Edition: MPRE · Section 4: Conflicts of Interest · NCBE weight 12–18% (App target 15%) Rule-text source: paraphrase throughout (Style Guide 3.2). Short quoted phrases are marked in quotation marks. Governing law: ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MR). State variations are out of scope for this packet. NCBE subtopics covered: 4.1 multiple clients & joint representation · 4.2 lawyer's personal interest or duties · 4.3 former clients · 4.4 prospective clients · 4.5 imputed conflicts · 4.6 acquiring an interest in litigation · 4.7 business transactions with clients · 4.8 third-party compensation & influence · 4.9 current & former government lawyers · 4.10 former judges, arbitrators, mediators & neutrals Part B (in this same file, after Part A): 45 flashcards · 55 MC · 32 T/F · 2 Scenario Walkthroughs · 27 key terms · Rapid Review script
Notice. Independent educational material. Not affiliated with, sponsored by or endorsed by the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE), the American Bar Association or any board of bar examiners. MPRE is a mark of NCBE, used here only to identify the exam. Not legal advice; using this material does not create a lawyer-client relationship. The ABA Model Rules are paraphrased and cited, not reproduced. (Final wording: founder, per PRD F14.)
- Exact consent wording ("informed consent, confirmed in writing"): FC-0030, MC-0011 D, MC-0025 answer, OUT-4.1.4 rule, OUT-4.2.1 item 2, RR-0001.
- OUT-4.5.1 screening item 1 rewritten in original wording (layer C). Common Traps and RR-0001 personal-interest sentence reworded positively.
- RR-0001: partly applied. Consent wording and "unrelated matter" added; rejected "rarely consentable" (MR 1.7 cmt. [6] treats unrelated-matter adversity as often consentable).
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Re-certification adds: FC-0030, MC-0011, MC-0025, OUT-4.1.4, OUT-4.2.1, OUT-4.5.1, Common Traps, RR-0001 (all already on the v1.13 list).
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FC-0017 trap limited to credentials-only websites; invites without limiting warnings can create an expectation (MR 1.18 cmt. [2]). MC-0026 A now uses "expectation that the lawyer will discuss an engagement."
- Common Traps and RR-0001: personal-interest exception now conditional on no significant risk to the other lawyers; MR 1.8(j) never imputed.
- FC-0041: adds that the firm no longer represents the client (MR 1.10(b)); example has Z follow Abbott.
- MC-0050: stem and C reframed around information about a person adverse to the company, material disadvantage, no actual-use requirement (MR 1.11(c); cmt. [8]). Key B unchanged.
- OUT-4.2.1 item 2, MC-0011 answer, SW-0002 rule: job discussions use the significant-risk test (MR 1.7 cmt. [10]; ABA Formal Op. 96-400).
- TF-0017 and FC-0037: arbitration requires enforceability under applicable law (MR 1.8 cmt. [17]). TF key True unchanged.
- Copyright (layer C): OUT-4.1.4 rule, FC-0001 and FC-0030 definitions, OUT-4.5.1 notice/certification list rewritten in original structure.
- Term markers: ten proposed markers accepted and placed in Part A; B5 ✱ flags and change request removed.
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Founder re-certification needed for: FC-0001, 0017, 0030, 0037, 0041; MC-0011, 0026, 0050; TF-0017; SW-0002; OUT-4.1.4, 4.2.1, 4.5.1; Common Traps; RR-0001.
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OUT-4.3.3 lag sentence: "no earlier than about August 2027"; NCBE promises no first-test date and may test the prior comment until then.
- MC-0023: keyed A now rests on wide local-business-press reporting (MR 1.9 cmt. [8] / Res. 101D), not public-trial proof; explanation adds that open-court proof alone isn't enough and use-not-reveal. Key A unchanged. Optional "proven in open court = generally known" distractor not added: it would state an inaccurate rule, contrary to the pack's accurate-rule-misapplied distractor standard, and would be a right-result/wrong-reason No option alongside the key; the negative is taught in the explanation instead.
- MC-0006 C double comma removed. OUT-4.0 trap names contingent-fee agreements under MR 1.5(c).
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SW-0001, SW-0002 (approved): no change.
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MC-0004 C: "informed consent, confirmed in writing" (MR 1.9(a)). MC-0019 A: "informed consent, confirmed in writing" (D lengthened slightly for length balance). MC-0043 B: written advice on the desirability of independent counsel (MR 1.8(a)(2)). MC-0038 B: finding rejected; the option already states MR 1.8(e)(2) accurately, and the suggested "only" would make the rule statement false given MR 1.8(e)(3).
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Grok map audit: MC-0044 stem now says Walter will pay whether or not Sousa agrees to the reports, so no MR 1.8(f)(2) interference and B can't be right. MC-0049 B and MC-0029 A: no change; explanations already say the rule disqualifies the lawyer, not the firm.
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Critical closed, MC-0004: option A now says Mbeki may keep the secret and continue for both. That is plainly wrong: Cole's demand may revoke the sharing consent, so Mbeki can't reveal the commission, but for that reason she must withdraw (MR 1.6(a); MR 1.7 cmt. [31]; MR 1.16(a)(1)). B is the only right answer; the key explanation adds the revocation point.
- Consent formulas made exact in the options: MC-0026, 0027, 0028 (MR 1.18(d)(1), both parties, informed consent confirmed in writing); 0049, 0052 (MR 1.11(a)(2) agency); 0053 (MR 1.12(a)); 0039 (MR 1.8(a)). Same fix, not flagged: MC-0006, 0034 (MR 1.7 / 1.10(c) confirmed in writing); MC-0010, 0018, 0040, 0041, 0043 (MR 1.8(a) informed consent in a writing signed by the client); MC-0047, 0048 (MR 1.8(g)); MC-0054 (MR 1.12(a)).
- Rule statements corrected: MC-0027 D (relationship formed by agreement or failure to decline despite known reliance, Restatement § 14); 0028 A (MR 1.18(b) use/reveal vs. (c) disqualification); 0050 A (personal and substantial) and C, 0052 C (MR 1.11(c) bars adverse representation where the information could materially disadvantage the person; no actual use needed); 0043 D (pending or contemplated litigation); 0039 C (all MR 1.8(a) safeguards).
- Explanations corrected: MC-0008 A (no (b)(3) trigger; consentability still turns on (b)(1)); 0013 B (pre-existing relationship removes the MR 1.8(j) ban, not MR 1.7; no material-limitation risk shown); 0038 (no promise before retention or as an inducement to continue); 0049 (firm's separate written-notice duty).
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Keys unchanged (A 14 · B 13 · C 14 · D 14); key uniquely longest 2 of 55. Outline, FC, T/F unchanged.
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All three wrong options in each of the 55 MC items rewritten so each states a real rule, exception or standard (Model Rules; Code of Judicial Conduct not implicated) misapplied to the facts: wrong trigger, an exception that doesn't fit, the wrong consent form, the wrong party, or the right result for the wrong reason. Each "is wrong" line now names the rule and why the facts don't trigger it, with a cite. Keyed letters unchanged (A 14 · B 13 · C 14 · D 14); yes/no calls balanced 2 + 2 where the lead-in is yes/no.
- Two defensible answers closed: MC-0002 (each brother will testify against the other, and the prosecutor offers a deal to whoever testifies first); MC-0004 (engagement letter gave no advance consent to continuing for one partner, so option C needs Cole's MR 1.9(a) consent).
- Missing facts added: MC-0009 (Vireo now directs Crestline's legal work through a shared legal department, so the affiliate is treated as a client under MR 1.7 cmt. [34]; neither client consents; withdrawal from the tax matter causes no harm and needs no court approval); MC-0054 (Kim is a licensed lawyer drafting the bench memo, so she participates personally and substantially).
- MC-0032: the stem no longer states the conclusion ("no significant risk"); it now gives the facts (Cruz leads the defense, doesn't share or report to Nakamura; Nakamura has no role, supervision or pay).
- Other stem facts added to close distractor loopholes: MC-0001 (contract dispute unrelated to the lease), 0003, 0006 (separate appeals, same week, not consolidated), 0008 (Priya hasn't asserted a claim; Yeager not a witness), 0011, 0016 (watch now $5,000; no undue influence), 0021 (records never made public), 0033 (stake bought from Quillon itself), 0040, 0042, 0043 (no litigation pending), 0045, 0046 (flat fee), 0047 (all 12 told of the offer), 0050, 0055 (Okoro's services not used in obtaining the policy).
- MC-0055 moved next to the other third-party-payer items (after MC-0046, before the aggregate-settlement items); ID unchanged.
- Names: reused or near-duplicate surnames replaced so none repeats within the section: Brandt → Yeager (0008) / Szabo (0044); Pike → Ellery (0014); Farrow → Aldana (0012); Farrell → Nakamura (0032); Moreau → Lachance (0018); Kessler → Dunmore (0019); Lund → Tremblay (0025); Mora → Quintero (0027); Serrano → Achebe (0034); Vance & Ortiz → Bishop & Ortiz, Pruitt → Kincaid (0035); Moss → Abernathy (0037); Lindgren → Branson (0039); Swift Freight → Swift Haulage (0045); Grady → Pomeroy (0046); Delaney → Fairbanks (0055); Kestrel Chemical → Kestrel Coatings (0049); Whitley → Ashworth (0050); Keane → Marchetti (0052); Ferris → Gallo (0053). Genders varied (Park, Lindqvist, Ruiz, Sato, Grant, Kowalski, Duarte, Novak, Ibarra, Kerr, Okoro now male; Brooks, Ashworth female; Chen male client).
- MR 1.8 comment cites checked against the current numbering: financial assistance [10]–[13]; payer [14]–[15]; aggregate [16]; limiting liability [17]–[18]; proprietary interest [19]; sexual relations [20]–[22]; imputation [23].
- FC, T/F, outline, key terms, item IDs and counts unchanged.
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Second pass: every option states an accurate rule; wrongness depends on fact fit.
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MC answer options rewritten so the keyed option is no longer usually the longest. Keys were trimmed (supporting detail moved into the explanations) and distractors lengthened with plausible near-miss reasoning; the "is wrong" explanations were updated to match.
- Before/after (word count, 55 MC): key uniquely longest 53 (96%) → 11 (20%); key shortest or second-shortest 1 (2%) → 33 (60%). By character count: key uniquely longest 55 → 12; shortest or second-shortest 0 → 21.
- Absolute words ("never", "always", "any", "every") no longer appear only in wrong options.
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Stems, keyed letters (A 14 · B 13 · C 14 · D 14), item IDs, counts and legal content unchanged.
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OUT-4.1.2: consentability now names the black-letter term "reasonably believes" (MR 1.0(i)) and its two halves, keeping the cmt. [15] objective emphasis.
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OUT-4.2.1: new example 5, the lawyer's own material error (MR 1.4 cmt. [8], Aug. 2026), pointing to S02 OUT-2.6.1. Counts and keys unchanged.
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"Law as of" updated to September 24, 2026, with a 2026 update map showing where each resolution is handled.
- MC-0018: added facts establishing a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel (MR 1.8(h)(2)).
- MC-0029: the explanation no longer claims certifications were already provided (MR 1.10(a)(2)(iii)).
- MC-0052: added the confidential fact from the returns that bears on the profit dispute (MR 1.11(c)).
- MC-0055: the engagement letter now says the insurer is not a client (MR 1.8 cmt. [14]).
- Answer-letter runs broken: options reordered in MC-0022, 0024, 0026, 0031, 0035, 0038 and 0039. The new key totals are A 14 / B 13 / C 14 / D 14, with no repeating four-letter cycle. Explanations were relabeled to match.
- Pass C against the reference PDF: no findings (third reviewer to agree).
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Audio notes (citation notation; the long OUT-4.7 sentence) go to the K6 audio script, not the text.
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Consentability test updated to the current MR 1.7 cmt. [15] standard: can the lawyer reasonably conclude she can represent each client competently and diligently? This replaces the pre-2002 "disinterested lawyer" phrasing in OUT-4.1.2, FC-0009 and the MC-0002 explanation. Key unchanged.
- Payer as co-client: categorical "the payer is never the client" statements softened to "paying alone doesn't make someone a client; a payer can be a co-client" (MR 1.8 cmts. [14]–[15]). Covers OUT-4.8.1, checklist 9, common traps, FC-0023, TF-0028 and Rapid Review. Keys unchanged.
- MC-0015: added facts showing a purely professional relationship, so the MR 1.8(c) close-familial-relationship reading can't change the key.
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OUT-4.3.3 update note reworded; a mechanical scan found word-sequence overlap with the reference PDF.
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MR 1.8(c) wording: the exception now names "the lawyer or other recipient" related to the client (OUT-4.2.3, FC-0014, FC-0034).
- OUT-4.1.4: the hot-potato note now contrasts a legitimate withdrawal for an unforeseeable conflict (MR 1.7 cmt. [5]).
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MC-0004 option C explanation tightened. MC-0007 option D made a stronger distractor.
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Rule sentences reworded into plainer, original paraphrase so they no longer track the ABA text closely. This covers OUT-4.0 (informed consent, confirmed in writing), 4.1.1, 4.2.2–4.2.6, 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.4, 4.5.1 (including the screening definition), 4.5.2, 4.6.1, 4.6.2, 4.7, 4.8.1, 4.8.2, 4.9.1 (including "matter" and confidential government information), 4.9.2 and 4.10, plus FC-0014 and FC-0025. Legal elements are unchanged.
- The checklist (item 8) and Rapid Review ("Eight") now include MR 1.8(e)(2), paying costs outright for an indigent client.
- MC-0005: new facts (the bakeries are in different neighborhoods, and the lease doesn't involve the other client), so there is no material-limitation reading.
- Also from the full Grok review:
- OUT-4.1.2 recast as the B-L-O-C teaching test.
- OUT-4.8.1 gains the insurance-defense triangle, with new MC-0055.
- New TF-0031 tests MR 1.8(b).
- MC-0039 rewritten (present purchase of a share, not a contingent fee).
- MC-0004 option B narrowed to "the joint representation."
- TF-0005 now says "ordinarily."
- FC-0001 trimmed to one idea.
4. Conflicts of Interest
4.0 The Framework: How to Attack Any Conflict Question
Conflicts are the most heavily tested MPRE area. Almost every conflict question can be solved with the same four steps.
- Whose interests are in tension? Two current clients? A current and a former client? The client and the lawyer? A client and whoever is paying the bill?
- Which rule governs? - current clients: MR 1.7, plus the specific rules in MR 1.8 - former clients: MR 1.9 - prospective clients: MR 1.18 - the lawyer's firm: MR 1.10 - government lawyers: MR 1.11 - former judges and neutrals: MR 1.12
- Is there a conflict? Apply that rule's test.
- Can it be cured, and how? - Is it consentable? - What form of consent is required? The usual form is informed consent, confirmed in writing. Some rules require a writing signed by the client. - Does screening save the rest of the firm?
Two definitions you must know cold:
- Informed consent: the person agrees to a proposed course of action only after the lawyer has explained enough for a real decision: what could go wrong (the material risks) and what other options are reasonably available. (MR 1.0(e))
- Confirmed in writing: the consent is recorded in writing, either by the person writing it themselves or by the lawyer promptly sending them a writing that memorializes consent given orally. If a writing can't be done at the moment of consent, the lawyer must get or send it within a reasonable time. (MR 1.0(b))
⚠ Exam trap: "Confirmed in writing" does not require the client's signature. A lawyer's confirming email is enough. Only a few rules demand a writing signed by the client: business transactions (MR 1.8(a)), aggregate settlements (MR 1.8(g)), and contingent-fee agreements under MR 1.5(c) (Section 2). Know which is which.
4.1 Current-Client Conflicts: Multiple Clients and Joint Representation
4.1.1 The general rule: when a concurrent conflict exists
Rule: A concurrent conflict of interest arises in two ways: the lawyer would be acting directly against another current client, or there is a significant risk that the lawyer's work for a client will be held back by duties owed to someone else (another client, a former client, a third person) or by the lawyer's own interests.
A concurrent conflict exists in either of two situations:
- Direct adversity: the lawyer acts directly against a current client, even in a completely unrelated matter.
- Material limitation: a significant risk that the lawyer's duties to someone else, or the lawyer's own interests, will limit what the lawyer does for the client.
Explanation: Loyalty is the core duty. A client is entitled to a lawyer who will not turn on them while still representing them, and who is not held back by competing obligations. The test for material limitation is a significant risk, not a certainty. The question is whether the conflict is likely to interfere with the lawyer's independent judgment, for example in the options the lawyer considers or recommends.
Examples of direct adversity:
- Suing a current client on behalf of another client, even in an unrelated matter. (MR 1.7 cmt. [6])
- Cross-examining a current client who appears as an adverse witness in another client's lawsuit. (cmt. [6])
- In a transaction, representing the seller against a buyer whom the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter. (cmt. [7])
Not direct adversity: representing two clients who are merely economic competitors in unrelated matters, such as two competing businesses. (cmt. [6])
Example of material limitation: A lawyer is asked to represent three people forming a joint venture. The lawyer may be unable to recommend positions each would take if represented separately. That is a significant risk that loyalty to one limits advice to the others. (cmt. [8])
Cite: MR 1.7(a)
4.1.2 When a concurrent conflict can be cured (consentable conflicts)
Rule: A concurrent conflict can be cured only if four things are true. Remember them as B-L-O-C: the lawyer Believes, reasonably, that she can serve every affected client competently and diligently; the representation is Lawful; the clients are not Opponents in the same lawsuit or tribunal proceeding; and every affected client gives informed Consent, confirmed in writing.
The four requirements:
- Reasonable belief. Can the lawyer reasonably conclude that she can give competent and diligent representation to each affected client? The black-letter term is "reasonably believes" (MR 1.0(i), S01 OUT-1.1.2): she must actually believe it, and the belief must be objectively reasonable. The objective half is what usually decides exam questions. If she can't, the conflict is nonconsentable conflict, whatever the clients want. (cmt. [15]) Older materials phrase this as whether "a disinterested lawyer would conclude the client should not agree." That was the pre-2002 Comment's wording; use the current test.
- Not prohibited by law. Some representations are barred by statute or other law regardless of consent. (cmt. [16])
- Not opposing clients in the same litigation. A lawyer may never represent both sides of the same lawsuit or proceeding before a tribunal. (cmt. [17])
- Informed consent of each affected client, confirmed in writing. Both clients, not just the one who benefits.
Explanation: Consent works only when the lawyer can still do the job well for everyone. A client cannot waive the lawyer's basic obligation of competent, loyal representation.
Example: Attorney Park represents Harlow in a lease negotiation. Northwind, another current client, wants Park to sue Harlow in an unrelated contract dispute. This is direct adversity, but it is consentable if Park reasonably believes she can represent both diligently and both Harlow and Northwind give informed consent, confirmed in writing.
⚠ Exam trap: Students pick "No, a lawyer may never sue a current client." Wrong: direct adversity is usually consentable. The absolute bar is on representing opposing parties in the same litigation.
⚠ Exam trap: Consent must come from every affected client. The client who benefits from the representation can't consent for the one being sued.
Compare: A nonconsentable conflict (e.g., both sides of one lawsuit) can't be cured by any consent. A consentable conflict needs informed consent, confirmed in writing, plus the lawyer's reasonable belief.
Cite: MR 1.7(b); cmts. [14]–[17]
4.1.3 Joint (common) representation
Rule: A lawyer may represent multiple clients in the same matter (for example, co-plaintiffs, co-defendants, or several parties to a deal) when their interests are generally aligned, but only after evaluating the conflict under MR 1.7 and obtaining each client's informed consent, confirmed in writing, if a conflict exists.
Explanation: Joint representation can save money and promote cooperation. But if the clients' interests diverge, the lawyer may have to withdraw from representing all of them, and the clients lose the lawyer they share. (cmt. [29])
Key features the lawyer must explain at the outset:
- No secrets between joint clients. Each client has a right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests. The lawyer should advise each client at the start that information will be shared, and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. (cmt. [31])
- The attorney-client privilege generally won't protect communications between joint clients if they later sue each other. (cmt. [30])
- The lawyer may have to withdraw from all of them if the conflict ripens, and may be unable to keep representing any of them. (cmt. [29])
Criminal co-defendants: The potential for conflict in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one co-defendant. (cmt. [23])
Civil co-parties: Simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict (for example, co-plaintiffs or co-defendants with a substantial discrepancy in testimony or incompatible positions toward an opposing party) is a conflict. Common representation of co-plaintiffs or co-defendants in civil cases is often proper when properly evaluated and consented to. (cmt. [23])
Example: A driver and passenger injured in the same crash ask one lawyer to sue the other driver. If there's a real possibility the passenger has a claim against the driver (e.g., the driver may have been partly at fault), the lawyer must evaluate that risk. The lawyer may proceed only if she reasonably believes she can represent both well and both give informed consent, confirmed in writing, after being told they could sue each other and she could not act in that dispute.
⚠ Exam trap: A joint client's request to keep a material fact secret from the other joint client is not simply "confidential." It forces the lawyer to deal with the conflict, often by withdrawing.
Cite: MR 1.7 cmts. [23], [29]–[33]
4.1.4 Conflicts that arise during the representation
Rule: A conflict can surface midway through a case. When it does, the lawyer's default move is to withdraw, unless the MR 1.7(b) conditions are met, including each affected client's informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Explanation:
- Withdrawal: withdrawal follows MR 1.16. If the lawyer withdraws from one client, the question of whether she may continue for the other is governed by the former-client rule, MR 1.9. (MR 1.7 cmt. [4])
- Unforeseeable conflicts: sometimes a conflict arises through no fault of the lawyer, e.g., a corporate acquisition makes one client the owner of another. In that case the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one representation to avoid the conflict, subject to court approval where required and to the duties owed the withdrawn-from client. (cmt. [5])
Example: Lawyer represents Acme in a contract dispute against Beta Co. Mid-case, Acme's parent company acquires another of the lawyer's clients, Gamma, which is now aligned with Beta. The lawyer must reassess the conflict and may withdraw from one client, but must still protect that client's confidences under MR 1.9.
⚠ Exam trap: "Dropping a client like a hot potato" to turn a current-client conflict into an easier former-client conflict is widely condemned by courts. On the MPRE, the safe analysis is to treat the client as a current client when the conflict arose. (This comes from case law, not the Model Rules' text.)
Compare, a legitimate withdrawal: when a conflict arises that the lawyer couldn't have foreseen, such as one client acquiring another's adversary, MR 1.7 cmt. [5] lets the lawyer choose to withdraw from one of the representations to cure the conflict. She still owes that client the former-client duties of MR 1.9. The difference from a hot potato is that the lawyer didn't create the conflict by taking on new, adverse work.
Cite: MR 1.7 cmts. [4]–[5]; MR 1.16
4.1.5 Advance waivers and positional conflicts
Rule: A client may consent in advance to future conflicts (an advance waiver), but the consent is effective only to the extent the client reasonably understood the material risks the waiver involves.
Explanation (advance consent):
- The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future representations that might arise and their reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences, the more likely the client understood the waiver.
- A general, open-ended consent is ordinarily ineffective unless the client is an experienced user of legal services (especially if independently represented in giving consent), and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation.
- Advance consent can't cure a conflict that would be nonconsentable under MR 1.7(b). (cmt. [22])
Explanation (positional conflict):
- Arguing opposite legal positions for different clients in different cases is ordinarily not a conflict.
- It becomes a conflict if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's action for one client will materially limit her effectiveness for the other. The standard example is when a decision favoring one client will create precedent likely to seriously weaken the other client's position. (cmt. [24])
⚠ Exam trap: "Taking inconsistent legal positions is always a conflict." It is not, unless the material-limitation risk is significant (e.g., the same appellate court).
Cite: MR 1.7 cmts. [22], [24]
4.2 Current-Client Conflicts: The Lawyer's Personal Interest or Duties
4.2.1 Personal-interest conflicts under the general rule
Rule: A personal-interest conflict exists when there is a significant risk that the lawyer's own interests (financial, relational, or reputational) will materially limit the representation. It is analyzed under MR 1.7 and cured, if at all, by the MR 1.7(b) conditions.
Common examples:
- The lawyer's own conduct is in question. If the probity of the lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. (cmt. [10])
- Job discussions with the opponent's firm. Discussing possible employment with the client's opponent, or with the opponent's law firm, creates a conflict when it poses a significant risk of materially limiting the representation. Concrete, substantive talks by a lawyer actively working on the matter usually meet that test. The lawyer may then continue only under MR 1.7(b), with the client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. (cmt. [10]; ABA Formal Op. 96-400 (advisory))
- Family relationships with opposing counsel. Lawyers related by blood or marriage (e.g., parent, child, sibling, spouse) who represent opposite sides ordinarily may not do so without each client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. This conflict is personal and is not imputed to other lawyers in their firms unless it creates a significant risk of limiting their representation. (cmt. [11]; MR 1.10(a)(1))
- Referral or business interests. Examples: an interest in a business the lawyer refers the client to, or financial incentives tied to a particular outcome.
- The lawyer's own material error. A material error in the representation must be disclosed to the current client (MR 1.4 cmt. [8], Aug. 2026), and the lawyer's interest in avoiding liability can create a personal-interest conflict she must assess. See S02 OUT-2.6.1.
⚠ Exam trap: A lawyer married to opposing counsel is not automatically barred. The conflict is ordinarily consentable (subject to the other MR 1.7(b) conditions), and it isn't imputed to the firm unless it significantly risks limiting the other lawyers' work.
Cite: MR 1.7(a)(2); cmts. [10]–[12]
4.2.2 Sexual relations with clients
Rule: Sexual relations with a current client are prohibited. The only exception is a consensual sexual relationship that already existed when the representation began.
Explanation:
- The relationship is fiduciary, and the lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. A sexual relationship can involve unfair exploitation and can impair the lawyer's independent judgment. (MR 1.8 cmt. [20])
- The client's consent doesn't cure a prohibited relationship.
- When the client is an organization, the rule bars sexual relations with a constituent who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the lawyer concerning the organization's legal matters. (cmt. [22])
⚠ Exam trap: This prohibition is not imputed to other lawyers in the firm. (MR 1.8(k) excludes paragraph (j))
Cite: MR 1.8(j); cmts. [20]–[22]
4.2.3 Gifts from clients
Rule: A lawyer may not ask a client for a substantial gift, including one made by will. A lawyer also may not draft a document (such as a will or deed) that makes a substantial gift to the lawyer or to someone related to the lawyer. Both bans lift if the lawyer, or whoever else receives the gift, is related to the client.
Explanation:
- "Related person" means close family (spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent) or anyone else with whom the lawyer or the client has a close, family-like relationship. (MR 1.8(c))
- A client may make an unsolicited gift to the lawyer. A simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. (cmt. [6])
- If a client wants to leave the lawyer a substantial bequest, the client should have the instrument prepared by another lawyer. (cmt. [7])
⚠ Exam trap: Accepting an unsolicited substantial gift isn't prohibited by MR 1.8(c) (though it may be voidable as undue influence under other law). Drafting the will that makes the gift is the prohibited act, unless the lawyer is related to the client.
Cite: MR 1.8(c); cmts. [6]–[8]
4.2.4 Literary and media rights
Rule: While the representation is still going on, a lawyer may not make, or even negotiate, a deal that gives the lawyer book, film or other media rights to a story drawn substantially from the representation.
Explanation: The lawyer's interest in a dramatic story could conflict with the client's interests, such as a quick plea deal that makes a less exciting book. After the representation ends, such an agreement is not barred by this rule, though confidentiality duties still apply. (cmt. [9])
⚠ Exam trap: The timing is before the representation concludes. And a fee paid in property (e.g., a share of the client's own literary rights to an unrelated property) isn't covered if it complies with MR 1.8(a) and 1.5. (cmt. [9])
Cite: MR 1.8(d)
4.2.5 Using client information against the client
Rule: A lawyer may not use what she learned in the representation to the client's disadvantage without the client's informed consent, unless another rule permits or requires it.
Example: A lawyer learns that a client plans to buy several parcels in an area. The lawyer may not use that information to buy a parcel himself in competition with the client. (cmt. [5])
Cite: MR 1.8(b)
4.2.6 Limiting malpractice liability
Rule: Two things are barred. First, an agreement made in advance that limits the lawyer's malpractice liability, unless the client is independently represented in making that agreement. Second, settling an actual or potential malpractice claim with an unrepresented client or former client, unless the lawyer first advises that person in writing that getting independent counsel is a good idea and gives a reasonable chance to do so.
Explanation:
- Agreements to arbitrate malpractice claims are not prohibited, if the agreement is enforceable under applicable law and the client is fully informed of its scope and effect. (MR 1.8 cmt. [17]; see also S02 OUT-2.2.4)
- Practicing as a limited-liability entity is also permitted, as long as each lawyer remains personally liable for his or her own conduct and the client is informed of the form of practice. (MR 1.8 cmts. [17]–[18])
- The malpractice topic itself is covered in Section 5; this rule is about the conflict.
⚠ Exam trap: For prospective limits, the client must actually be independently represented. For settling an existing claim, the lawyer only needs to advise in writing that the client should seek independent counsel, and give a reasonable opportunity to do so.
Cite: MR 1.8(h)
4.3 Former-Client Conflicts
4.3.1 The rule
Rule: Once a representation ends, the lawyer may not switch sides: she may not represent a new client against the former client in the same matter or one substantially related to it, unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Elements of a former-client conflict:
- The lawyer (personally) represented the former client.
- The new matter is the same or substantially related.
- The new client's interests are materially adverse to the former client.
Explanation: The duty of loyalty to a former client is narrower than to a current one. The lawyer may generally act against a former client in unrelated matters. What survives is the duty not to switch sides in the same or a substantially related matter, and the duty of confidentiality.
Substantially related matter: two matters are substantially related when they involve the same deal or dispute, or when confidential facts a lawyer would normally learn in the first matter would give the new client a real advantage in the second. (cmt. [3])
- The former client is not required to reveal the confidential information to prove the substantial risk; the lawyer is presumed to have learned what a lawyer ordinarily would in such a matter. (cmt. [3])
- Information that has become generally known, or is outdated by the passage of time, may not be disqualifying. (cmt. [3])
Example: A lawyer who helped a company negotiate a supply contract may not later represent the supplier suing the company over that same contract. The lawyer may, however, represent a new client suing the company over an unrelated slip-and-fall.
⚠ Exam trap: For former clients, the question is "same or substantially related?" not merely "adverse?" Being adverse to a former client in an unrelated matter is fine.
Cite: MR 1.9(a); cmts. [1]–[3]
4.3.2 Lawyers who switch firms
Rule: A lawyer who moves firms may not represent a client in the same or a substantially related matter adverse to a client of the lawyer's former firm if the lawyer personally acquired protected, material information about that client, unless that client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Explanation:
- The test for the moving lawyer turns on actual knowledge. A lawyer who had no involvement and learned nothing material about the former firm's client is not disqualified. (cmts. [5]–[6])
- Whether the lawyer's new firm is also disqualified is governed by MR 1.10 (imputation and screening; see 4.5).
Cite: MR 1.9(b); cmts. [4]–[6]
4.3.3 Continuing confidentiality to former clients
Rule: Duties to a former client continue after the representation ends. The lawyer (and a lawyer whose old firm handled the matter) may not use the former client's information against that client unless a rule allows it or the information has become generally known, and may not reveal it unless a rule allows it.
⚠ Exam trap: "Generally known" is an exception to the use restriction. It is not a general license to reveal former-client information.
Update note (August 2026): a 2026 Comment to MR 1.9 narrows "generally known." Information that someone could find in a public record doesn't qualify on that basis alone. It has to be broadly familiar, whether to people in the relevant locality or within the former client's field. This is MR 1.9 cmt. [8], adopted by ABA Res. 101D (Aug. 3–4, 2026) and drawn from Formal Op. 479 (advisory). Under the usual one-year lag, it is testable no earlier than about August 2027; NCBE does not promise a first-test date and may continue testing the prior comment until then.
Cite: MR 1.9(c)
4.4 Prospective-Client Conflicts
Rule: A prospective client is someone who consults a lawyer about possibly hiring her. Even if the lawyer is never hired, she must protect what she learned in that consultation the same way she would protect a former client's information. If she received information that could be significantly harmful, she may not act against that person in the same or a substantially related matter, and her firm may do so only with both parties' informed consent, confirmed in writing, or if she limited the interview, is timely screened with no fee share, and prompt written notice is given.
Disqualification test:
- The lawyer may not represent a client with interests materially adverse to the prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter. (MR 1.18(c))
- That disqualification is imputed to the lawyer's firm, unless either of the two escape routes below applies. (MR 1.18(c), (d))
Two escape routes when the lawyer received disqualifying information:
- Consent: both the affected client and the prospective client give informed consent, confirmed in writing; or
- Screening, available only if the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to decide whether to take the matter, and: - (a) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened and apportioned no part of the fee; and - (b) written notice is promptly given to the prospective client.
Explanation:
- Someone who contacts a lawyer unilaterally, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss a possible relationship, is not a prospective client. An example is someone who sends unsolicited information in response to a lawyer's general advertising. (cmt. [2])
- Lawyers should limit initial interviews to the information needed to decide on the conflict check and whether to take the case. (cmt. [4])
Example: A divorcing spouse meets with a lawyer for an hour and describes hidden assets. The lawyer declines the case. The lawyer may not later represent the other spouse in the divorce. The firm may do so only if the first lawyer limited the interview and is timely screened with no part of the fee and prompt written notice goes to the first spouse, or both people give informed consent, confirmed in writing.
⚠ Exam trap: The screening route is lost if the lawyer let the prospective client pour out every detail. The rule rewards lawyers who limit the initial interview.
Cite: MR 1.18; cmts. [2]–[7]
4.5 Imputed Conflicts (Firm-Wide Disqualification)
4.5.1 The general imputation rule
Rule: If one lawyer in a firm would be barred by a current-client (MR 1.7) or former-client (MR 1.9) conflict, every lawyer in the firm is barred too. Two exceptions: (1) the conflict rests only on that lawyer's personal interest and poses no significant risk to the other lawyers' work; (2) the conflict comes from the lawyer's work at a prior firm and the lawyer is properly screened.
Explanation:
- A firm is treated like one lawyer for loyalty and confidentiality purposes. Imputed conflict is the rule, and the exceptions are narrow. (MR 1.10 cmt. [2])
- "Firm" includes law partnerships, professional corporations, sole proprietorships, legal services organizations and the legal departments of corporations or other organizations. (MR 1.0(c))
- Imputation also applies to the specific MR 1.8 prohibitions in (a) through (i), which extend to every lawyer in the firm, but not to MR 1.8(j) (sexual relations). (MR 1.8(k))
Exception 1: personal-interest conflicts. Examples: a lawyer's strong political beliefs, or a family relationship with opposing counsel. These are not imputed if they don't significantly risk limiting the other lawyers' work. (cmt. [3])
Exception 2: screening for lateral lawyers. When the disqualification comes from the lawyer's prior firm (a former-client conflict under MR 1.9(a) or (b)), the new firm isn't disqualified if all three of these are met:
- The lateral lawyer is walled off from the case in time (timely screened) and takes no share of the fee it produces.
- Prompt written notice goes to the former client. It explains how the screen works, says the firm and the lawyer are following the Rules, tells the client a tribunal may be able to review the arrangement, and commits the firm to answer the client's written questions or objections promptly.
- Certifications: the screened lawyer and a firm partner confirm in writing that the Rules and the screen are being followed, whenever the former client reasonably asks in writing and again when the screen ends.
Timely screened / screening defined: screening walls a lawyer off from a matter, using procedures put in place in time and strong enough to keep the information the lawyer must protect away from the team. (MR 1.0(k))
Example: Associate Diaz represented Buyer Co. at her old firm in a deal dispute. She joins New Firm, which represents Seller Co. against Buyer Co. in the same dispute. Diaz is personally disqualified under MR 1.9. New Firm may continue if Diaz is timely screened, receives no part of the fee, and Buyer Co. gets the required written notice and certifications.
⚠ Exam trap: Under the Model Rule, screening a lateral lawyer works even if that lawyer personally and substantially represented the former client in the same matter. Many states are stricter. On the MPRE, apply the Model Rule.
⚠ Exam trap: Nonlawyer employees (paralegals, secretaries) and lawyers who worked on the matter as law students are not covered by MR 1.10(a) imputation. They must be screened to protect confidences, but their knowledge doesn't automatically disqualify the firm. (cmt. [4])
Cite: MR 1.10(a); MR 1.0(k); cmts. [2]–[4], [7]–[10]
4.5.2 When the disqualified lawyer leaves the firm
Rule: Once the conflicted lawyer has left, the firm may act against that lawyer's former client (if the firm no longer represents that client), unless the new matter is the same or substantially related and a lawyer still at the firm holds protected, material information about it.
Cite: MR 1.10(b)
4.5.3 Waiver and government lawyers
- An imputed conflict may be waived by the affected client under the MR 1.7 conditions. (MR 1.10(c))
- Conflicts of lawyers who are or were government lawyers are governed by MR 1.11, not MR 1.10. (MR 1.10(d))
4.6 Acquiring an Interest in Litigation
4.6.1 Proprietary interest in the cause of action
Rule: A lawyer handling a lawsuit may not take an ownership stake (a proprietary interest in litigation) in the claim or in the property being fought over. Two exceptions: a lien the law allows to secure the lawyer's fee or costs, and a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
Explanation: The rule grows out of the old prohibitions on champerty and maintenance. A lawyer with a stake in the claim itself may put her own interests ahead of the client's, and it may make it harder for the client to discharge the lawyer. (MR 1.8 cmt. [19])
Examples:
- Permitted: a statutory attorney's lien; a one-third contingent fee in a personal-injury case.
- Prohibited: a lawyer buys a share of the client's claim; a lawyer takes an ownership interest in the property being litigated as a fee. Taking such an interest as a fee in a non-litigation matter is analyzed under MR 1.8(a) and MR 1.5 instead.
⚠ Exam trap: Contingent fees are prohibited in criminal cases and in certain domestic-relations matters (MR 1.5(d)), so the contingent-fee exception here applies only in civil cases.
Cite: MR 1.8(i); cmt. [19]
4.6.2 Financial assistance to clients
Rule: While litigation is pending or expected, a lawyer may not give the client financial assistance, with three exceptions: (1) the lawyer may advance court costs and litigation expenses, and repayment may depend on the outcome; (2) for an indigent client, the lawyer may simply pay the court costs and litigation expenses; and (3) a lawyer representing an indigent client for free (pro bono), including through a nonprofit legal-services or public-interest organization or a law-school clinic or pro bono program, may give modest gifts to help with basic living costs such as food, rent, transportation and medicine.
Conditions on the third exception: the lawyer may not:
- promise or offer such gifts before being retained, or as an inducement to keep the lawyer;
- seek or accept reimbursement from the client or anyone affiliated with the client;
- publicize or advertise a willingness to provide such gifts.
(The third exception was added by the ABA in 2020. Current wording confirmed by two independent reviewers, Sept 2026.)
Explanation: Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or give clients living expenses generally, because it would encourage suits that might not otherwise be brought and give the lawyer too great a financial stake in the case. Court costs and litigation expenses are different: they are virtually indistinguishable from contingent fees and help ensure access to courts. (cmt. [10])
⚠ Exam trap: "The lawyer lent the client money for rent during the lawsuit" → subject to discipline, unless the narrow pro bono / indigent-client gift exception applies, and a loan doesn't fit it, since that exception covers only gifts made without seeking repayment.
Cite: MR 1.8(e); cmts. [10]–[13]
4.7 Business Transactions with Clients
Rule: Before entering a business transaction with a client, or knowingly acquiring a property, ownership, security or other financial interest adverse to a client, the lawyer must meet three requirements: (1) the deal is fair and reasonable to the client, and its terms are fully disclosed in writing the client can understand; (2) the lawyer tells the client in writing that getting independent legal advice is a good idea, and gives a reasonable chance to get it; and (3) the client gives informed consent in a writing the client signs, covering the key terms and the lawyer's role, including whether the lawyer represents the client in the deal.
The three requirements in short:
- Fair and reasonable terms, fully disclosed in writing.
- Written advice to consult independent counsel, and a reasonable opportunity to do so.
- Informed consent in a writing signed by the client, covering the essential terms and the lawyer's role.
Explanation:
- The lawyer's legal skill and the client's trust create the possibility of overreaching. The rule applies even when the transaction is unrelated to the representation. (cmt. [1])
- It does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements governed by MR 1.5 (though it does apply when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client's business or other property as payment). (cmt. [1])
- It does not apply to standard commercial transactions for products or services the client generally markets to others, such as banking services or utilities. (cmt. [1])
Example: A lawyer invests $50,000 in a client's start-up in exchange for 10% of the shares. The lawyer must ensure the terms are fair, put them in writing, advise the client in writing to consult another lawyer and give time to do so, and obtain the client's signed informed consent, including whether the lawyer represents the client in the deal.
⚠ Exam trap: This is one of the few rules requiring a writing signed by the client. "Confirmed in writing" (a lawyer's email) is not enough.
⚠ Exam trap: Buying a client's product or service at the normal price (a client's restaurant meal, a client-bank's checking account) is not covered.
Cite: MR 1.8(a); cmts. [1]–[4]
4.8 Third-Party Compensation and Influence
4.8.1 Someone other than the client pays the fee
Rule: A lawyer may be paid by someone other than the client (a third-party payer) only if three conditions hold: the client gives informed consent; the payer does not interfere with the lawyer's independent judgment or the client-lawyer relationship; and the client's information stays protected under MR 1.6.
The three conditions:
- Client's informed consent. It need not be in writing under MR 1.8(f), unless a separate MR 1.7 conflict also exists.
- No interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment or the client-lawyer relationship.
- Confidentiality protected under MR 1.6.
Related rule: a person who recommends, employs or pays a lawyer to render legal services for another may not direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering those services. (MR 5.4(c))
Explanation:
- Common examples: a parent pays for a child's defense; an employer pays for an employee's lawyer; a liability insurer pays defense counsel for its insured.
- Paying doesn't make someone a client. The client is the person the lawyer represents. A payer becomes a client only if the lawyer also represents the payer, as a co-client (for example, in some insurance-defense arrangements). Then the lawyer owes duties to both, and MR 1.7 governs any conflict between them. (MR 1.8 cmts. [14]–[15])
- If the payer's interests create a significant risk of materially limiting the representation, MR 1.7 also applies, and then consent must be confirmed in writing. (MR 1.8 cmt. [15])
Example: A father pays his adult son's criminal defense fee and asks the lawyer for weekly updates and to push for a quick plea. The lawyer may accept the fee only with the son's informed consent. The lawyer must keep the son's information confidential (updates to the father only with the son's consent), and must take instructions from the son, not the father.
⚠ Exam trap: "The one who pays is the client." Wrong. Paying alone gives no control over the lawyer's judgment and no automatic access to confidential information. Watch for facts showing the lawyer also represents the payer; then there are two clients.
The insurance-defense triangle: when a liability insurer hires a lawyer to defend its insured, the insured is the client (or at least a client). The insurer is paying, so MR 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) apply: the insurer may not direct the lawyer's professional judgment in a way that hurts the insured, and it has no right to the insured's confidential information unless the insured consents. If the insurer's interests split from the insured's (for example, a coverage dispute), the lawyer's duty of loyalty runs to the insured, and MR 1.7 applies.
⚠ Exam trap: "The insurance company hired the lawyer, so it controls the defense and gets everything." Wrong. The lawyer must not sacrifice the insured's interests or reveal the insured's confidences to help the insurer.
Cite: MR 1.8(f); MR 5.4(c); MR 1.8 cmts. [14]–[15]
4.8.2 Aggregate settlements
Rule: When one lawyer represents several clients, she may not help arrange a settlement that resolves their claims together (an aggregate settlement), or in a criminal case a combined plea deal, unless each client gives informed consent in a writing that client signs. Before they sign, the lawyer must tell each client about every claim or plea involved and what each person will receive or do under the deal.
Explanation:
- Each client has the right to decide whether to settle (MR 1.2(a)).
- An all-or-nothing offer to several clients pits their interests against each other. So each client must know what everyone else is getting and must sign off individually. (MR 1.8 cmt. [16])
⚠ Exam trap: Majority vote among joint clients isn't enough, and neither is an advance agreement to be bound by the majority. Each client must give signed, informed consent to the specific settlement.
Cite: MR 1.8(g); cmt. [16]
4.9 Lawyers Currently or Formerly in Government Service
4.9.1 Former government lawyers moving to private practice
Rule: A former government lawyer must protect confidential information from her government work under MR 1.9(c). She also may not represent a private client in a matter she worked on personally and substantially while in government, unless the government agency involved gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Firm screening: the former government lawyer's new firm is not disqualified if:
- the lawyer is timely screened and apportioned no part of the fee; and
- written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency, to enable it to ascertain compliance.
Confidential government information about a person:
- A lawyer who, while in government, acquired confidential government information about a person may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter where the information could be used to the person's material disadvantage.
- The lawyer's firm may proceed if the lawyer is timely screened and apportioned no part of the fee. (MR 1.11(c))
- Confidential government information is information the lawyer got through government authority that the government is legally barred from disclosing, or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and that the public can't otherwise get.
Matter (for MR 1.11): a specific proceeding or dispute involving identified parties, such as a lawsuit, contract, claim, investigation, charge or arrest, plus anything else the agency's own conflict rules treat as a matter. (MR 1.11(e))
Explanation:
- The rule balances two goals: preventing a lawyer from exploiting public office for a private client, and not discouraging lawyers from entering government service.
- That's why the test is "participated personally and substantially" rather than "any substantially related matter". It's also why the government agency, not the opposing party, gives consent. (MR 1.11 cmts. [3]–[4])
Example: A former EPA lawyer who personally and substantially worked on an enforcement action against a chemical company may not represent that company in the same enforcement action after leaving, unless the EPA gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. Her new firm may represent the company if she is timely screened, gets no part of the fee, and the EPA gets written notice.
⚠ Exam trap: Drafting general regulations or legislation usually isn't a "matter" involving specific parties, so it doesn't trigger MR 1.11(a). Working on a specific enforcement case does. (cmt. [10])
⚠ Exam trap: Former government lawyers are governed by MR 1.11, not MR 1.9(a). A former government lawyer is not barred from matters that are merely "substantially related"; the test is personal and substantial participation in the same matter.
Cite: MR 1.11(a)–(c), (e); cmts. [3]–[10]
4.9.2 Current government lawyers
Rule: A lawyer now working for the government is bound by MR 1.7 and MR 1.9. In addition, she may not (1) work on a matter she handled personally and substantially in private practice, unless the agency gives informed consent, confirmed in writing; or (2) negotiate for a private job with a party, or a party's lawyer, in a matter she is currently working on personally and substantially.
Exception: a lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge or other adjudicative officer may negotiate for private employment as permitted by MR 1.12(b), which is discussed next.
Cite: MR 1.11(d)
4.10 Former Judges, Arbitrators, Mediators and Other Third-Party Neutrals
Rule: A lawyer who worked personally and substantially on a matter as a judge or other adjudicator, as a judge's law clerk, or as an arbitrator, mediator or other neutral may not later represent anyone in that matter, unless all parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Negotiating for employment:
- A judge, adjudicative officer, arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral may not negotiate for employment with any person involved as a party, or as a lawyer for a party, in a matter in which he or she is participating personally and substantially.
- A law clerk may negotiate for employment with a party or a lawyer in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after notifying the judge or other adjudicative officer. (MR 1.12(b))
Firm screening: the firm is not disqualified if:
- the disqualified lawyer is timely screened and apportioned no part of the fee; and
- written notice is promptly given to the parties and any appropriate tribunal, to enable them to ascertain compliance. (MR 1.12(c))
Partisan arbitrators: an arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from later representing that party. (MR 1.12(d))
Explanation:
- Who must consent differs from the government rule: here all parties must give informed consent, confirmed in writing, not an agency.
- "Personally and substantially" excludes remote or incidental involvement. Examples of what doesn't count: a judge who exercised only administrative responsibility over a court unit, or a judge who merely had the case on the docket without acting on the merits. (cmt. [1])
Example: A former judge who ruled on summary judgment in Smith v. Jones may not later represent Jones in the same case, unless Smith and Jones both give informed consent, confirmed in writing. Her new firm may represent Jones if she is timely screened, takes no part of the fee, and written notice goes to the parties and the court.
⚠ Exam trap: A mediator who helped the parties reach agreement may not later represent one of them in the same matter without all parties' informed consent, confirmed in writing. The fact that no ruling was made doesn't matter; the mediator participated personally and substantially.
⚠ Exam trap: The law clerk may negotiate for a job with a firm appearing in the clerk's case, but must notify the judge first. The judge may not negotiate for such a job at all.
Cite: MR 1.12(a)–(d); cmts. [1]–[4]
Section 4: Common Traps
- "Never sue a current client": wrong. Usually consentable. The bar is on both sides of the same case.
- "Confirmed in writing" does not mean signed by the client. Signed writings are required for MR 1.8(a), MR 1.8(g) and contingent-fee agreements under MR 1.5(c) (Section 2).
- Former-client conflicts need the same or substantially related matter. Mere adversity isn't enough.
- Sexual-relations conflicts (MR 1.8(j)) are never imputed. A personal-interest conflict stays with that lawyer unless it poses a significant risk of limiting the other lawyers' representation.
- Former government lawyers use MR 1.11 (personal and substantial participation, agency consent), not MR 1.9's "substantially related" test.
- Paying the fee, by itself, gives no right to direct the lawyer or to learn the client's confidences.
End of Part A. Part B follows.
Contents | Part | Items | IDs | |---|---|---| | B1 Flashcards | 45 (27 term · 18 concept = 60/40) | FC-0001 – 0045 | | B2 Multiple choice | 55 | MC-0001 – 0055 | | B3 True/False | 32 (16 true · 16 false) | TF-0001 – 0032 | | B4 Scenario Walkthroughs | 2 | SW-0001 – 0002 | | B5 Key-term list | 27 | KT-0001 – 0027 | | B6 Rapid Review script | 1 | RR-0001 |
Term markers: all 27 term cards now point to marked terms in Part A (the ten proposed markers were accepted in v1.13).
B1. Flashcards
Format: Front · Definition (compact view) · Explanation · Example · Exam trap · Cite · Outline · Related. The first 27 are term cards and the last 18 are concept cards.
Term cards
FC-0001 · term
- Front: Imputed conflict
- Definition: A firm's lawyers share one another's conflicts: if any lawyer at the firm couldn't take a client on her own because of a current-client or former-client conflict, no colleague may knowingly take that client either, unless an exception applies: a personal-interest conflict with no significant risk to the other lawyers' work, or a lateral lawyer's prior-firm conflict cured by a timely screen, no fee share, prompt written notice and certifications.
- Explanation: A firm shares information and loyalties, so the law treats its lawyers as one for most conflicts. If one lawyer is barred, assume the whole firm is barred, then check the narrow exceptions (personal-interest conflicts, screened lateral lawyers). Those exceptions have their own cards.
- Example: Associate Diaz represented Buyer Co. at her old firm and now joins a new firm that represents Seller Co. against Buyer Co. in the same deal dispute. If Diaz is timely screened, apportioned no fee, Buyer Co. gets prompt written notice, and certifications of compliance are provided on request and when the screen ends, the new firm may continue.
- Exam trap: Screening does not cure every conflict. Under the Model Rule, it works for lateral lawyers' former-client conflicts (and for former government lawyers under MR 1.11), not for a conflict the firm itself has.
- Cite: MR 1.10(a) · Outline: OUT-4.5.1 · Related: Screening · Former-client conflict · Personal-interest conflict
- Carried from Style Guide Part 12 (approved as style).
FC-0002 · term
- Front: Informed consent
- Definition: A person's agreement to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has explained the material risks of it and the reasonably available alternatives.
- Explanation: Consent is only as good as the information behind it. The lawyer must tell the client what could go wrong and what else the client could do. A client who says "yes" without that information hasn't given informed consent.
- Example: A lawyer asks two co-defendants to share her. She must explain that she can't keep secrets between them, that their privilege won't protect them against each other, and that she may have to withdraw from both. Only then can they give informed consent.
- Exam trap: "The client agreed" is not the same as "the client gave informed consent." Look for whether the risks and alternatives were explained.
- Cite: MR 1.0(e) · Outline: OUT-4.0 · Related: Confirmed in writing · Writing signed by the client
FC-0003 · term
- Front: Confirmed in writing
- Definition: Informed consent that the client gives in writing, or oral informed consent that the lawyer promptly confirms in a writing sent to the client.
- Explanation: The writing protects both sides by recording what was agreed. It doesn't have to be signed by the client. If a writing isn't feasible when consent is given, the lawyer must obtain or send it within a reasonable time afterward.
- Example: A client agrees by phone to waive a conflict. The lawyer sends an email that afternoon summarizing the conflict and the client's consent. The consent is confirmed in writing.
- Exam trap: Students assume the client must sign. Only a few rules demand a writing signed by the client (MR 1.8(a), 1.8(g), contingent-fee agreements).
- Cite: MR 1.0(b) · Outline: OUT-4.0 · Related: Informed consent · Writing signed by the client
FC-0004 · term
- Front: Writing signed by the client
- Definition: A stricter form of consent that some rules require: the client must sign a writing. A lawyer's confirming email is not enough.
- Explanation: The rules demand a signature where the risk of overreaching is highest. The main examples in conflicts are business transactions with a client and aggregate settlements. Contingent-fee agreements under MR 1.5(c) also need the client's signature.
- Example: A lawyer invests in a client's company. The client agrees orally and the lawyer emails a summary. That's not enough; the client must sign a writing consenting to the essential terms and the lawyer's role.
- Exam trap: Don't mix up "confirmed in writing" (most conflicts) with "signed by the client" (MR 1.8(a), 1.8(g) and contingent fees under MR 1.5(c)).
- Cite: MR 1.8(a)(3), 1.8(g); MR 1.5(c) · Outline: OUT-4.0 · Related: Confirmed in writing · Aggregate settlement
FC-0005 · term
- Front: Concurrent conflict of interest
- Definition: A conflict that exists when representing one client will be directly adverse to another current client, or when there is a significant risk the representation will be materially limited by duties to others or by the lawyer's own interests.
- Explanation: There are two kinds: direct adversity and material limitation. Either one triggers MR 1.7. The lawyer then asks whether the conflict can be cured under MR 1.7(b).
- Example: A lawyer who represents a landlord in one matter is asked to sue that landlord for a tenant in another. That's a concurrent conflict by direct adversity.
- Exam trap: A concurrent conflict isn't automatically fatal. Most are consentable.
- Cite: MR 1.7(a) · Outline: OUT-4.1.1 · Related: Direct adversity · Material limitation · Consentable conflict
FC-0006 · term
- Front: Direct adversity
- Definition: Acting directly against a current client, even in a matter that has nothing to do with the work the lawyer is doing for that client.
- Explanation: A client is entitled to a lawyer who won't turn on them while still representing them. Suing a current client and cross-examining a current client as an adverse witness are the standard examples.
- Example: A lawyer represents Grayson in a zoning matter. She is asked to cross-examine Grayson, who is an adverse witness in another client's lawsuit. That's direct adversity.
- Exam trap: Clients who are merely economic competitors (two rival bakeries) are not directly adverse when the matters are unrelated.
- Cite: MR 1.7(a)(1); cmts. [6]–[7] · Outline: OUT-4.1.1 · Related: Concurrent conflict of interest · Material limitation
FC-0007 · term
- Front: Material limitation
- Definition: A significant risk that the lawyer's duties to another client, a former client or a third person, or the lawyer's own interests, will limit what the lawyer does for a client.
- Explanation: The test is a significant risk, not a certainty. Ask whether the competing duty or interest is likely to hold the lawyer back, for example in the options she considers or recommends.
- Example: One lawyer is asked to represent three people forming a joint venture. She may not be able to push for terms that favor one without hurting the others. That's a material-limitation conflict.
- Exam trap: There doesn't have to be any lawsuit or open hostility. A realistic risk of divided loyalty is enough.
- Cite: MR 1.7(a)(2); cmt. [8] · Outline: OUT-4.1.1 · Related: Concurrent conflict of interest · Personal-interest conflict
FC-0008 · term
- Front: Consentable conflict
- Definition: A concurrent conflict the lawyer may proceed with if she reasonably believes she can represent each client competently and diligently, the representation is lawful, it isn't opposing clients in the same litigation, and each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- Explanation: Consent works only when the lawyer can still do the job well for everyone. That's why the lawyer's reasonable belief is required in addition to the clients' consent.
- Example: A lawyer may sue a current client in an unrelated matter if she reasonably believes she can represent both diligently and both clients give informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- Exam trap: Consent from the client who benefits isn't enough. Every affected client must consent.
- Cite: MR 1.7(b) · Outline: OUT-4.1.2 · Related: Nonconsentable conflict · Informed consent · Confirmed in writing
FC-0009 · term
- Front: Nonconsentable conflict
- Definition: A conflict that no client consent can cure, because the lawyer can't reasonably conclude she can represent each affected client competently and diligently, the representation is prohibited by law, or the lawyer would represent opposing parties in the same litigation.
- Explanation: Some conflicts are so severe that the clients can't waive them. The reasonable-belief test is objective: could a lawyer reasonably conclude that competent and diligent representation of each client is possible? What the clients want doesn't answer that.
- Example: A husband and wife each ask the same lawyer to represent them against the other in their contested divorce. No consent can cure that.
- Exam trap: "Both clients signed a waiver" doesn't answer a nonconsentable-conflict question.
- Cite: MR 1.7(b)(1)–(3); cmts. [14]–[17] · Outline: OUT-4.1.2 · Related: Consentable conflict · Concurrent conflict of interest
FC-0010 · term
- Front: Joint representation
- Definition: One lawyer representing several clients in the same matter, such as co-plaintiffs, co-defendants or several parties to a deal, whose interests are generally aligned.
- Explanation: It can save money and promote cooperation. But if interests diverge, the lawyer may have to withdraw from all of them. The lawyer must explain at the outset that information will be shared, that the privilege won't protect them against each other, and that withdrawal may follow.
- Example: Two siblings who inherited a house hire one lawyer to sell it. If they disagree about the price, the lawyer may be unable to continue for either.
- Exam trap: A joint client's request to keep a material fact from the other client is not simply "confidential." It creates a conflict, often forcing withdrawal.
- Cite: MR 1.7 cmts. [29]–[31] · Outline: OUT-4.1.3 · Related: Material limitation · Informed consent · Aggregate settlement
FC-0011 · term
- Front: Advance waiver
- Definition: A client's consent, given now, to conflicts that may arise in the future. It is effective only to the extent the client reasonably understood the material risks.
- Explanation: The more specific the explanation of likely future conflicts, the more likely the waiver works. A general, open-ended waiver usually works only for an experienced user of legal services, especially one with independent counsel, and only for conflicts unrelated to the current work.
- Example: A large company with in-house counsel agrees that the firm may represent other clients against it in unrelated matters. That advance waiver is likely effective.
- Exam trap: An advance waiver can never cure a conflict that would be nonconsentable anyway.
- Cite: MR 1.7 cmt. [22] · Outline: OUT-4.1.5 · Related: Informed consent · Nonconsentable conflict
FC-0012 · term
- Front: Positional conflict
- Definition: Arguing opposite legal positions for different clients in different cases. It is ordinarily not a conflict, unless there is a significant risk that winning for one client will materially limit the lawyer's work for the other.
- Explanation: Lawyers argue both sides of legal questions all the time. It becomes a problem when a win for one client would create precedent likely to seriously weaken the other client's case, for example in the same appellate court.
- Example: A lawyer argues a statute of limitations should be read narrowly in one trial court and broadly in another, in unrelated cases. Ordinarily that's no conflict.
- Exam trap: "Inconsistent legal positions are always a conflict" is wrong. Look for the material-limitation risk.
- Cite: MR 1.7 cmt. [24] · Outline: OUT-4.1.5 · Related: Material limitation · Concurrent conflict of interest
FC-0013 · term
- Front: Personal-interest conflict
- Definition: A conflict that exists when there is a significant risk the lawyer's own financial, relational or reputational interests will materially limit the representation.
- Explanation: It is analyzed and cured under MR 1.7. Common examples are job talks with the opponent's firm, a family relationship with opposing counsel, and questions about the lawyer's own conduct. Personal-interest conflicts are often not imputed to the rest of the firm.
- Example: A lawyer whose own advice is at the center of the client's dispute may be unable to give detached advice about it.
- Exam trap: A personal-interest conflict doesn't automatically disqualify the whole firm. Check the MR 1.10(a)(1) exception.
- Cite: MR 1.7(a)(2); cmts. [10]–[11]; MR 1.10(a)(1) · Outline: OUT-4.2.1 · Related: Material limitation · Imputed conflict
FC-0014 · term
- Front: Related person (for gifts)
- Definition: Close family (spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent) or anyone else with whom the lawyer or the client has a close, family-like relationship.
- Explanation: A lawyer may not draft an instrument giving a substantial gift to the lawyer or to someone related to the lawyer, unless the lawyer or other recipient is related to the client. The family exception exists because gifts within a family are natural, not signs of overreaching.
- Example: A lawyer may draft his own mother's will even if it leaves him her house.
- Exam trap: The relationship that matters is to the client. A gift to the lawyer's own child is barred unless that child (or the lawyer) is also related to the client.
- Cite: MR 1.8(c) · Outline: OUT-4.2.3 · Related: Personal-interest conflict
FC-0015 · term
- Front: Former-client conflict
- Definition: A lawyer may not represent a new client in the same or a substantially related matter in which the new client's interests are materially adverse to a former client's, unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- Explanation: Loyalty to a former client is narrower than to a current one. The lawyer can generally be adverse to a former client in unrelated matters. What survives is the ban on switching sides in the same or a related matter, and confidentiality.
- Example: A lawyer who negotiated a supply contract for Company X may not later sue Company X over that contract for the supplier.
- Exam trap: The question is "same or substantially related?", not just "adverse?"
- Cite: MR 1.9(a) · Outline: OUT-4.3.1 · Related: Substantially related matter · Imputed conflict
FC-0016 · term
- Front: Substantially related matter
- Definition: A matter that involves the same transaction or legal dispute, or where there is a substantial risk that confidential facts normally learned in the earlier representation would materially help the new client.
- Explanation: The former client doesn't have to reveal its secrets to prove the risk. The lawyer is presumed to have learned what a lawyer ordinarily would in that kind of matter. Information that is now generally known, or outdated, may not be disqualifying.
- Example: A lawyer who handled a company's environmental permits for a plant may not later sue the company over contamination at that same plant.
- Exam trap: Different legal claims can still be substantially related if they share the same facts.
- Cite: MR 1.9 cmt. [3] · Outline: OUT-4.3.1 · Related: Former-client conflict
FC-0017 · term
- Front: Prospective client
- Definition: A person who consults a lawyer about possibly forming a client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer must protect what she learns even if no relationship results.
- Explanation: Someone who sends information unilaterally, with no reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss a relationship, isn't a prospective client. The lawyer is disqualified from acting against the person only if she received significantly harmful information.
- Example: A person meets a lawyer for an hour about a divorce and describes hidden assets. The lawyer declines. The person is a prospective client, and the lawyer may not later represent the other spouse.
- Exam trap: An unsolicited email sent in response to a website that only lists credentials and contact details, with no invitation to describe a matter, doesn't make the sender a prospective client. A website that invites people to submit case information, without clear limiting warnings, can create that expectation.
- Cite: MR 1.18(a)–(c); cmt. [2] · Outline: OUT-4.4 · Related: Screening · Former-client conflict
FC-0018 · term
- Front: Screening
- Definition: Isolating a lawyer from any participation in a matter, through timely procedures reasonably adequate to protect information that lawyer must protect.
- Explanation: Screening lets a firm keep a matter even though one of its lawyers is personally disqualified. It is available for lateral lawyers' former-client conflicts, prospective-client conflicts, former government lawyers, and former judges and neutrals. It usually comes with no share of the fee and written notice.
- Example: The firm blocks a newly hired associate from the case files, tells staff not to discuss the case with her, and gives her no part of the fee.
- Exam trap: Screening can't cure the firm's own current-client conflict under MR 1.7.
- Cite: MR 1.0(k); MR 1.10(a)(2); 1.11(b); 1.12(c); 1.18(d) · Outline: OUT-4.5.1 · Related: Timely screened · Imputed conflict
FC-0019 · term
- Front: Timely screened
- Definition: Screened as soon as the firm knows or reasonably should know the screen is needed, before the disqualified lawyer can share or use protected information.
- Explanation: A screen put up after the lawyer has already worked on or discussed the matter comes too late. The point is to prevent the information from ever reaching the team.
- Example: A lateral joins on Monday and is walled off from the case that same day, before any contact with the team. That screen is timely.
- Exam trap: A screen erected only after the former client objects is usually not timely.
- Cite: MR 1.0(k); MR 1.0 cmts. [8]–[10] · Outline: OUT-4.5.1 · Related: Screening · Imputed conflict
FC-0020 · term
- Front: Proprietary interest in litigation
- Definition: An ownership stake in the client's cause of action or in the subject matter of the lawsuit, which a lawyer may not acquire. Two exceptions: a lien authorized by law, and a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
- Explanation: A lawyer who owns part of the claim may put her own interest ahead of the client's and may be hard to fire. The rule grows out of the old bans on champerty and maintenance.
- Example: A lawyer may not buy a share of her client's patent-infringement claim.
- Exam trap: A contingent fee is allowed only in civil cases. It is prohibited in criminal cases.
- Cite: MR 1.8(i); cmt. [19] · Outline: OUT-4.6.1 · Related: Financial assistance · Business transaction with a client
FC-0021 · term
- Front: Financial assistance (to a litigation client)
- Definition: Money or support a lawyer gives a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation. It is prohibited except for advancing court costs and litigation expenses, paying them for an indigent client, and modest gifts to indigent pro bono clients for basic living expenses.
- Explanation: Paying clients' living expenses would encourage suits and give the lawyer too big a stake in the outcome. Court costs are different because they help ensure access to the courts.
- Example: A lawyer may advance filing fees and expert costs, with repayment contingent on winning. She may not lend the client money for rent.
- Exam trap: A loan never fits the pro bono gift exception. That exception covers gifts without any repayment.
- Cite: MR 1.8(e) · Outline: OUT-4.6.2 · Related: Proprietary interest in litigation
FC-0022 · term
- Front: Business transaction with a client
- Definition: A deal between a lawyer and a client, or the lawyer's acquisition of an interest adverse to the client. It requires fair terms disclosed in writing, written advice to seek independent counsel, and the client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client.
- Explanation: The lawyer's skill and the client's trust make overreaching possible. The rule applies even if the deal has nothing to do with the representation. It doesn't cover ordinary fee agreements or buying the client's regular products at normal prices.
- Example: A lawyer lends money to a client's restaurant in exchange for a share of profits. All three requirements apply.
- Exam trap: The client's consent must be in a writing signed by the client. A lawyer's email is not enough.
- Cite: MR 1.8(a); cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-4.7 · Related: Writing signed by the client · Proprietary interest in litigation
FC-0023 · term
- Front: Third-party payer
- Definition: Someone other than the client who pays the lawyer's fee. The lawyer may accept payment only with the client's informed consent, no interference with the lawyer's judgment, and confidentiality protected.
- Explanation: The client is the person represented. Paying alone doesn't make someone a client, though a payer can be a co-client if the lawyer also represents it. The payer may not direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment. If the payer's interests create a significant risk of limiting the representation, MR 1.7 also applies.
- Example: An employer pays for an employee's lawyer in a workplace investigation. The lawyer takes instructions from the employee, not the employer.
- Exam trap: The payer has no automatic right to confidential information or to control strategy.
- Cite: MR 1.8(f); MR 5.4(c) · Outline: OUT-4.8.1 · Related: Material limitation · Informed consent
FC-0024 · term
- Front: Aggregate settlement
- Definition: A settlement of two or more clients' claims together, or in a criminal case an aggregated plea agreement. Each client must give informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, after learning all the claims and each person's share.
- Explanation: An all-or-nothing offer pits joint clients against one another. Each client has the right to decide whether to settle, so each must know what everyone else is getting and must sign off individually.
- Example: A defendant offers $900,000 to settle three plaintiffs' claims. The lawyer must tell each plaintiff about all claims and how the money will be divided, and each must sign.
- Exam trap: A majority vote, or an advance agreement to be bound by the majority, does not satisfy the rule.
- Cite: MR 1.8(g); cmt. [16] · Outline: OUT-4.8.2 · Related: Joint representation · Writing signed by the client
FC-0025 · term
- Front: Matter (government-lawyer rule)
- Definition: A specific proceeding or dispute involving identified parties (a lawsuit, contract, claim, investigation, charge or arrest), plus anything the agency's own conflict rules treat as a matter.
- Explanation: The definition focuses on matters with specific parties. Drafting general regulations or legislation usually isn't a "matter", so it doesn't disqualify the lawyer later.
- Example: A former agency lawyer who drafted a general safety regulation may later represent a company challenging it.
- Exam trap: Working on a specific enforcement case is a matter; writing a rule of general application usually isn't.
- Cite: MR 1.11(e); cmt. [10] · Outline: OUT-4.9.1 · Related: Personally and substantially · Confidential government information
FC-0026 · term
- Front: Personally and substantially
- Definition: The level of involvement that disqualifies a former government lawyer, judge, law clerk or neutral: real, direct participation in the matter, not remote or incidental involvement.
- Explanation: The test balances two goals: keeping lawyers from exploiting public office, and not discouraging them from entering public service. Supervising a unit or merely having a case on the docket usually doesn't count.
- Example: A former judge who ruled on a summary-judgment motion participated personally and substantially. A chief judge who only assigned the case did not.
- Exam trap: For government lawyers and judges, the test is personal and substantial participation in the same matter, not "substantially related."
- Cite: MR 1.11(a)(2); MR 1.12(a); MR 1.12 cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-4.9.1 · Related: Matter · Screening
FC-0027 · term
- Front: Confidential government information
- Definition: Information obtained under government authority that the government is legally barred from disclosing, or privileged not to disclose, and that isn't otherwise available to the public.
- Explanation: A former government lawyer who learned such information about a person may not represent a private client adverse to that person where the information could be used to the person's material disadvantage. The new firm may proceed if the lawyer is timely screened and gets no part of the fee.
- Example: A former tax-agency lawyer who saw a businessman's confidential tax returns may not represent that businessman's partner in suing him over the business.
- Exam trap: This bar applies even if the lawyer never worked on the new matter at all. It turns on the information, not the matter.
- Cite: MR 1.11(c) · Outline: OUT-4.9.1 · Related: Matter · Screening
Concept cards
FC-0028 · concept
- Front: Four steps to attack any conflict question?
- Definition: There are four steps. Whose interests clash? Which rule governs? Is there a conflict under that rule's test? Can it be cured, and how?
- Explanation: First, identify the tension: two current clients, a former client, the lawyer's own interest, or a payer. Second, pick the rule: MR 1.7 and 1.8 for current clients, 1.9 former, 1.18 prospective, 1.10 the firm, 1.11 government, 1.12 judges and neutrals. Third, apply that rule's test. Fourth, check whether it is consentable, what form of consent it needs, and whether screening saves the firm.
- Example: A lateral associate's old client is the opponent. Step 1: former client versus new client. Step 2: MR 1.9, then 1.10. Step 3: same matter. Step 4: a timely screen, no fee share, prompt written notice and compliance certifications save the firm.
- Exam trap: Skipping step 2. Former government lawyers use MR 1.11, not MR 1.9.
- Cite: MR 1.7–1.12, 1.18 · Outline: OUT-4.0 · Related: Concurrent conflict of interest · Former-client conflict
FC-0029 · concept
- Front: Four conditions to cure a concurrent conflict?
- Definition: There are four. Reasonable belief in competent and diligent representation of each client; not prohibited by law; not opposing clients in the same litigation; each affected client's informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- Explanation: Memory aid, B-L-O-C: Belief, Lawful, no Opposing clients in one case, Consent from each affected client. The first three decide whether the conflict is consentable at all. The fourth is the cure.
- Example: A lawyer may represent a buyer against a current client in an unrelated deal if all four conditions are met.
- Exam trap: Answers that stop at "if the clients consent" leave out the lawyer's reasonable belief.
- Cite: MR 1.7(b) · Outline: OUT-4.1.2 · Related: Consentable conflict · Nonconsentable conflict
FC-0030 · concept
- Front: Criminal co-defendants: may one lawyer represent both?
- Definition: Almost never. The risk that co-defendants' interests will clash is so serious that the usual answer is to represent only one of them.
- Explanation: Co-defendants may want to testify against each other, blame each other, or take different plea deals. One lawyer can't pursue all of those at once. Civil co-parties are different: common representation is often proper after evaluation and each client's informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- Example: Two co-defendants are charged with the same robbery, and one may accept a plea deal that requires testifying against the other. The lawyer should represent only one.
- Exam trap: Treating criminal and civil co-parties alike. The comment's warning is much stronger for criminal cases.
- Cite: MR 1.7 cmt. [23] · Outline: OUT-4.1.3 · Related: Joint representation · Nonconsentable conflict
FC-0031 · concept
- Front: Three things to tell joint clients at the start?
- Definition: There are three. Information will be shared among them; the privilege generally won't protect them against each other if they later fight; and the lawyer may have to withdraw from all of them if a conflict ripens.
- Explanation: These warnings are what make the clients' consent informed. They also prepare the lawyer for the hard moment when one client wants to keep a material secret from the other.
- Example: Before forming a business for two co-founders, the lawyer explains these three points and gets consent confirmed in writing.
- Exam trap: Assuming joint clients keep privilege against each other in a later dispute. They generally don't.
- Cite: MR 1.7 cmts. [29]–[31] · Outline: OUT-4.1.3 · Related: Joint representation · Informed consent
FC-0032 · concept
- Front: Family relationship with opposing counsel?
- Definition: Lawyers closely related by blood or marriage (parent, child, sibling, spouse) ordinarily may not represent opposing sides without each client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. The conflict is personal and not imputed to their firms unless it significantly risks limiting the other lawyers' work.
- Explanation: The relationship may tempt one lawyer to go easy or share confidences. Because the risk comes from the relationship itself, the firm partners of each lawyer can usually handle the matter instead.
- Example: Attorney Ng is married to the lawyer on the other side. Ng's partner, who has no tie to that lawyer and whose work faces no significant risk of limitation, may handle the case without the client's consent.
- Exam trap: "The whole firm is disqualified" is wrong. The conflict is personal and stays with Ng unless it significantly risks limiting the other lawyers' work.
- Cite: MR 1.7 cmt. [11]; MR 1.10(a)(1) · Outline: OUT-4.2.1 · Related: Personal-interest conflict · Imputed conflict
FC-0033 · concept
- Front: Sexual relations with a client: when allowed?
- Definition: Only if a consensual sexual relationship existed before the client-lawyer relationship began.
- Explanation: The lawyer holds a position of trust, so a new sexual relationship risks exploitation and impairs judgment. The client's consent doesn't cure it. For an organizational client, the ban covers a constituent who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the lawyer about the organization's legal matters.
- Example: A lawyer who has been married to a client for years may represent her spouse. A lawyer may not begin a relationship with a divorce client mid-case.
- Exam trap: This prohibition is not imputed to other lawyers in the firm.
- Cite: MR 1.8(j), (k); cmts. [20]–[23] · Outline: OUT-4.2.2 · Related: Personal-interest conflict · Imputed conflict
FC-0034 · concept
- Front: Gifts from clients: what's forbidden?
- Definition: Soliciting a substantial gift, or preparing an instrument (such as a will) that gives the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer a substantial gift, unless the lawyer or other recipient is related to the client.
- Explanation: Accepting an unsolicited gift is not barred by this rule, and simple gifts such as holiday presents are fine. A client who wants to leave the lawyer a substantial bequest should have another lawyer draft the will.
- Example: A client asks her lawyer to write a will leaving him her vacation home. He must send her to another lawyer to prepare it.
- Exam trap: The prohibited acts are soliciting and drafting, not accepting.
- Cite: MR 1.8(c); cmts. [6]–[7] · Outline: OUT-4.2.3 · Related: Related person · Personal-interest conflict
FC-0035 · concept
- Front: Financial assistance: three exceptions?
- Definition: There are three. Advance court costs and litigation expenses (repayment may depend on the outcome); pay them outright for an indigent client; and give modest gifts for basic living expenses to an indigent pro bono client.
- Explanation: The pro bono gift exception has three limits: no promising gifts before retention or as an inducement to stay, no seeking reimbursement, and no advertising the willingness to give them.
- Example: A legal-aid lawyer buys a bus pass for her indigent client so he can get to medical appointments. That's permitted.
- Exam trap: The gift exception doesn't cover paying clients or loans.
- Cite: MR 1.8(e)(1)–(3) · Outline: OUT-4.6.2 · Related: Financial assistance · Proprietary interest in litigation
FC-0036 · concept
- Front: Media rights: when can a lawyer take them?
- Definition: Not before the representation ends. Before then, a lawyer may not make or negotiate an agreement giving her literary or media rights based substantially on the representation.
- Explanation: A lawyer hoping for a dramatic book may be tempted to steer the case toward drama rather than the client's interest. After the representation ends, the rule no longer bars the deal, but confidentiality still applies.
- Example: A defense lawyer signs a book deal about her client's trial two days after the verdict and after the representation has concluded. MR 1.8(d) doesn't bar it.
- Exam trap: Negotiating counts. The lawyer can't even negotiate the deal while the case is going on.
- Cite: MR 1.8(d); cmt. [9] · Outline: OUT-4.2.4 · Related: Personal-interest conflict
FC-0037 · concept
- Front: Limiting malpractice liability: prospective vs. settling?
- Definition: A prospective limit requires the client to be independently represented in making the agreement. Settling an existing claim with an unrepresented client or former client requires written advice to seek independent counsel and a reasonable opportunity to do so.
- Explanation: Agreements to arbitrate malpractice claims are allowed if they are enforceable under applicable law and the client is fully informed. Practicing as a limited-liability entity is allowed if each lawyer stays personally liable for her own conduct.
- Example: A lawyer's engagement letter caps malpractice damages at the fee paid. Unless the client had her own lawyer review it, the lawyer is subject to discipline.
- Exam trap: Mixing up the two tests. Only the prospective limit needs actual independent counsel.
- Cite: MR 1.8(h); cmts. [17]–[18] · Outline: OUT-4.2.6 · Related: Personal-interest conflict
FC-0038 · concept
- Front: Lawyer switching firms: when personally disqualified?
- Definition: Only if she personally acquired protected, material information about the old firm's client in the same or a substantially related matter, unless that client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- Explanation: A moving lawyer isn't tainted by everything her old firm knew. The test is her actual knowledge. Whether her new firm is disqualified is a separate question under MR 1.10.
- Example: An associate at a 500-lawyer firm never worked on or heard about a case. After moving, she may work against the old firm's client in it.
- Exam trap: Assuming a lateral lawyer is disqualified from every matter her old firm handled.
- Cite: MR 1.9(b); cmts. [5]–[6] · Outline: OUT-4.3.2 · Related: Former-client conflict · Imputed conflict
FC-0039 · concept
- Front: Screening a lateral: three requirements?
- Definition: There are three. Timely screening with no part of the fee; prompt written notice to the former client; and certifications of compliance on request and when the screen ends.
- Explanation: The notice must describe the screen, state compliance with the Rules, say that review may be available before a tribunal, and include the firm's agreement to respond promptly to the former client's questions or objections. The screened lawyer and a firm partner give the certifications.
- Example: The firm walls off the lateral, excludes her from the fee, sends notice to the former client, and later certifies compliance on request.
- Exam trap: Under the Model Rule, screening works even if the lateral personally and substantially worked on the same matter. Many states are stricter.
- Cite: MR 1.10(a)(2) · Outline: OUT-4.5.1 · Related: Screening · Imputed conflict
FC-0040 · concept
- Front: Which MR 1.8 prohibitions bind the whole firm?
- Definition: Paragraphs (a) through (i) apply to every lawyer in the firm. Paragraph (j), sexual relations, does not.
- Explanation: So if one lawyer couldn't do a business deal with a client without meeting MR 1.8(a), neither can any partner, even one who isn't working for that client.
- Example: A partner wants to invest in a start-up that her colleague represents. She must comply with MR 1.8(a).
- Exam trap: Forgetting that 1.8(j) is the one exception.
- Cite: MR 1.8(k); cmt. [23] · Outline: OUT-4.5.1 · Related: Imputed conflict · Business transaction with a client
FC-0041 · concept
- Front: Firm after the disqualified lawyer leaves?
- Definition: If the firm no longer represents that client, it may then act against the departed lawyer's former client, unless the matter is the same or substantially related and a lawyer still at the firm has protected, material information about it.
- Explanation: A lawyer's departure doesn't end the firm's own duties to a client it still represents. Once the client has left too, the firm is free unless the taint stayed behind in another lawyer.
- Example: Partner Abbott, who represented Client Z, leaves the firm, and Z ends the firm's representation and follows Abbott. The firm may sue Z in the same matter only if no remaining lawyer has Z's material confidential information.
- Exam trap: First confirm the firm no longer represents the client. Then both conditions must be present to bar the firm.
- Cite: MR 1.10(b) · Outline: OUT-4.5.2 · Related: Imputed conflict · Former-client conflict
FC-0042 · concept
- Front: Prospective client: two ways the firm can still act?
- Definition: There are two. Both the affected client and the prospective client give informed consent, confirmed in writing; or the lawyer limited the interview, is timely screened with no part of the fee, and prompt written notice goes to the prospective client.
- Explanation: The screening route rewards lawyers who take only the information needed to run a conflict check and decide whether to take the case.
- Example: A lawyer stops a caller after ten minutes, once the conflict is clear. Her firm may represent the other side if she is timely screened, gets no part of the fee, and prompt written notice goes to the caller.
- Exam trap: If the lawyer let the prospective client tell everything, the screening route is lost.
- Cite: MR 1.18(d); cmt. [4] · Outline: OUT-4.4 · Related: Prospective client · Screening
FC-0043 · concept
- Front: Former government lawyer: who consents, and what saves the firm?
- Definition: The government agency gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. The new firm is saved by timely screening, no share of the fee, and prompt written notice to the agency.
- Explanation: The agency, not the opposing party, consents because the rule protects the public's interest in the integrity of government work.
- Example: A former prosecutor who handled a fraud case may defend the same defendant only with the prosecutor's office's informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- Exam trap: Asking for the former opposing party's consent. That's the MR 1.12 rule for judges and neutrals, not MR 1.11.
- Cite: MR 1.11(a)–(b); cmts. [3]–[4] · Outline: OUT-4.9.1 · Related: Personally and substantially · Matter
FC-0044 · concept
- Front: Current government lawyer: job hunting?
- Definition: A lawyer serving in government may not negotiate for private employment with a party, or a party's lawyer, in a matter in which she is participating personally and substantially.
- Explanation: The lawyer's hope of a job could soften her work for the public. A law clerk is the exception: she may negotiate after notifying the judge (MR 1.12(b)).
- Example: A city attorney negotiating a contract with a developer may not interview with the developer's law firm while the negotiation is under way.
- Exam trap: The ban is on negotiating with those involved in her matter, not on job hunting in general.
- Cite: MR 1.11(d)(2) · Outline: OUT-4.9.2 · Related: Personally and substantially · Personal-interest conflict
FC-0045 · concept
- Front: Judge vs. law clerk: negotiating a job with a party?
- Definition: A judge, arbitrator, mediator or other neutral may not negotiate for employment with a party or a party's lawyer in a matter she is working on. A law clerk may, but only after notifying the judge.
- Explanation: Notice lets the judge take the clerk off the case. The judge herself has no one to notify and decides the case, so the ban is flat.
- Example: A clerk tells her judge she has an interview with a firm appearing before the court. The judge removes her from that case. The interview is proper.
- Exam trap: Treating judge and clerk the same. The clerk may negotiate with notice; the judge may not.
- Cite: MR 1.12(b) · Outline: OUT-4.10 · Related: Personally and substantially · Screening
B2. Multiple Choice
Format: stem, lead-in, options A–D, answer with explanation, why each distractor is wrong, tags. "d1/d2/d3" = difficulty (Style Guide 6.1).
4.1 Multiple clients and joint representation
MC-0001 · d2
Attorney Park represents Client Harlow in a pending commercial lease negotiation. Northwind LLC, another current client of Park's in an unrelated estate-planning matter, asks Park to file a breach-of-contract lawsuit against Harlow. The contract dispute has nothing to do with the lease, and nothing Park learned in the lease work bears on it. Park believes he can handle both matters competently and diligently.
May Park accept the representation of Northwind against Harlow? - A. No, because a lawyer may not represent one client asserting a claim against another client in the same litigation, and Northwind would be suing Harlow. - B. No, because a lawyer may not use a client's information to the client's disadvantage without consent, and Park learned about Harlow in the lease work. - C. Yes, if Park reasonably believes he can represent both Harlow and Northwind, and each gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. - D. Yes, if Northwind consents, because a client may give informed consent to a consentable conflict, and Northwind is the client bringing the suit.
- Answer: C. Suing a current client, even in an unrelated matter, is direct adversity. It is consentable if the lawyer reasonably believes he can represent both diligently, the representation isn't prohibited by law, it doesn't involve one client's claim against another in the same litigation, and each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. (MR 1.7(a)(1), (b); cmt. [6])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it applies when the lawyer represents both clients in the same litigation. Park represents Harlow only in the lease negotiation. (MR 1.7(b)(3); cmt. [17])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the stem says nothing Park learned in the lease work bears on the contract dispute, so there is no use to Harlow's disadvantage. (MR 1.8(b))
- D is wrong: a client can consent, but consent must come from each affected client, and Harlow, the client being sued, is the one most affected. (MR 1.7(b)(4))
- Tags: 4.1 · concurrent conflict, direct adversity, informed consent, confirmed in writing · Carried from Style Guide Part 12.
MC-0002 · d2
Brothers Tomas and Luis Ferreira are charged together with burglary. Both ask Attorney Quinn to defend them. In separate meetings, Tomas tells Quinn that Luis planned the break-in and that Tomas only drove the car. Luis tells Quinn that Tomas planned it. Each brother intends to testify at trial that the other was the planner, and the prosecutor has offered a reduced charge to whichever brother testifies against the other. Both brothers say they want Quinn as their lawyer and will sign whatever waiver she needs.
May Quinn represent both brothers? - A. No, because a conflict is nonconsentable if the lawyer cannot reasonably believe she can represent each client diligently, and each brother will blame the other. - B. Yes, if Tomas and Luis give informed consent, confirmed in writing, because co-defendants may share a lawyer when their conflict is consentable. - C. No, because a lawyer may not represent clients asserting claims against each other in the same proceeding, and Tomas and Luis are co-defendants in one criminal case. - D. Yes, if both consent, because a lawyer must protect each client's information, and Quinn could keep each brother's statements from the other.
- Answer: A. A conflict is nonconsentable when the lawyer can't reasonably conclude she can provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client. Here each brother will testify against the other, and the plea offer rewards whichever one turns first, so Quinn couldn't pursue either defense without hurting the other client. The rules also warn that a lawyer ordinarily should decline to represent more than one criminal co-defendant. (MR 1.7(b)(1); cmts. [15], [23])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it requires a consentable conflict. With each brother testifying against the other, Quinn can't reasonably believe she can represent both. (MR 1.7(b)(1); cmts. [15], [23])
- C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. The same-proceeding bar covers clients who assert claims against each other; co-defendants in a criminal case assert none. (MR 1.7(b)(3); cmt. [17])
- D is wrong: confidentiality is owed to each brother, but keeping their statements apart doesn't cure the fact that each defense attacks the other client. (MR 1.6(a); MR 1.7(b)(1))
- Tags: 4.1 · nonconsentable conflict, joint representation · cites MR 1.7(b)(1), cmt. [23]
MC-0003 · d1
Spouses Aiko and Ben Hartley are ending their marriage. They disagree about custody of their child and the division of their home. They ask Attorney Lindqvist to represent both of them in the contested divorce proceeding to save money. Both say they will give written consent. Lindqvist believes he could be fair to both.
May Lindqvist represent both spouses? - A. Yes, if Aiko and Ben each give informed consent, confirmed in writing, because a consentable concurrent conflict may be cured by each client's consent. - B. Yes, if Aiko and Ben agree to limit his role to their uncontested issues, because a lawyer may reasonably limit scope with the client's consent. - C. No, because a lawyer may not oppose a former client in the same matter without consent, and Aiko and Ben are adverse in the divorce. - D. No, because a lawyer may not represent clients asserting claims against each other in one proceeding, and Aiko and Ben dispute custody and the home.
- Answer: D. A lawyer may not represent clients asserting claims against each other in the same litigation or proceeding before a tribunal. That conflict is nonconsentable. (MR 1.7(b)(3); cmt. [17])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it cures only consentable conflicts, and spouses asserting claims against each other in one proceeding can't be cured by consent. (MR 1.7(b)(3))
- B is wrong: scope may be limited, but the spouses remain opposing parties in one contested case, so a limit can't remove the same-proceeding bar. (MR 1.2(c); MR 1.7(b)(3))
- C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. Neither spouse is a former client; both would be current clients, so MR 1.7 governs. (MR 1.9(a))
- Tags: 4.1 · nonconsentable conflict · cites MR 1.7(b)(3)
MC-0004 · d3
Attorney Mbeki represents business partners Cole and Dana in buying a warehouse for their partnership. At the start, Mbeki explained that information would be shared between them, and both consented in writing to the joint representation. The engagement letter did not address whether Mbeki could keep representing either partner alone if a conflict arose between them. Before closing, Cole privately tells Mbeki that he has secretly agreed to receive a personal commission from the seller, and asks Mbeki not to tell Dana. The commission is material to the deal.
Which is the most accurate statement of Mbeki's obligations? - A. Mbeki may keep the commission secret and continue for both, because a lawyer may not reveal client information absent consent or an exception, and Cole asked for secrecy. - B. Mbeki should urge Cole to disclose and must withdraw if he refuses, because the partners agreed to share information and Dana must be kept reasonably informed. - C. Mbeki may drop Cole and keep representing Dana, because a lawyer may oppose a former client in the same matter with informed consent, confirmed in writing. - D. Mbeki may continue for Cole and Dana, because a concurrent conflict may be cured by informed consent, and both partners consented in writing at the outset.
- Answer: B. Joint clients are told at the outset that information will be shared. When one client insists that a material fact be kept from the other, the lawyer can't continue representing both. She should urge Cole to disclose, and if he refuses, she must withdraw from the joint representation. Cole's secrecy demand may revoke his earlier consent to sharing, so Mbeki may not herself reveal the commission; but that is exactly why she can't go on representing Dana while hiding it. Whether she could later continue for either partner alone is a separate question under MR 1.9. (MR 1.6(a); MR 1.7 cmt. [31]; MR 1.16(a)(1))
- A is wrong: the confidentiality rule is accurate, and Mbeki may not reveal the commission without Cole's consent; but she can't keep the secret and continue the joint representation, because hiding a material fact from Dana would breach the duty to keep her informed. Secrecy requires withdrawal. (MR 1.6(a); MR 1.7 cmt. [31]; MR 1.4; MR 1.16(a)(1))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Cole hasn't consented, and the engagement letter gave no advance consent to continuing for one partner. (MR 1.9(a); MR 1.7 cmt. [31])
- D is wrong: the initial consent covered a joint representation with shared information. It doesn't cover the later conflict created by Cole's demand for secrecy. (MR 1.7 cmts. [5], [31])
- Tags: 4.1 · joint representation, informed consent · cites MR 1.7 cmt. [31]
MC-0005 · d1
Attorney Osei represents Hilltop Bakery in negotiating a lease for a second location across town. Osei also represents Main Street Bakery, a competing bakery in another neighborhood, in an employment dispute with a former employee. The lease does not involve Main Street Bakery, and Main Street Bakery has no interest in the property or the landlord. Neither bakery knows Osei represents the other.
Is Osei subject to discipline? - A. No, because clients who are only economic competitors are not directly adverse, and Hilltop's lease does not involve Main Street Bakery. - B. Yes, because a significant risk that duties to one client will limit work for another is a conflict, and Hilltop and Main Street compete. - C. Yes, because a lawyer must keep a client reasonably informed about its matter, and neither bakery knows Osei represents the other. - D. No, because a lawyer must protect each client's confidential information, and Osei can keep each bakery's information from the other.
- Answer: A. Representing economic competitors in unrelated matters is ordinarily not a conflict. The clients aren't adverse to each other in either matter, and nothing suggests that Osei's work for one would be held back by her duties to the other. (MR 1.7 cmt. [6])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but neither matter involves the other bakery, so competition alone creates no significant risk of limitation. (MR 1.7(a)(2); cmt. [6])
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it covers information about the client's own matter. With no conflict, the other client's identity isn't such information, and it is confidential. (MR 1.4(a); MR 1.6(a))
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. Confidentiality is always required, but what makes this permissible is that there is no conflict. (MR 1.7 cmt. [6])
- Tags: 4.1 · direct adversity · cites MR 1.7 cmt. [6]
MC-0006 · d3
Attorney Ruiz has two appeals pending before the same state supreme court. In one, he argues for Client Voss that a consumer-protection statute allows punitive damages. In the other, he argues for Client Keller, a retailer, that the same statute does not allow them. The two appeals are separate cases, but the court will hear both the same week on that question, and a ruling for either client will be binding precedent against the other.
Which is the most accurate statement? - A. Ruiz has no conflict, because a lawyer may ordinarily take inconsistent legal positions for different clients, and Voss and Keller are in separate appeals. - B. Ruiz has no conflict, because direct adversity arises when a lawyer acts against a current client, and Ruiz is suing neither Voss nor Keller. - C. Ruiz may continue if Keller gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, because an affected client may waive a consentable conflict, and Keller's position is at risk. - D. Ruiz has a conflict, because precedent for one client that would seriously weaken another's position creates one, and both appeals are before one court.
- Answer: D. Arguing opposite legal positions is ordinarily fine. It becomes a conflict when there is a significant risk that the lawyer's action for one client will materially limit his effectiveness for the other, as when a ruling for one will create precedent likely to seriously weaken the other's position in the same court on the same question. Ruiz must then apply MR 1.7(b). He may continue only if the conflict is consentable and both clients give informed consent, confirmed in writing, which may be doubtful on these facts. (MR 1.7(a)(2); cmt. [24])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the comment treats this situation (same court, same question, binding precedent) as a material-limitation conflict. (MR 1.7 cmt. [24])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the conflict here is a material limitation, which doesn't require direct adversity. (MR 1.7(a)(2))
- C is wrong: Keller could consent, but Voss is equally affected, and each affected client must consent. (MR 1.7(b)(4))
- Tags: 4.1 · positional conflict, material limitation · cites MR 1.7 cmt. [24]
MC-0007 · d2
Global Freight Corp., a large company with its own legal department, retains the law firm Adair & Pike for trademark work. In the engagement letter, which Global Freight's general counsel reviewed, Global Freight agrees that the firm may represent other clients against it in future matters unrelated to the firm's work for Global Freight. Two years later, Adair & Pike is asked to represent a supplier in an unrelated contract suit against Global Freight.
Is the advance consent likely to be effective? - A. No, because informed consent requires that the client understand the material risks, and Global Freight could not know which future suits would come. - B. No, because consent can't cure one client's claim against another in the same litigation, and the supplier is suing Global Freight. - C. Yes, because an advance waiver can bind an experienced client, and Global Freight's general counsel reviewed a waiver limited to unrelated matters. - D. Yes, because consent to a concurrent conflict must be confirmed in writing, and Global Freight's consent appears in its engagement letter.
- Answer: C. An advance waiver is effective to the extent the client reasonably understood the material risks. A general waiver is more likely to work when the client is an experienced user of legal services, is independently represented in giving consent (here, by its general counsel), and the waiver covers only unrelated matters. All three facts are present. (MR 1.7 cmt. [22])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but an experienced, independently advised client can understand the risks of a general waiver limited to unrelated matters. (MR 1.0(e); MR 1.7 cmt. [22])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it applies when the firm represents both clients in that litigation. Adair & Pike represents Global Freight only in trademark work. (MR 1.7(b)(3))
- D is wrong: the right result for an incomplete reason. A writing is necessary but not enough; sophistication, independent advice and the unrelated-matter limit make this waiver work. (MR 1.7 cmt. [22])
- Tags: 4.1 · advance waiver, informed consent · cites MR 1.7 cmt. [22]
MC-0008 · d2
Priya, a passenger, and Eli, the driver, were both injured when another car ran a red light and hit them. They ask Attorney Yeager to sue the other driver for both of them. There is some evidence that Eli was speeding, which could give Priya a claim against Eli, but Priya has not asserted one. Yeager did not witness the accident. He believes he can represent both effectively.
May Yeager represent both Priya and Eli? - A. No, because a lawyer may not represent clients asserting claims against each other in one proceeding, and Priya may have a claim against Eli. - B. Yes, if Yeager reasonably believes he can represent Priya and Eli, and each gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. - C. No, because a lawyer ordinarily may not be trial advocate where he is likely a necessary witness, and Eli's speed is disputed. - D. Yes, without consent, because co-plaintiffs are not directly adverse to each other, and Priya and Eli are suing the same driver.
- Answer: B. The possible claim between co-plaintiffs creates a material-limitation conflict. It's consentable: Yeager reasonably believes he can represent both, and each client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, after learning of the possible claim and that Yeager couldn't act in any dispute between them. (MR 1.7(a)(2), (b); cmt. [23])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Priya hasn't asserted a claim against Eli, so paragraph (b)(3) isn't triggered. Consentability still depends on paragraph (b)(1), which B's reasonable-belief condition supplies. (MR 1.7(b)(1), (3); cmt. [23])
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Yeager didn't witness the accident, so he isn't a likely witness. (MR 3.7(a))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Priya's possible claim against Eli is a material-limitation conflict, which needs consent. (MR 1.7(a)(2))
- Tags: 4.1 · joint representation, material limitation, consentable conflict · cites MR 1.7 cmt. [23]
MC-0009 · d3
Attorney Sato represents Lumen Corp. in a contract lawsuit against Vireo Inc. Sato also represents Crestline Co. in an unrelated tax-planning matter that is in its early stages. Midway through the lawsuit, Vireo unexpectedly buys Crestline. Vireo's general counsel now directs Crestline's legal work, including Sato's tax engagement, and the two companies share one legal department. Neither Lumen nor Vireo will consent to Sato's continuing both matters. Another tax lawyer could take over Crestline's work without harm to Crestline, and no court approval is needed to withdraw from it.
Which is the most accurate statement? - A. Sato may continue both matters, because a lawyer for a company does not by that fact represent its parent, and Crestline is a separate entity from Vireo. - B. Sato must withdraw from both matters, because a lawyer must withdraw if continuing will violate the rules, and neither Lumen nor Vireo has consented. - C. Sato may be able to withdraw from Crestline's tax matter, because an unforeseeable conflict may be cured that way, and Vireo's purchase was unexpected. - D. Sato must withdraw from Lumen's lawsuit, because a lawyer must withdraw if continuing will violate the rules, and that lawsuit is adverse to Vireo.
- Answer: C. Because Vireo now directs Crestline's legal work and shares its legal department, Crestline and Vireo are treated as one client for conflict purposes, so suing Vireo for Lumen is direct adversity to a current client. When such a conflict arises unforeseeably, for example through a corporate acquisition, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations to avoid it. Withdrawal must follow MR 1.16, and Sato still owes Crestline the former-client duties of MR 1.9 (the tax matter is unrelated to the lawsuit). (MR 1.7 cmts. [5], [34]; MR 1.16(b)(1))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but an affiliate is treated as a client when the parent directs its legal work through a shared legal department, as Vireo does. (MR 1.7 cmt. [34])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but withdrawing from one matter ends the violation, so withdrawing from both isn't required. (MR 1.16(a)(1); MR 1.7 cmt. [5])
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but dropping the tax matter also ends the conflict, and it harms no one, while dropping Lumen mid-suit would. Nothing forces Sato to drop Lumen. (MR 1.7 cmt. [5]; MR 1.16(b)(1))
- Tags: 4.1 · concurrent conflict · cites MR 1.7 cmts. [5], [34]; MR 1.16
MC-0010 · d1
Attorney Grant discovers a conflict between two current clients. In a phone call, he fully explains the risks and alternatives to each client, and each agrees orally to waive the conflict. That afternoon, Grant emails each client a letter summarizing the conflict and confirming the client's consent. Neither client signs or replies to the email.
Has Grant satisfied the consent requirement for the conflict? - A. No, because a business deal with a client needs informed consent in a writing signed by the client, and neither client signed Grant's confirming letter. - B. Yes, because informed consent requires explaining the material risks and alternatives, and Grant did so in each phone call. - C. No, because a business deal with a client needs written advice to seek independent counsel, and Grant gave the clients no such advice. - D. Yes, because consent may be confirmed by a writing the lawyer promptly sends, and Grant emailed each client a confirming letter that afternoon.
- Answer: D. "Confirmed in writing" means consent given in writing by the client, or a writing the lawyer promptly sends confirming an oral informed consent. No client signature or reply is required. (MR 1.0(b); MR 1.7(b)(4))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but this is a concurrent conflict, not a business deal, and it needs only consent confirmed in writing. (MR 1.8(a)(3); MR 1.7(b)(4))
- B is wrong: the right result for an incomplete reason. Explaining the risks makes consent informed, but it must also be confirmed in writing, which Grant's email did. (MR 1.7(b)(4); MR 1.0(b))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it belongs to business transactions, not to consent to a concurrent conflict. (MR 1.8(a)(2))
- Tags: 4.1 · confirmed in writing, informed consent · cites MR 1.0(b)
4.2 The lawyer's personal interest or duties
MC-0011 · d2
Associate Kowalski is second chair for the plaintiff in a large product-liability trial. During trial, the law firm representing the defendant invites Kowalski to interview for a senior position, and he accepts the interview. His supervising partner has given him no instructions about it. He does not tell his supervising partner or the client.
Is Kowalski subject to discipline? - A. No, because a personal interest is a conflict if it significantly risks limiting the work, and Kowalski is only the second-chair lawyer. - B. Yes, because job talks with an opponent's firm can create a personal-interest conflict, and Kowalski is interviewing with the defense firm mid-trial. - C. No, because a subordinate who follows a supervisor's reasonable resolution of an arguable question is protected, and Kowalski works under a partner. - D. Yes, because a government lawyer may not negotiate for a job with a party's lawyer in her matter, and Kowalski is working on this trial.
- Answer: B. Substantive job interviews with the opponent's law firm while actively trying the case create a significant risk of a personal-interest conflict: he may be tempted to go easy on the other side. He must disclose it and may continue only under MR 1.7(b), with the client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. (MR 1.7(a)(2); cmt. [10])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but any lawyer on the matter can have the conflict, and interviewing with the opposing firm mid-trial is that significant risk. (MR 1.7(a)(2); cmt. [10])
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but no supervisor resolved anything; Kowalski told no one. (MR 5.2(b))
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. Kowalski is a private lawyer, so the government-lawyer ban doesn't apply; his violation is proceeding without disclosure and the client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. (MR 1.11(d)(2)(ii); MR 1.7 cmt. [10])
- Tags: 4.2 · personal-interest conflict, material limitation · cites MR 1.7 cmt. [10]
MC-0012 · d3
Attorney Ng of Ng & Aldana LLP represents a landlord in an eviction case. Ng learns that the tenant's lawyer is her husband. Ng withdraws, and her law partner, Aldana, offers to take over the case. Neither Ng nor Aldana obtains the landlord's consent to the arrangement. Aldana has no personal relationship with the tenant's lawyer.
May Aldana handle the case? - A. No, because a lawyer's conflict is generally imputed to others in the firm, and Ng is Aldana's law partner. - B. No, because a personal-interest conflict needs the client's informed consent, confirmed in writing, and the landlord never consented. - C. Yes, because a conflict based on marriage to opposing counsel is generally not imputed, and Aldana has no tie to the tenant's lawyer. - D. Yes, if Ng is screened and gets no fee share, because screening can prevent imputing a lateral's conflict, and Ng withdrew from the case.
- Answer: C. Lawyers closely related by marriage who represent opposing sides have a personal-interest conflict. Because it rests on the relationship, it ordinarily isn't imputed to their partners, so Aldana may proceed without consent. (MR 1.7 cmt. [11]; MR 1.10(a)(1))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but personal-interest conflicts like Ng's are excepted from imputation. (MR 1.10(a)(1); MR 1.7 cmt. [11])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate for Ng herself, but her conflict isn't imputed, so Aldana needs no consent. (MR 1.10(a)(1))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Ng isn't a lateral, and her conflict isn't imputed, so no screen is needed. (MR 1.10(a)(2))
- Tags: 4.2 · personal-interest conflict, imputed conflict · cites MR 1.7 cmt. [11]; MR 1.10(a)(1)
MC-0013 · d1
Attorney Reyes and Marcus Chen have been in a committed, consensual romantic relationship for three years. Chen is sued by a former business partner and asks Reyes to defend him. Reyes agrees and continues the relationship during the case.
Is Reyes subject to discipline? - A. Yes, because a lawyer may not begin sexual relations with a current client, and Reyes is Chen's lawyer throughout the entire course of the relationship. - B. Yes, because a personal-interest conflict may require informed consent, confirmed in writing, and Chen gave none. - C. No, because the ban aims at exploitation of vulnerable clients, and Chen is a competent adult in a consensual relationship. - D. No, because the ban excludes a consensual relationship that predates the representation, and Reyes and Chen have been together three years.
- Answer: D. The ban on sexual relations with clients doesn't apply to a consensual relationship that existed before the representation began. The lawyer should still consider whether the relationship materially limits the representation under MR 1.7(a)(2); nothing here suggests it does. (MR 1.8(j); cmt. [21])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Reyes didn't begin a relationship during the representation; it began three years earlier. (MR 1.8(j))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the facts show no significant risk that the relationship will materially limit Reyes's defense, so no MR 1.7 consent is triggered; the pre-existing relationship takes Reyes outside the MR 1.8(j) ban. (MR 1.7(a)(2); MR 1.8(j); cmt. [21])
- C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. The ban covers consensual relationships with any client; Reyes is saved by timing. (MR 1.8(j); cmt. [20])
- Tags: 4.2 · personal-interest conflict · cites MR 1.8(j)
MC-0014 · d2
Attorney Haddad is outside counsel to Brightwater Inc. He works closely with Brightwater's general counsel, Jordan Ellery, who directs Haddad's work on the company's litigation. During the representation, Haddad and Ellery begin a consensual sexual relationship.
Is Haddad subject to discipline? - A. Yes, because for an organizational client the ban covers a constituent directing the lawyer, and Ellery directs Haddad. - B. No, because a lawyer for an organization represents the entity, not its officers, and Ellery is Brightwater's general counsel. - C. No, because the ban's central concern is exploitation of the client, and Ellery is an experienced lawyer. - D. Yes, unless Brightwater's board consents, because an organization consents through authorized constituents, and the board is one.
- Answer: A. When the client is an organization, the ban on sexual relations extends to a constituent who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the lawyer about the organization's legal matters. Ellery does exactly that. (MR 1.8(j); cmt. [22])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the comment extends the ban to constituents who supervise or direct the lawyer's work. (MR 1.13(a); MR 1.8 cmt. [22])
- C is wrong: exploitation is the concern, but the ban applies regardless of consent or sophistication. (MR 1.8(j); cmt. [20])
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the sexual-relations ban has no consent exception, so board approval can't cure it. (MR 1.13; MR 1.8(j))
- Tags: 4.2 · personal-interest conflict · cites MR 1.8(j), cmt. [22]
MC-0015 · d1
Attorney Whitfield has handled estate planning for elderly Client Morrow for ten years. They are not related, and their relationship has always been purely professional; they don't socialize or spend holidays together. Morrow asks Whitfield to prepare a new will leaving Whitfield $250,000, saying he has been "like a son." Whitfield prepares and supervises the signing of the will exactly as Morrow asked.
Is Whitfield subject to discipline? - A. No, because a lawyer may not solicit a substantial gift from a client, and Morrow offered the bequest on his own. - B. Yes, because a lawyer may not draft a substantial gift to himself from an unrelated client, and Whitfield drafted Morrow's will. - C. No, because the gift rule excepts a person in a close, familial relationship with the client, and Morrow calls Whitfield "like a son." - D. Yes, unless Morrow got written advice to seek counsel, because a business deal with a client requires that advice, and the will benefits Whitfield.
- Answer: B. A lawyer may not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer a substantial gift unless the lawyer is related to the client. Even an unsolicited bequest must be drafted by another lawyer. (MR 1.8(c); cmt. [7])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the gift rule separately bars preparing the instrument, which Whitfield did. (MR 1.8(c))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but their relationship has always been purely professional, whatever Morrow calls him. (MR 1.8(c))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate for business deals, but a will is not one, and drafting a gift to oneself has no advice-and-consent cure. (MR 1.8(a), (c))
- Tags: 4.2 · related person, personal-interest conflict · cites MR 1.8(c)
MC-0016 · d2
After Attorney Balogun wins a difficult lawsuit for Client Estrada, Estrada, without being asked, gives Balogun a wristwatch worth $5,000 as thanks. Balogun had not suggested any gift and accepts it. Estrada acted freely, and there is no sign of undue influence.
Is Balogun subject to discipline for accepting the watch? - A. Yes, because a lawyer may not solicit a substantial gift from a client, and Estrada's $5,000 watch is substantial. - B. Yes, because a business deal with a client requires written advice to seek counsel, and Estrada got none before giving the watch. - C. No, because the gift rule does not bar accepting an unsolicited gift, and Estrada gave the watch without being asked. - D. No, because a lawyer may accept a simple gift such as a token of appreciation, and Estrada gave the watch as thanks.
- Answer: C. MR 1.8(c) forbids soliciting a substantial gift and preparing an instrument that gives one. Accepting an unsolicited gift, like this watch, isn't prohibited by that rule, though a gift can be voidable under other law if it resulted from undue influence. (MR 1.8(c); cmt. [6])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Balogun didn't ask for or suggest any gift. (MR 1.8(c))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a gift is not a business deal. (MR 1.8(a)(2))
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. A $5,000 watch isn't a simple token; it's allowed because it wasn't solicited. (MR 1.8 cmt. [6])
- Tags: 4.2 · personal-interest conflict · cites MR 1.8(c), cmt. [6]
MC-0017 · d1
Attorney Castellano is defending a well-known athlete in a highly publicized criminal trial. Midway through trial, a publisher offers Castellano a book contract for an account of the case. Castellano negotiates and signs the contract before the verdict.
Is Castellano subject to discipline? - A. Yes, because a lawyer may not reveal client information without consent, and a book would describe the athlete's case. - B. No, if the athlete signs a consent, because many personal-interest conflicts may be cured by informed consent, and the athlete could consent. - C. No, because the media-rights ban reaches deals made before the representation ends, and the book won't appear until after the verdict. - D. Yes, because the media-rights ban reaches deals made before the representation ends, and Castellano signed before the verdict.
- Answer: D. Before the representation ends, a lawyer may not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights based substantially on the representation. The client's consent doesn't cure it. (MR 1.8(d); cmt. [9])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the media-rights ban is violated by the deal itself, whatever the book reveals. (MR 1.6(a); MR 1.8(d))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate for many conflicts, but the media-rights ban has no consent exception. (MR 1.8(d))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it turns on when the deal is made, and Castellano signed before the verdict; publication date doesn't matter. (MR 1.8(d))
- Tags: 4.2 · personal-interest conflict · cites MR 1.8(d)
MC-0018 · d2
Former Client Afolabi threatens to sue Attorney Lachance for malpractice over a missed filing deadline. Afolabi has no lawyer. Lachance sends Afolabi a letter stating that she should consult an independent lawyer before settling, and offers $15,000 with no deadline to respond. Afolabi has the time and the means to consult a lawyer but chooses not to. Two weeks later, still unrepresented, she accepts the offer and signs a release.
Was Lachance's settlement proper? - A. No, because an agreement prospectively limiting malpractice liability requires independent representation, and Afolabi had no lawyer. - B. Yes, because a malpractice claim may be settled after written advice to seek counsel, and Lachance gave that advice and time. - C. No, because a business deal with a client requires informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, and Afolabi signed only a release. - D. Yes, because the decision whether to settle belongs to the client, and Afolabi chose to accept Lachance's offer.
- Answer: B. A lawyer may settle a malpractice claim with an unrepresented client or former client if the lawyer advises that person in writing of the desirability of seeking independent counsel and gives a reasonable opportunity to do so. Lachance did both. (MR 1.8(h)(2))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but this settles an existing claim; it doesn't limit future liability. (MR 1.8(h)(1)–(2))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but settling a malpractice claim is governed by its own rule, not the business-transaction rule. (MR 1.8(a), (h)(2))
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. The client decides settlements, but a settlement with the lawyer is proper because MR 1.8(h)(2) was met. (MR 1.2(a); MR 1.8(h)(2))
- Tags: 4.2 · personal-interest conflict · cites MR 1.8(h)(2)
4.3 Former clients
MC-0019 · d1
Attorney Duarte represented Dunmore Manufacturing in negotiating a five-year supply contract with Orbit Parts. The representation ended when the contract was signed. A year later, Orbit asks Duarte to sue Dunmore for breaching that same contract. Dunmore has not consented.
May Duarte represent Orbit? - A. No, because a lawyer may not oppose a former client in the same matter without informed consent, confirmed in writing, and Orbit sues on it. - B. No, unless Duarte is screened, because screening can prevent imputing a lateral's conflict, and Duarte negotiated the contract. - C. Yes, if Duarte doesn't misuse Dunmore's information, because a lawyer may not use it to Dunmore's disadvantage, and he learned its positions. - D. Yes, because the current-client conflict rule covers only a lawyer's current clients, and Duarte's work for Dunmore ended when the contract was signed.
- Answer: A. A lawyer may not represent a new client in the same or a substantially related matter against a former client without the former client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. Suing over the contract Duarte negotiated is the same matter. (MR 1.9(a))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but screening protects a firm, not the disqualified lawyer himself. (MR 1.10(a)(2))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it is a separate duty; it doesn't cure switching sides in the same matter. (MR 1.9(a), (c))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the former-client rule took over and bars this same-matter adversity. (MR 1.9(a))
- Tags: 4.3 · former-client conflict · cites MR 1.9(a)
MC-0020 · d1
Five years ago, Attorney Pellegrini defended Harbor Hotels in a guest's slip-and-fall lawsuit. That representation is over. Now a hotel employee asks Pellegrini to sue Harbor Hotels for unpaid overtime. The overtime claim has no factual connection to the slip-and-fall case, and nothing Pellegrini learned in that case would help the employee.
May Pellegrini represent the employee? - A. No, because a lawyer may not use a former client's information to its disadvantage, and Pellegrini once defended Harbor Hotels. - B. No, unless Harbor Hotels consents, because a former client's consent cures a related-matter conflict, and the employee is suing Harbor Hotels. - C. Yes, because the former-client rule reaches the same or substantially related matters, and the overtime claim has no tie to the slip-and-fall. - D. Yes, if the employee consents, because duties to a former client can limit a new representation, and Pellegrini worked for Harbor Hotels.
- Answer: C. The former-client rule bars only the same or substantially related matters. A lawyer may be adverse to a former client in an unrelated matter. (MR 1.9(a); cmt. [3])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but nothing Pellegrini learned would help the employee. (MR 1.9(c)(1))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the matters are unrelated, so no consent is needed. (MR 1.9(a))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but unrelated past work creates no significant risk of limitation here. (MR 1.7(a)(2))
- Tags: 4.3 · former-client conflict, substantially related matter · cites MR 1.9(a)
MC-0021 · d3
For three years, Attorney Yilmaz advised Tarrant Chemical on environmental permits for its river plant. She reviewed its internal discharge records and inspection reports, which have never been made public. That representation ended last year. Now a group of neighbors asks Yilmaz to sue Tarrant for contaminating their wells with discharges from the same plant. The neighbors' claim is in tort, not under the permits.
May Yilmaz represent the neighbors without Tarrant's consent? - A. Yes, because matters are substantially related when they involve the same transaction or dispute, and a tort suit differs from permit work. - B. Yes, because a lawyer may use a former client's information once generally known, and Tarrant filed its permit applications publicly. - C. No, because direct adversity to a current client requires that client's consent, and the neighbors would be suing Tarrant. - D. No, because matters are substantially related if confidential facts from prior work would aid the new case, and Yilmaz saw Tarrant's records.
- Answer: D. Matters are substantially related if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute, or if there is a substantial risk that confidential facts normally obtained in the earlier work would materially advance the new client's position. Permit work at the same plant likely gave Yilmaz discharge information central to the contamination suit. (MR 1.9(a); cmt. [3])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate but incomplete; matters are also related when confidential facts from the earlier work would materially advance the new case. (MR 1.9 cmt. [3])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Yilmaz reviewed internal records that were never made public. (MR 1.9(c)(1))
- C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. Tarrant is a former client, so MR 1.9 governs. (MR 1.7(a)(1); MR 1.9(a))
- Tags: 4.3 · substantially related matter, former-client conflict · cites MR 1.9 cmt. [3]
MC-0022 · d2
Associate Farouk worked for two years at a 400-lawyer firm that represented Delmont Bank in a lending dispute. Farouk never worked on the Delmont matter, never saw its files, and learned nothing about it. She moves to a small firm that represents the borrower suing Delmont Bank in that dispute.
May Farouk work on the borrower's case? - A. No, because a firm's conflicts are imputed to each lawyer while she is there, and Farouk's old firm represented Delmont Bank. - B. Yes, if her new firm screens her, because screening can prevent imputing a lateral's conflict, and Farouk came from Delmont's firm. - C. Yes, because a moving lawyer is disqualified if she acquired protected information, and Farouk never saw the Delmont files. - D. No, unless Delmont Bank consents, because a former client's consent cures a lateral's conflict, and Farouk's old firm represented Delmont.
- Answer: C. A lawyer who moves firms is personally disqualified from matters of her former firm's clients only if she acquired protected, material information about them. Farouk acquired none. (MR 1.9(b); cmts. [5]–[6])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but imputation ends when she leaves; the question becomes what she personally learned. (MR 1.10(a); MR 1.9(b))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Farouk isn't disqualified, so no screen is needed. (MR 1.10(a)(2))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Farouk has no conflict to cure. (MR 1.9(b))
- Tags: 4.3 · former-client conflict · cites MR 1.9(b)
MC-0023 · d3
Attorney Olsen formerly represented Client Garrity in a business dispute that went to a public trial. At trial, Garrity's history of late payments to suppliers was proven in open court and reported widely in the local business press. Years later, in an unrelated matter, Olsen represents a supplier negotiating credit terms with Garrity and uses Garrity's payment history to insist on a large deposit.
Is Olsen subject to discipline? - A. No, because a lawyer may use a former client's information once generally known, and the local business press widely reported Garrity's payment history. - B. Yes, because a lawyer may not use a former client's information to its disadvantage, and Olsen used Garrity's payment history to demand a large deposit. - C. Yes, because a lawyer may not oppose a former client in a related matter without consent, and Olsen now negotiates against Garrity. - D. No, because a lawyer may use client information to establish a claim in a dispute with the client, and the supplier is now dealing with Garrity.
- Answer: A. A lawyer may not use former-client information to the former client's disadvantage unless the Rules permit it or the information has become generally known. Information is generally known when it is widely recognized by the public in the relevant geographic area or in the former client's industry or trade; wide reporting in the local business press meets that test. Proof in open court would not have been enough by itself (MR 1.9 cmt. [8], Aug. 2026). Even so, the exception allows only use, not revealing the information. The matter is also unrelated, so MR 1.9(a) doesn't bar the representation. (MR 1.9(a), (c)(1))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it has an exception for generally known information. (MR 1.9(c)(1))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but this negotiation is unrelated to the earlier dispute. (MR 1.9(a))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it covers disputes between the lawyer and the client, not the supplier's dealings. (MR 1.6(b)(5))
- Tags: 4.3 · former-client conflict · cites MR 1.9(c)(1)
MC-0024 · d1
Attorney Ivanova previously represented Client Pruitt in buying a commercial building. A tenant now asks Ivanova to sue Pruitt over a defect in the same building that Ivanova's due-diligence work covered. Ivanova calls Pruitt, explains the situation fully, and Pruitt says, "That's fine with me." Ivanova takes the case but never puts the consent in writing, and neither does Pruitt.
Is Ivanova subject to discipline? - A. No, because a former client may waive a same-matter conflict by informed consent, and Ivanova fully explained the situation to Pruitt. - B. Yes, because a former client's consent must be confirmed in writing, and nobody put Pruitt's oral consent in writing. - C. No, because a former client is protected against misuse of its information, and Ivanova can try the case without using Pruitt's. - D. Yes, because a business deal with a client requires a writing the client signs, and Pruitt signed nothing.
- Answer: B. A former-client conflict may be cured only by the former client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. Oral consent with no confirming writing isn't enough. (MR 1.9(a); MR 1.0(b))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the consent must also be confirmed in writing, and it wasn't. (MR 1.9(a); MR 1.0(b))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the former-client rule also bars side-switching in the same matter. (MR 1.9(a), (c))
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. This isn't a business deal; a confirming writing from Ivanova would have been enough. (MR 1.0(b); MR 1.8(a))
- Tags: 4.3 · former-client conflict, confirmed in writing · cites MR 1.9(a)
4.4 Prospective clients
MC-0025 · d3
Rowan Akande met with Attorney Beck for two hours about divorcing his wife. Beck needed only the spouses' names and the nature of the case to check conflicts and decide whether to take it, but he let Akande go on to describe his finances in detail, including assets he had not disclosed to his wife. Beck declined the case. A month later, the wife asks Beck's partner, Attorney Tremblay, to represent her in the divorce. The firm screens Beck, gives him no part of the fee, and promptly sends Akande written notice. Akande objects and refuses to consent.
May Tremblay represent the wife? - A. Yes, because a person who consults a lawyer but never hires him is owed confidentiality, and Akande never became Beck's client. - B. Yes, because screening can keep a prospective-client conflict from reaching the firm, and the firm screened Beck and notified Akande. - C. No, because a lawyer with significantly harmful information may not oppose that prospective client, and Tremblay's client is Akande's wife. - D. No, because screening protects the firm only if the lawyer limited the interview, and Beck let Akande detail his finances at length.
- Answer: D. Beck is disqualified because he received information that could be significantly harmful to Akande in the same matter. His disqualification is imputed to the firm. Screening saves the firm only if Beck took reasonable measures to avoid more information than he needed to decide whether to take the case, and he didn't. Without informed consent, confirmed in writing, from both Akande and the wife, the firm can't act. (MR 1.18(c)–(d); cmt. [4])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but prospective clients are also protected against adverse representation by the firm in the same matter. (MR 1.18(b)–(c))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the screen works only if Beck limited the interview, and he didn't. (MR 1.18(d)(2))
- C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. Tremblay received nothing; Beck did, and his conflict is imputed. (MR 1.18(c))
- Tags: 4.4 · prospective client, screening · cites MR 1.18(c)–(d)
MC-0026 · d2
Attorney Sandoval's website lists her practice areas and an email address, with no invitation to send case details. Without any prior contact, Carver emails Sandoval a detailed description of his dispute with his neighbor, including damaging admissions. Sandoval doesn't reply. A week later, the neighbor asks Sandoval to sue Carver over the same dispute.
Which is the most accurate statement? - A. Sandoval is not disqualified, because someone emailing with no reasonable expectation that the lawyer will discuss an engagement isn't a prospective client, and Carver wasn't invited. - B. Sandoval is disqualified, because a lawyer with significantly harmful information from a prospective client is disqualified, and Carver revealed admissions. - C. Sandoval may act if Carver and the neighbor give informed consent, confirmed in writing, because that cures prospective-client disqualification, and Carver's email concerns this dispute. - D. Sandoval is disqualified, because a lawyer may not use a prospective client's information against him, and Carver's email has damaging admissions.
- Answer: A. A person who communicates information unilaterally, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss a possible relationship, isn't a prospective client. Merely listing an email address with no invitation to share details doesn't create that expectation. (MR 1.18 cmt. [2])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Carver never became a prospective client. (MR 1.18(a), (c); cmt. [2])
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the stem establishes no prospective-client disqualification, so there is nothing to cure. (MR 1.18(d)(1))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it protects prospective clients, and Carver isn't one. (MR 1.18(b); cmt. [2])
- Tags: 4.4 · prospective client · cites MR 1.18 cmt. [2]
- Reviewer note: whether a website creates a reasonable expectation depends on its wording (cmt. [2]). The stem states "no invitation to send case details" to keep one best answer.
MC-0027 · d2
Tessa Quintero calls Attorney Ibarra about suing her former employer for wrongful termination. Ibarra asks only for the parties' names and a one-sentence summary, runs a conflict check, and learns his firm already represents the employer. He ends the call. Quintero's summary included one fact that could significantly harm her case. The firm timely screens Ibarra, gives him no part of any fee, and promptly sends Quintero written notice.
May Ibarra's firm continue to represent the employer? - A. Yes, because screening protects the firm if the lawyer limited the interview, and Ibarra took only names and a brief summary of the dispute. - B. No, because a lawyer with significantly harmful information from a prospective client is disqualified, and Quintero told Ibarra a harmful fact. - C. No, because a prospective-client conflict can be cured by both parties' informed consent, confirmed in writing, and neither has consented. - D. Yes, because a relationship forms by the lawyer's agreement or failure to decline despite known reliance, and Ibarra promptly declined.
- Answer: A. A lawyer who received disqualifying information from a prospective client doesn't disqualify his firm if he took reasonable measures to limit the information to what was needed, is timely screened and apportioned no part of the fee, and prompt written notice goes to the prospective client. (MR 1.18(d)(2))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it disqualifies Ibarra personally; the screening exception protects the firm. (MR 1.18(c), (d)(2))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but consent is one cure; the screen, which the firm met, is another. (MR 1.18(d)(1)–(2))
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. No client-lawyer relationship formed, but Quintero was still a prospective client whose disqualifying information binds Ibarra; the firm is saved by the screen. (MR 1.18(a), (c); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (Tier 3 — persuasive))
- Tags: 4.4 · prospective client, screening, timely screened · cites MR 1.18(d)(2)
MC-0028 · d2
Attorney Novak meets briefly with a restaurant owner about a lease dispute with his landlord. The owner shares only the lease's publicly recorded terms and says he wants to "explore options." Novak declines the case. The landlord then asks Novak to represent it in the same dispute. Nothing the owner said would harm him in the dispute.
May Novak represent the landlord? - A. No, because a lawyer may not use or reveal information learned from a prospective client, and the owner discussed this same dispute. - B. No, unless the owner and landlord give informed consent, confirmed in writing, because that cures a prospective-client disqualification. - C. Yes, because disqualification requires significantly harmful information, and the owner shared only publicly recorded lease terms. - D. Yes, if Novak is screened, because screening can protect a firm from a prospective-client conflict, and Novak met with the owner.
- Answer: C. A lawyer is disqualified from acting against a prospective client in the same matter only if he received information that could be significantly harmful to that person. Publicly recorded terms and a general wish to explore options aren't significantly harmful. Novak must still protect what he learned. (MR 1.18(b)–(c))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but representation and use are separate questions. Paragraph (b) limits Novak's use of what he learned; only significantly harmful information disqualifies him under paragraph (c), and he received none. (MR 1.18(b)–(c))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but there is no disqualification to cure. (MR 1.18(d)(1))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but screening protects a firm, not Novak himself, and he isn't disqualified. (MR 1.18(d)(2))
- Tags: 4.4 · prospective client · cites MR 1.18(c)
4.5 Imputed conflicts
MC-0029 · d2
At her former firm, Associate Diaz personally represented Buyer Co. in a contract dispute with Seller Co. She joins New Firm, which represents Seller Co. in that same dispute. New Firm immediately screens Diaz, gives her no part of the fee, sends Buyer Co. written notice describing the screen and the other required information, and agrees to provide certifications of compliance. Buyer Co. objects.
Under the Model Rules, may New Firm continue representing Seller Co.? - A. No, because a lawyer may not switch sides in the same matter without the former client's consent, and Diaz represented Buyer Co. in this matter. - B. Yes, because a lateral's former-client conflict isn't imputed if she is screened with notice, and New Firm screened Diaz and notified Buyer Co. - C. No, because a conflict can be cured by the affected client's informed consent, and Buyer Co. has objected. - D. Yes, because a lawyer's personal-interest conflict is generally not imputed, and Diaz's conflict comes from her own past work.
- Answer: B. A lateral lawyer's former-client conflict from a prior firm isn't imputed to her new firm if she is timely screened, gets no part of the fee, and the former client receives prompt written notice. The firm must also provide certifications of compliance when the former client asks and when the screen ends, which New Firm has agreed to do. Under the Model Rule, this works even if she personally worked on the same matter. (MR 1.10(a)(2); cmts. [7]–[10])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it disqualifies Diaz, not New Firm, which met the screening exception. (MR 1.9(a); MR 1.10(a)(2))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the screening exception works without consent. (MR 1.10(a)(2))
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. A former-client conflict isn't a personal-interest conflict; the screen is what protects the firm. (MR 1.10(a)(1)–(2))
- Tags: 4.5 · imputed conflict, screening, timely screened · cites MR 1.10(a)(2)
MC-0030 · d2
Attorney Clement joins Barlow LLP from a firm where she represented Pinecrest Co. in a pending lawsuit. Barlow represents Pinecrest's opponent in that lawsuit. Barlow screens Clement on her first day and gives her no part of the fee, but never notifies Pinecrest of her arrival or of the screen.
Is Barlow subject to disqualification? - A. No, because a screen must be in place in time to protect the former client, and Barlow screened Clement on her first day. - B. No, because a screened lateral must be apportioned no part of the fee, and Clement receives no share of this fee. - C. Yes, unless Barlow certifies compliance, because a firm must certify its screen when the former client asks, and Pinecrest is that client. - D. Yes, because a lateral screen also requires prompt written notice to the former client, and Barlow never notified Pinecrest.
- Answer: D. The lateral-screening exception has several parts. The screen and fee exclusion aren't enough; prompt written notice to the affected former client is also required, so it can check compliance. (MR 1.10(a)(2)(ii))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but notice is also required, and Barlow gave none. (MR 1.10(a)(2)(i)–(ii))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but fee exclusion doesn't replace notice. (MR 1.10(a)(2)(i)–(ii))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Pinecrest never asked, and the missing element is the notice. (MR 1.10(a)(2)(ii)–(iii))
- Tags: 4.5 · screening, imputed conflict · cites MR 1.10(a)(2)
MC-0031 · d2
Paralegal Zhou worked on a construction-defect case for the contractor at her old firm. She takes a job at Emmett & Vance, which represents the homeowner suing the contractor in the same case. Emmett & Vance instructs Zhou not to work on or discuss the case and restricts her access to its files.
Is Emmett & Vance disqualified? - A. Yes, unless the contractor consents, because a former client's consent cures a same-matter conflict, and Zhou worked on the contractor's side. - B. Yes, because a lawyer's former-client conflict follows the lawyer to a new firm, and Zhou worked for the contractor at her old firm. - C. No, because a nonlawyer's prior work is not imputed to the firm's lawyers, and Zhou is a paralegal whom the firm has screened. - D. No, because a timely screen with notice can prevent imputing a lateral's conflict, and Emmett & Vance restricted Zhou's access.
- Answer: C. MR 1.10(a) imputation covers lawyers, not nonlawyer assistants. Nonlawyers must still be screened to protect the former client's information, as the firm did, and the firm must supervise them under MR 5.3. (MR 1.10 cmt. [4])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but there is no disqualification to cure. (MR 1.10 cmt. [4])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate for lawyers, but Zhou is a nonlawyer. (MR 1.10(a); cmt. [4])
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. That exception is for lawyers and needs notice; nonlawyers aren't imputed at all. (MR 1.10(a)(2); cmt. [4])
- Tags: 4.5 · imputed conflict, screening · cites MR 1.10 cmt. [4]; MR 5.3
MC-0032 · d2
Attorney Nakamura, a partner at Cruz & Nakamura, holds strong personal beliefs against a gun manufacturer and refuses to work on any case defending it. The manufacturer asks the firm to defend it in a product-liability suit. Partner Cruz, who would lead the defense, does not share Nakamura's views and does not report to her. Nakamura will have no role in the case and will not supervise, discuss or be paid for it.
May Cruz & Nakamura represent the manufacturer? - A. No, because a lawyer's conflict is generally imputed to others in the firm, and Nakamura is a partner at Cruz & Nakamura. - B. No, unless Nakamura is screened, because screening can prevent imputing a lateral's conflict, and Nakamura won't be defending the manufacturer herself. - C. Yes, because a personal-interest conflict isn't imputed absent significant risk to others, and Cruz neither shares Nakamura's views nor reports to her. - D. Yes, if the manufacturer consents, because a client may waive a consentable conflict, and Nakamura's views would be disclosed to it.
- Answer: C. A conflict based on one lawyer's personal interest, such as strong political or moral views, isn't imputed if it doesn't present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation by the other lawyers. Cruz doesn't share Nakamura's views or answer to her, and she will have nothing to do with the case. (MR 1.10(a)(1); cmt. [3])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but personal-interest conflicts with no significant risk to others are excepted. (MR 1.10(a)(1))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Nakamura isn't a lateral and her conflict isn't imputed. (MR 1.10(a)(2))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the firm has no conflict needing consent. (MR 1.7(b)(4); MR 1.10(a)(1))
- Tags: 4.5 · personal-interest conflict, imputed conflict · cites MR 1.10(a)(1)
MC-0033 · d3
Partner Atwell represents start-up Quillon Labs. Her partner at the same firm, Attorney Dorsey, has never worked for Quillon. Dorsey buys a 5% stake directly from Quillon in its seed round, on terms that are fair. He does not advise Quillon in writing to seek independent counsel or obtain Quillon's signed consent.
Is Dorsey subject to discipline? - A. No, because the business-transaction rule protects a lawyer's own clients, and Dorsey has never worked for Quillon. - B. Yes, because the business-transaction rule extends to every lawyer in the client's lawyer's firm, and Dorsey is Atwell's partner. - C. No, because the business-transaction rule requires fair and reasonable terms, and Dorsey bought his Quillon stake on fair terms. - D. Yes, if Atwell knew of the deal, because a partner who knows of another lawyer's violation may be responsible, and Atwell represents Quillon.
- Answer: B. The specific prohibitions in MR 1.8(a) through (i) that apply to one lawyer apply to every lawyer in the firm. So a lawyer may not enter a business transaction with another firm lawyer's client without meeting MR 1.8(a), even if he isn't personally involved in the representation. (MR 1.8(k); cmt. [23])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but MR 1.8(k) extends it to every lawyer in the firm. (MR 1.8(k))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but written advice and signed consent are also required. (MR 1.8(a)(1)–(3))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate for Atwell's own liability, but Dorsey's violation doesn't depend on her knowledge. (MR 5.1(c); MR 1.8(k))
- Tags: 4.5 · imputed conflict, business transaction with a client · cites MR 1.8(k)
MC-0034 · d1
Attorney Lyle of Harmon Law begins a consensual sexual relationship with Client Beaumont during Beaumont's custody case. Harmon Law immediately removes Lyle from the case and assigns it to Attorney Achebe, who has no involvement with Beaumont outside the case.
Is Harmon Law disqualified from continuing to represent Beaumont? - A. Yes, because most specific conflict bans in MR 1.8 are imputed to the firm, and Lyle is a Harmon Law lawyer. - B. Yes, unless Beaumont gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, because a client may waive an imputed conflict, and Beaumont is Harmon Law's client. - C. No, because the sexual-relations ban excludes relationships predating the representation, and Lyle's relationship is consensual. - D. No, because the sexual-relations ban is not imputed to other lawyers, and Achebe has no involvement with Beaumont outside the case.
- Answer: D. MR 1.8(k) imputes the prohibitions in MR 1.8(a) through (i) but not (j), the ban on sexual relations. Lyle may be subject to discipline, but the other lawyers of the firm aren't disqualified. (MR 1.8(j)–(k); cmt. [23])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the sexual-relations ban is the one expressly left out. (MR 1.8(k))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but there is no imputed conflict to waive. (MR 1.8(k))
- C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. The relationship began during the case, so the exception doesn't apply; the firm is free because the ban isn't imputed. (MR 1.8(j)–(k))
- Tags: 4.5 · imputed conflict · cites MR 1.8(k)
MC-0035 · d3
Partner Abbott represented Client Zeller in a land-use dispute while at Bishop & Ortiz. Abbott then left the firm, and Zeller followed him as a client. Two years later, Bishop & Ortiz is asked to represent Zeller's neighbor against Zeller in the same land-use dispute. Associate Kincaid, who remains at Bishop & Ortiz, worked with Abbott on Zeller's matter and knows Zeller's confidential development plans.
May Bishop & Ortiz represent the neighbor? - A. Yes, because a firm may generally oppose a departed lawyer's client, and Abbott left Bishop & Ortiz and took Zeller with him. - B. Yes, if Kincaid is screened, because screening can prevent imputing a lateral's conflict, and Kincaid knows Zeller's plans. - C. No, because a lawyer's former-client conflict is imputed while he is at a firm, and Abbott represented Zeller at Bishop & Ortiz. - D. No, because a firm is barred if a remaining lawyer has material information in the same matter, and Kincaid knows Zeller's plans.
- Answer: D. After a lawyer leaves, the firm may act against the departed lawyer's client unless the matter is the same or substantially related and a remaining lawyer has protected, material information. Both conditions are met because Kincaid knows Zeller's plans. The firm could proceed only with Zeller's informed consent under MR 1.10(c). (MR 1.10(b))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the exception applies because Kincaid remains and knows Zeller's plans. (MR 1.10(b)(2))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Kincaid isn't a lateral. (MR 1.10(a)(2), (b))
- C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. Abbott has left, so his conflict is no longer imputed; Kincaid's knowledge bars the firm. (MR 1.10(b))
- Tags: 4.5 · imputed conflict, former-client conflict · cites MR 1.10(b)
4.6 Acquiring an interest in litigation
MC-0036 · d1
Attorney Kaplan represents Client Oduya, who is not indigent, in a personal-injury case on a one-third contingent fee. Kaplan pays $8,000 for expert witnesses and filing fees. Their written agreement says Oduya must repay these costs only if the case produces a recovery.
Is Kaplan subject to discipline? - A. No, because a lawyer may advance costs with repayment contingent on outcome, and Kaplan's agreement ties repayment to Oduya's recovery. - B. Yes, because a lawyer may pay an indigent client's costs outright, and Oduya is not indigent. - C. Yes, because a lawyer may not give a client financial assistance in connection with pending litigation, and Kaplan paid $8,000 for Oduya's case. - D. No, because a lawyer may take a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case, and Kaplan's fee is one-third of any recovery.
- Answer: A. A lawyer may advance court costs and litigation expenses, and repayment may be contingent on the outcome. This exception isn't limited to indigent clients. (MR 1.8(e)(1))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but advancing costs is allowed for any client. (MR 1.8(e)(1)–(2))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it excepts advancing costs and litigation expenses. (MR 1.8(e)(1))
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. That exception is to the proprietary-interest ban; the costs exception is what applies. (MR 1.8(i)(2), (e)(1))
- Tags: 4.6 · financial assistance · cites MR 1.8(e)(1)
MC-0037 · d1
Attorney Tanaka represents Client Abernathy, who lost his job, in a pending wrongful-termination suit. Abernathy says he may be evicted. Tanaka is not working pro bono. She lends Abernathy $2,000 for rent, to be repaid from any settlement.
Is Tanaka subject to discipline? - A. No, because repayment of advanced litigation costs may depend on the outcome, and Abernathy repays Tanaka only from a settlement. - B. Yes, because a lawyer may not give financial help for living expenses in pending litigation, and Tanaka lent Abernathy rent money. - C. No, because a pro bono lawyer may give an indigent client modest gifts for rent, and Abernathy faces eviction. - D. Yes, unless the loan met the business-transaction rule, because a loan to a client is a business deal, and Tanaka lent Abernathy $2,000.
- Answer: B. A lawyer may not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending litigation, except for court costs, litigation expenses and the narrow pro bono gift exception. A loan for rent in a paid representation fits none of them. (MR 1.8(e))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but rent is a living expense, not a litigation cost. (MR 1.8(e)(1))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Tanaka is paid and made a loan, not a gift. (MR 1.8(e)(3))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but meeting MR 1.8(a) doesn't cure the financial-assistance ban. (MR 1.8(a), (e))
- Tags: 4.6 · financial assistance · cites MR 1.8(e)
MC-0038 · d2
Attorney Adeyemi represents an indigent tenant pro bono through a nonprofit legal-aid organization in an eviction defense. The client can't afford bus fare to court or his blood-pressure medication. Without having promised anything beforehand, Adeyemi buys the client a monthly bus pass and pays for one refill. She does not seek repayment, and the organization doesn't advertise such help.
Is Adeyemi subject to discipline? - A. No, because a pro bono lawyer may give an indigent client modest living-expense gifts, and Adeyemi bought a bus pass and one refill. - B. Yes, because a lawyer may pay an indigent client's court costs and litigation expenses, and a bus pass and medicine are neither. - C. No, because the gift rule bars soliciting a substantial gift from a client, and Adeyemi's client asked for nothing. - D. Yes, because a lawyer may not give a client financial assistance in pending litigation, and Adeyemi paid expenses during the eviction case.
- Answer: A. A lawyer representing an indigent client pro bono, including through a nonprofit legal-services organization, may give modest gifts for food, rent, transportation, medicine and similar basic living expenses. The lawyer may not promise the gifts before being retained or as an inducement to continue the relationship, seek reimbursement, or advertise them. Adeyemi met every condition. (MR 1.8(e)(3))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a separate exception covers modest living-expense gifts in pro bono cases. (MR 1.8(e)(2)–(3))
- C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. That rule governs gifts from a client; gifts to a client fall under the financial-assistance rule. (MR 1.8(c), (e)(3))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Adeyemi met each condition of the pro bono gift exception. (MR 1.8(e)(3))
- Tags: 4.6 · financial assistance · cites MR 1.8(e)(3)
MC-0039 · d2
Attorney Branson represents Client Rao in a pending lawsuit to determine who owns a valuable painting. Midway through the case, Rao needs cash. Branson pays Rao $20,000, a fair price, for a 25% ownership share in the painting, effective immediately and regardless of how the lawsuit ends. Branson puts the terms in writing, advises Rao in writing to consult another lawyer, and Rao signs a consent.
Is Branson subject to discipline? - A. No, because a business deal with a client requires fair and reasonable terms, and Branson paid Rao a fair $20,000. - B. Yes, because a lawyer may not acquire an interest in the subject of his litigation, and Branson bought part of the disputed painting. - C. No, because a business deal with a client is proper when every MR 1.8(a) safeguard is met, and Rao signed a consent. - D. Yes, because a business deal with a client requires informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, and Branson bought a share from Rao mid-case.
- Answer: B. A lawyer handling a lawsuit may not take an ownership stake in the claim or in the property being fought over. The only exceptions are a lien the law allows and a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case. Buying a present share of the disputed painting is neither. (MR 1.8(i); cmt. [19])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the proprietary-interest ban applies however fair the price. (MR 1.8(a)(1), (i))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but even full compliance with MR 1.8(a) (fair terms, written disclosure, written advice and a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel, and informed consent in a writing signed by the client) doesn't cure MR 1.8(i), a separate ban. (MR 1.8(a), (i); cmt. [19])
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. Rao did sign a consent; the violation is the interest in the painting. (MR 1.8(a)(3), (i))
- Tags: 4.6 · proprietary interest in litigation, business transaction with a client · cites MR 1.8(a), (i)
- v1.1: rewritten after Grok Pass B, so a "percentage of the recovery" contingent-fee reading is no longer possible.
4.7 Business transactions with clients
MC-0040 · d2
Attorney Brooks represents Client Hale, who is starting a software company. Brooks offers to invest $50,000 for 10% of the shares. The terms are fair, and Brooks sends Hale a letter describing them and advising him in writing to consult independent counsel. A week later, Hale says on the phone that he agrees. Brooks sends Hale an email confirming the call, then wires the money. Hale never signs anything. No litigation is pending.
Is Brooks subject to discipline? - A. Yes, because a business deal with a client requires informed consent in a writing signed by the client, and Hale agreed only by phone. - B. No, because a business deal with a client requires fair terms fully disclosed in writing, and Brooks sent Hale a letter describing fair terms. - C. No, because consent to a conflict may be confirmed by the lawyer's prompt writing, and Brooks emailed Hale confirming the call. - D. Yes, because a lawyer may not acquire an interest in the subject of litigation she conducts, and Brooks bought 10% of Hale's company.
- Answer: A. MR 1.8(a) requires fair terms disclosed in writing, written advice to seek independent counsel, and the client's informed consent in a writing signed by the client. A lawyer's confirming email doesn't meet the third requirement. (MR 1.8(a)(3))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the signed consent is also required and missing. (MR 1.8(a)(1)–(3))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate for general conflicts, but a business deal needs a writing the client signs. (MR 1.0(b); MR 1.8(a)(3))
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. No litigation is pending, so MR 1.8(i) doesn't apply. (MR 1.8(i))
- Tags: 4.7 · business transaction with a client, writing signed by the client · cites MR 1.8(a)
MC-0041 · d1
Attorney Varga represents Client Delacroix, who owns a chain of hardware stores, in a zoning dispute. Varga buys a lawnmower at one of Delacroix's stores at the regular retail price, the same price any customer would pay.
Is Varga subject to discipline? - A. Yes, because a business deal with a client requires written advice to seek counsel, and Varga gave Delacroix none. - B. Yes, because a business deal with a client requires informed consent in a writing signed by the client, and Delacroix signed no writing. - C. No, because the business-transaction rule requires terms fair to the client, and Varga paid the full retail price. - D. No, because the rule excludes standard commercial sales of goods the client sells to the public, and Varga paid retail.
- Answer: D. MR 1.8(a) doesn't apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and client for products or services the client generally markets to others. There's no advantage for the lawyer to exploit. (MR 1.8 cmt. [1])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it doesn't apply to standard retail purchases. (MR 1.8(a)(2); cmt. [1])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it doesn't apply here either. (MR 1.8(a)(3); cmt. [1])
- C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. Fair terms alone wouldn't satisfy MR 1.8(a); it doesn't apply to a standard sale. (MR 1.8 cmt. [1])
- Tags: 4.7 · business transaction with a client · cites MR 1.8 cmt. [1]
MC-0042 · d2
Attorney Pham drafts incorporation documents and investor agreements for Client Solberg's new company. Solberg has little cash and offers Pham 2% of the company's stock as her entire fee. No litigation is involved. Pham is willing to accept.
What must Pham do before accepting the stock? - A. Only ensure a reasonable fee, because the fee rule governs fee arrangements, and Pham is taking Solberg's stock as her fee. - B. Obtain consent confirmed in writing, because a concurrent conflict needs that form of consent, and the stock gives Pham a stake in Solberg's company. - C. Comply with the business-transaction rule, because it applies when a lawyer takes a client's stock as a fee, and Pham is doing so. - D. Decline, because a lawyer may not acquire an interest in the subject of litigation she conducts, and Pham would own part of Solberg's company.
- Answer: C. Ordinary fee arrangements are governed by MR 1.5, but when a lawyer accepts an interest in the client's business as payment, MR 1.8(a) also applies: fair terms fully disclosed in writing, written advice to seek independent counsel, and the client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The fee must also be reasonable under MR 1.5. (MR 1.8 cmt. [1]; MR 1.5)
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but taking an ownership interest also brings in MR 1.8(a). (MR 1.8 cmt. [1])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a business deal needs a writing the client signs, plus the other MR 1.8(a) steps. (MR 1.7(b)(4); MR 1.8(a))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but this is transactional work, not litigation. (MR 1.8(i))
- Tags: 4.7 · business transaction with a client · cites MR 1.8(a), cmt. [1]
MC-0043 · d2
Attorney Jovanovic handles commercial leasing for Client Trent Holdings. No litigation is pending. Jovanovic lends Trent $200,000 at a fair interest rate. He gives Trent's chief executive a clear written description of the terms, and the executive signs a document consenting to the terms and to Jovanovic's role. The chief executive is an experienced businessperson, so Jovanovic doesn't mention independent counsel.
Is Jovanovic subject to discipline? - A. No, because a business deal requires fair terms and informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, and Trent's chief executive signed a consent to fair terms. - B. Yes, because a business deal requires written advice on the desirability of independent counsel, and Jovanovic never mentioned counsel to Trent. - C. No, because an organization acts through its authorized officers, and Trent's experienced chief executive approved the loan. - D. Yes, because a lawyer may not give financial assistance in pending or contemplated litigation, and Jovanovic lent Trent $200,000.
- Answer: B. All three MR 1.8(a) requirements are mandatory, including written advice about the desirability of seeking independent counsel and a reasonable opportunity to do so. The client's sophistication doesn't waive it. (MR 1.8(a)(2))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but written advice to seek counsel is also required. (MR 1.8(a)(1)–(3))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but MR 1.8(a) has no exception for sophisticated officers. (MR 1.13(a); MR 1.8(a)(2))
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. The loan has no connection to pending or contemplated litigation. (MR 1.8(e))
- Tags: 4.7 · business transaction with a client · cites MR 1.8(a)(2)
4.8 Third-party compensation and aggregate settlements
MC-0044 · d1
Walter Szabo hires Attorney Sousa to defend his 22-year-old son, Felix, on a drunk-driving charge, and pays the fee. Walter tells Sousa he expects weekly reports on everything Felix tells her, but he will pay the fee whether or not Sousa agrees. Felix gives informed consent to his father paying the fee but does not want his father to know what he tells Sousa.
What must Sousa do? - A. Give Walter weekly reports, because a client may consent to a third party's paying the fee, and Felix consented to Walter paying. - B. Decline, because a payer may not interfere with the lawyer's judgment, and Walter demands reports on everything Felix says. - C. Protect Felix's confidences, because a lawyer paid by a third party must protect the client's information, and Felix doesn't want Walter told. - D. Give Walter general updates, because a lawyer may reveal information impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, and Walter funds the defense.
- Answer: C. A lawyer may accept payment from a third party only if the client consents, there is no interference with the lawyer's judgment, and the client's information is protected as MR 1.6 requires. Felix is the client; Walter has no right to his confidences, which Sousa may share only with Felix's informed consent. (MR 1.8(f); MR 1.6)
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but consent to payment isn't consent to disclosure. (MR 1.8(f)(1), (3))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Walter will pay regardless, so his demand doesn't control Sousa's judgment; she simply refuses it. (MR 1.8(f)(2))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Felix has objected, so nothing is impliedly authorized. (MR 1.6(a))
- Tags: 4.8 · third-party payer · cites MR 1.8(f)
MC-0045 · d3
Delivery driver Amara is sued after a crash while making deliveries. Her employer, Swift Haulage, hires Attorney Kerr to defend her and pays the fee. Amara has a strong defense that Swift Haulage overloaded her truck, which would shift liability to the company. Swift Haulage tells Kerr not to raise that defense. Amara has not agreed to drop it.
Which is the most accurate statement? - A. Kerr may follow the instruction, because a lawyer may reasonably limit scope with consent, and Swift Haulage is paying for the defense. - B. Kerr may follow the instruction, because an employer may pay an employee's defense with the employee's informed consent, and Swift employs Amara. - C. Kerr must withdraw, because a lawyer must withdraw if continuing will violate the rules, and Swift Haulage's interests conflict with Amara's. - D. Kerr must use independent judgment, because a payer may not direct the lawyer's judgment, and Swift's conflicting interest also triggers MR 1.7.
- Answer: D. A payer may not direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment. When the payer's interests conflict with the client's, creating a significant risk of materially limiting the representation, MR 1.7 applies too. Kerr may continue only if he reasonably believes he can represent Amara effectively and Amara gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. (MR 1.8(f)(2); MR 5.4(c); MR 1.8 cmt. [15]; MR 1.7)
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the consent must be Amara's, and she hasn't given it. (MR 1.2(c))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but payment doesn't let the payer direct the lawyer. (MR 1.8(f)(1)–(2))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Kerr can continue without violating the rules by ignoring the instruction and obtaining Amara's consent. (MR 1.16(a)(1); MR 1.7(b))
- Tags: 4.8 · third-party payer, material limitation · cites MR 1.8(f), MR 5.4(c)
MC-0046 · d2
Attorney Lopez agrees to represent Client Pomeroy in a small-claims counterclaim for a flat fee. Pomeroy's uncle offers to pay the fee. Lopez explains the arrangement and its implications to Pomeroy, who agrees orally. The uncle has no stake in the case and asks for no information. Lopez never puts Pomeroy's consent in writing.
Is Lopez subject to discipline? - A. No, because consent to third-party payment must be informed, and Pomeroy agreed after Lopez explained the uncle's payment. - B. Yes, because consent to a concurrent conflict must be confirmed in writing, and Lopez never put Pomeroy's consent in writing. - C. Yes, because a contingent-fee agreement must be in a writing the client signs, and Pomeroy signed nothing. - D. No, because a fee must be reasonable and its basis communicated, and Lopez charges Pomeroy a flat fee.
- Answer: A. MR 1.8(f) requires informed consent but doesn't require it in writing. A writing is required only if the payment arrangement also creates a MR 1.7 conflict, and nothing here suggests one. (MR 1.8(f); cmt. [15])
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the uncle's payment creates no MR 1.7 conflict. (MR 1.7(b)(4); MR 1.8 cmt. [15])
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Lopez charges a flat fee. (MR 1.5(c))
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. MR 1.8(f) separately requires informed consent, which Pomeroy gave. (MR 1.5(a)–(b); MR 1.8(f)(1))
- Tags: 4.8 · third-party payer, informed consent · cites MR 1.8(f)
MC-0055 · d2
Pinnacle Insurance hires and pays Attorney Okoro to defend its policyholder, Fairbanks, in a car-accident lawsuit. The engagement letter states that Okoro represents only Fairbanks and that Pinnacle is not Okoro's client. During a meeting, Fairbanks tells Okoro that she was using her car for a delivery business she never told Pinnacle about. That fact could let Pinnacle deny coverage. Okoro's services were not used in obtaining the policy. Pinnacle's claims adjuster asks Okoro for a full report of everything Fairbanks has said.
May Okoro give the adjuster Fairbanks's statement about the delivery business? - A. No, because a lawyer paid by an insurer must protect the insured's information, and Fairbanks, not Pinnacle, is Okoro's only client. - B. Yes, because a lawyer may reveal information impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, and Pinnacle funds Fairbanks's defense. - C. Yes, because a lawyer may reveal information to prevent a client's fraud using the lawyer's services, and Fairbanks hid her business. - D. No, unless Pinnacle agrees in writing to limit its use, because a payer may not interfere with the lawyer's judgment, and Pinnacle pays Okoro.
- Answer: A. When an insurer pays for the insured's defense, the insured is the client. The lawyer may accept the insurer's payment only if the client's information stays protected, and the insurer may not direct the lawyer to act against the insured. Revealing a fact that could cost Fairbanks her coverage would betray her. (MR 1.8(f)(3); MR 1.6(a); MR 5.4(c))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a fact that could cost Fairbanks her coverage doesn't advance her defense. (MR 1.6(a); MR 1.8(f)(3))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Okoro's services weren't used in obtaining the policy. (MR 1.6(b)(2)–(3))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a payer's promise doesn't replace Fairbanks's informed consent. (MR 1.6(a); MR 1.8(f)(3))
- Tags: 4.8 · third-party payer · cites MR 1.8(f), MR 1.6, MR 5.4(c)
- v1.1: new item added after Grok Pass A (insurer-insured triangle). v1.8: moved next to the other third-party-payer items; ID unchanged.
MC-0047 · d2
Attorney Mahler represents 12 residents suing a factory over air pollution. At the outset, all 12 signed an agreement that any settlement approved by a majority of them would bind everyone. The factory offers a lump sum to settle all 12 claims, and Mahler tells all 12 about the offer. Eight residents vote to accept. Mahler accepts the offer for all 12.
Is Mahler subject to discipline? - A. No, because the decision to settle belongs to the clients, and eight of the 12 residents voted to accept. - B. Yes, because an aggregate settlement requires each client's signed, informed consent, and four of the 12 never approved it. - C. No, because a client may authorize the lawyer in advance to accept a settlement, and all 12 signed an agreement at the outset. - D. Yes, because a lawyer must promptly tell each client of a settlement offer, and the factory made a lump-sum offer.
- Answer: B. An aggregate settlement requires each client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, after disclosure of all the claims and each person's participation. An advance majority-vote agreement doesn't satisfy it. (MR 1.8(g); cmt. [16])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the decision belongs to each client, not to a majority. (MR 1.2(a); MR 1.8(g))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate for a single client, but an aggregate settlement requires each client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the actual terms. (MR 1.8(g); cmt. [16])
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. Mahler told all 12 about the offer. (MR 1.4(a)(1); MR 1.8(g))
- Tags: 4.8 · aggregate settlement, joint representation · cites MR 1.8(g)
MC-0048 · d2
Attorney Petrov represents three passengers injured in the same bus accident. The bus company offers $600,000 to settle all three claims. Petrov proposes a split and gets each client's signed written consent, but tells each client only the amount that client will receive, not what the others will get.
Is Petrov subject to discipline? - A. No, because an aggregate settlement requires each client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, and all three passengers signed consents. - B. No, because a lawyer may not reveal one client's information without consent, and each passenger's share is such information. - C. Yes, because an aggregate settlement requires disclosing each person's participation, and Petrov told each client only that client's amount. - D. Yes, because whether to accept a settlement is the client's decision, and Petrov proposed the split herself.
- Answer: C. For an aggregate settlement, the lawyer's disclosure to each client must include all the claims involved and each person's participation. Without that, the signed consents aren't informed. (MR 1.8(g))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but consent without the required disclosure isn't informed. (MR 1.8(g); MR 1.0(e))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the aggregate-settlement rule requires disclosing each person's participation. (MR 1.6(a); MR 1.8(g))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a lawyer may propose an allocation; the defect is the missing disclosure. (MR 1.2(a); MR 1.8(g))
- Tags: 4.8 · aggregate settlement, informed consent · cites MR 1.8(g)
4.9 Government lawyers
MC-0049 · d2
As a lawyer at a federal environmental agency, Attorney Serra personally and substantially worked on an enforcement action against Kestrel Coatings. She leaves the agency and joins a private firm. Kestrel asks the firm to defend it in the same enforcement action. The agency will not consent to Serra's involvement. The firm screens Serra, gives her no part of the fee, and promptly notifies the agency in writing.
May the firm represent Kestrel? - A. Yes, because a former government lawyer's firm is protected if she is screened with notice, and the firm screened Serra and notified the agency. - B. No, because a former government lawyer may not handle a matter she worked on personally and substantially, and Serra worked on the Kestrel action. - C. No, because a former government lawyer's conflict can be waived by the agency's informed consent, confirmed in writing, and the agency refused. - D. Yes, if Kestrel gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, because a client may waive a consentable conflict, and Serra's presence affects Kestrel.
- Answer: A. Serra herself is disqualified without the agency's informed consent, confirmed in writing. But her new firm isn't, because she is timely screened and apportioned no part of the fee, and the firm met its separate duty to give the agency prompt written notice. (MR 1.11(a)–(b))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but it disqualifies Serra, not her screened firm. (MR 1.11(a)–(b))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the firm is protected by the screen without agency consent. (MR 1.11(a)(2), (b))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but MR 1.11(b) doesn't depend on the new client's consent. (MR 1.11(b))
- Tags: 4.9 · screening, personally and substantially · cites MR 1.11(b)
MC-0050 · d2
At a state labor agency, Attorney Ashworth drafted a general regulation setting overtime rules for all employers in the state. She then left for private practice. A restaurant company asks her to challenge the regulation's validity in court on behalf of the company. At the agency she learned no confidential government information about any person who would be adverse to the company in the challenge.
May Ashworth represent the company? - A. No, because a former government lawyer may not handle a matter she worked on personally and substantially, and Ashworth drafted the regulation. - B. Yes, because a regulation of general application isn't a "matter" under the government-lawyer rule, and Ashworth's rule covers all employers in the state. - C. No, because a former government lawyer with confidential government information about a person may not act against that person, and Ashworth worked at the agency. - D. Yes, because a screen can protect a former government lawyer's firm, and Ashworth's firm could screen her.
- Answer: B. The government-lawyer rule applies to a "matter", meaning a particular proceeding or dispute involving specific parties. Drafting a regulation of general application usually isn't one. (MR 1.11(e); cmt. [10])
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a general regulation isn't a "matter." (MR 1.11(a), (e))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but MR 1.11(c) looks to information about the person the client would be adverse to, and whether it could be used to that person's material disadvantage; actual use isn't required. Ashworth has no such information about anyone adverse to the company. (MR 1.11(c); cmt. [8])
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. A screen protects the firm, not Ashworth; she is free because there is no "matter." (MR 1.11(b))
- Tags: 4.9 · matter · cites MR 1.11(e)
MC-0051 · d1
Assistant District Attorney Rivas is prosecuting a securities-fraud case. While the case is pending, the defendant's law firm invites Rivas to discuss joining the firm as a partner. Rivas meets the firm's hiring committee and negotiates salary terms.
Is Rivas subject to discipline? - A. No, because a private lawyer may discuss a job with an opposing firm with client consent, and Rivas was invited by the defense firm. - B. Yes, because a lawyer may not reveal information relating to a representation, and Rivas met the defense firm's hiring committee. - C. No, because a law clerk may negotiate with a party's lawyer after notifying the judge, and Rivas appears before the court in this very case. - D. Yes, because a government lawyer may not negotiate for a job with a party's lawyer in her matter, and Rivas negotiated with defense counsel.
- Answer: D. A current government lawyer may not negotiate for private employment with a party or a party's lawyer in a matter in which she is participating personally and substantially, as Rivas is by prosecuting the case. (MR 1.11(d)(2)(ii))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Rivas is a government lawyer, who faces a flat ban. (MR 1.7 cmt. [10]; MR 1.11(d)(2)(ii))
- B is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. Nothing shows Rivas revealed anything; the negotiation itself violates the rule. (MR 1.6(a); MR 1.11(d)(2)(ii))
- C is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Rivas is a prosecutor, not a law clerk. (MR 1.12(b))
- Tags: 4.9 · personally and substantially, personal-interest conflict · cites MR 1.11(d)(2)
MC-0052 · d3
While working at the state revenue department, Attorney Marchetti reviewed the confidential tax returns of businessman Holloway as part of an audit, which the department is legally barred from disclosing. Marchetti leaves for private practice. The returns showed that Holloway had been routing a large share of the business's income into a personal account the partner doesn't know about. Holloway's former business partner now asks Marchetti to sue Holloway over the division of their business profits. The lawsuit is unrelated to the audit, and Marchetti never worked on any matter involving the partner.
May Marchetti represent the partner? - A. Yes, because a former government lawyer is barred from matters he worked on, and Marchetti's lawsuit is unrelated to the audit. - B. Yes, because the matter-based bar requires personal and substantial participation, and Marchetti never worked on a matter with the partner. - C. No, because a former government lawyer may not act against a person his confidential government information could disadvantage, and Marchetti saw Holloway's returns. - D. No, because a former government lawyer needs the agency's informed consent, confirmed in writing, to handle a matter he worked on, and Marchetti audited Holloway himself.
- Answer: C. A lawyer who acquired confidential government information about a person while in government may not represent a private client adverse to that person in a matter where the information could be used to the person's material disadvantage. Tax-return data could be used in a profits dispute. Disqualification doesn't require actual use or an intent to use the information. Marchetti's firm could act only if he were timely screened and got no part of the fee. (MR 1.11(c))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a separate information-based bar applies even in a different matter. (MR 1.11(a), (c))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but the information bar turns on what Marchetti knows about Holloway. (MR 1.11(c))
- D is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. The lawsuit isn't the audit matter; the information bar controls. (MR 1.11(a)(2), (c))
- Tags: 4.9 · confidential government information · cites MR 1.11(c)
4.10 Former judges, arbitrators, mediators and neutrals
MC-0053 · d1
Attorney Oyelaran served as the mediator in a commercial lease dispute between Landlord Gallo and Tenant Wong. The mediation produced a partial agreement, but the parties later went to court over the remaining issues. Gallo now asks Oyelaran to represent him in that lawsuit. Gallo consents in writing; Wong refuses.
May Oyelaran represent Gallo? - A. Yes, if Oyelaran is screened, because a screen can protect a former neutral's firm, and Oyelaran's firm could screen her. - B. Yes, because a former neutral may act with the parties' informed consent, confirmed in writing, and Gallo consented in writing. - C. No, because a lawyer may not use a former client's information against that client, and Oyelaran learned Wong's positions. - D. No, because a former mediator needs all parties' informed consent, confirmed in writing, and Wong refuses to give it.
- Answer: D. A lawyer who participated personally and substantially as a mediator or other third-party neutral may not represent anyone in the same matter unless all parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing. Wong refuses. (MR 1.12(a))
- A is wrong: the rule is accurate, but a screen protects the firm, not Oyelaran herself. (MR 1.12(c))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but "the parties" means all parties, and Wong refuses. (MR 1.12(a))
- C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. Wong was never Oyelaran's client. (MR 1.9(c); MR 1.12(a))
- Tags: 4.10 · personally and substantially · cites MR 1.12(a)
MC-0054 · d2
Kim, a licensed lawyer, is a law clerk to Judge Albright. Kim is drafting the bench memo in a pending breach-of-contract case, so she is participating personally and substantially in it. The law firm representing the plaintiff invites Kim to interview for an associate position. Before responding, Kim tells Judge Albright about the invitation, and she then interviews with the firm.
Is Kim subject to discipline? - A. No, because a law clerk may negotiate with a party's lawyer after first notifying the judge, and Kim told Judge Albright before the interview. - B. Yes, because a judge may not negotiate for a job with a party's lawyer in her matter, and Kim works on this case. - C. No, because the conflict rules govern lawyers in their representation of clients, and Kim represents no clients. - D. Yes, unless both parties give informed consent, confirmed in writing, because a former neutral needs all parties' consent, and Kim is on the case.
- Answer: A. Unlike a judge, a law clerk may negotiate for employment with a party or a party's lawyer in a matter in which she is participating personally and substantially, but only after notifying the judge. Kim did so. (MR 1.12(b))
- B is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Kim is a clerk, not the judge. (MR 1.12(b))
- C is wrong: the right result for the wrong reason. MR 1.12(b) expressly covers law clerks; Kim is fine because she notified the judge. (MR 1.12(b))
- D is wrong: the rule is accurate, but Kim is not a former neutral. (MR 1.12(a)–(b))
- Tags: 4.10 · personally and substantially · cites MR 1.12(b)
B3. True/False
Format: statement · answer · why · corrected statement (false items) · exam trap · cite · outline.
TF-0001
- Statement: Informed consent requires that the lawyer explain the material risks of, and reasonably available alternatives to, the proposed course of conduct.
- Answer: True
- Why: That is the definition. Agreement without that explanation isn't informed consent.
- Exam trap: Treating a bare "yes" from the client as informed consent.
- Cite: MR 1.0(e) · Outline: OUT-4.0
TF-0002
- Statement: Consent "confirmed in writing" requires the client's signature.
- Answer: False
- Why: A writing the lawyer promptly sends to confirm the client's oral informed consent is enough.
- Corrected statement: Consent "confirmed in writing" may be the client's own writing or a writing the lawyer promptly sends confirming the client's oral informed consent; no signature is needed.
- Exam trap: Confusing "confirmed in writing" with "a writing signed by the client" (MR 1.8(a), 1.8(g)).
- Cite: MR 1.0(b) · Outline: OUT-4.0
TF-0003
- Statement: A lawyer may never represent a client whose interests are directly adverse to another current client.
- Answer: False
- Why: Direct adversity is a concurrent conflict, but it is usually consentable under MR 1.7(b).
- Corrected statement: A lawyer may represent a client directly adverse to another current client if she reasonably believes she can represent both competently and diligently, the representation is lawful, it doesn't involve opposing clients in the same litigation, and each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- Exam trap: "Never sue a current client."
- Cite: MR 1.7(b) · Outline: OUT-4.1.2
TF-0004
- Statement: A lawyer may not represent clients asserting claims against each other in the same litigation, even if both clients consent.
- Answer: True
- Why: This is one of the conflicts no consent can cure. It's a true absolute.
- Exam trap: Assuming every conflict can be waived.
- Cite: MR 1.7(b)(3) · Outline: OUT-4.1.2
TF-0005
- Statement: Representing two businesses that compete with each other, in unrelated matters, is ordinarily a concurrent conflict of interest.
- Answer: False
- Why: Economic competition alone isn't direct adversity, and unrelated matters create no material-limitation risk.
- Corrected statement: Representing two business competitors in unrelated matters ordinarily is not a conflict of interest.
- Exam trap: Treating economic competitors as adverse parties.
- Cite: MR 1.7 cmt. [6] · Outline: OUT-4.1.1
TF-0006
- Statement: A material-limitation conflict exists when there is a significant risk, not a certainty, that the lawyer's other duties or interests will materially limit the representation.
- Answer: True
- Why: The test is a significant risk that the conflict will interfere with the lawyer's judgment.
- Exam trap: Waiting for actual harm before seeing a conflict.
- Cite: MR 1.7(a)(2); cmt. [8] · Outline: OUT-4.1.1
TF-0007
- Statement: If jointly represented clients later sue each other, their communications with their shared lawyer remain privileged against each other.
- Answer: False
- Why: The privilege generally doesn't protect joint clients' communications from each other in a later dispute between them.
- Corrected statement: If jointly represented clients later sue each other, the attorney-client privilege generally will not protect their communications with the shared lawyer from each other.
- Exam trap: Assuming the privilege works the same way between joint clients as against outsiders.
- Cite: MR 1.7 cmt. [30] · Outline: OUT-4.1.3
TF-0008
- Statement: A lawyer ordinarily should decline to represent more than one co-defendant in a criminal case.
- Answer: True
- Why: The potential for conflict among criminal co-defendants is so grave that the comments advise declining in most cases.
- Exam trap: Treating criminal co-defendants like civil co-parties.
- Cite: MR 1.7 cmt. [23] · Outline: OUT-4.1.3
TF-0009
- Statement: A general, open-ended advance waiver of future conflicts is effective for any client who signs it.
- Answer: False
- Why: An advance waiver works only to the extent the client reasonably understood the risks. General waivers are ordinarily effective only for experienced users of legal services, especially those independently represented, and for unrelated matters.
- Corrected statement: A general advance waiver is ordinarily effective only if the client is an experienced user of legal services, preferably independently represented, and the waiver covers future conflicts unrelated to the current representation.
- Exam trap: Treating a signature as proof of informed consent.
- Cite: MR 1.7 cmt. [22] · Outline: OUT-4.1.5
TF-0010
- Statement: Arguing opposite legal positions for different clients in different cases is always a conflict of interest.
- Answer: False
- Why: It's ordinarily not a conflict. It becomes one only when a win for one client is likely to seriously weaken the other client's position, for example through precedent in the same court.
- Corrected statement: Arguing opposite legal positions for different clients is ordinarily not a conflict, unless there is a significant risk that the lawyer's work for one client will materially limit her work for the other.
- Exam trap: "Always" is too strong.
- Cite: MR 1.7 cmt. [24] · Outline: OUT-4.1.5
TF-0011
- Statement: A conflict arising from a lawyer's marriage to opposing counsel is ordinarily not imputed to the other lawyers in the lawyer's firm.
- Answer: True
- Why: The conflict is personal. Unless it creates a significant risk of limiting the other lawyers' work, it isn't imputed.
- Exam trap: Disqualifying the whole firm.
- Cite: MR 1.7 cmt. [11]; MR 1.10(a)(1) · Outline: OUT-4.2.1
TF-0012
- Statement: A client's informed consent permits a lawyer to begin a sexual relationship with the client during the representation.
- Answer: False
- Why: The ban has one exception: a consensual relationship that existed before the representation. Consent doesn't cure a new relationship.
- Corrected statement: A lawyer may not have sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship began.
- Exam trap: Treating MR 1.8(j) like a consentable conflict.
- Cite: MR 1.8(j) · Outline: OUT-4.2.2
TF-0013
- Statement: A lawyer may accept an unsolicited simple gift, such as a holiday present, from a client.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 1.8(c) bars soliciting substantial gifts and drafting instruments that give them. It doesn't bar accepting simple or unsolicited gifts.
- Exam trap: Thinking every gift from a client is forbidden.
- Cite: MR 1.8(c); cmt. [6] · Outline: OUT-4.2.3
TF-0014
- Statement: A lawyer may draft a will leaving himself a substantial gift if the client insists on it.
- Answer: False
- Why: The client's wishes don't matter. Unless the lawyer is related to the client, another lawyer must prepare the instrument.
- Corrected statement: A lawyer may not prepare an instrument giving himself a substantial gift unless he is related to the client; the client should have another lawyer prepare it.
- Exam trap: Focusing on who suggested the gift rather than who drafted the will.
- Cite: MR 1.8(c); cmt. [7] · Outline: OUT-4.2.3
TF-0015
- Statement: After a representation has ended, MR 1.8(d) no longer bars a lawyer from acquiring media rights to an account based on it (former-client duties under MR 1.9(c) still apply).
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 1.8(d) applies only before the representation concludes. The lawyer's confidentiality duties still apply afterward.
- Exam trap: Forgetting that confidentiality continues even when MR 1.8(d) no longer applies.
- Cite: MR 1.8(d); cmt. [9] · Outline: OUT-4.2.4
TF-0016
- Statement: A lawyer may agree in advance to limit malpractice liability to a client if the client signs a written waiver.
- Answer: False
- Why: A prospective limit on malpractice liability requires that the client be independently represented in making the agreement. A signature isn't enough.
- Corrected statement: A lawyer may agree in advance to limit malpractice liability to a client only if the client is independently represented in making the agreement.
- Exam trap: Confusing the prospective-limit rule with the settlement rule, which requires only written advice to seek counsel.
- Cite: MR 1.8(h)(1) · Outline: OUT-4.2.6
TF-0017
- Statement: An agreement to arbitrate future malpractice claims is not prohibited, if the client is fully informed of its scope and effect and the agreement is enforceable under applicable law.
- Answer: True
- Why: Arbitration changes the forum but doesn't limit liability, so it isn't barred by MR 1.8(h), provided the client is fully informed and the agreement is enforceable where made.
- Exam trap: Treating arbitration clauses as prohibited liability limits.
- Cite: MR 1.8 cmt. [17] · Outline: OUT-4.2.6
TF-0018
- Statement: A lawyer may never represent a client whose interests are adverse to a former client.
- Answer: False
- Why: The former-client rule bars adversity only in the same or a substantially related matter.
- Corrected statement: A lawyer may not represent a client adverse to a former client in the same or a substantially related matter without the former client's informed consent, confirmed in writing; unrelated matters are not barred.
- Exam trap: Applying current-client loyalty to former clients.
- Cite: MR 1.9(a) · Outline: OUT-4.3.1
TF-0019
- Statement: To show that two matters are substantially related, a former client does not have to reveal the confidential information the lawyer obtained.
- Answer: True
- Why: The lawyer is presumed to have learned what a lawyer ordinarily would in that kind of representation.
- Exam trap: Requiring the former client to prove what the lawyer knows.
- Cite: MR 1.9 cmt. [3] · Outline: OUT-4.3.1
TF-0020
- Statement: Anyone who sends a lawyer an email describing a legal problem becomes a prospective client.
- Answer: False
- Why: A person who communicates unilaterally, without a reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss a relationship, isn't a prospective client.
- Corrected statement: A person becomes a prospective client by consulting a lawyer about a possible client-lawyer relationship; someone who sends information unilaterally, without a reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss representation, does not.
- Exam trap: Treating every contact as a consultation.
- Cite: MR 1.18(a); cmt. [2] · Outline: OUT-4.4
TF-0021
- Statement: A firm can use screening to avoid imputation of a prospective-client conflict only if the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid learning more than was needed to decide whether to take the case.
- Answer: True
- Why: That condition is part of MR 1.18(d)(2), along with a timely screen, no share of the fee, and written notice.
- Exam trap: Assuming a screen always works.
- Cite: MR 1.18(d)(2) · Outline: OUT-4.4
TF-0022
- Statement: Under the Model Rules, screening cannot prevent imputation if the lateral lawyer personally and substantially worked on the same matter at the former firm.
- Answer: False
- Why: The Model Rule's lateral-screening exception has no such limit. Some states restrict screening this way, but the MPRE tests the Model Rule.
- Corrected statement: Under the Model Rules, a firm can avoid imputation of a lateral lawyer's former-client conflict by timely screening, no share of the fee, written notice and certifications, even if the lawyer personally worked on the same matter.
- Exam trap: Applying a stricter state rule on the MPRE.
- Cite: MR 1.10(a)(2) · Outline: OUT-4.5.1
TF-0023
- Statement: The prohibition on sexual relations with clients applies only to the lawyer involved, not to the other lawyers in the firm.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 1.8(k) imputes paragraphs (a) through (i) but not (j).
- Exam trap: Assuming all of MR 1.8 is imputed.
- Cite: MR 1.8(k) · Outline: OUT-4.2.2, OUT-4.5.1
TF-0024
- Statement: A lawyer may advance court costs and litigation expenses, with repayment contingent on the outcome of the case.
- Answer: True
- Why: That is the first exception to the ban on financial assistance, and it applies to any client.
- Exam trap: Limiting it to indigent clients.
- Cite: MR 1.8(e)(1) · Outline: OUT-4.6.2
TF-0025
- Statement: A lawyer may lend a litigation client money for living expenses if the client agrees to repay it with interest.
- Answer: False
- Why: Financial assistance for living expenses in pending litigation is prohibited. The only living-expense exception covers modest gifts to indigent pro bono clients, never loans.
- Corrected statement: A lawyer may not provide financial assistance, including loans, for a litigation client's living expenses; the narrow exception allows only modest gifts to indigent clients represented pro bono.
- Exam trap: Thinking repayment terms make the assistance acceptable.
- Cite: MR 1.8(e) · Outline: OUT-4.6.2
TF-0026
- Statement: An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party on a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from later representing that party.
- Answer: True
- Why: A partisan arbitrator was never neutral toward that party, so MR 1.12(a)'s concern doesn't apply.
- Exam trap: Treating every arbitrator as a neutral.
- Cite: MR 1.12(d) · Outline: OUT-4.10
TF-0027
- Statement: The business-transaction rule applies even when the transaction has nothing to do with the matter the lawyer is handling for the client.
- Answer: True
- Why: The risk of overreaching comes from the relationship of trust, not the subject of the representation.
- Exam trap: Assuming only related transactions are covered.
- Cite: MR 1.8 cmt. [1] · Outline: OUT-4.7
TF-0028
- Statement: A person who pays a lawyer's fee for someone else is entitled to direct the lawyer's strategy.
- Answer: False
- Why: The payer may not direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment. Paying doesn't make the payer a client. Even when a payer is also a client, it can't direct the lawyer's work for the other client.
- Corrected statement: A person who pays a lawyer's fee for someone else may not direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment; the lawyer takes instructions from the client.
- Exam trap: "Whoever pays is the client, or controls the case."
- Cite: MR 1.8(f)(2); MR 5.4(c) · Outline: OUT-4.8.1
TF-0029
- Statement: An aggregate settlement of several clients' claims requires each client's informed consent in a writing signed by that client.
- Answer: True
- Why: MR 1.8(g) requires each client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, after disclosure of all the claims and each person's participation.
- Exam trap: Accepting a majority vote.
- Cite: MR 1.8(g) · Outline: OUT-4.8.2
TF-0030
- Statement: A former government lawyer is barred from any private matter substantially related to one she worked on in government.
- Answer: False
- Why: MR 1.11 uses a narrower test: personal and substantial participation in the same matter. The "substantially related" test is from MR 1.9.
- Corrected statement: A former government lawyer may not represent a private client in a matter in which she participated personally and substantially in government, unless the agency gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
- Exam trap: Applying MR 1.9's test to government lawyers.
- Cite: MR 1.11(a) · Outline: OUT-4.9.1
TF-0031
- Statement: A lawyer may use information learned in a representation to buy property in competition with the client, as long as the lawyer doesn't reveal the information to anyone.
- Answer: False
- Why: The rule forbids using representation information to the client's disadvantage without informed consent. Revealing it isn't required for a violation.
- Corrected statement: A lawyer may not use information learned in a representation to the client's disadvantage, such as buying property the client wants, unless the client gives informed consent or a rule permits it.
- Exam trap: Thinking only disclosure is forbidden. Use counts too.
- Cite: MR 1.8(b); cmt. [5] · Outline: OUT-4.2.5
- v1.1: added after Grok Pass A (MR 1.8(b) was untested).
TF-0032
- Statement: Some conflicts cannot be cured by informed consent, because the law forbids the representation outright.
- Answer: True
- Why: Consent is only one of four conditions that must all be satisfied. A representation the law itself bars stays off-limits no matter how fully the clients agree to it.
- Exam trap: Treating informed consent as a cure-all. It never reaches a representation that law prohibits.
- Cite: MR 1.7(b)(2) · Outline: OUT-4.1.2
B4. Scenario Walkthroughs
SW-0001 · The Start-Up Founders
Facts. Maya Ortiz and Sam Kwan are college friends starting a food-delivery app. They ask Attorney Hollis to form the company and draft their founders' agreement. Each will own half. They can't afford Hollis's hourly rate. Hollis offers to take 3% of the company's stock as her fee, and Maya's father, Rafael, offers to pay any extra costs. Rafael tells Hollis privately that he wants her to "make sure Maya ends up in control," and asks for copies of all correspondence. A month into the work, Sam tells Hollis that he has a job offer from a competitor and may leave the company soon. He asks her not to tell Maya until he decides.
Prompt. Identify the issues and how Hollis should proceed.
Issues.
- May Hollis represent both founders, and what must she tell them?
- What must Hollis do to take stock as her fee?
- How should Hollis handle Rafael's payment and requests?
- What should Hollis do about Sam's request for secrecy?
Rules.
- Joint representation involves a material-limitation conflict. It is consentable if the lawyer reasonably believes she can represent each client competently and diligently and each gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. The lawyer should explain at the start that information will be shared, that the privilege won't protect them against each other, and that she may have to withdraw. (MR 1.7(a)(2), (b); cmts. [29]–[31])
- Accepting an ownership interest in the client's business as a fee is a business transaction: fair terms disclosed in writing, written advice to seek independent counsel, and the client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The fee must also be reasonable. (MR 1.8(a); cmt. [1]; MR 1.5)
- A third party may pay only with the client's informed consent, no interference with the lawyer's judgment, and confidentiality protected. The payer may not direct the lawyer's judgment. (MR 1.8(f); MR 5.4(c))
Application.
- Joint representation. The founders' interests are largely aligned, but they could diverge on control, vesting and exit terms. Hollis may proceed if she reasonably believes she can serve both fairly and gets each founder's informed consent, confirmed in writing, after giving the three warnings.
- Stock fee. Taking 3% of the company is a business transaction with the clients. Hollis must put fair terms in writing, advise both founders in writing to consult independent counsel and give them time to do so, and get their signed consent to the terms and her role. The 3% must also be a reasonable fee.
- Rafael. Hollis may accept Rafael's payment only with the clients' informed consent. Because he wants Maya "in control," his interest conflicts with Sam's and creates a significant risk of limiting the representation, so MR 1.7 is also triggered. Hollis must refuse his direction and may not send him correspondence without the clients' consent.
- Sam's secret. Sam's possible departure is material to the founders' agreement, since it affects vesting and control. Hollis shouldn't keep it from Maya. She should urge Sam to tell Maya. If he refuses, she likely must withdraw from the joint representation.
Conclusion. Hollis may take the joint representation with proper warnings and consent, and may take stock if she satisfies MR 1.8(a) in full. She may accept Rafael's payment only with the clients' consent and without letting him direct her or see confidences. If Sam won't share his plans, she will probably have to withdraw.
Cites: MR 1.7(a)(2), (b), cmts. [29]–[31]; MR 1.8(a), (f); MR 1.5; MR 5.4(c); MR 1.16 Related outline links: OUT-4.1.3 · OUT-4.7 · OUT-4.8.1
SW-0002 · The Lateral Associate
Facts. Associate Nadia Rahimi works at Blake & Moss, which represents Coastal Hospital in a malpractice suit brought by patient Ellen Voight. Rahimi drafted Coastal's discovery responses and knows its litigation strategy. While the case is pending, Voight's law firm, Pérez Grant, invites Rahimi to interview for a position, and she interviews twice without telling anyone at Blake & Moss. Pérez Grant hires her. On her first day, Pérez Grant blocks her from the Voight files, tells staff not to discuss the case with her, and excludes her from any share of the fee. Three weeks later, after Coastal learns of the hire from a news item, Pérez Grant sends Coastal a notice describing the screen. Separately, before joining Blake & Moss, Rahimi had a one-hour consultation with Voight's sister about a different claim, which Rahimi declined.
Prompt. Identify the issues and how the lawyers should proceed.
Issues.
- Did Rahimi's job interviews create a conflict while she worked on Coastal's case?
- Is Pérez Grant disqualified from representing Voight?
- Does the consultation with Voight's sister matter?
Rules.
- Employment discussions with the firm representing the client's opponent create a personal-interest conflict when they significantly risk materially limiting the representation, as substantive interviews by a lawyer working on the case usually do. The lawyer may continue only with the client's informed consent, confirmed in writing. (MR 1.7(a)(2); cmt. [10])
- A lateral lawyer is personally barred from the same matter adverse to her former firm's client if she acquired protected, material information. Her new firm avoids imputation only if she is timely screened, gets no part of the fee, prompt written notice goes to the former client, and certifications are provided. (MR 1.9(b); MR 1.10(a)(2))
- A prospective-client conflict applies only in the same or a substantially related matter in which the lawyer received significantly harmful information. (MR 1.18(c))
Application.
- Interviews. Interviewing with Voight's firm during the case created a personal-interest conflict. Rahimi should have disclosed it and either obtained Coastal's informed consent, confirmed in writing, or stepped off the case. Continuing without disclosure exposes her to discipline.
- Disqualification. Rahimi knows Coastal's strategy, so she's personally disqualified. The screen was timely and she gets no fee, but the notice came three weeks later and only after Coastal found out. The rule requires notice to be given promptly. Coastal has a strong argument that the exception fails and Pérez Grant should be disqualified. Pérez Grant must also be ready to provide certifications.
- Voight's sister. That consultation concerned a different claim and a different person. It doesn't appear to be the same or a substantially related matter, so MR 1.18 likely has no effect here. Rahimi still must protect what she learned.
Conclusion. Rahimi likely violated MR 1.7 by interviewing without disclosure. Pérez Grant is at real risk of disqualification because its notice to Coastal wasn't prompt. The consultation with Voight's sister is probably irrelevant.
Cites: MR 1.7(a)(2), cmt. [10]; MR 1.9(b); MR 1.10(a)(2); MR 1.18(c) Related outline links: OUT-4.2.1 · OUT-4.3.2 · OUT-4.4 · OUT-4.5.1
B5. Key-Term List (27)
Each term opens its outline passage (F3/F4) and its term card.
| ID | Term | Outline | Card |
|---|---|---|---|
| KT-0001 | Informed consent | OUT-4.0 | FC-0002 |
| KT-0002 | Confirmed in writing | OUT-4.0 | FC-0003 |
| KT-0003 | Writing signed by the client | OUT-4.0 | FC-0004 |
| KT-0004 | Concurrent conflict of interest | OUT-4.1.1 | FC-0005 |
| KT-0005 | Direct adversity | OUT-4.1.1 | FC-0006 |
| KT-0006 | Material limitation | OUT-4.1.1 | FC-0007 |
| KT-0007 | Consentable conflict | OUT-4.1.2 | FC-0008 |
| KT-0008 | Nonconsentable conflict | OUT-4.1.2 | FC-0009 |
| KT-0009 | Joint representation | OUT-4.1.3 | FC-0010 |
| KT-0010 | Advance waiver | OUT-4.1.5 | FC-0011 |
| KT-0011 | Positional conflict | OUT-4.1.5 | FC-0012 |
| KT-0012 | Personal-interest conflict | OUT-4.2.1 | FC-0013 |
| KT-0013 | Related person | OUT-4.2.3 | FC-0014 |
| KT-0014 | Former-client conflict | OUT-4.3.1 | FC-0015 |
| KT-0015 | Substantially related matter | OUT-4.3.1 | FC-0016 |
| KT-0016 | Prospective client | OUT-4.4 | FC-0017 |
| KT-0017 | Imputed conflict | OUT-4.5.1 | FC-0001 |
| KT-0018 | Screening | OUT-4.5.1 | FC-0018 |
| KT-0019 | Timely screened | OUT-4.5.1 | FC-0019 |
| KT-0020 | Proprietary interest in litigation | OUT-4.6.1 | FC-0020 |
| KT-0021 | Financial assistance | OUT-4.6.2 | FC-0021 |
| KT-0022 | Business transaction with a client | OUT-4.7 | FC-0022 |
| KT-0023 | Third-party payer | OUT-4.8.1 | FC-0023 |
| KT-0024 | Aggregate settlement | OUT-4.8.2 | FC-0024 |
| KT-0025 | Matter (government-lawyer rule) | OUT-4.9.1 | FC-0025 |
| KT-0026 | Personally and substantially | OUT-4.9.1 | FC-0026 |
| KT-0027 | Confidential government information | OUT-4.9.1 | FC-0027 |
Spoken summary (audio): Section four has twenty-seven key terms, grouped into eight areas: consent, current-client conflicts, personal interests, former clients, prospective clients, imputation and screening, the specific transaction rules, and government lawyers.