision Belongs to Client [MR 1.2(a)]: The decision whether to accept a settlement offer is reserved to the client. Bhatia was required to communicate the offer and the information Singh needed to make the decision — including the medical expert's report.

Issue 2 — Communication for Informed Decision [MR 1.4(b)]: A client's agreement to a settlement is informed only if the lawyer has explained the material information relevant to the decision. The $350,000 in projected surgery costs was directly material to whether a $200,000 settlement was adequate. Bhatia's failure to share the medical report denied Singh an informed decision.

Issue 3 — Proactive Communication Duty [MR 1.4(a)(3)]: Bhatia had the expert report in hand and did not disclose it. The proactive sub-duty of MR 1.4 required disclosure of material developments; withholding a medical expert opinion bearing on the case value is a violation.

Discipline Analysis: Bhatia is subject to discipline under MR 1.4(b) and MR 1.4(a). Accepting a settlement after withholding a material report from the client is a serious communication failure.

Malpractice Analysis: Bhatia may face malpractice liability: Singh suffered a provable loss (the difference between $200,000 and what a properly informed decision might have produced, including the future surgery costs). Elements: (1) duty present; (2) breach — failing to disclose the expert report fell below the standard of care; (3) causation — but for the non-disclosure, Singh might have rejected the offer or negotiated a higher settlement; (4) damages — the amount Singh likely would have obtained in a properly informed negotiation or trial.

Discipline vs. Malpractice Contrast: Discipline requires only the communication violation — no showing of financial loss needed. Malpractice requires that Singh prove he would have done better had the report been disclosed (case-within-a-case analog in settlement context).


WT-0003 — The Technology Incident

Facts: Marcus is a family law attorney. For all client communications, she uses an unencrypted messaging app that she knows is widely regarded as insecure for sensitive data. A client, Petrova, is going through a contentious divorce involving a child custody dispute. Marcus sends Petrova a detailed strategy memo about custody litigation, including the client's negotiating positions and confidential information about Petrova's mental health history, over the unencrypted app. A third party intercepts the messages, and the information is disclosed to opposing counsel, prejudicing Petrova's case.

Step-by-step analysis:

Issue 1 — Technology Competence [MR 1.1 cmt. [8]]: Marcus is required to keep abreast of the risks of technology relevant to the representation. Custody disputes involving sensitive mental health information are precisely the kind of situation that calls for careful security analysis. Using a known-insecure channel for highly sensitive communications, without the client's knowledge of that risk, fails the technology-competence component of MR 1.1.

Issue 2 — Reasonable Security Analysis [ABA Formal Op. 477R (2017) (advisory)]: The standard is not perfect security, but reasonable security matched to the sensitivity of the information. For routine, non-sensitive matters, unencrypted communication may be acceptable. Here, the information was highly sensitive (mental health history, litigation strategy); an obviously insecure channel was unreasonable for this communication.

Issue 3 — Communication / Confidentiality Overlap: Sending confidential communications over a channel that Marcus knew was insecure, without warning or consent from Petrova, also raises MR 1.6 confidentiality issues (unauthorized disclosure of confidential information) and MR 1.4 issues (failure to inform the client of a material limitation on communication security).

Discipline Analysis: Marcus is subject to discipline under MR 1.1 (technology competence) and potentially MR 1.6 (confidentiality). The combination of knowing the channel was insecure and choosing it anyway for highly sensitive information is not a good-faith reasonable-security judgment.

Malpractice Analysis: If the interception of the communications harmed Petrova's custody case, malpractice elements may be met: (1) duty; (2) breach (below the standard of care in selecting communication channels); (3) causation (the interception and disclosure caused prejudice to the case); (4) damages (loss in the custody proceedings).

Exam Note: The MPRE is likely to test this scenario by asking whether Marcus is subject to discipline (yes — MR 1.1 and MR 1.6) separately from whether Petrova has a malpractice claim (yes, if causation and damages can be shown). These are independent questions.


WT-0004 — The Prospective Liability Cap and the Malpractice Settlement

Facts: Tanaka is a transactional attorney. She represents Wexler in a commercial real estate purchase. Before the representation begins, Tanaka presents a retainer agreement that includes: (1) a cap limiting Tanaka's malpractice liability to $50,000, and (2) a clause providing that any dispute about Tanaka's representation would be resolved by Tanaka's judgment, which Wexler agrees to in writing. Wexler did not have separate counsel when he signed the agreement. After closing, Wexler discovers that Tanaka negligently failed to identify a significant lien on the property. Wexler's losses from the lien total $400,000. Tanaka offers to settle the resulting malpractice dispute for $30,000, telling Wexler verbally (not in writing) that he should "think about whether he really needs a lawyer for something this straightforward."

Step-by-step analysis:

Issue 1 — Prospective Liability Cap [MR 1.8(h)(1)]: The $50,000 liability cap is impermissible because Wexler was not independently represented when he signed the agreement. MR 1.8(h)(1) requires the client to have independent counsel in negotiating such a limitation. The cap is a disciplinary violation and is likely unenforceable.

Issue 2 — Dispute-Resolution Clause: A clause letting the lawyer decide disputes about her own representation is, in substance, another prospective limit on the client's ability to hold the lawyer to account. It should be analyzed under MR 1.8(h)(1) on the same footing as the cap: without independent representation it is impermissible. MR 1.8(a), the business-transaction rule, is not the right tool here: Comment [1] to MR 1.8 takes the ordinary terms of a fee arrangement outside 1.8(a) and leaves them to MR 1.5. ABA Formal Op. 02-425 (ethics opinion — advisory, not binding) likewise analyzes dispute clauses in retainer agreements under MR 1.4(b), which requires explaining the clause well enough for an informed decision, and MR 1.8(h), not 1.8(a). The clause fails under MR 1.8(h)(1). Whether a court would enforce the clause is a separate contract question; MPRE calls will focus on the disciplinary breach.

Issue 3 — Settlement of Malpractice Claim [MR 1.8(h)(2)]: Wexler is unrepresented in the malpractice dispute. MR 1.8(h)(2) requires Tanaka to: (a) advise in writing that Wexler should seek independent counsel, and (b) give a reasonable opportunity to do so before settling. Tanaka's verbal suggestion that Wexler "think about whether he really needs a lawyer" does not satisfy the writing requirement; Tanaka must advise in writing.

Issue 4 — Malpractice Substance: On the merits, Tanaka failed to identify a material lien — a basic component of real estate due diligence and clearly within the scope of the representation. This is a breach of the standard of care. Causation and damages are both present ($400,000 lien-related loss).

Discipline Findings:

  • MR 1.8(h)(1): obtaining the liability cap, and the self-judging dispute clause, without Wexler's independent representation.
  • MR 1.8(h)(2): failing to give written advice to seek independent counsel before settling the malpractice claim.
  • MR 1.1: failure to identify the lien (breach of competence).

Malpractice: The liability cap is likely invalid as obtained in violation of MR 1.8(h)(1), so Tanaka faces the full $400,000 exposure despite the cap. The malpractice elements are straightforward: duty, breach (missed lien), causation, damages.


End of WT — 4 walkthroughs — Sep 30 2026

— Key Terms (KT)

Each term mapped to its OUT block(s) and the flashcard(s) that teach it.

ID Term Definition OUT Block FC
KT-0001 Competence Having the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation the representation requires. [MR 1.1] OUT-5.1 FC-0001, FC-0002
KT-0002 Emergency exception (competence) Limited latitude to assist a client on a matter outside one's competence when a genuine emergency demands it, restricted to the scope of the emergency. [MR 1.1 cmt. [3]] OUT-5.2 FC-0004
KT-0003 Technology competence The component of MR 1.1 requiring a lawyer to keep up with the benefits and risks of technology relevant to the representation. [MR 1.1 cmt. [8]] OUT-5.3 FC-0005
KT-0004 Diligence The duty to act with reasonable follow-through and promptness, and to see a matter through to completion. [MR 1.3] OUT-5.4 FC-0006
KT-0005 Status update duty The obligation under MR 1.4(a)(3) to proactively keep the client reasonably informed about the matter's progress, without waiting for the client to ask. OUT-5.6 FC-0008, FC-0009
KT-0006 Informed decision A client's decision made after the lawyer has explained the material information the decision requires, including options, risks, and alternatives. [MR 1.4(b)] OUT-5.7 FC-0010
KT-0007 Client objectives The ends the client seeks from the representation; the client controls these under MR 1.2(a). OUT-5.8 FC-0011
KT-0008 Lawyer means The tactics and strategies the lawyer uses to achieve client objectives; within the lawyer's authority after consultation. [MR 1.2(a)] OUT-5.8 FC-0011
KT-0009 Diminished capacity A reduction in a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions; triggers special communication and protective-action duties under MR 1.14. OUT-5.9 FC-0013, FC-0014
KT-0010 Candid advice Honest, complete professional advice that reflects the lawyer's independent judgment rather than what the client hopes to hear. [MR 2.1] OUT-5.10 FC-0015
KT-0011 Legal malpractice A claim against a lawyer for negligent representation, requiring duty, breach, causation, and damages. [Rest. 3d § 48 (Tier 3 — persuasive)] OUT-5.11 FC-0016
KT-0012 Standard of care (malpractice) The level of skill and care a reasonably competent lawyer in similar circumstances would provide. [Rest. 3d § 52(1) (Tier 3 — persuasive)] OUT-5.13 FC-0018
KT-0013 Specialist standard (malpractice) Lawyers who hold themselves out as specialists are measured against the competence specialists in that field ordinarily exercise. [Rest. 3d § 52(1) cmt. b (Tier 3 — persuasive)] OUT-5.13 FC-0018
KT-0014 Case within a case The litigation malpractice requirement that the plaintiff prove the underlying case would have been won but for the lawyer's negligence. [Rest. 3d § 53 (Tier 3 — persuasive)] OUT-5.14 FC-0017
KT-0015 Limited scope representation An arrangement under MR 1.2(c) where, with client informed consent, the lawyer handles only specified aspects of the matter. OUT-5.16 FC-0020
KT-0016 Mandatory withdrawal Withdrawal required under MR 1.16(a) when representation would violate the Rules, when physical/mental impairment materially affects representation, or when the client discharges the lawyer. OUT-5.17 FC-0021
KT-0017 Fee communication duty The obligation under MR 1.5(b) to communicate the scope of representation and fee basis before or promptly after the representation begins. OUT-5.18 FC-0022
KT-0018 Reasonable security (communication) The standard under ABA Formal Op. 477R (advisory) for selecting communication channels — match security to information sensitivity. OUT-5.19 FC-0023
KT-0019 Prospective malpractice limitation An agreement made before a representation capping the lawyer's liability for negligence; requires the client to be independently represented. [MR 1.8(h)(1)] OUT-5.23 FC-0026
KT-0020 Fee forfeiture The equitable remedy of stripping a lawyer of some or all earned fees following a serious breach of duty, available without proof of damages. [Rest. 3d § 37 (Tier 3 — persuasive)] OUT-5.24 FC-0028, FC-0029
KT-0021 Informed consent The client's agreement to something the lawyer proposes, given only after the lawyer has laid out what could go wrong and what else the client could do instead. [MR 1.0(e)] OUT-5.7 FC-0010
KT-0022 MR Scope [20] rule A violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not itself create a civil cause of action; the disciplinary and civil liability systems are independent. OUT-5.15, OUT-5.22 FC-0019

End of KT — 22 key terms — Sep 27 2026

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